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Bergdorf Goodman Inc. v Hillard
2003 NY Slip Op 51544(U)
Decided on November 21, 2003
Appellate Term, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law ยง 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the Official Reports.


Decided on November 21, 2003
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE TERM : 2nd and 11th JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

PRESENT:PESCE, P.J., PATTERSON and RIOS, JJ.
NO. 2002-1795 K C

BERGDORF GOODMAN INC., Appellant,

against

DAVID HILLARD, Respondent, -and LATIA HILLARD, Defendant.


Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the Civil Court, Kings County (K. Yellen, J.), entered November 15, 2002, granting defendant David Hillard's motion to vacate a default judgment.


Order unanimously reversed without costs and defendant David Hillard's motion to vacate a default judgment denied.

A defendant seeking to vacate a default must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense to the action (Putney v Pearlman, 203 AD2d 333). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (Bardales v Blades, 191 AD2d 667, 668). The court improvidently exercised its discretion in this case, however, and reversal is warranted (see generally Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568). Defendant did not proffer any defense to the action and provided only a bare, unsubstantiated allegation that his wife had problems with a pregnancy as an excuse (see Westchester Med. Ctr. v ELRAC, Inc., 301 AD2d 518; Eretz Funding v Shalosh Assocs., 266 AD2d 184). Furthermore, the motion was made approximately 17 months after entry of the default judgment, and defendant provides no excuse for this delay (see generally Molesky v Molesky, 255 AD2d 821).
Decision Date: November 21, 2003