Pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b), the defense has moved to dismiss this case. They allege that the People did not file a proper certificate of compliance ("COC") before stating ready for trial within 90 days of arraignment. Specifically, they allege that the People filed their COC without first disclosing various disciplinary records under C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k) relating to the People's police witnesses. The People concede that they did not disclose "the underlying summaries or additional information" relating to substantiated misconduct before filing their COC. Nonetheless, they maintain that their COC was proper. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

The procedural history is uncontested. On August 6, 2021, Bronx Criminal Court arraigned Mr. Spaulding. He pled not guilty. On September 24, 2021, the People filed a supporting deposition. On October 19, 2021, Mr. Spaulding did not appear, and the Court stayed a bench warrant. On November 3, 2021—the 89th day after arraignments—the People filed and served an off-calendar COC and a statement of readiness. On November 9, 2021, Mr. Spaulding did not appear, and the Court issued a bench warrant. On November 15, 2021, Mr. Spaulding appeared in custody before an arraignment court in New York County, which vacated the bench warrant on this case and sent this case back to the Bronx for November 16, 2021. On that day, even though he was in the custody of the New York City Department of Corrections on this case and on another matter, Mr. Spaulding was not produced before the Court. On December 16, 2021, the Court set a motion schedule, which resulted in this motion.

Because the People withheld various disciplinary records relating to prior bad acts by their police witnesses, their COC was not proper. The discovery statute works as follows. First, the People must make a diligent effort to ascertain the existence of items and information subject [*2]to discovery. C.P.L. §§ 245.50(1), 245.20(2). That includes "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control." C.P.L. § 245.20(1). The "possession, custody or control of the prosecution" includes all such items and information "in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency." C.P.L. § 245.20(2). Second, the People must "disclose[]" and make available "all known material and information subject to discovery" in their possession, custody, or control. C.P.L. §§ 245.50(1); 245.20(2). The only default statutory exception to this requirement is for items that are "lost or destroyed." C.P.L. § 245.50(1). Third, the People must file and serve a proper certificate of compliance, truthfully affirming that "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery." Id. Finally, the People cannot be deemed ready for trial until they file and serve a COC meeting these requirements, absent an individualized finding of special circumstances. C.P.L. §§ 30.30(5); 245.50(3).

As the Appellate Division has explained, until C.P.L. § 245.20(1) material is "actually produced" to the defense, the prosecution's COC "[can]not be deemed complete." People ex rel. Ferro v. Brann, 197 AD3d 787, 788 (2d Dep't 2021). This Court agrees—as it must^[FN1] —just like other courts across the state. "In order for the People to file a valid certificate of compliance, they must actually turn over all known material and information." E.g., People v. Cooper, 71 Misc 3d 559, 566 (Erie Cty. Cty. Ct. 2021); People v. Portillo, 73 Misc 3d 216, 229 (Suffolk Cty. Sup. Ct. 2021) (stating the same); see also People v. Naula, 75 Misc 3d 1205(A), at *4 (Queens Cty. Sup. Ct. 2022) ("[T]he People's filing of a certificate of compliance . . . cannot be deemed complete until all material and information subject to discovery was actually disclosed."); People v. Perez, 75 Misc 3d 1205(A) (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022) ("[T]he People failed to meet their discovery obligations when the COC was filed and therefore, the certificate is deemed invalid."); People v. Williams, 73 Misc 3d 1209(A), at *2 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021) ("The People's failure to disclose rendered their COC invalid, regardless of the rationale for that failure."); People v. Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d 226, 271 (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021) ("[W]hat the People may not do is file a certificate of compliance in which they claim to have exercised due diligence and turned over all known material and information while at the same time not actually turning over all known material and information."); People v. Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d 563, 574 (Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. 2020) (stating the same).

As the Appellate Division has also recognized, the plain text meaning of C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k) requires the People to disclose all underlying information relating to the misconduct of their police witnesses—mere summaries are not sufficient. Matter of Jayson C., 200 AD3d 447 (1st Dep't 2021); see also People v. Polanco-Chavarria, 74 Misc 3d 1210(A), at *4 (Rockland Cty. Cty. Ct. 2021) (analyzing Jayson C.).

