138 Bruckner Owner LLC v Anjost Corp.
2021 NY Slip Op 05768 [198 AD3d 523]
October 21, 2021
Appellate Division, First Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
As corrected through Wednesday, December 1, 2021


[*1] (October 21, 2021)
 138 Bruckner Owner LLC, Appellant,
v
Anjost Corp. et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. Anjost Corp. et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, v 138 Bruckner Owner LLC et al., Third-Party-Defendants-Appellants.

Hamburger, Maxson, Yaffe & Martingale, LLP, Melville (Richard Hamburger of counsel), for appellants.

Sills Cummis & Gross P.C., New York (Lori K. Sapir of counsel), for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Eddie J. McShan, J.) entered April 13, 2021, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss so much of the counterclaim as sought damages in excess of $2 million and denied third-party defendants' motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motions granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the counterclaim and third-party complaint.

Interpreting the contract in light of the plain meaning of words and phrases used, the term "deposit" is reasonably susceptible of only one meaning (Greenfield v Philles Records, 98 NY2d 562, 570 [2002]; see Bluebird Partners v First Fid. Bank, N.J., 248 AD2d 219, 224 [1st Dept 1998]). The liquidated damages provision, which provides that defendants are entitled "to retain the [d]eposit as liquidated damages" in the event of plaintiff's default, unambiguously refers to the deposit already made and held in escrow, as a party cannot "retain" something not already acquired (see V.C. Vitanza Sons v New York City Hous. Auth., 7 AD3d 398, 398 [1st Dept 2004]).

As to the third-party complaint against plaintiff's members in their individual capacities, the pleadings fail to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate the inequity, fraud, or malfeasance necessary to sustain a claim to pierce the corporate veil (see Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v Bonderman, 31 NY3d 30, 47-48 [2018]; Array BioPharma, Inc. v AstraZeneca AB, 184 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2020]). The third-party complaint also fails to plead any facts to substantiate the conclusory allegations of a scheme to undercapitalize plaintiff (see Albstein v Elany Contr. Corp., 30 AD3d 210, 210 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 712 [2006]). In any event, to the extent the third-party complaint alleges that plaintiff is undercapitalized and might not be able to pay a judgment, third-party plaintiffs could not be damaged by such a scheme even if it existed, as the remedy under the contract is to retain the deposit already held in escrow. Concur—Acosta, P.J., Manzanet-Daniels, Kern, Oing, Kennedy, JJ.