It is, ORDERED that this application by plaintiff for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988, is granted; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff is granted attorney's fees in the amount of $827,700.00 and disbursements in the amount of $14,800.27, for a total of $842,500.27 payable to the law firm of Gleich, Siegal & Farkas; and it is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff is also granted attorney's fees in the amount of $64,500.00 and disbursements in the amount of $2,814.79, for a total of $67,314.79 payable to [*2]the law firm of Payne, Wood & Littlejohn; and it is further

ORDERED that payment of the attorney's fees and disbursements shall be paid to the respective law firms within seventy-five (75) days of the date herein and in the event defendants fail to pay said attorney's fees awards on or before the date set forth herein, then and in that event plaintiff may file a judgment with the Clerk of the Court without a further Order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry upon counsel for the defendants within thirty (30) days of the date herein pursuant to CPLR 2103(b)(1), (2) or (3) and thereafter file the affidavit of service with the Clerk of the Court.

Familiarity with this matter and its various stages and phases of litigation, as well as, the subsequent jury verdict and previous Orders and decisions of the Appellate Division, Second Department and the Supreme Court of Suffolk County, are presumed and only relevant facts will be restated where necessary.

Plaintiff moves for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §1988 as part of his costs of the proceedings instituted in a state court to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in addition to disbursements as the prevailing party. "A plaintiff need not have succeeded on every issue raised in her case, nor even the most crucial one to be considered a prevailing party" (LaRouche v Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 71 [2d Cir 1994]; see also Haley v Pataki, 901 F. Supp 85 [N.D. NY 1995]). The Court, in conjunction with the consent of the parties herein, determined that in lieu of a hearing on the plaintiff's application for attorney's fees, the matter would be determined upon submission of documentation by both sides to the Court.

Plaintiff contends, and defendant does not dispute, that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, he is entitled to the use of the "lodestar" calculation in determining the award of attorney's fees (see Matter of Rahmey v Blum, 95 AD2d 294, 466 NYS2d 350 [2d Dept 1983] citations omitted). The lodestar amount is the product of multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on litigation times a reasonable hourly rate (see Quaratino v Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422 [2d Cir 1999]; Greenbaum v Svenka Handelscbanken, NY, 998 F. Supp 301 [S.D. NY 1998]).

Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees in the amount of $1,169,386.80 is based upon a claimed total of 3,464.85 hours, expended by all attorneys in this matter through October, 2006 for which contemporaneous bills have been submitted. Plaintiff also claims combined disbursements of $33,500.67, making the total amount being sought as $1,202,789.94. Plaintiff contends that his total figure for reimbursement is based upon a blended hourly rate of $337.50, which takes into account the different rates of partners and associates within a law firm.

The billing statements submitted by plaintiff covers a seventeen year period and are from his present law firm of Gleich, Siegal & Farkas (hereinafter "Gleich") and his previous law firm of Payne, Woods & Littlejohn (hereinafter "Payne"). The Gleich billing statements cover the years [*3]from August, 1994 to September 2006. The Payne billing statements cover the years from June, 1989 to March 1994. A review of the voluminous time records submitted by Gleich and Payne do not define the fractional hourly time methodology used in calculating the time records. Thus, in order to correct this ambivalent methodology, the Court has utilized the following fractional hourly time methodology: .25 in counsel's billing records will equal 15 minutes; .50 will equal 30 minutes; .75 will equal 45 minutes and any number in between will be rounded to the nearest quarter hour. In utilizing this methodology, the Court has determined that the amount of hours billed by Gleich is 2,919.30 and the amount of hours billed by Payne is 485.30, for a combined total of 3,409 hours.

