Appeal from a judgment of the Justice Court of the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County (Deborah E. Kooperstein, J.), rendered January 28, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged in an information with obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05). The information alleged that Erika Vaquero was employed by the "Sag Harbor P. D." as a "Sag Harbor Village Traffic Control Officer" and that she was writing a summons for a vehicular "Village Code Violation" when defendant backed his automobile into her and then left the scene without having been given a summons. The supporting deposition makes reference to defendant's parking his vehicle at a specified location. On appeal, defendant contends that the accusatory instrument is jurisdictionally defective.

Section 100.40 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Law states that an information is sufficient on its face when it substantially conforms to the requirements of CPL 100.15, and the factual allegations thereof (together with those of any supporting deposition which may accompany it) provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information, and the nonhearsay allegations of the factual part of the information, and/or any supporting depositions establish, if true, every element of the offense charged and defendant's commission thereof. The law does not require that the most precise words or phrases which most clearly express the thought be used in an information, but only that the crime be alleged and the specifics set forth so that the defendant can prepare himself for trial, and so that he will not be tried again for the same offense (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]; People v Zambounis, 251 NY 94 [1929]). The failure to comply with this [*2]requirement is a nonwaivable jurisdictional defect (People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]) with the exception that a claim of a failure to comply with the nonhearsay requirement must be preserved (see Casey, 95 NY2d at 366-367) and is, in any event, forfeited by a plea of guilty (see People v Pittman, 100 NY2d 114, 116 [2003]).

A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree under Penal Law § 195.05 when he "intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function, or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function by means of intimidation, physical force or interference."

It is an essential element of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree that a public servant was performing an "official function" at the time of the offense (Penal Law § 195.05; see People v Christiansen, 19 Misc 3d 134[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50693[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]; People v Cacsere, 185 Misc 2d 92 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2000]). The accusatory instrument must contain allegations "delineat[ing] what the obstructing and official function consist of" (Cacsere, 182 Misc 2d at 93). The factual allegations contained in the accusatory instrument are to be construed from its four corners (see People v Thomas, 4 NY3d 143, 146 [2005]).

Contrary to defendant's contention, the information is legally sufficient on its face since the factual allegations delineate the official function and defendant's obstruction thereof, to wit, that defendant backed his vehicle into the officer while she was attempting to write a summons for a vehicular Village Code violation (see Cacsere, 185 Misc 2d at 93). The information sufficed to allege the offense of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree even though reference to the specific underlying vehicular Village Code violation was omitted (see People v Christiansen, 19 Misc 3d 134[A]) and there was no allegation indicating that the official function was authorized (see Cacsere, 185 Misc 2d at 93; cf. People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225 [2009] [involving the charge of resisting arrest]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987] [same]). We note that to require more for pleading purposes would be an unacceptable hypertechnical interpretation of the pleading requirements (see People v Casey, 95 NY2d at 360; People v Pappalardo, 180 Misc 2d 707 [App Term, 1st Dept 1999]).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Tanenbaum, J.P., Molia and LaCava, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: July 08, 2010