Guice v PPC Residential, LLC
2023 NY Slip Op 00394 [212 AD3d 577]
January 31, 2023
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, March 1, 2023


[*1]
 Marjorie Guice, Appellant,
v
PPC Residential, LLC, et al., Defendants, and Rock Group NY Corp. et al., Respondents.

Law Office of Arnold DiJoseph, P.C., New York (Arnold E. DiJoseph, III of counsel), for appellant.

Kaufman Borgeest & Ryan LLP, Valhalla (Jacob B. Sher of counsel), for Rock Group NY Corp., respondent.

Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, New York (Michael P. Kelly of counsel), for RB NY Enterprises, Inc., respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Doris M. Gonzalez, J.), entered January 12, 2022, which granted defendants RB NY Enterprises Inc.'s and Rock Group NY Corp.'s motions to enforce a settlement agreement with plaintiff, pursuant to CPLR 2104, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

A binding settlement agreement existed between plaintiff and defendants when plaintiff's counsel responded, "Confirmed. Thank you" to RB NY Enterprises Inc.'s insurance carrier's email stating "This email is to confirm we are settled at $85,000" (see Matter of Philadelphia Ins. Indem. Co. v Kendall, 197 AD3d 75, 80 [1st Dept 2021]). Plaintiff's counsel had authority to accept the settlement; the confirmation came from counsel's email account; the parties reached an agreement as to the settlement amount; no conditions were attached to the confirmation; the parties prepared the release documents; and plaintiff's counsel forwarded the releases to plaintiff for signature. Contrary to plaintiff's arguments, the emails that followed the confirmation, discussing medical lien amounts, did not create a condition precedent to vitiate the agreement (see Rawald v Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y., 199 AD3d 477, 478 [1st Dept 2021]), and plaintiff's failure to sign the release documents amounted to no more than a ministerial condition precedent to payment under these facts (Philadelphia Ins., 197 AD3d at 81-82).

There is no reason to set aside this agreement based on "fraud, collusion, mistake or accident" (Matter of Alsaede v Kelly, 96 AD3d 495, 496 [1st Dept 2012]). Plaintiff knew of her right shoulder injury and was advised of the need for surgery prior to settlement discussions. Plaintiff's mistake lies in the "consequence, future course, or sequelae of a known injury" (Mangini v McClurg, 24 NY2d 556, 564 [1969]). The fact that plaintiff became dissatisfied with the settlement amount after receiving additional treatment for a known injury does not constitute sufficient grounds to invalidate the settlement (see Calavano v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 246 AD2d 317, 319-320 [1st Dept 1998]). Concur—Renwick, J.P., Webber, Singh, Rodriguez, Higgitt, JJ.