Nunes v 1320 Heritage Place, LLC |
2006 NY Slip Op 52323(U) [13 Misc 3d 144(A)] |
Decided on November 29, 2006 |
Appellate Term, Second Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports. |
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Nassau County, First District (Martin J. Massell, J.), entered April 14, 2005. The judgment, insofar as appealed from as limited by defendant's brief, after a nonjury trial, dismissed defendant's counterclaim.
Judgment affirmed without costs.
This small claims action was commenced by plaintiffs against their former landlord to recover the sum of $1,274.96, representing a security deposit which was not returned to them after they vacated a leased apartment. Defendant counterclaimed for $2,749.05, seeking damages for "arrears," "parking" and "breach of lease." Following a nonjury trial, the court awarded plaintiffs the principal sum of $1,274.96 and dismissed defendant's counterclaim. Defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from that portion of the judgment which dismissed its counterclaim.
The standard of review on an appeal of a small claims judgment is whether "substantial justice has . . . been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" (UDCA 1807). The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is obvious that its conclusions could not be reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence, particularly when the findings of fact rest in large measure on considerations relating to the credibility of witnesses. This principle "applies with greater force" to judgments rendered in small claims proceedings, given the limited scope of review (Williams v Roper, 269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]; see also Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Moses v Randolph, 236 AD2d 706, 707 [1997]).
After reviewing the record, we find that substantial justice was done between the parties [*2]according to the rules and principles of substantive law (UDCA 1804, 1807). While it appears that plaintiffs may not have executed the actual renewal lease, the lease could properly be "deemed" to have been renewed (see Emergency Tenant Protection Regulations [9 NYCRR] § 2503.5 [b] [2]) by virtue of plaintiffs' execution of the lease rider, their remaining in possession into the renewal period, their payment of the increased rental amount for a one-year renewal lease, and acceptance of that amount following the expiration of the original lease by defendant and its predecessor. The counterclaim was based in part upon plaintiffs' alleged failures to pay the November 2002 rent, due under the lease as renewed, and to give timely notice of their intent to vacate at the end of January 2003, thereby rendering them liable for the rent which accrued for the month of February 2003. However, the record permits a finding, that in November of 2002, plaintiff Michael Nunes paid the November 2002 rent to defendant's predecessor; that, at that time, he gave notice to defendant's predecessor of his intention to vacate the premises, and that defendant's predecessor expressly acknowledged said notice and showed the apartment in the interim period to prospective tenants. While the counterclaim further sought arrears owed for parking, we note that no proof was submitted with respect to this issue. Under the circumstances, giving deference to the credibility determination of the lower court, we are of the view that the court below properly dismissed defendant's counterclaim.
Angiolillo, J.P., McCabe and Tanenbaum, JJ., concur.
Decision Date: November 29, 2006