Michael Leibowitz, Brooklyn, NY, appellant pro se.

Morris K. Mitrani, P.C., New York, NY, for respondents.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated June 7, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel certain discovery.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provisions thereof denying those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel responses to document demands 2, 4, and 5, and substituting therefor provisions granting those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff is a longtime rent-controlled tenant in an apartment building formerly owned by the defendant Town Management Co., presently owned by the defendant Town Management Assoc. LLC, and managed by the defendant Chaim Babad. The plaintiff, pro se, commenced this action alleging, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress and abuse of process, in connection with his tenancy.

The defendants objected to many of the plaintiff's interrogatories and document demands, and the plaintiff moved, inter alia, to compel certain discovery. The Supreme Court denied those branches of the motion which were to compel the requested discovery, and the plaintiff appeals.

CPLR 3101 (a) provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to supervise disclosure and set reasonable terms and conditions therefor, and absent an improvident exercise of that discretion, its determination will not be disturbed (see Gould v Decolator, 131 AD3d 445, 447 [2015]).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel responses to document demand 1 and interrogatory number 1, as the defendants adequately responded to those demands.

With regard to document demand 6, on appeal, the plaintiff has waived his request for compliance with that demand.

The defendants should be compelled, however, to respond to document demand 2, which requests a copy of the rents paid by the plaintiff from September 2004 to November 2010, document demand 4, which requests the names and addresses of the defendants' witnesses (see Awai v Benchmark Constr. Serv., Inc., 172 AD3d 978 [2019]; Slomczewski v Ross, 148 AD3d 1648, 1649 [2017]), and document demand 5, which requests copies of the documents the defendants intend to offer into evidence at trial. These demands are not irrelevant, overly broad, or unduly burdensome.

We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of the remainder of those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were to compel certain discovery, as the remaining demands were palpably improper in that they either sought irrelevant information, were overly broad, or were unduly burdensome (see Accent Collections, Inc. v Cappelli Enters., Inc., 84 AD3d 1283 [2011]; Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531 [2007]).

The plaintiff's remaining contention is without merit. Leventhal, J.P., Roman, LaSalle and Christopher, JJ., concur.