1934 Bedford, LLC v Gutman Weiss, P.C.
2023 NY Slip Op 04558 [219 AD3d 1271]
September 13, 2023
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, November 8, 2023


[*1] (September 13, 2023)
 1934 Bedford, LLC, et al., Appellants,
v
Gutman Weiss, P.C., et al., Respondents.

Law Office of Daniel L. Abrams, PLLC, New York, NY, for appellants.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New York, NY (Jamie R. Wozman and Mark K. Anesh of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), dated March 10, 2022. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In March 2021, the plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for legal malpractice against the defendants, their former attorneys, who represented the plaintiffs in connection with obtaining financing to develop certain real property located in Brooklyn. In an order dated October 28, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (7) to dismiss the complaint. Thereafter, the plaintiffs moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend the complaint. The court denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion. The plaintiffs appeal.

Although leave to amend a pleading should be freely given in the absence of prejudice or surprise to the opposing party (see id.), a motion for leave to amend should be denied where the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see Buccigrossi v Glatman, 214 AD3d 696 [2023]; Silverman v Potruch & Daab, LLC, 142 AD3d 660, 661 [2016]; Pedote v Kelly, 124 AD3d 855, 856 [2015]; Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 229 [2008]). "A determination whether to grant such leave is within the Supreme Court's broad discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed" (Gitlin v Chirinkin, 60 AD3d 901, 902 [2009]; see U.S. Bank N.A. v Cuesta, 208 AD3d 821, 822 [2022]; Johnson v Ortiz Transp., LLC, 205 AD3d 696, 697 [2022]).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendment was palpably insufficient or patently without merit. The proposed amendment failed to sufficiently allege that "but for" the defendants' alleged negligence, the plaintiffs "would not have incurred any damages" (Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer, 8 NY3d 438, 442 [2007]; see Nomura Asset Capital Corp. v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 26 NY3d 40, 49-50 [2015]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301-302 [2002]). Iannacci, J.P., Christopher, Ford and Wan, JJ., concur.