Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Derrick J. Robinson, J.), rendered March 25, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

During the early morning hours of January 9, 2011, defendant's son was arrested in a parking lot across the street from a bar, and charged with stabbing another person in the head with a knife. Suffolk County police determined that defendant's car would be impounded in order to obtain a warrant to search the vehicle for the presence of the knife. Shortly after 6:00 a.m., defendant, a retired Suffolk County police detective, his wife, and his nephew, arrived at the parking lot. The People presented evidence that defendant attempted to prevent his son's car from being impounded, by standing between the tow truck and the car. A Suffolk County police officer arrested defendant on a charge of harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). Four months later, three separate charges of obstructing governmental administration (Penal Law § 195.05), arising from the same incident, were added. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of one of the charges of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, in that he had stood between the tow truck and his son's car.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of one charge of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree.

Penal Law § 195.05 provides that "[a] person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference." Here, the evidence established that defendant intentionally and physically interfered with a lawful police function (see People v Case, 42 NY2d 98, 101-102 [1977]; People v Garnett, 235 AD2d 492 [1997]; People v Stewart, 45 Misc 3d 127[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51454[U], *1-2 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]). Defendant "interjected himself into an obvious, defined area of police activity" (People v Covington, 18 AD3d 65, 71 [2005]). Defendant's intent to obstruct governmental administration may be inferred from his conduct and the surrounding circumstances (see People v Meyers, 46 Misc 3d 142[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50179[U], *2 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud [*2]Dists 2015]; cf. People v Offen, 96 Misc 2d 147, 148-149 [Crim Ct, NY County 1978]).

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), we accord great deference to the opportunity of the jury to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]; People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]; People v Adilovic, 34 Misc 3d 159[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50437[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]). We must weigh "the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable based upon the evidence, and whether the jury failed to accord the evidence the weight it should have been accorded (id.; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348).

Here, after weighing any conflicting testimony, reviewing the rational inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and evaluating the strength of such conclusions, we find that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348-349; cf. People v Nisthalal, 87 AD3d 702, 702-703 [2011]).

Defendant's remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Iannacci, J.P., Tolbert and Connolly, JJ., concur.