Supreme Court, Albany County, February 27, 2024

Tabner, Ryan & Keniry, LLP, Albany (William F. Ryan, Jr. of counsel), for respondent.

Phillips Lytle LLP, Buffalo (Craig A. Leslie and Jacob S. Sonner of counsel), for petitioners.

In this consolidated proceeding brought under article 7 of the Real Property Tax Law, petitioners Crossgates Mall General Company Newco, LLC, Crossgates Mall Devco LLC and PCC Newco LLC (collectively Crossgates) challenged the 2020 and 2021 tax assessments imposed on them by respondent Town of Guilderland (the Town or Guilderland) in regard to the property commonly known as Crossgates Mall. Following a trial, by decision and order dated December 13, 2023 (the D&O or December 13 D&O), I granted [*2]the petition to the extent of reducing the valuation for the 2020 assessment rolls from $282,493,500 to $258 million, and for the 2021 assessment rolls from $282,493,500 to $177 million.

After I issued the D&O, correspondence between the parties revealed a disagreement as to the contents of the judgment that was to be entered, in regard to the assessment rolls for the three years following 2021. Respondent moved for entry of a judgment which would, in the form proposed, provide that in addition to reflecting the valuations listed above for the 2020 and 2021 assessment rolls, "the assessed value for the 2022, 2023 and 2024 assessment rolls" would be fixed at $177,000,000. Petitioners have cross-moved for entry of their proposed judgment, which as relevant here would state that the assessor shall, after beginning with the $177 million figure, provide that

"any refunds due to Petitioners for excess taxes paid in any of these years is to be calculated by applying the Town of Guilderland's equalization rate in each of those tax years to the full market value determined by the Court for the 2021-22 tax year, to arrive at the corresponding assessed value for each tax year (for the avoidance of doubt, the equalization rate to be applied for the 2022-23 tax year is 91%, resulting in an assessed value for that tax year of{**84 Misc 3d at 244} $161,070,000 and the equalization rate to be applied for the 2023-24 tax year is 85%, resulting in an assessed value for that tax year of $150,450,000)"^[FN1] (notice of cross-mot, proposed judgment).

Equalization is a process intended to "assure equitable property tax allocation" among different tax jurisdictions (see New York State Office of Real Property Tax Services, Understanding the Equalization Rate, https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/orpts/under_eqrates.pdf). Since most school districts collect taxes from several different municipalities, the Office of Real Property Tax Services each year calculates an equalization rate for each municipality representing "the percentage of true market value at which a municipality assesses its real property," which is then used to adjust the municipalities' valuations (see Matter of Town of Riverhead v New York State Bd. of Real Prop. Servs., 5 NY3d 36, 39 [2005]). The question presented by the motions before me is whether those equalization rates should be applied to the valuation of Crossgates for the years that follow 2021.

The parties' disagreement turns on the meaning of subdivision (3) of Real Property Tax Law § 727, which reads as follows (with emphasis added):

"1. Except as hereinafter provided, and except as to any parcel of real property located within a special assessing unit as defined in article eighteen of this chapter where an assessment being reviewed pursuant to this article is found to be unlawful, unequal, excessive or misclassified by final court order or judgment, the assessed valuation so determined shall not be changed for such property for the next three succeeding assessment rolls prepared on the basis of the three taxable status dates next occurring on or after the taxable status date of the most recent assessment under review in the proceeding subject to such final order or judgment. Where the assessor or other local official having custody and control of the assessment roll receives notice of the order or [*3]judgment subsequent to the filing of the next assessment roll, he or she is authorized and directed to correct the entry of assessed valuation on the assessment roll to conform to the provisions of this section.{**84 Misc 3d at 245}

"2. An assessment on property subject to the provisions of subdivision one of this section may be changed on an assessment roll where:

"(a) There is a revaluation or update of all real property on the assessment roll;

"(b) There is a revaluation or update in a special assessing unit of all real property of the same class;

"(c) There has been a physical change (improvement) to the property;

"(d) The zoning of such property has changed;

"(e) Such property has been altered by fire, demolition, destruction or similar catastrophe;

"(f) An action has been taken by any office of the federal, state or local government which caused a discernible change in the general area where the property is located which directly impacts on property values;

"(g) There has been a change in the occupancy rate of twenty-five percent or greater in a building located on a property which is not eligible for an assessment review under title one-A of this article (small claims assessment review);

"(h) The owner of the property becomes eligible or ineligible to receive an exemption; or

"(i) The use or classification of the property has changed.

