Appeal from judgments of the Justice Court of the Town of Southampton, Suffolk County (Thomas J. DeMayo, J.), rendered March 1, 2006. The judgments convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree.

Judgment of conviction of resisting arrest reversed on the law and accusatory instrument dismissed.

Judgment of conviction of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree affirmed.

An instrument alleging resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30) must, in the factual part, set forth allegations sufficient to establish, if true, that defendant's arrest was lawful (People v Jensen, 86 NY2d 248, 253 [1995]; e.g. People v Lucas, 15 Misc 3d
139[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50943[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]; People v Smith, 13 Misc 3d 142[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52277[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2006]; People v Rodriguez, 1 Misc 3d 135[A], 2003 NY Slip Op 51657[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]; People v Harper, 2003 NY Slip Op 51350 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2003]; see also Matter of Verna C., 143 AD2d 94, 95 [1988]). The instrument merely named the offense for which defendant was arrested. Accordingly, the accusatory instrument is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed (People v Grabinski, 189 Misc 2d 307, 308 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists [2001]).

The information alleging a violation of obstruction of governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05) was factually sufficient. "So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [*2][2000]). The instrument alleged that when the complainant, a member of the Suffolk County Probation Department, attempted to communicate with a probationer, defendant attempted to prevent or obstruct that official function by physically interposing himself between the two, "menacing" the complainant with a raised fist, and kicking the complainant. As it is settled that "interference sufficient to establish this crime includes inappropriate and disruptive conduct at the scene of the performance of an official function . . . even if there is no physical force involved" (People v Romeo, 9 AD3d 744, 745 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d 88, 91 [1997]; People v Covington, 18 AD3d 65, 71 [2005]; Matter of Joshua C., 289 AD2d 1095 [2001]; Willinger v City of New Rochelle, 212 AD2d 526, 527 [1995]; People v Tarver, 188 AD2d 938 [1992]), these factual allegations are more than sufficient to allege the offense. We note that the jury's acquittal of defendant on the additional charges of menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.15) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]), based on defendant's conduct with respect to the raised fist and the kicking of the complainant, are of no consequence to the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument charging obstructing governmental administration in the second degree. An accusatory instrument must be construed on its four corners (People v Thomas, 4 NY3d 143, 146 [2005]) and may not be undone by contrary findings of fact in a subsequent proceeding (People v Gordon, 88 NY2d 92, 96 [1996]). In any event, as noted above, the instrument sufficed to allege the offense even had it omitted reference to the acts underlying the charges of menacing in the third degree and harassment in the second degree.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 437 [1985]; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction. Two probation officers testified to their status as public officials, their official purpose in visiting a probationer, defendant's son, at his home, and the necessity of consulting with the son in furtherance of their duty to monitor his compliance with the requirements of his probation. The officers also testified to their repeated efforts to speak to the son, first in the kitchen of his home and then outside the home, efforts which defendant continually disrupted by, inter alia, physically interposing himself between the officers and his son, by challenging the officers' authority to speak to his son, by ordering his son to decline to cooperate with the officers, by overtly encouraging his son's defiance of the officers' official purpose, and by a threat of physical force. Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt without regard to whether the kicking was, as defendant argues, an act independent of the commission of the offense for which he was convicted (Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d at 91; People v Romeo, 9 AD3d at 745; People v Tarver, 188 AD2d 938 [1992], supra).

We are satisfied, upon the exercise of our factual review power (see CPL 470.15 [5]), that the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence (People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]). The officers testified coherently and consistently with respect to the facts. According, as we must, great deference to the jury's "opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor" (People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644 [2006], quoting People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), we affirm the judgment of conviction.

McCabe, J.P., Tanenbaum and Molia, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 21, 2008