Innumerable lower courts have held the same. E.g., id.; People v. Williams, 72 Misc 3d 1214(A), at *3 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021); People v. Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d 371, 375-76 (Bronx [*3]Cty. Sup. Ct. 2021) ("The court holds that when the statute explicitly says 'all' information and evidence that tends to impeach credibility, the statute means just that: all underlying records for substantiated and unsubstantiated misconduct complaints must be provided by the People."); People v. Perez, 71 Misc 3d 1214(A) (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021); People v. Herrera, 71 Misc 3d 1205(A) (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct. 2021); Cooper, 71 Misc 3d 559; People v. Edwards, 74 Misc 3d 433 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021).

And that is no surprise. The statute plainly requires that the People disclose "all evidence and information that tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness . . . [w]hether or not in tangible form." C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k). This mandate encompasses the substance of allegations, as well as the tangible files, records, and other materials on which disciplinary findings against the People's police witnesses are based.

As a result, the People's withholding of police misconduct records here violates their C.P.L. § 245.20(1) discovery obligations. The People note that they intend to call police officers Alex Schmidt, Alex Tegan, and Kamaal Ryan as their witnesses at trial. Resp. at 6. They affirm that they have disclosed "substantiated summaries" of misconduct, "CCRB allegation history," and "lawsuit information" for the officers for whom it exists. Id. at 6-7. However, they concede, as the defense has alleged, that they "have not yet disclosed the underlying summaries or additional information related to three different substantiated allegations" of Officer Alex Tegan's misconduct in NYPD possession. Id. at 8.^[FN2] The defense also alleges that the People have entirely redacted "an additional fourth item listed on the disclosure form" and that the People have produced "no underlying documentation" regarding NYPD disciplinary records. Def. Mot. ¶ 48. The People do not specifically deny those allegations. See generally Resp. 4-10.

Because the People did not disclose these materials, their COC was not proper. They did precisely what they "may not do": they "file[d] a certificate of compliance in which they claim[ed] to have exercised due diligence and turned over all known material and information, while at the same time not actually [having] turn[ed] over all known material and information." Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d at 271; see also Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574 (noting the same).

The People here did not exercise the requisite due diligence before filing their COC. In the context of the discovery statute, "due diligence" concerns the People's effort "to ascertain the existence" of discoverable material. C.P.L. § 245.50(1). After diligently ascertaining the existence of discoverable material, the People must then make that material available to the defense. Id. Here, the People did not do either. For the first time in this motion briefing, the People allege that they "requested the underlying IAB logs" and "as of March 3, 2022, were informed that the logs were not in the Bronx District Attorney's Office Discovery Compliance Bureau file." Resp. at 8. This statement implies that the People only requested the underlying NYPD Internal Affairs Bureau files from another part of their own office and not from the NYPD itself. See id. The People also state that they are "informed that 'due to staffing shortages in the NYPD's Giglio Unit, obtaining underlying documents will take much longer than it has in [*4]the past.'" Id. The People do not explain who informed them of this claim or why it justified filing a COC despite knowing that there were discovery documents outstanding. These bare allegations—establishing at best an intraoffice "request"—do not fulfill the People's statutory obligation to "ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the police . . . and [their] office . . . including, but not limited to, any evidence or information discoverable under [C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k)]." C.P.L. § 245.55. Further, none of these allegations explain why the People unilaterally chose to fully redact a police disciplinary document that they provided to the defense, a charge they do not contest. The decision to redact such documents lies with the Court, not the People. See C.P.L. § 245.70 (providing for protective orders). "That the People might have applied good faith and due diligence in making their own determination that disciplinary records do not — or should not — fall within the statute is of no moment. That is not the People's determination to make." Williams, 72 Misc 3d 1214(A), at *5. In sum, the People have not established that they diligently ascertained the existence of discoverable material and disclosed it to the defense.

Moreover, the People do not explain why they did not even attempt to pursue any of the discovery statute's "numerous opportunities" for relief from their discovery obligations before filing their COC. See Soto, 72 Misc 3d at 1162-63. They did not apply to a court for an extension of time upon a showing of "special circumstances." C.P.L. § 245.50(3). They did not apply to a court for a modification of discovery periods for "good cause." C.P.L. § 245.70(2). And they did not apply to a court for a protective order to redact any materials. C.P.L. § 245.70. If the People are aware of outstanding discovery that cannot be disclosed, the discovery statute requires that they pursue at least one of these numerous opportunities. But what they cannot do is file a COC certifying they have turned over all discovery pursuant to C.P.L. § 245.20 when, in truth, they did not actually do so. Where the People do not seek any of these numerous opportunities for relief, they cannot be said to have exercised due diligence before filing their COC.

