Reed Smith LLP, New York, NY (Kessen B. Zinner of counsel), for appellant.

Heller, Horowitz & Feit, P.C., New York, NY (Eli Feit and Stuart A. Blander of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Noach Dear, J.), dated September 5, 2017. The order, insofar as appealed from, in effect, granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Yechezkel Reiss which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof, in effect, granting that branch of the motion of the defendant Yechezkel Reiss which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time-barred to the extent that the complaint relates to unpaid mortgage installments which accrued on or after October 6, 2010, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

In August 2006, the defendant Yechezkel Reiss (hereinafter the defendant) executed a consolidated note in the sum of $400,000 in favor of Fairmont Funding, Ltd. (hereinafter Fairmont Funding), which was secured by a mortgage on residential property in Brooklyn. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff, alleging that it is the current holder of the note, and that the defendant defaulted on his monthly payments in February 2009, commenced this mortgage foreclosure action against, among others, the defendant. The defendant moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time-barred. The Supreme Court, in effect, granted that branch of the motion. The plaintiff appeals.

The Supreme Court should not have, in effect, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as time-barred in its entirety. An action to foreclose a mortgage is subject to a six-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 213 [4]). The limitations period begins to run on the entire debt when the mortgagee or its predecessor elects to accelerate the mortgage (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke, 94 AD3d 980, 982-983 [2012]; Esther M. Mertz Trust v Fox Meadow Partners, 288 AD2d 338, 340 [2001]). When the mortgagee elects to accelerate the mortgage debt, notice to the borrower must be "clear and unequivocal" (Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d 866, 867 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke, 94 AD3d at 983). "[O]nce a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the entire debt" (EMC Mtge. Corp. v Patella, 279 AD2d 604, 605 [2001]; see Kashipour v Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB, 144 AD3d 985, 986 [2016]).

"On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired" (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Burke, 155 AD3d 668, 669 [2017]; see U.S. Bank N.A. v Gordon, 158 AD3d 832, 834-835 [2018]). " 'If the defendant satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or otherwise inapplicable, or whether the plaintiff actually commenced the action within the applicable limitations period' " (U.S. Bank N.A. v Gordon, 158 AD3d at 835, quoting Barry v Cadman Towers, Inc., 136 AD3d 951, 952 [2016]).

Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, he did not establish that the complaint should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds through the notices sent to the defendant in February 2009 and May 2009, as those notices did not accelerate the mortgage. The notices indicated that acceleration was a possible future event, but did not constitute an exercise of the mortgage's acceleration clause (see DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v Hirsh, 161 AD3d 944, 945 [2018]; 21st Mtge. Corp. v Adames, 153 AD3d 474, 475 [2017]). Rather, the mortgage was only accelerated in October 2016, when the plaintiff served the foreclosure complaint on the defendant seeking immediate payment of the balance of the principal indebtedness. Thus, the Supreme Court should not have granted dismissal of the complaint in its entirety as time-barred. Specifically, the defendant failed to show that the causes of action in the complaint, insofar as they relate to unpaid mortgage installments which accrued within the six-year period immediately preceding the plaintiff's October 2016 commencement of this foreclosure action, to wit, the unpaid installments which accrued on or after October 6, 2010, were time-barred (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cohen, 80 AD3d 753, 754 [2011]; EMC Mtge. Corp. v Suarez, 49 AD3d 592, 593 [2008]).

However, where, as here, the mortgage was payable in installments, there are "separate causes of action for each installment accrued, and the Statute of Limitations [begins] to run, on the date each installment [becomes] due" (Pagano v Smith, 201 AD2d 632, 633 [1994]; see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cohen, 80 AD3d at 754). Therefore, since the plaintiff alleged that the defendant made his last payment on the mortgage in January 2009 and this action was not commenced until October 6, 2016, the defendant established that any unpaid installments of the mortgage which accrued before the six-year period prior to the plaintiff's commencement of this mortgage foreclosure action, to wit, unpaid installments from January 2009 through October 5, 2010, are time-barred (see Khoury v Alger, 174 AD2d 918, 919 [1991]; see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cohen, 80 AD3d at 754). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact.

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Leventhal, J.P., Miller, Duffy and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.