Gleich has submitted billing records dating from 1994 to October, 2006. While the most recent billing statements regarding 2005 were sent to the plaintiff shortly after the completion of the trial, the billing statements for the years 1994 to 2004 were only sent to plaintiff on November 23, 2005. Plaintiff's counsel has adequately explained the maintenance of the contemporaneous time records in that they have not been paid by plaintiff and the purpose of maintaining such time records was simply to provide the Court with enough information "to audit the hours and determine whether they were reasonably expended" (King v JCS Enter., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 162, 166 [E.D. NY 2004], citation omitted; compare New York Assn. for Retarded Children v Carey, 711 F. 2d 1136 [1983]).

Stephen B. Gleich, senior partner in the moving law firm, submits his affirmation and although he states that he has spoken to several prominent local land use litigation counsel who informed him of their prevailing hourly billing for land use litigation and that the hourly billing ranges from $350 to $400 per hour, he does not present any documentation to demonstrate what the prevailing hourly billing rate was by attorneys of reasonable comparable skill and reputation in Suffolk County from the commencement of his action until the submission of his application (see e.g. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v County of Albany, 369 F.3d 91 [2d Cir. 2004]; see also McDonald ex rel Prendergast v Pension Plan of the NYSA-ILA Pension Trust Fund, 450 F. 3d 91 [2d Cir 2006]; cf. In Matter of Behavior Research Inst. v Ambach, 144 AD2d 872, 535 NYS2d 465 [2d Dept 1988]). Additionally, Mr. Gleich did not include a copy of any retainer agreement with plaintiff for either his firm or Payne regarding fee arrangements between the parties (see Blanchard v Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed 67 [1989]), or an affirmation from Payne.

In support of its application, counsel sets forth in a straight forward statement that Gleich has extensive real estate, litigation and appellate experience. However, the firm includes no curriculum vitae attesting to this fact or to the individual attorneys, Stephen B. Gleich and Lawrence W. Farkas, or the individual attorneys employed by the firm who worked on the file over the years. This application submitted on behalf of Payne simply lists its billing statements with no curriculum vitae or identification of the one attorney who primarily worked on the file for the years in which Payne submitted its statements

The grounds upon which plaintiff seeks the payment of his legal fees is that he is a prevailing party as defined in LeBlanc-Sternberg v Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir 1998) (see Hensley [*4]v Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed. 2d 40 [1983]; cf. Hicks v Schoetz, 12 AD3d 1112, 784 NYS2d 416 [4th Dept 2004]). "It is well established that the Supreme Court has inherent power to supervise the fees attorneys charge for legal services" (Stortecky v Mazzone, 85 NY2d 518, 525, 626 NYS2d 733 [1995]). Under this Court's inherent authority to regulate the practice of law in this state and to evaluate what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees, has consistently been held to be a matter within the sound discretion of the court (see Lefkowitz v Van Ess, 166 AD2d 556, 560 NYS2d 838 [2d Dept 1990]; DeCabrera v DeCabrera-Rosate, 70 NY2d 879, 524 NYS2d 176 [1987]; In Matter of Behavior Research Inst. v Ambach, 144 AD2d 872, supra ). While the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under the applicable provisions, conversely the cutting of the claimed fees is a proper exercise of discretion as well (see Matter of Ury, 108 AD2d 816, 485 NYS2d 329 [2d Dept 1985], lv den 64 NY2d 611, 490 NYS2d 1024 [1985]). "So long as the time entries for billing do not offend the court as being unnecessarily vague and ambiguous as to be deemed unconscionable, the requested fee award will be deemed reasonable. However, a request for a fee award must sufficiently apprise the court of the specific services awarded and the time spent on each time block noted" (Nitram Inc. v Industrial Risk Insurers, 154 F.R.D. 274, 277 [M.D. Fla 1994]). The application is opposed by defendants who set forth in their opposition papers specific examples of billing practices wherein defendants contend the submissions are vague, duplicative and not relevant to the action which was before this Court which culminated in a jury verdict for plaintiff (see Litigation Statutory Attorney's Fees § 1983, Schwartz & Kirklin, Volume 2, 3d Ed. [1997]).

The starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides the Court with an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of the attorney's services by the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community (see Quarantino v Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422 [2d Cir 1999]; which governs a Court's initial estimate of reasonable fees (see Grant v Martinez, 973 F.2d 96 [2d Cir 1992]; Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, supra ). It is well settled law that "whenever the court augments or reduces the lodestar fee, it must state its reasons for doing so as specifically as possible" (Matter of Rahmey v Blum, 95 AD2d 294 at 305, supra ). However, the party seeking attorney's fees must prove its entitlement by demonstrating the "nature and extent of the services, the actual time spent, the necessity therefor, the nature of the issues involved, the professional standing of counsel, and the results achieved" (Jordan v Freeman, 40 AD2d 656, 336 NYS2d 671 [1st Dept 1972] citation omitted; see also Klein v Robert's Am. Gourmet Food, Inc., 28 AD3d 63, 808 NYS2d 776 [2d Dept 2006]; Gutierrez v Direct Mktg. Credit Serv., Inc., 267 AD2d 427, 701 NYS2d 116 [2d Dept 1999]).

As a general rule, the reasonable hourly rate is based upon the customary fee charged for similar services by lawyers in the community with like experience and of comparable reputation to those by whom the prevailing party was represented (see Matter of Rahmey v Blum, 95 AD2d 294, supra ). If, the facts presented warrant, the Court may adjust the basic lodestar amount either upward or downward in consideration of the unique factors of the case or the lack thereof (see Podhorecki v Lauer's Furniture Stores, Inc., 201 AD2d 947, 607 NYS2d 818 [4th Dept 1994]; Matter of Rahmey v Blum, 95 AD2d 294;, supra ). Generally speaking, courts are given broad discretion to [*5]grant, deny or modify a fee application (see Luciano v Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111 [2d Cir 1997]; Hensley v Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, supra ).

In determining the lodestar fees in this matter, the Court has considered, among others, the 12 factors set forth in Johnson v Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir 1974) in arriving at the fees to be paid the law firms (see Matter of Harvey v County of Rensselaer, 190 AD2d 261, 597 NYS2d 836 [3rd Dept 1993]; app dism 82 NY2d 846, 606 NYS2d 597 [1993]; order rev. in part 83 NY2d 917, 615 NYS2d 304 [1994]). The fee sought by counsel in this matter does not appear to be unreasonable in light of the issues involved in this long litigation which resulted in a jury verdict awarding plaintiff monetary damages for the taking of his property by a municipality using its zoning powers and the subsequent loss of the property.

Gleich seeks a blended hourly rate of $337.50 for his firm and that of Payne. The records submitted by Gleich indicate that during the years, the law firm, at different times, had from two to four attorneys working on the file during the particular year for which the bills were submitted. The records submitted on behalf of Payne indicate that during the time period it was retained, except for one or two periods of time, there was only one attorney working on the file. While it would have been a better practice by counsel to have obtained an affidavit from Payne as to the attorney who worked on the file regarding their legal expertise and experience, its failure to do so is not fatal to the application on behalf of Payne or his firm (see US ex rel Auerbach v Pastor Medical Assoc., 224 F. Supp 2d 342 (D. Mass 2002]).

The billing statements as to the billable hours and disbursements submitted on behalf of both law firms were carefully reviewed by the Court. The Court's efforts in discerning the reasonableness of the hours expended by the respective law firms were hampered by the paucity of detail in their respective billing records (see Matter of Rouke v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. 245 AD2d 870, 666 NYS2d 765 [3d 1997]). As stated, the billing statements cover a period of seventeen years that contain many mixed entries which do not differentiate between the multiple activities by counsel, e.g. Payne entries 6/26/91 DAR; Review file, attend conference with Judge LaPera, telephone with T. Costa; letter to T. Costa; billed 4 hours at $190 an hour; 2/20/92 DAR, Work on presentation; make presentation to Town Board at Medford board; billed 8.10 hours at $190 an hour; Gleich slip entry 12090 8/29/02; telephone call various appeal printers; telephone call Parviz, legal research, confer/w Gabe; Noughrey/Brookha/Farkas; billed 2 hours @ 275 per hour; Gleich slip entry 37242; 10/17/05; work on motion in limine; pre-trial memo; trial prep; Noughrey/Brookha/Farkas: 4 hours at $300 an hour.