The People advance two arguments that their COC should be deemed proper despite the withheld documents. First, they argue that, in their view, the "nature of the [withheld] allegations have little to no impact on the Officer's character for truthfulness were he to be called as a witness at trial." Resp. at 8. Second, they argue that the People "are not under an obligation" to acquire records "so long as the defendant has a means of obtaining the records." Id. at 9. On each count, the People misapprehend the law.

First, the People's assertion that, in their view, the withheld allegations "have little or no impact" on the officer's credibility is not a decision for them to make. "It is not for the People to decide, in the first instance, if a particular item from a disciplinary record might be admissible or might impeach a witness." People v. Pennant, 73 Misc 3d 753, 761 (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct. 2021). "As the Court of Appeals has long recognized, the best judge of the impeachment value of evidence is the 'single-minded counsel for the accused.'" Edwards, 74 Misc 3d at 443 (quoting People v. Rosario, 9 NY2d 286, 290 (1961)). "To permit the single-minded counsel for the accused to be permitted only to see filtered allegations of misconduct impinges on counsel's ability to represent the accused." Id. It also violates the plain text of C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k), which demands that the People disclose "all" impeachment information relating to their testifying officers—not to pick and choose which they think would have "impact" on the officer's credibility. The clear scope of the statute removes that discretion from the People." Pennant, 73 Misc 3d at 761.

Second, it is not true that the discovery statute allows the People to withhold information [*5]in their possession, or in the possession of law enforcement,^[FN3] simply because the defense could subpoena it. "On the contrary, the discovery statute now imposes upon the People an affirmative obligation to ferret out and ascertain whether any material responsive to the dictates of section exists." Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d at 376-77. The People are not "relieved of [their] obligation simply because the [defense] has independent access, by subpoena or otherwise, to the same information." People v. Barralaga, 73 Misc 3d 510 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2021). Of course, the defense "is not precluded from seeking information by way of a subpoena, but this does not excuse the People from their duty to supply potential impeachment information that they possess or is within the possession of law enforcement," as is the case here. Id. Moreover, "since the new discovery statute was meant to reduce discovery delays, it makes little sense to limit the required disclosure and shift the burden to the defense to attempt to learn the specifics of a misconduct complaint through a subpoena." Castellanos, 72 Misc 3d at 376-77 (internal quotation marks omitted). The party in possession of information should bear the burden of producing it. See Hon. Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 26, 135-73 (1970) (arguing that tort-law efficiency is maximized by imposing the burden on the party with better access to the information at issue). And that is exactly what the discovery statute requires.

In sum, the Court finds that the People's COC was improper because they filed it even though they had not disclosed discoverable disciplinary records in their possession or in the possession of law enforcement.

The Criminal Procedure Law requires that the People fully comply with their initial discovery obligations and file a proper COC before validly stating ready for trial. Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30(1) mandates that the People state ready for trial within its prescribed time limits. Before validly stating ready for trial, the People must do "all that is required of them to bring the case to the point where it may be tried." People v. England, 84 NY2d 1, 4 (1994). That includes removing all legal impediments to bringing the case to trial. Id. In a misdemeanor case, those legal impediments include filing a "facially sufficient information." E.g., People v. Maslowski, 187 AD3d 1211, 1214 (2d Dep't 2020); see also People v. Sosa, 71 Misc 3d 140(A), at *3 (2d Dep't App. Term 2021). Under the discovery-reform statute, they now also include filing and serving a proper COC, C.P.L. §§ 30.30(5) and 245.50(3), and actually producing the discovery listed, Ferro, 197 AD3d at 788. "Pre-readiness"—or before the People state ready for the first time—only specific provisions in the text of C.P.L. § 30.30(4) may exclude any time. See People v. Liotta, 79 NY2d 841, 842 (1992); Sosa, 71 Misc 3d 140(A), at *3; People v. Simon, 48 Misc 3d 1225(A), at *4 (Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. 2015) ("[I]n a pre-readiness posture . . . the entire adjournment is chargeable to the People unless otherwise specifically excluded under C.P.L. § 30.30(4)."); People v. Canosa, 38 Misc 3d 1231(A), at *3 (Nassau Cty. Dist. Ct. 2013) (stating the same).

