Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Gilbert C. Hong, J.), rendered November 16, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while his ability was impaired by the consumption of alcohol.

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

After a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his ability was impaired by the consumption of alcohol (Vehicle and Traffic Law §

Defendant's principal contention with respect to legal sufficiency is that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had operated a motor vehicle, within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, while his ability was impaired by the consumption of alcohol. More specifically, defendant contends that, since the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that he had been found by the arresting officer sleeping in the fully reclined driver's seat of his brother's vehicle, proof of defendant's operation of the vehicle could not be established merely by testimony that he had been observed behind the wheel of the vehicle with the key in the ignition and the engine running (cf. People v Alamo, 34 NY2d 453, 459 [1974] ["[a] person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of [the statute] when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of the vehicle"] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; People v Cunningham, 274 AD2d 484 [2000]; People v Marriott, 37 AD2d 868 [1971]; People v Murray, 40 Misc 3d 47 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]; People v Moore, 196 Misc 2d 120 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2002]). However, the element of operation can also be proven by circumstantial evidence, i.e., without the necessity of eyewitness testimony that the defendant had actually been observed operating the vehicle (see People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185 [1987]; People v Saplin, 122 AD2d 498 [1986]; People v Sieber, 40 Misc 3d 133[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51143[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]; People v Turner, 34 Misc 3d 159[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50443[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2012]).

Here, the evidence adduced at trial established that, at approximately 3:55 a.m., the arresting officer had observed defendant sleeping in the fully reclined driver's seat of a vehicle which was stopped in the middle of the roadway, obstructing traffic. The arresting officer testified that, in order to go around the vehicle, she had to drive her police vehicle across the solid double yellow lines into the opposite lane of traffic. Furthermore, the officer testified that, [*2]when defendant was awakened, he admitted to her that he had driven from a friend's house and then "pulled over." After defendant stepped out of the vehicle, the officer observed that he was unsteady on his feet and had watery bloodshot eyes, and that a strong odor of alcohol emanated from defendant. The officer further testified that, as a result, she determined that defendant was intoxicated; however, she did not see any alcoholic beverages inside the vehicle. Thus, the arresting officer encountered defendant under circumstances that are amenable to no other rational explanation than that defendant had driven the vehicle to the location where he had stopped and that he had done so while his ability had been impaired by the consumption of alcohol (see Saplin, 122 AD2d at 499 [circumstantial evidence permits the inference that a vehicle "had been driven by the intoxicated defendant before it came to rest"]; Sieber, 40 Misc 3d 133[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51143[U]). Such circumstances "point logically to the defendant's operation of the automobile while intoxicated, even though there is no direct proof that he drove [his vehicle]" (People v Blake, 5 NY2d 118, 120 [1958]; see also People v Fenger, 68 AD3d 1441 [2009]).

Based upon the foregoing, we find that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see Turner, 34 Misc 3d 159[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50443[U]). Further, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony and assess their credibility (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 [1987]). Upon a review of the record, we find that the conviction was not against the weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Pesce, P.J., Weston and Aliotta, JJ., concur.