Law Office of Paul R. Kenney, LLC, New York, NY (Emily Finsterwald of counsel), for appellant.

Law Office of Henry Graham P.C., Greenvale, NY, for respondent.

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendant 1237 Dean Street Corp. appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lawrence Knipel, J.), dated September 13, 2021. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant 1237 Dean Street Corp. and for an order of reference, and denied those branches of that defendant's cross-motion which were, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 317 to vacate its default in appearing or answering the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) for leave to serve a late answer, or, alternatively, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the loan was criminally usurious and, thus, void ab initio.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

On October 16, 2015, 1237 Dean Street Corp. (hereinafter the defendant), by its president, Everton Pierre, executed a note in the sum of $675,000 in favor of the plaintiff, Funding NY, LLC. The note was secured by a mortgage on certain commercial property located in Brooklyn. The defendant allegedly defaulted on its obligations under the note and mortgage by failing to pay the entire amount due and owing on October 15, 2016, the maturity date of the loan.

In March 2019, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, among others, to foreclose the mortgage. According to an affidavit of service, the defendant was served with process by delivery of the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 306 on April 12, 2019. The defendant failed to appear or answer the complaint.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference. The defendant cross-moved, in effect, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 317 to vacate its default in appearing or answering the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) for leave to serve a late answer, or, alternatively, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the loan was criminally usurious and, thus, void ab initio. In an order dated September 13, 2021, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion and denied those branches of the defendant's cross-motion. The defendant appeals.

[*2] "Pursuant to CPLR 317, a defaulting defendant who was served with a summons other than by personal delivery may be permitted to defend the action upon a finding by the court that the defendant did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a potentially meritorious defense" (Bookman v 816 Belmont Realty, LLC, 180 AD3d 986, 987 [2020]; see New York City Economic Dev. Corp. v GCC, LLC, 209 AD3d 661, 662 [2022]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Benitez, 179 AD3d 891, 892-893 [2020]). In contrast to a motion pursuant to CPLR 317, a motion pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) to extend the time to answer the complaint requires the movant to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Cumanet, LLC v Murad, 188 AD3d 1149, 1152-1153 [2020]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Benitez, 179 AD3d at 893).

Here, the record reflects that the defendant personally received notice of the summons in time to defend the action (see New York City Economic Dev. Corp. v GCC, LLC, 209 AD3d at 662; Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Power Supply, Inc., 179 AD3d 405, 406 [2020]). Moreover, the defendant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for failing to timely answer the complaint. The defendant contends that it has a reasonable excuse based on law office failure because its attorney failed to advise it that the address on file with the Secretary of State for service of process was no longer valid. The court has discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse where that claim is supported by a detailed and credible explanation of the default at issue (see Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Bandhu, 214 AD3d 705, 707 [2023]). However, conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations of law office failure are not sufficient (see id.). Here, the assertion of the defendant's president that the defendant's attorney never advised the defendant of the change of address was conclusory and unsubstantiated (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Ramnarine, 172 AD3d 886, 887 [2019]).

Since the defendant failed to demonstrate that it lacked notice of the action, or provide a reasonable excuse for its failure to timely answer the complaint, there is no need to consider whether the defendant demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see 259 Milford, LLC v FV-1, Inc., 211 AD3d 658, 660-661 [2022]; Goldfarb v Zhukov, 145 AD3d 757, 759 [2016]; Citimortgage, Inc. v Kowalski, 130 AD3d 558, 558 [2015]).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference, and properly denied those branches of the defendant's cross-motion which were pursuant to CPLR 317 to vacate its default in appearing or answering the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3012 (d) for leave to serve a late answer, or, alternatively, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the loan was criminally usurious and, thus, void ab initio. LaSalle, P.J., Maltese, Voutsinas and Love, JJ., concur.