"3. No petition for review of the assessment on such property shall be filed while the provisions of subdivision one of this section are applicable to such property."

In short, this statute locks in a judicial determination of value after a successful article 7 proceeding for the following three years, unless certain exceptions apply. The legislative history of the provision makes clear that its purpose was to reduce the volume of lawsuits challenging tax assessments, which under prior law could be brought each year after the annual assessment was imposed (see Governor's Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1995, ch 693 at 5^[FN2] ["by locking in the judicially reduced assessments on most properties for the following three tax years, the bill will spare all parties the time and expense of{**84 Misc 3d at 246} repeated court intervention"]; Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1995, ch 693 at 8 [section 727 was intended to address situations in which "taxpayers who are successful in obtaining reductions in assessments frequently have those assessments increased to pre judicially determined levels the succeeding year" and "this pattern sometimes becomes an annual event, forcing the taxpayer to seek judicial review each and every year"]; see also Matter of ELT Harriman, LLC v Assessor of Town of Woodbury, 128 AD3d 201, 208 [2d Dept 2015] [section 727 allows all parties to "avoid the time and expense of repeated court interventions"], lv denied 26 NY3d 918 [2016]). To this end, the statute "prevent[s] assessing units from increasing judicially reduced assessments in succeeding years" and "prevent[s] taxpayers from perpetually challenging their assessments" (Matter of Rosen v Assessor of City of Troy, 261 AD2d 9, 12 [3d Dept 1999]). The measure also "provides a measure of financial certainty to school districts [*4]that rely upon tax assessments when creating their annual budgets" (see Matter of ELT Harriman, LLC, 128 AD3d at 208).

The statute delineates a few specific exceptions to this rule, and only those events provide a basis to get around the three-year moratorium^[FN3] (see id.; Shoppingtown Mall, LLC v Assessor, 55 Misc 3d 1225[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 52032[U], *3 [Sup Ct, Onondaga County 2015] [sale of property is not a change that allows a party to get around the three-year bar on suit; noting that "subsection (2) of the statute does not list a change in ownership as an exception to a three year moratorium"]). Petitioners do not argue that any of these exceptions apply here.^[FN4] Rather they claim that the statute is ambiguous on the question of whether the assessments fixed by statute for future years are subject to the equalization process, and thus under the principle that "tax statutes of doubtful meaning are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer" (see Matter of Bloomingdale Bros. v Chu, 70 NY2d 218, 223 [1987]), section 727 should be read to incorporate the equalization rate (see petitioners' mem of law [pet mem] at 3).{**84 Misc 3d at 247}

For this argument, Crossgates relies on Matter of Dresser-Rand Co. v Champlin (39 AD3d 1156 [4th Dept 2007]). In that case, the parties resolved an RPTL article 7 proceeding by stipulation. In response to a petition asserting that the stipulated amount should be adjusted for 2005 to reflect the applicable equalization rate for that year, the Court found the stipulation to be ambiguous on this issue, and therefore construed it in the taxpayer's favor to apply the relevant equalization rate to the property (id. at 1157).

Petitioners' effort to apply the Dresser-Rand holding to this case does not wash, however. For one thing, the issue here is not how to construe a stipulation, but how to read RPTL 727. And this very argument was made in Dresser-Rand, where petitioner's initial challenge was that the adjustment it sought was required by statute—to which the Court responded that "[p]etitioner's reliance on RPTL 727 is misplaced," since none of the statutory exceptions applied to this circumstance (39 AD3d at 1156). Indeed, the Court declined to consider whether the equalization rate should be accounted for in the following two years, as to which the record was silent—and thereby implicitly rejected the proposition advanced by Crossgates here, that these adjustments were required by statute (see id. at 1157).

