Held & Hines, LLP, Brooklyn, NY (Philip M. Hines and Edward Miller of counsel), for appellants.

Congdon, Flaherty, O'Callaghan, Fishlinger & Pavlides, Uniondale, NY (Michael T. Reagan of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Gina Abadi, J.), dated January 4, 2023. The order granted the motion of the defendants Talmud Torah of Crown Heights, Inc., and Mill Basin Yeshiva Academy for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendants Talmud Torah of Crown Heights, Inc., and Mill Basin Yeshiva Academy for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is denied.

The infant plaintiff attended a school operated by the defendants Talmud Torah of Crown Heights, Inc., and Mill Basin Yeshiva Academy (hereinafter together the defendants). The infant plaintiff allegedly tripped and fell on a roadway defect that abutted a curb in a public street adjacent to the school. The plaintiffs alleged that the location of the defect and where the accident occurred were designated by the defendants for pick-up and drop-off by parents of their children and that the infant plaintiff was stepping towards her mother's parked vehicle when she fell. The infant plaintiff, by her mother, and her mother suing derivatively, commenced this action against the defendants and another defendant, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. In an order dated January 4, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion. The plaintiffs appeal.

"Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision" (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]; see Begley v City of New York, 111 AD3d 5, 23 [2013]). "Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students" (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d at 49; see Stephenson v City of New York, 19 NY3d 1031, 1033 [2012]). "[A] school's duty to supervise is generally viewed as being coextensive with and concomitant to its physical custody of and control over the child," and therefore, "[w]hen that custody ceases because the child [*2]has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that the parent is perfectly free to reassume control over the child's protection, the school's custodial duty also ceases" (Begley v City of New York, 111 AD3d at 23 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[W]hile a school has no duty to prevent injury to schoolchildren released in a safe and anticipated manner, the school breaches a duty when it releases a child without further supervision into a foreseeably hazardous setting it had a hand in creating" (Ernest v Red Cr. Cent. School Dist., 93 NY2d 664, 672 [1999]; see Donofrio v Rockville Ctr. Union Free Sch. Dist., 149 AD3d 805, 806 [2017]).

Under the circumstances of this case, the defendants failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the infant plaintiff was released from school without adequate supervision into a foreseeably hazardous setting they had a hand in creating (see Ernest v Red Cr. Cent. School Dist., 93 NY2d at 672). Thus, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that their negligent supervision over the infant plaintiff was not a proximate cause of the injuries the infant plaintiff sustained (cf. Giresi v City of New York, 125 AD3d 601, 603-604 [2015]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, without regard to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the parties' remaining contentions. Barros, J.P., Christopher, Dowling and Taylor, JJ., concur.