Against this statutory framework, the People argue that the Court can also freely exclude [*6]C.P.L. § 30.30 time, even where a COC and an initial statement of readiness are invalid. See Resp. at 4-5. But they do not point to any C.P.L. § 30.30(4) exclusion. See id. Instead, they argue that the Court can deem that the People's own failure to meet their own discovery obligations was "attributable" to the defense. See id. The People cite only two decisions in support of this argument, both from last year, and both unpublished: People v. Nova-Ceballos, Indictment 98/2019 (NY Cty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 15, 2021) (Kiesel, J.); and People v. Randolph, Indictment 2326/2019 (Bronx Cty. Sup. Ct. June 29, 2021) (Fabrizio, J.). These decisions excluded C.P.L § 30.30 time by imposing an "obligation" on defense attorneys to "challenge the People's discovery compliance" before the speedy-trial clock expires.

The Court rejects this argument, which has no basis in either the discovery or speedy-trial statutes. Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30(1) requires that "the People" validly state ready for trial within the prescribed time periods after commencing a criminal action. (emphasis added). "The inquiry is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried." People v. Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 403 (2016) (emphasis added). After all, C.P.L. § 30.30 "was specifically intended 'to address delays occasioned by prosecutorial inaction'"—not defense inaction. People v. Clarke, 28 NY3d 48, 52 (2016) (quoting People v. McKenna, 76 NY2d 59, 63 (1990)) (emphasis added). Indeed, that guiding principle is precisely why the People are charged with any delay pre-readiness, subject to C.P.L. § 30.30(4) exclusions, but only with delay "solely attributable to them" post-readiness. See People v. Jackson, 267 AD2d 183, 184 (1st Dep't 1999). As a result, like any other legal requirement that the People face before stating ready for the first time, the burden of fulfilling the People's own initial discovery obligations lies "squarely upon the shoulders of the District Attorney." See People v. N.S., 58 Misc 3d 613, 616 (Queens Cty. Crim. Ct. 2018), aff'd 71 Misc 3d 140(A) (2d Dep't App. Term 2021) ("The People's obligation—that they alone possess—[is] to be ready for trial before the expiration of their '30.30 clock.'").

The Court also rejects "[a]ny argument from the prosecution that [the defense] had an obligation to confer with it in a way that would impact the accrual of speedy trial time," which is also "nowhere to be found in the statute." People v. Audino, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22177, at *5 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022); People v. Rahman, 74 Misc 3d 1214(A), at *3 (Queens Cty. Sup. Ct. 2022) (noting that orders that parties confer about discovery do not and "could not" change "any of the People's statutory [readiness] obligations"). It is squarely the People's burden to ascertain the existence of, and disclose, discoverable material within their own allotted speedy-trial time. See C.P.L. §§ 245.20(1), (2). And it is also squarely the People's burden to seek any of the "numerous opportunities" available to them in Article 245 should they face special circumstances that would prevent them from doing so timely. See Audino, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22177, at *5 (noting that the People "failed to avail [themselves] of any such recourse"); Soto, 72 Misc 3d at 1162-63 (same). Any attempt by the People "to minimize or shift blame to the defense for the prosecution's own failure to [produce police misconduct records or seek an advance judicial remedy] are ineffectual in light of both the letter and the spirit of Article 245." Audino, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22177, at *5. There is simply no requirement in the statute that the defense utter even a single word to the People about discovery in a way that would relieve the [*7]People's burden to validly state ready within their own C.P.L. § 30.30 timeframe.^[FN4] And there is certainly no requirement that the defense rush to object to the People's discovery production so that the People may avert a C.P.L. § 30.30 dismissal. That is especially true when the People wait until the 89th day to file a COC and state ready for trial, as they did in this case.

Indeed, a requirement otherwise would be highly problematic for criminal litigation. "[A]ny requirement that defense counsel assist the People in rooting out deficiencies [in the People's discovery production], and do so in time to preserve the continued prosecution of their client, would have the untenable effect of forcing defense attorneys to potentially harm [their client] and strain the attorney-client relationship." See N.S., 58 Misc 3d at 617 (articulating a similar problem in the context of facial sufficiency defects); see also NY R. of Prof. Conduct §§ 1.7(a)(1); 1.8(b). The Court declines the People's invitation to invent such a problematic requirement out of thin air when it has no basis in the text of any statute.