Petitioners' argument in this regard has another problem: there is no apparent ambiguity in the statutory language that would invite application of the cited rule of construction in the first instance. The phrase pointed to by Crossgates at oral argument which contains this purported lack of clarity—the "assessed valuation so determined shall not be changed"—does not seem to me to be unclear at all. It refers back to the statutory phrase "where an assessment being reviewed pursuant to this article is found to be unlawful, unequal, excessive or misclassified by final court order or judgment." It is hard to see how the "assessed valuation so determined" means anything else but the valuation determined by the court in such a proceeding. In case [*5]there was any doubt, the legislative history makes this plain (see Governor's Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1995, ch 693 at 5 [statute "lock(s) in the judicially-reduced assessments . . . for the following three tax years"]; Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1995, ch 693 at 8 [bill "would prohibit changes in assessed value for three years following assessment reductions ordered in tax certiorari proceedings"]). Indeed, as the Town points out, the argument that the statutory language{**84 Misc 3d at 248} excluded the equalization process was raised in a letter submitted in opposition to the statute when it was initially proposed, and no steps were taken to change the bill to address the issue^[FN5] (see respondent's mem of law [resp mem] at 4; respondent's affirmation in support, exhibit E ["Under the proposed Bill . . . a settlement reached in 1988 for an assessment of $100,000 based on a property value of $221,288 would prelude the property owner from a further challenge to that property's $100,000 assessment for the next three years, despite the fact that that same assessment indicates an increased market value each year" based on the equalization process]). Since there is no ambiguity, I must read the statute to mean precisely what it says: that the valuation is fixed for the next three years, unless a delineated exception applies.

In any case, I note that the equalization process could either advantage or disadvantage a taxpayer^[FN6] (cf. New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Equalization Rates, https://www.tax.ny.gov/pit/property/learn/eqrates.htm ["The change in a town's total market value relative to other towns in the same school district (or county) can cause the town's share of the tax levy to increase or decrease"]). In Dresser-Rand, the Court was construing a particular stipulation, and could determine whether a reading of that specific document benefitted the taxpayer. Here, I must construe a statute, and the reading proffered by petitioners would benefit taxpayers in some instances, and harm them in others. I cannot apply petitioners' proffered reading based on this rule of construction just because it helps the taxpayer in this case, or even in most cases, since I cannot determine that the law means one thing where it assists the taxpayer, and another when it does not (see Matter of Wegmans Food Mkts., Inc. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 33 NY3d 587, 592 [2019] [citing "settled rule of construction to ensure consistent application of taxing statutes"]). In addition, this principle of construction generally {**84 Misc 3d at 249}applies "only in determining whether property, income, a transaction or event is subject to taxation"—none of which is at issue here (see Matter of Grace v New York State Tax Commn., 37 NY2d 193, 196 [1975]).

For all these reasons, I find that the Town's reading of the statute is correct: it fixes the valuation for three years without modification to reflect the equalization rates.

Petitioners maintain, however, that if the Town's reading is correct, then the statute is unconstitutional as applied to this case. They make two arguments in this regard. First, they [*6]assert that the imposition of the present assessments without the equalization adjustments violates article XVI, § 2 of the State Constitution, which provides as relevant here: "Assessments shall in no case exceed full value." Second, they contend that in excluding Crossgates from the equalization adjustments from which all other Guilderland taxpayers will benefit (unless they have similarly had their valuation fixed under section 727), the statute violates petitioners' right to equal protection.^[FN7]

In regard to the first argument, it is petitioners' contention that since "full value" has been determined for the next three years pursuant to the court's ruling and RPTL 727, denying Crossgates the benefit of equalization would increase the assessment to an amount exceeding full value, in violation of article XVI (see pet mem at 8-9). Those court decisions that have considered similar (although somewhat distinct) arguments make clear, however, the flaws in petitioners' position.

The parties discuss two trial court decisions regarding as applied challenges to the constitutionality of section 727 under article XVI, neither of which provides a basis for the argument made by Crossgates. First, in Susquehanna Dev. v Assessor of {**84 Misc 3d at 250}City of Binghamton (185 Misc 2d 267 [Sup Ct, Tompkins County 2000]), the court considered a claim that imposition of the three-year fixed valuation period based on the stipulated resolution of a tax certiorari action was a violation of article XVI, § 2 as to a subsequent purchaser of the property that had not been party to the original action or stipulation. The court found upon evidence presented, including two comparable and contemporaneous property sales, that the stipulated valuation "far exceeds the full value limit imposed by the State Constitution on any conceivable valuation formula,"^[FN8] and that the new owner had been in no way "complicit" in setting that assessment (id. at 272-273). Accordingly, the court ruled as follows on the constitutional question:

"We cannot assume that the Legislature intended that RPTL 727 would be invoked to suspend the operation of the constitutional limitation upon the real property taxing power. The Legislature must have reasoned that RPTL 727 would operate within the NY Constitution and [*7]subject to its mandate that assessments 'shall in no case exceed full value' (NY Const, art XVI, § 2). In that contemplation, there is no inherent conflict between the State Constitution and RPTL 727. Hence, there is no need to conclude that RPTL 727 is unconstitutional on its face. However, where the assessment is clearly in excess of full value, the application of the statutory moratorium to a noncomplicit transferee raises a far different and much sharper issue. Here, the statute must yield to the constitutional command" (id. at 273).

