Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Village of Spring Valley, Rockland County (Alan M. Simon, J.), rendered January 5, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant's conviction of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01 [2]) is based on an incident at his home, which occurred after an investigator employed by the office of the New York State Attorney General had served an order to show cause with the assistance of police. Shortly after the investigator left in his car, defendant exited his home with what the People alleged was a long metal pipe, and which defendant claimed was a plastic broomstick handle. The People's witnesses testified that defendant confronted two police officers, while holding the pipe and loudly threatening to kill them. One of the officers deployed his taser device. Defendant fell to the ground. Nevertheless, he attempted to prevent the officers from handcuffing him by flailing his arms.

Defendant's contention that the information was facially defective with respect to the charge of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree is without merit. An information is facially sufficient where its factual part contains nonhearsay allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense, and factual allegations of an evidentiary character that establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1] [b], [c]; People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]). The most precise words or phrases are not required in an information. The crime only need be alleged and the specifics set forth so that a defendant can prepare for trial, and so that the defendant will not be tried a second time for the same offense (see People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 [2009]; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 575 [2004]).

A person commits the crime of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), when he or she intentionally "prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful act." In this case, the information contained sufficient allegations that the officers were performing an official function. The information alleged that the officers were arresting defendant for confronting and threatening [*2]them while wielding a long metal pipe, and that defendant obstructed his own arrest (see Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d 88, 90-91 [1997]; Matter of Isaiah C., 96 AD3d 617, 618 [2012]; People v Tarver, 188 AD2d 938 [1992]; People v Cox, 43 Misc 3d 134[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51162[U], *2 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; People v Tisdale, 21 Misc 3d 141[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52370[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2008]). While the People must ultimately establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrest was authorized, the information need not allege that the arrest was authorized. To require more for pleading purposes would be an unacceptable hyper-technical interpretation of the pleading requirements (see People v Stewart, 32 Misc 3d 133[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 51445[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]; People v Ballard, 28 Misc 3d 129[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51221[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010]; People v Cascere, 185 Misc 2d 92 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2000]). In any event, the information contained sufficient evidentiary facts that the arrest was authorized (see People v Cascere, 185 Misc 2d at 94).

The information further contained sufficient factual allegations that defendant obstructed governmental administration by means of intimidation, physical force or interference (see People v Baltes, 75 AD3d 656, 659 [2010]; People v Romeo, 9 AD3d 744, 744-745 [2004]; People v Tisdale, 21 Misc 3d 141[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52370[U]), and that he had the intent to commit that crime. Intent may be inferred from the act itself or from the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstance (see People v Dumay, 23 NY3d 518, 525 [2014]; People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; People v Rodriguez, 71 AD3d 450, 452 [2010], affd 17 NY3d 486 [2011]; People v Reyes, 42 Misc 3d 127[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52145[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]).

Defendant's claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the convictions is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Finch, 23 NY3d 408 [2014]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-493 [2008]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt, of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (see Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d at 90-91; Matter of Isaiah C., 96 AD3d at 618; People v Tarver, 188 AD2d at 938) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see People v Okafore, 72 NY2d 81, 88 [1988]).

In exercising our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]), we accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). This court must weigh "the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), determine whether an acquittal would not have been unreasonable based upon the evidence presented, and whether the finder of fact failed to accord the evidence the weight it should have been accorded (id.; see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d at 348). In this case, an acquittal would have been unreasonable, and the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence.

Defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Iannacci, J.P., Marano and Tolbert, JJ., concur.