Courts have routinely reduced fee awards where submitted billing records contain such "mixed entries" that do not provide the court and the opposing party with the definiteness to dispute their accuracy (see e.g. Domgan v Ponte, 972 F.2d 401 [1st Cir 1992]; vacated and remanded on other grounds, 507 U.S. 956, 113 S.Ct. 1378, 122 L. Ed.2d 754 [1993]; In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982 [ D.C. Cir 1989]). The Court finds that other entries are just as conclusory. There are multiple entries throughout both billing statements which are merely stated to be for research, trial prep, add and revise insert to memo, strategy, and work on presentation. Here, courts have also frequently [*6]found that such entries do not meet the specificity required for a fee award (see e.g. F.H. Krear & Co. v Nineteen Named Trusties, 810 F.2d 1250 [2d Cir. 1987]; Ragin v Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 870 F.Supp. 510 [S.D. NY 1994] [declining to award fees for entries described as "research for brief," "research for and draft brief," "draft and edit brief," "telephone conference" or "review files"]; Orshan v Macchiarola, 629 F. Supp. 1014 [E.D. N.Y.1986] [declining to award a fee for hours documented with vague descriptions like "review correspondence" or "prepare correspondence"]; Matter of Ury, 108 AD2d 816, supra , [reducing request where there was no categorical breakdown of services]; Matter of Schaich, 55 AD2d 914, 391 NYS2d 135 [1977] [reducing fee award where attorney had not documented hours]).

While time records need not be overly detailed, the records must be sufficiently specific so that a court may assess the reasonableness of the time expended in relation to the work performed (see Dailey v Societe Generale, 915 F.Supp 1315 [S.D.N.Y 1996]; United States Football League v National Football League, 887 F.2d 409 [2d Cir. 1989]). Records that do not adequately describe the nature of the work performed provide the court with justification for reducing fee awards accordingly (Veron v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 220 F.Supp 2d 223 [S.D.NY 2002]).

In light of the aforementioned deficiencies, plaintiff's application for attorney's fees was evaluated and taking into consideration defendants' objections to the billing statements (see Litigation Statutory Attorney's Fees, § 1983, Schwartz & Kirklin, supra ), the Court will exercise its discretion and not engage in a line-by-line adjustment in both billing applications to arrive at a reasonable fee. Rather, the Court will "deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application" (Kirsch v Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149,173 [2d Cir. 1998]).

Therefore, in its discretion, the Court has reduced the number of billable hours for Gleich for the time period from 8/3/94 to 12/31/99 from 1454.05 hours to 1354 hours and for the time period from 1/1/00 to 10/26/07 from 1465.25 hours to 1405 hours. For the time period 8/3/94 to 12/31/99, the Court awards Gleich as reasonable compensation at a blended rate (see Figueroa ex rel. Havre v Savanar Rest., Inc., 182 F. Supp 2d 339 [S.D.NY 2002]; LTGMANHB § 4:18) of $300.00 per hour, an award of $406,200.00 for 1354 hours and for the time period 1/1/00 to 10/26/07, at a blended rate of $300.00 per hour, an award of $421,500.00 for 1454.05 hours (see Myree v Local 41, Intl. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 847 F. Supp. 1059 [W.D.NY 1994]; affd 29 F. 3d 620 [2d Cir 1994]). The Court arrived at the aforementioned hourly rates based upon amounts the Second Circuit Courts were awarding as legal fees under the applicable civil rights statutes during the time period of plaintiff's action against defendants (see La Barbera v State Line Excavators Corp., 2007 WL 952068 [E.D.NY 2007]; Farbotko v Clinton County of New York, 433 F. 3d 204 [2d Cir. NY 2005]; Veron v Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 220 F. Supp 2d 223, supra ; Shannon v Fireman's Fund, 156 F. Supp 2d 279 (S.D.NY 2001]; Haley v Pataki, 901 F. Supp 85, supra ; Myree v Local 41, Intl. Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 847 F. Supp. 1059, supra ).