The court recognized that the decision could potentially allow for further valuation challenges within the three-year moratorium period and thereby undermine the "salutary purposes of RPTL 727 to afford both municipalities and taxpayers a measure of stability and temporary repose" (id.). It found, however, that such an outcome "would require an unlikely combination of factors, i.e., an assessment in excess of constitutional limits and a transferee with no connection to an assessment reduction within the moratorium period" (id. at 273 [emphasis added]).

{**84 Misc 3d at 251}The second case, cited by respondent, is Niksus Realty v Assessor of Town of Greenburgh (1 Misc 3d 764 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2003]). In that case, a new property owner again challenged the three-year moratorium provision in regards to a tax certiorari settlement reached by the prior owner. The court noted, however, that "the Susquehanna court held that two factors in particular would be required to defeat section 727, namely, (1) an assessment which exceeds constitutional limits, and (2) a transferee who had absolutely no connection whatsoever to the assessment reduction at issue" (id. at 766). The court found these elements were not present in the case before it, and therefore dismissed the challenge.

As particularly relevant here, petitioners' argument as to value in Niksus Realty was precisely what Crossgates asserts here: that as a result of a decline in the equalization rate, the market value of the property had increased, and thus the RPTL 727 moratorium "would cause the subject property's assessment to be in excess of its full market value" (id. at 766; see also id. at 767 ["petitioner herein argues that if he is 'locked in' by RPTL 727 for calendar years 2001 and 2002 at the figure agreed to by the prior owner for year 2000, he will be unable to resolve these more recent proceedings at the appropriate equalization rates for these years"]).^[FN9] The court found that there was no evidence that this was so, as fluctuations in the equalization rate in combination with a valuation fixed by section 727 were insufficient to establish that the assessment exceeded market value—noting the recent sale price of the property for higher than that on which prior assessments were based as evidence^[FN10] (id. at 767).

Petitioners argue that these trial-level decisions are not binding, and in any case concern a [*8]question—the impact of a settlement on a nonparty—that is not at issue here (see pet mem at 10-11). But the Second Department has adopted the Susquehanna holding, finding it to "represent[ ] sound reasoning under its unique facts" (ELT Harriman, LLC, 128 AD3d at 210). It then construed the ruling as requiring five elements to{**84 Misc 3d at 252} sustain a claim that section 727 has been unconstitutionally applied in violation of article XVI:

"(1) there is a successful challenge to a property's tax assessment, (2) the same property is sold to a new owner, (3) the property's sale occurs within three years of the assessment reduction, (4) the new property owner is in no way complicit in the prior assessment reduction, and (5) the assessment unconstitutionally exceeds the fair market value of the property" (id.).

Elements (2) and (4) are not present here, and thus Susquehanna (and its construction by the Appellate Division) is at odds with petitioners' argument.

And even if I were to agree with petitioners that an article XVI constitutional challenge could be sustained under circumstances where the present owner is the entity that brought the tax certiorari proceeding, it would still fail because the record does not demonstrate that the valuation set by section 727 will exceed full value if exempted from the equalization process, which is the crux of Crossgates' argument. As the above case law makes clear, petitioners' constitutional argument requires some actual proof that the assessment is for greater than full value, such as the showing in Susquehanna of a subsequent resale of the property at one fourth of the assessed price (see 185 Misc 2d at 268-269; ELT Harriman, LLC, 128 AD3d at 209-210). In contrast, the ELT Harriman, LLC Court rejected the constitutional challenge in part because "the record fail[ed] to establish that the reduced . . . assessment of the property exceeds the property's fair market value so as to render the assessment unconstitutional," notwithstanding its claims about the impact of the equalization rates (ELT Harriman, LLC, 128 AD3d at 211).