As a result, the Court respectfully disagrees with the two unpublished decisions from last year on which the People rely. It is notable that one of those decisions, Nova-Ceballos, relies on People v. Odoms, 143 Misc 2d 503 (NY Crim. Ct. 1989). Odoms, a trial-court decision from 1989, held that defense attorneys have an obligation to alert prosecutors when an information is facially insufficient so that prosecutors can cure their errors before the case is dismissed. Several appellate courts have since held otherwise. E.g., Sosa, 71 Misc 3d 140(A), at *3 ("[I]f the original accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective, any statement of readiness made by the People was illusory because the People could not validly declare themselves ready until there was an accusatory instrument sufficient for trial."); Maslowski, 187 AD3d at 1214 ("Without a fully converted, facially sufficient information, any statement of readiness by the People is illusory and ineffective."). Accordingly, Odoms should not be followed, and the Court does not find Nova-Ceballos persuasive. It is also worth noting that Randolph, the other case the People cite, involved a "delay" of around 450 days, while here, any arguable "delay" was, at maximum, 79 days.

In any event, the overwhelming weight of case authority—including at least one decision from an Appellate Term this year—agrees that where a COC is invalid and no special circumstances were presented, the statement of readiness is "also invalid." People v. Guzman, 75 Misc 3d 132(A), at *3 (2d Dep't, App. Term. 2022); accord Martinez, 75 Misc 3d 1212(A), at *2-*3 ("Trial readiness is contingent on compliance with CPL 245.20."); Audino, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22177, at *5 (holding that where a "certificate of compliance is improper," then "the prosecution's certificate of readiness and subsequent statements of readiness were illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock"); Darren, 75 Misc 3d 1208(A), at *2 ("The People cannot be deemed ready for trial until a proper COC is filed with the court and served upon the defense."); People v. Perez, 75 Misc 3d 1205(A), at *5 (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. [*8]2022) ("Since the COC has been deemed invalid, the People's statement of readiness . . . was ineffective to stop the speedy trial clock."); People v. Naula, 75 Misc 3d 1205(A), at *4-*5 (Queens Cty. Sup. Ct. 2022) ("[T]he SOR filed on November 16, 2021, was neither accompanied and/or preceded by the requisite good faith certification of compliance . . . and is therefore illusory."); People v. Pierna, 74 Misc 3d 1072, 1087 (Bronx Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022) ("No trial ready statement is valid unless the People file a proper COC."); People v. Surgick, 73 Misc 3d 1212(A), at *4 (Albany Cty. Cty. Ct. 2021) ("No trial ready statement is valid unless the People file a [proper] COC."); Quinlan, 71 Misc 3d at 270-73 (holding that "as the [COC] was not and could not have been valid when it was filed," the speedy-trial clock was not stopped); Soto, 2021 NY Slip Op. 21204, at *1 (finding a COR invalid because a COC was invalid because discovery was incomplete); Aquino, 72 Misc 3d at 913 (holding that an invalid COC "will not shield the People from application of the speedy trial statutes, where discovery is incomplete"); People v. Lobato, 66 Misc 3d 1230(A), at *1 (Kings Cty. Crim. Ct. 2020) ("[D]iscovery compliance is a condition precedent to a valid announcement of readiness for trial."); Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 570 (finding a "statement of readiness and certificate of compliance insufficient to toll the speedy trial clock").

These decisions also explain why the People's citation to C.P.L. § 245.80(2) sanctions is misplaced. In their response, the People cite this discovery-sanction statute to argue that the defense has not shown prejudice resulting from the discovery failures. But in doing so, the People conflate the discovery-sanction statute, C.P.L. § 245.80, with the speedy-trial statutes, C.P.L. §§ 245.50(3), 30.30(5). The issue before the Court is not a motion for sanctions under C.P.L. § 245.80(2). "Dismissal pursuant to C.P.L. § 30.30 is not a sanction" pursuant to C.P.L. § 245.80. People v. Martinez, 75 Misc 3d 1212(A), at *6 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022); People v. Darren, 75 Misc 3d 1208(A), at *5 (NY Cty. Crim. Ct. 2022) (stating the same). Where the People do not comply with their discovery obligations, they do not do what is necessary to stop the speedy-trial clock. "Prejudice," which is a consideration for § 245.80 sanctions, "is not a factor" in a § 30.30 analysis. Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574. "[T]he People's obligation to provide discovery, and to certify compliance with that obligation, is not relieved by an absence of prejudice to the defendant." Id. "Therefore, while a defendant must show some prejudice in order to obtain a [pre-30.30] sanction against the People under CPL 245.80, the burden is not lifted from the People to comply with their obligation in the first instance." Id.

