Shirley Ramrattan, appellant pro se. Lopresto & Barbieri, P.C. (Guy Barbieri of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (David M. Hawkins, J.), dated August 4, 2023. The order denied plaintiff's motion to vacate a stipulation of settlement and, in effect, the judgment of June 9, 2022 entered thereon, and to restore the action to the calendar.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.

In this action to recover for nonpayment of rent, plaintiff, represented by counsel, entered into a so-ordered stipulation of settlement with defendants. When plaintiff had difficulty enforcing the ensuing judgment of June 9, 2022, she moved to vacate the stipulation and, in effect, the judgment entered thereon, and to restore the action to the calendar, alleging fraud and that her attorney had failed to ensure that she had read and understood the terms and conditions of the stipulation of settlement. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court (David M. Hawkins, J.) entered on August 9, 2023 denying her motion.

It is well settled that stipulations of settlement are judicially favored and will not be set aside absent proof that the settlement was obtained by fraud, collusion, mistake, accident or other ground sufficient to invalidate a contract (see Hallock v State of New York, 64 NY2d 224 [1984]; New York Med. & Diagnostic Ctr. v Nachande, 56 Misc 3d 140[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 51092[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2017]; Cach, LLC v Woodsnajac, 42 Misc 3d 129[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52165[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013]). "[I]n the context of civil litigation, an attorney's errors or omissions are binding on the client and, absent extraordinary circumstances, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be entertained" (Mendoza v Plaza Homes, LLC, 55 AD3d 692, 693 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hudson City Sav. Bank v Bomba, 149 AD3d 704 [2017]). Here, plaintiff failed to assert any fraud or extraordinary circumstances.

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to set aside the stipulation on the ground that she is old [*2]and stressed, "case law makes clear that 'a person is presumed to be competent at the time of the performance of the challenged action and the burden of proving incompetence rests with the party asserting incapacity' " (Sears v First Pioneer Farm Credit, ACA, 46 AD3d 1282, 1284 [2007], quoting Matter of Obermeier, 150 AD2d 863, 864 [1989]; see Ng v Chalasani, 51 Misc 3d 134[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 50544[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th, & 13th Jud Dists 2016]). Plaintiff's mere conclusory assertion that she is "an elder layman citizen unsavvy in legal matters and under the fog of aging" is insufficient to establish that her mind was "so affected as to render [her] wholly and absolutely incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction" (Sears v First Pioneer Farm Credit, ACA, 46 AD3d at 1284 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lukaszuk v Lukaszuk, 304 AD2d 625, 625 [2003]; Pender v LaSalle Bus Serv., Inc., 28 Misc 3d 127[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 51175[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010]). Consequently, we find no basis to vacate the stipulation of settlement.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., BUGGS and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.