Here, petitioners simply presume that the property's market value in years subsequent to 2021 will be at least that set for July 2020. At argument, petitioners also cited the evidence at trial of downward trends in valuation for retail malls to support the claim that the 2020 valuation would (at least) constitute full value for subsequent years as well, and thus excluding the equalization would push it beyond the constitutional limit. But there is no reason to assume that this is the case. The three-year fixed valuation is a creature of statute intended (as discussed above) to limit litigation; it does not reflect a finding that such fixed value necessarily reflects the actual{**84 Misc 3d at 253} value (see Matter of Mallinckrodt Med. v Assessor of Town of Argyle, 292 AD2d 721, 723 [3d Dept 2002] [rejecting claim that "the value (of the property) has clearly diminished and therefore the current stipulated valuation (set by section 727) violates NY Constitution, article XVI, § 2," since alleged drop in value not proved by one of the accepted means of valuation]).^[FN11]

That is particularly true in this case, where the 2020 market value which I found in the December 13 D&O reflected in significant measure the impact of COVID-19 at the time for which the assessment had to be made. Indeed, my opinion repeatedly recognized that the uncertainty created by the pandemic in July 2020 directly impacted the capitalization rate and thus the valuation (see D&O at 14 [petitioners' expert adjusted the capitalization rate, inter alia, for "the uncertainty brought about by COVID"]; id. at 37 ["the trial testimony regarding the highly negative impact of the COVID pandemic on regional malls generally, and Crossgates in particular, justify a drop in the grade for 2020"]; see also petition ¶ 12 ["Additionally, the Town's Assessor was advised that the fair market value of the Property had also been negatively affected by the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic catastrophe on the Property"]). And while Crossgates' expert opined that COVID-19 accelerated trends that were already in motion, the record—and my findings—made clear that the pandemic had a particularly adverse impact on valuation for 2020, when the mall was shut down and the future highly uncertain. Indeed, Crossgates' expert stated explicitly that the uncertainty created by COVID-19 impacted his estimate of capitalization rates for July 2020, and thus his valuation:

"I added one thing here that, I think, is relevant is the uncertainty concerning Covid 19, looking forward, you know, as of July 1, 2020, there was still a lot of uncertainty, even when the mall was{**84 Misc 3d at 254} going to open again, or almost going to open again, so, I think, that's a factor that qualitatively, you know, is a reason why caprates would be higher" (trial tr at 421).

I explicitly adopted this principle into my own analysis^[FN12] (see D&O at 39 ["(s)ince I find Gardner's estimate of a 1% increase in the applicable capitalization rate for 2020 to be persuasive, in light of the significantly greater risks facing malls given the valuation date falls during the COVID closure, a 9.5% rate should be used for that year" (emphasis added)]).

One implication that can be drawn from the above is that petitioners potentially received a significant benefit from section 727 in this case, in that the statute requires that the lower valuation they received as a result of the pandemic be extended out into future years where that factor was no longer present. The Legislature made a careful calculus that freezing the valuation in this way, with certain narrow exceptions, was needed in order to avoid excessive litigation and create greater certainty in the assessment process, regardless of whether valuations may in fact rise or fall in subsequent years. But that does not mean that the fixed valuation is therefore equal to the actual market value—even when the record provides an indication to the contrary.

In sum, I specifically took into account the risks faced by investors in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic in my valuation analysis, and the lower valuation that resulted from this factor was then locked in over the following three years by section 727. For Crossgates to simply ignore this aspect of my findings, and assert that the fixed valuation in future years necessarily reflects the mall's market value for those periods as well, is disingenuous. Since its argument is premised on this assertion, it must fall with it.

For the same reason, I find unavailing petitioners' claim that they cannot be made to "surrender the Constitutional right to be free of an assessment in excess of full value during the period{**84 Misc 3d at 255} covered by RPTL § 727 (1) in order to exercise the right to be free of an assessment in excess of full value during the years being litigated through trial" (pet mem at 11). There is no evidence that they have surrendered any such right.

Petitioners raise one more constitutional challenge to the fixing of its tax rates without regard to the equalization process: that it would violate the Equal Protection Clause. The argument is that such a construction of section 727 would "violate Petitioners' right to have their property assessed at a uniform percentage of its fair market value, the same as every other taxpayer within the Town of Guilderland" (pet mem at 12).

An equal protection challenge to a taxing statute will succeed only if the statute creates distinctions between classes which are " 'palpably arbitrary' or amount[ ] to 'invidious discrimination' " (see Nash v Assessor of Town of Southampton, 168 AD2d 102, 105 [2d Dept 1991], citing Lehnhausen v Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 US 356, 360 [1973]). As "absolute uniformity is an unattainable ideal," such a challenge to valuation on this basis must demonstrate that it is "arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, or intentionally discriminatory" (id.). A tax assessment scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause, moreover, if it "permits similarly-situated properties to be taxed unequally and there is no rational basis for the difference" (Killeen v New York State Off. of Real Prop. Servs., 253 AD2d 792, 792-793 [2d Dept 1998] [finding unconstitutional a law "effectively preclud(ing) the utilization of the special segment equalization rate" by residents of certain municipalities]; see also Wilson v Dziedzic, 13 Misc 3d 242, 245 [Sup Ct, Broome County 2006] [equal protection violation shown when less favorable valuation method used only for newly improved properties, while more favorable method used for those not recently improved]).