Finally, the People here never sought an individualized finding of special circumstances before stating ready with an improper COC, and even if they had, it would have been denied. See C.P.L. § 245.50(3). As noted previously, the People have blamed their failure to disclose on various office failures. They note that logs were "not in the Bronx District Attorney's Office Discovery Compliance Bureau." Resp. at 8. They also note, without establishing the source, basis, or reliability of the information, that the NYPD's Giglio Unit has "staffing shortages." Id. However, as an Appellate Term recently explained, "it is well settled that office failure does not amount to special circumstances" for purposes of Article 245. Guzman, 75 Misc 3d 132(A), at *5. Of course, even if such an office failure did establish a "special circumstance," there are no special circumstances presented that would justify the People choosing to unilaterally redact a police disciplinary document.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that the Criminal Procedure Law requires that the People file a proper COC before validly stating ready for trial. The People's COC in this case was invalid. Therefore, their statement of readiness was invalid, as well.

Mr. Spaulding's top charge is fourth-degree criminal mischief, a violation of P.L. § 145.00(1). That charge is a class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to 364 days in jail. Accordingly, the People had 90 days from arraignment to validly state ready for trial on this case. See C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b).

A Bronx arraignment court arraigned Mr. Spaulding on August 6, 2021. The People did not state ready for trial. The court adjourned the case to September 8, 2021. On that day, the People again did not state ready for trial. The court adjourned the case to October 19, 2021. On that day, the People yet again did not state ready for trial. Both the People and the defense agree that as of October 19, 2021, a period of 74 days of time had accrued since arraignment.

On October 19, 2021, Mr. Spaulding did not appear. The Court stayed a bench warrant and adjourned the case to November 9, 2021. On November 9, 2021, Mr. Spaulding again did not appear, and the Court issued a bench warrant. No days accrue here. People v. Alexander, 67 Misc 3d 126(A) (1st Dep't App. Term 2020).

On November 15, 2021, Mr. Spaulding returned on the warrant, in custody, before an arraignment court in New York County. The arraignment court set $1.00 bail on this case and adjourned it back to the Bronx for November 16, 2021. On that day, however, even though Mr. Spaulding was in the custody of the New York City Department of Corrections on this case (and on his New York County matter), he was not produced before the Court.

Thirty-one days accrue here. Neither subsection of C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(c) excludes time because Mr. Spaulding's location was known, he was in the People's custody on this case, and the People have not shown that they could not obtain his presence by due diligence. See also People v. Daniels, 217 AD2d 448, 453 (1st Dep't 1995) ("The failure of officials having custody of a defendant to produce him for appearance in court is chargeable to the prosecution."); People v. Ali, 209 AD2d 227, 227 (1st Dep't 1994) ("[T]he five-day period during which the People failed to produce defendant while in their custody is chargeable to the People."); People v. Mapp, 308 AD2d 463, 464 (2d Dep't 2003) (charging time where the People should have known that the accused person was incarcerated and failed to show due diligence in producing him); People v. Jackson, 48 Misc 3d 1202(A), at *1-*2 (Bronx Cty. Sup. Ct. 2015) (charging time where the People failed to establish due diligence in attempting to produce the accused person from jail for court). At "a minimum," the People are "obligated to establish" that they "properly followed the applicable rules, regulations, or statutes governing the process for securing the defendant's presence in court." Jackson, 48 Misc 3d at *1. Here, they provided no information about any such efforts whatsoever.

In addition, as explained in this decision's legal discussion, the People's COC was improper. Therefore, their November 3, 2021, statement of readiness was invalid and did not stop the speedy-trial clock.

On December 16, 2021, the Court set a motion schedule. This tolls C.P.L. § 30.30 time. See C.P.L. § 30.30(4)(a).

Based on the foregoing reasoning, the Court concludes that: (1) the COC filed on November 3, 2021, was invalid; and (2) that 105 days passed from arraignment without a valid statement of readiness from the People. This amount of time exceeds the People's 90-day speedy trial period. C.P.L. § 30.30(1)(b). Therefore, the defense's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

In light of this decision, the defense's remaining motions are moot.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.