Matter of Rivera v New York State Div. of Parole |
2005 NY Slip Op 08789 [23 AD3d 863] |
November 17, 2005 |
Appellate Division, Third Department |
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
In the Matter of Manuel Rivera, Appellant, v New York State Division of Parole, Respondent. |
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Cardona, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kavanagh, J.), entered October 21, 2004 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review determinations of the Board of Parole denying petitioner's request for parole release and the disclosure of certain documents under the Freedom of Information Law.
Following his conviction of numerous felonies arising from three separate incidents occurring in 1985, 1986 and 1987, petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 15
Initially, we agree with Supreme Court that the Board's determination made after the April 2003 de novo hearing is rendered moot by petitioner's December 2003 reappearance before the Board (see Matter of Baez v Travis, 10 AD3d 778 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 702 [2004]). As for the Board's December 2003 determination, we find no indication that it reflects a " 'showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety' " such as would warrant annulment (Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980]). The record discloses that, in addition to the serious nature of petitioner's crimes, the Board considered petitioner's program participation, prison disciplinary record and postrelease plans. Thus, the Board properly took into account the statutory factors set forth in Executive Law § 259-i and was not required to articulate each specific factor in its decision or give each factor equal weight (see Matter of Wan Zhang v Travis, 10 AD3d 828, 829 [2004]; Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789, 790 [2004]).
As for petitioner's request for the disclosure of his parole records under the Freedom of Information Law, it appears that respondent granted petitioner's latest request in March 2005 to the extent required by law. Consequently, inasmuch as petitioner has been afforded all of the relief to which he is entitled, this claim is moot (see Matter of Ramos v New York State Div. of Parole, 2 AD3d 936, 937 [2003]). We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find that they are either unpreserved for our review or are lacking in merit.
Mercure, Carpinello, Mugglin and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.