[*1]
456, LLC v Wagstaff
2024 NY Slip Op 50564(U) [82 Misc 3d 132(A)]
Decided on April 12, 2024
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on April 12, 2024
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE TERM, SECOND DEPARTMENT, 2d, 11th and 13th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT: : WAVNY TOUSSAINT, P.J., MARINA CORA MUNDY, LISA S. OTTLEY, JJ
2021-106 K C

456, LLC, Appellant,

against

Amanda Wagstaff, Respondent, et al., Undertenants.


Shivers & Associates, LLC (Joseph M. Claro of counsel), for appellant. The Legal Aid Society (Anna Wettstein and Sharone Miodovsky of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Zhuo Wang, J.), dated February 1, 2021, deemed from a final judgment of that court entered February 2, 2021 (see CPLR 5512 [a]). The final judgment, entered pursuant to the decision, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the petition in a holdover summary proceeding.

ORDERED that the final judgment is affirmed, without costs.

In this nonprimary-residence holdover proceeding to recover possession of a rent-controlled apartment (see NY City Rent and Rehabilitation Law [Administrative Code of City of NY] § 26-403 [e] [2] [i] [10]), landlord asserts that tenant has not been primarily residing in the subject apartment, which is located in Brooklyn. Following a nonjury trial, the Civil Court dismissed the petition.

The New York City Rent and Rehabilitation Law, governing rent-controlled apartments within New York City, excludes from coverage a housing accommodation which is "not occupied by the tenant . . . as his or her primary residence, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction" (id.). "Primary residence" has been defined as "an ongoing, substantial, physical nexus with the controlled premises for actual living purposes" (Emay Props. Corp. v Norton, 136 Misc 2d 127, 129 [App Term, 1st Dept 1987]; see Johnson v Smith, 53 Misc 3d 144[A], 2016 NY Slip Op 51562[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016]).

The determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]; Hamilton v Blackwood, 85 AD3d 1116 [2011]; Zeltser v Sacerdote, 52 AD3d 824, 826 [2008]).

First, we note that landlord's sole witness did not have personal knowledge of tenant's [*2]occupancy of the building. Furthermore, while tenant admitted to spending time at her daughter's Pennsylvania address, the totality of the evidence established that tenant was using the subject Brooklyn apartment in an "ongoing" and "substantial" manner consistent with physically living at the subject premises. Upon a review of the record, we find no basis to disturb the Civil Court's determination that landlord did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that tenant did not occupy the subject apartment as her primary residence.

Accordingly, the final judgment is affirmed.

TOUSSAINT, P.J., MUNDY and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.


ENTER:
Paul Kenny
Chief Clerk
Decision Date: April 12, 2024