Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Lenora Gerald, J., at plea; Dorothy Chin Brandt, J., at sentencing), rendered August 23, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of menacing in the second degree.

ORDERED that the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court, Queens County, for a hearing and a report in accordance with this decision, and the appeal is held in abeyance pending receipt of the Criminal Court's report. The Criminal Court shall file its report with all convenient speed.

Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]), menacing in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]) and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). The felony assault count was dismissed, and defendant pleaded guilty to menacing in the second degree with a promised sentence of a one-year jail sentence. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea (see CPL 220.60 [3]; 340.20 [1]), alleging that he had agreed to the plea because his attorney had given him incorrect information about the deportation consequences of the plea, which allegation was proved by the transcript of the plea proceedings. Defendant also argued that there was no "statement in the record" regarding the constitutional rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. The motion was denied, and defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea.

On appeal, defendant argues that the count of the accusatory instrument charging menacing in the second degree is facially insufficient; that his plea was not voluntary because the court failed to discuss certain constitutional rights he was giving up or the deportation consequences of the plea and because his attorney's representation was constitutionally defective, in that he provided incorrect immigration advice; and that his sentence should be reduced in the interest of justice.

At the outset, we note that the argument raised concerning the facial sufficiency of the count of the accusatory instrument in question is jurisdictional (see People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]). Thus, defendant's claim was not forfeited upon his plea of guilty (see People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]; People v Konieczny, 2 NY3d 569, 573 [2004]) and must be reviewed despite his failure to raise it in the Criminal Court (see Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133). As defendant waived the right to be prosecuted by information, the count of the accusatory instrument in question need only satisfy the criteria for a misdemeanor complaint. A misdemeanor complaint is sufficient on its face when it substantially conforms to the requirements of CPL 100.15 (CPL 100.40 [4] [a]) and when the factual portion provides reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged (CPL 100.40 [4] [*2][b]). This is accomplished when "the articulated, objective facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom suffice to lead a reasonable person who possesses the same expertise as the officer to conclude, under the circumstances, that a crime is being or was committed" (People v Thompson, 43 Misc 3d 137[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50708[U], *2 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

The offense of menacing in the second degree is committed when an individual "intentionally places or attempts to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm" (Penal Law § 120.14 [1]). Here, the instrument alleges that defendant "stabbed [the complainant] with a knife, after the two had a verbal dispute earlier that day," and that the arresting officer "observed lacerations to complainant's face and hand and stab wounds to the right side of complainant's shoulder and chest area." Defendant's argument with respect to the facial sufficiency of the count of menacing in the second degree is that it does not allege a display of the "dangerous instrument," the knife, at a time separate and apart from the assault itself (see Matter of Angel C., 93 AD3d 602 [2012]). However, since the complainant sustained wounds to his face and chest, it is reasonable to infer therefrom that the knife was displayed to the complainant. Giving the accusatory instrument "a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), we are satisfied that the misdemeanor complaint was facially sufficient to allege menacing in the second degree.

Defendant's next three arguments go to the voluntariness of his plea. While there is no requirement of a "uniform mandatory catechism of pleading defendants" (People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 353 [1967]; see also People v Harris, 61 NY2d 9, 17 [1983]), and there is no constitutional requirement that the court make a factual inquiry (see People v Winbush, 199 AD2d 447 [1993]), the record must demonstrate that the plea was knowing and voluntary (see Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 747 [1970]; People v Facey, 30 Misc 3d 138[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50224[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]). A defendant can challenge the voluntariness of a plea based upon a court's failure to determine that the defendant has knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights (see generally People v Tyrell, 22 NY3d 359, 365-366 [2013]), or based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 [1998]).

Defendant argues that, although the court informed him that he was forgoing a trial, it did not provide "even a brief description of his trial rights." However, this is not a case where the record is silent as to the constitutional rights being waived. The court asked defendant if he was aware that he was giving up his right to remain silent and his right to a trial, and, under the circumstances presented, we find that this was sufficient (see People v Sougou, 46 Misc 3d 140[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50146[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2015]; People v Green, 43 Misc 3d 141[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50815[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2014]).

Defendant's next argument is that the court deprived him of due process by failing to inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. However, defendant failed to assert this claim in his motion to withdraw his plea, in which he demonstrated that he was aware of the deportation issue, and therefore this challenge to the plea was not preserved (see People v Peque, 22 NY3d 168, 183 [2013]). We decline to review this issue in the interest of justice.

Defendant contends that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated because his attorney gave him incorrect advice as to the immigration consequences of his plea. A defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions (US Const, 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6). When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must determine whether counsel's representation met both the federal (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668) and New York State standards (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 [1981]). Under either standard, a defendant must show that his attorney's performance was deficient (Strickland, 466 US at 687; People v Turner, 5 NY3d 476, 480 [*3][2005]). Here, the Criminal Court held that defendant had satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test, and the issue is therefore not reviewable on defendant's appeal (see CPL 470.15 [1]; People v LaFontaine, 92 NY2d 470 [1998]). If we were to review it, we would agree with the Criminal Court's conclusion that the record demonstrated the deficiency of defendant's attorney's performance at the plea (see Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US 356, 369 [2010]; People v Augusto, 22 Misc 3d 140[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50393[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]).

The second prong of the test under Strickland "focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process" (Hill v Lockhart, 474 US 52, 59 [1985]). The second prong of the New York test "focuses on the fairness of the process as a whole rather than its particular impact on the outcome of the case" (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 156 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and, while this also includes a prejudice component (id. at 155), it "does not require a defendant to fully satisfy the prejudice test of Strickland" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In his affidavit in support of his motion to withdraw his plea, defendant stated, among other things, that his main concern was that his plea not result in his deportation; that he had previously rejected a plea for the same jail time because of the likelihood of deportation; and that, had he known about the immigration consequences of the plea, he "would not have taken the Plea and would have continued to defend the case." As this assertion demonstrates, prima facie, that defendant can meet the second prong of the Strickland test (see People v Hassan, 36 Misc 3d 160[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51823[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2012]; People v Augusto, 22 Misc 3d 140[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 50393[U]), and, by extension, the New York test, there is "a legitimate question as to the voluntariness of the plea, [and] an evidentiary hearing is required" (People v Brown, 14 NY3d 113, 116 [2010]; cf. People v Hassan, 36 Misc 3d 160[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 51823[U]).

Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the Criminal Court for a hearing and a report in accordance with this decision, and the appeal is held in abeyance pending receipt of the Criminal Court's report.

Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Elliot, JJ., concur.