Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Alexander Calabrese, J.), rendered June 13, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

On June 28, 2011, the People charged defendant, in an information, with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]), menacing in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.15), and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]), alleging that, at 3:36 p.m. on May 24, 2011, at a gas station located at 64 4th Avenue in Kings County, defendant punched another motorist with a closed fist, causing the victim's mouth to bleed, and redness and swelling to the victim's face. Prior to trial, the assault charge was reduced to attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 [1]). After a nonjury trial, the Criminal Court convicted defendant of the charges. Defendant appeals, arguing that the convictions were against the weight of the evidence.

Pursuant to this court's statutory authority to determine whether a conviction is against the weight of the evidence (CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we must "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). In so doing, we accord great deference to the credibility determinations of the finder of fact, given its opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, and observe their demeanor (People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]), while "weigh[ing] the evidence in light of the elements of the crime[s]" (Danielson, 9 NY3d at 349).

At trial, the victim's testimony, which was largely unrebutted, established that defendant, angry that the victim was taking too long to complete his activity at a gas pump, punched the victim in the face, causing the victim's mouth to bleed, and redness and swelling to the victim's face, for which the victim received an ice compress from an ambulance worker. The arresting officer, who arrived at the scene within minutes of receiving a report of an assault in progress, testified that the victim, who appeared "upset" and whose bleeding and swelling represented fresh wounds, accused defendant of striking him, and that defendant admitted to him that he had punched the victim because the latter had taken "too long" at the pump. Testifying on his own behalf, defendant, a self-styled "bouncer," who is seven inches taller and 70 pounds heavier than the victim, admitted that he had been angry with the victim's refusal to yield his position at the gas pump after having finished filling his gas tank, but insisted that only a "scuffle" had occurred after the victim had threatened him with a mop. The Criminal Court granted defendant's request that it consider a justification defense in its deliberations and convicted defendant of the offenses, concluding that the People had disproved the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree and [*2]affirm.

The intent to cause physical injury may be inferred from the conduct itself and the surrounding circumstances (People v Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486, 489 [2011]; People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]), and, as an inference is permitted that defendant intended the natural consequences of his acts (People v Getch, 50 NY2d 456, 465 [1980]), the proof of defendant's conduct, his admissions as to his state of mind, and the physical trauma suffered by the victim sufficed to establish the elements of the offenses charged (see Matter of Eric C., 281 AD2d 543, 543 [2001]; People v Williams, 42 Misc 3d 149[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 50400[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2014]; see also People v Whatts, 116 AD3d 456, 457 [2014]; Matter of Shakura J., 4 Misc 3d 1017[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50925[U] [Fam Ct, NY County 2004]). The evidencealso sufficed to support the Criminal Court's determination that the victim's alleged conduct with the mop did not justify defendant's striking the victim in the face.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Aliotta, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.