Gleich seeks reimbursement for disbursements in the amount of $28,899.08 for such items [*7]as the cost of computerized research, fees for photocopying, messenger fees, overnight delivery charges, expedited documents transmittal charges, travel, and parking expenses. Although these items are properly billed as disbursements and are recoverable under § 1988 (see Kuzuma v Internal Revenue Serv., 821 F. 2d 930 [2d Cir. 1987]), it is well settled that "computer research is merely a substitute for an attorney's time that is compensable under an application for attorney's fees and is not a separately taxable cost" (United States v Merritt-Meridan Constr. Corp., 95 F. 3d 153, 173 [2d Cir. 1996 ]; see also BD v DeBuono, 177 F. Supp 2d 201 [S.D.NY 2001]). The Court finds that under the facts and circumstances of this matter and in view of the award herein, computerized research fees are duplicative and inappropriate (see Marisol A.V. v Guiliani, 111 F. Supp. 2d 381 [S.D.NY 2000]; Scanlon v Kessler, 23 F. Supp 2d 413 [S.D.NY 1998]). "Costs and disbursements are statutory and the authority to tax same must clearly appear" (Wolper v New York Water Serv. Corp., 83 NYS2d 97, 99 [Sup Ct Kings County 1948]; C.J.S. Costs § 110). Further, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not allow recovery for airline tickets and hotel expenses. Therefore, plaintiff's application seeking disbursements in the sum of $10,081.74 for Westlaw research and $4,017.07 for an airline ticket and hotel billing in 2005, are denied.

Plaintiff also seeks a blended rate of $337.50 an hour for Payne. A review of the record indicates that Payne only had one attorney working on the file and charged $190.00 an hour over a five year period, which was well over fifteen years ago. This indicates that plaintiff is seeking an award of $163,657.50, nearly one hundred thousand dollars more than the unpaid balance of the legal fee due Payne in April, 1994 and gives plaintiff an incredible windfall. It does not appear from the billing records submitted on behalf of Payne that the legal issues during the time it represented plaintiff, were novel or complex. Therefore, for the reasons previously discussed regarding the lack of detail, the Court reduces the number of billable hours for Payne to be reimbursed from 485.30 to 430 hours at a billable rate of $150.00 per hour. The Court will not award a blended attorney fee to Payne but separately awards Payne a legal fee of $64,500.00 and disbursements of $2,814.79 for office expenses, excluding legal research, making a total due Payne of $67,314.79.

In addition, plaintiff seeks reimbursement in the amount of $16,500.00 for the services of an expert real estate appraiser. The recovery of expenditures of expert fees to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1981(a) is limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (see Ramos Padro v Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 100 F. Supp. 2d 99 [D.P.R. 2000]; affd as modified 247 F. 3d 288 [1st Cir 2001]; West Virginia Univ. Hosp. Inc. v Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 111 S.Ct 1138, 113 L.Ed. 2d 68 [1991]). Therefore, that portion of plaintiff's application is denied.

The calculation of the fee award does not end with the computation of the lodestar award. "Other factors may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the results obtained" (Haley v Pataki, 901 F. Supp 85, supra , citation omitted; see also Gonzalez v Bratton, 147 F. Supp 2d 180 [S.D. NY 2001]). Here, plaintiff has not sustained his burden of proof to justify an adjustment of the fee awarded (see Grant v Martinez, 973 F. 2d 96 [2d Cir 1992]).

Accordingly, the plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees and disbursements as set forth above. [*8]This constitutes the Order and Judgment of the Court.

DATED: __________________________________________________

THOMAS F. WHELAN, J.S.C.