Appeal from judgments of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Michael Gerstein, J.), rendered July 9, 2009. The judgments convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted assault in the third degree and attempted criminal contempt in the second degree, respectively.

ORDERED that the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Defendant was charged in two accusatory instruments with various offenses and, following a nonjury trial, two judgments were entered convicting defendant of attempted assault in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.00 [1]) and attempted criminal contempt in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 215.50 [3]), respectively.

On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt of either offense beyond a reasonable doubt. However, defendant did not preserve these issues for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2] People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 491-492; People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]).

In any event, defendant's contention lacks merit. "A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person" (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]). "A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime" (Penal Law § 110.00). "Physical injury means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain" (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]). The intent to cause physical injury can be inferred from the act itself and from the defendant's conduct and the surrounding circumstances, including the nature of the physical encounter (see People v Rodriguez, 17 NY3d 486, 489 [2011] People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977] People v Shehabeldin, 29 Misc 3d 149[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 50942[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). A "person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act" (People v Thomas, 50 NY2d 467, 474 [1980]). Here, defendant's intent to cause physical injury can be inferred from his act of punching the complainant in the face and head (see Matter of Eric C., 281 AD2d 543 [2001] [intent inferred from punching officer in chest] Matter of Marcel F., 233 AD2d
442 [1996] [intent to cause physical injury can be inferred from throwing punches in the direction of the face]). Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of attempted assault in the third degree.

"A person is guilty of criminal contempt in the second degree when he engages in . . . [i]ntentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court" (Penal Law § 215.50 [3]). An order of protection is a "mandate of a court" (see People v Halper, 209 AD2d 637 [1994]). Defendant was aware of the order of protection and wilfully violated it by calling the complainant. Thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of attempted criminal contempt in the second degree.

In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the [*2]evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5] People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor, and assess their credibility (see People v Lane, 7 NY3d 888 [2006] People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 [1987]). Upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that the verdicts of guilt were not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

Accordingly, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

Weston, J.P., Aliotta and Solomon, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: March 10, 2014