Crossgates has not shown that the application of section 727 here—and the exclusion of equalization rates from the fixed valuations created by that statute—violates these standards. In brief, this is not a case where those subject to this provision are "similarly situated" to other taxed entities. Rather, the statute treats those who have successfully brought a tax certiorari proceeding differently from those who have not—that is the whole point of the law. Those who have prevailed on such a challenge have the valuation fixed for three years. They do not get a new annual valuation during the moratorium period. They do not get the benefit (or loss) that may result from{**84 Misc 3d at 256} equalization. They cannot bring a legal challenge during that time. On the other hand the municipality is bound by the court's finding (or any stipulation), regardless of whether there has been an event that increases (or lowers) the valuation, except for those exceptions set forth in the statute.

That is the legislative compromise reflected by RPTL 727, under which both taxpayer and assessing authority are severely limited in their ability to adjust the valuation for a period of [*10]three years, with an overall benefit to the parties and public of reducing litigation and uncertainty, albeit with potential detriments that could redound to both the municipality (if the valuation increases during that time) or the taxpayer (if it decreases). In short, section 727 "has a rational basis, seeks to address and remedy a circumstance detrimental to the public welfare and seeks to achieve a balance between the competing interests in the least restrictive manner" (see Matter of Mallinckrodt Med., 292 AD2d at 723-724). That careful balancing is in no way arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory on its face^[FN13] (see id. at 723 [Section 727 "is neither so arbitrary nor capricious as to violate substantive due process principles since it balances the relinquishment of the individual right to challenge the tax assessment against the forfeiture of the tax assessing unit's ability to increase the assessment during this period, regardless of any increase in the value of the real estate"]).

Now, there may be particular circumstances in which this legislative compromise unfairly penalizes a company for bringing a challenge to its tax assessment.^[FN14] But this is not such a case. As discussed supra, my ruling on Crossgates' petition was on its face impacted significantly by the timing of the 2020 valuation date, coming as it did in the midst of a global pandemic that shut the mall. The result was a reduction in value of nearly one third over the course of a year, a calculation{**84 Misc 3d at 257} consistent with the appraisal experts of both petitioners (over 31% reduction in value between 2019 and 2020) and respondent (over 34% reduction) (see Dec. 13 D&O at 14-15, 19-20). That result will now be locked in for three years. Petitioners' equal protection argument, which looks only at its exclusion from equalization in isolation from this broader context, thus fails to demonstrate that they were treated in a discriminatory manner by the legislative balance underlying section 727.

Finally, petitioners ask that in the event the court rules against its application, that I issue an order "allowing them the opportunity to try the remaining (and still-pending) proceedings challenging the Town's assessments for the 2022-23 and 2023-24 tax years" (pet mem at 18). As made clear at oral argument, the request for such relief is premised on petitioners' reading of section 727 as not applying to cases already commenced, on the ground that the statute states that no article 7 petition "shall be filed" while during the three-year period where valuation is fixed, without addressing pending petitions (see RPTL 727 [3]).

These other, pending proceedings are not before me, and I have no jurisdiction to opine on what impact this decision and order—much less any statute—will have on those cases. I [*11]therefore decline petitioners' invitation to rule on such matters, except to make clear that nothing in this decision and order should be read as intimating in any way my position on this issue. It is a question for those other courts in those proceedings, not for me, to answer.

In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that respondent's motion is granted to the extent that the judgment shall not reflect petitioners' demands that the assessment rolls for 2022, 2023 and 2024 be calculated by applying the Town of Guilderland's equalization rate in each of those tax years to the full market value determined by the court for the 2021 tax year, and petitioners' cross-motion to enter the form of judgment it has proposed applying such equalization rates is denied; and it is further ordered that the parties shall confer so as to agree on a form of judgment consistent with this decision and order, and shall either submit an agreed upon form of judgment to the court within seven days of the filing of this decision and order, without petitioners thereby waiving for purposes of appeal any arguments they have made in their cross-motion, and it is further ordered that if the parties cannot{**84 Misc 3d at 258} reach agreement on the form of a judgment consistent with this decision and order, they shall submit any remaining differences in regard to the language of the judgment and letters setting forth the reason for such to the court within seven days of the filing of this decision and order.