[*1]
5503-805 St. Marks St. Brooklyn LLC v Webb
2025 NY Slip Op 50019(U) [84 Misc 3d 1261(A)]
Decided on January 8, 2025
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Kings County
Jimenez, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on January 8, 2025
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County


5503-805 St. Marks Street Brooklyn LLC, Petitioners,

against

Cherise Webb, Respondent.




Index No. 314467-23


Rose & Rose
Attn: William Chuang, Esq.
291 Broadway
13th Floor
New York, New York 10007
Attorneys for Petitioner 5503-805 St. Marks Street Brooklyn LLC

DC 37, MELS Firm
Attn: Marisa Zuckerman
55 Water Street
22nd Floor
New York, New York 10041
Attorneys for Respondent Cherise Webb


Sergio Jimenez, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of respondent's order to show cause (Seq. 4) and any other relief as the court may find appropriate:

Papers Numbered
Order to Show Cause (Seq. 4) with affidavits and exhibits 1 (NYSCEF #57-60)
Affirmation in Opposition and exhibits 2 (NYSCEF #62-68)

After argument and taking into account the above listed papers, the court must deny the motion. While the court is loathe to evict someone under the auspices of failing to secure a guarantor under any circumstance and, while not before the court currently, can imagine how such requirements could constitute a violation of Local Law 10 of 2008 against discrimination of lawful source of income, the court must also honor the agreements parties have entered into [*2]before it, especially those negotiated heavily by attorneys (Ruru & Assoc. LLC v. Weinberg Holdings LLC, 78 Misc 3d 132[A][App Term 1st Dept 2023]. Here, the respondent has been given every opportunity to obtain a guarantor, of their choice, in an attempt to live up to the stipulation. This very court has extended the deadlines, over vociferous opposition, in allowing the respondent to cure the conditions required. However, at this point, the court can no longer do so, as doing so would make an absurdity of the stipulation two experienced sophisticated litigators entered into on behalf of their clients.

Housing court is generally a court of formalisms. It is created by statute,[FN1] its judges are not elected and it is a different set of statutes which outline their appointment,[FN2] and its general day to day functioning is governed by statutes.[FN3] As a result of this formality, a lot of the legalistic interpretation coming out of New York City Housing Court is rooted in strict constructionism. This is necessary, especially in the context of summary proceedings, which, by virtue of their speed, necessitates powerful safeguards, lest the court devolve into a disingenuous rubber stamp court.

However, the strict construction of laws in this context is notably unfair/unjust to all litigants in some discretionary areas without injecting some critical realism in the analysis. It would be high absurdity for the court to ignore the various real world social, economic, cultural and ethical forces surrounding the disputes that come before housing court on a daily basis.

Firstly, the court acknowledges that the relevant laws are disproportionately influenced/created by those with resources (See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S.Ct. 876 [2010]). Secondly, the court must also acknowledge the different power imbalances that exist between litigants: between lessors and lessees, between self-represented small property owners facing foreclosure and moneyed tenants with bevy of options, between established rich, generally white, property owners and poverty-stricken, generally minority tenants. The court must also look not only at the background forces acting but also taking a real-life look at the results of its decisions. Will extending the stay period result in a foreclosure? Will not extending a stay result in homelessness and subsequent shelter entry?

It is within this context that in the interest of justice, the court stays the execution of the warrant of eviction to February 14, 2025 for respondent to vacate the premises. Upon default all stays are lifted and the warrant may execute after service of the marshal's notice, which may be done by mail with reasonably contemporaneous email notification to respondent's counsel. The court has considered in this discretionary exercise the longevity of the proceeding, the various prior orders allowing for cure, the alleged health issues of the respondent, the presence of school aged children, and the small prejudice to the large property owner. This constitutes the decision/order of the court.

Dated: January 8, 2025
Sergio Jimenez, JHC

Footnotes


Footnote 1:Civil Court Act §110

Footnote 2:Civil Court Act §110 / RPAPL §746

Footnote 3:Real Property Actions & Proceedings (RPAPL) as well as the Real Property Law (RPL)