## AGGRAVATED CRIMINAL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON Penal Law § 265.19

(Committed on or after Mar. 16, 2013)

(Revised July 2016 & Dec. 2022)1

The (*specify*) count is Aggravated Criminal Possession of a Weapon.

Under our law, a person is guilty of Aggravated Criminal Possession of a Weapon when that person knowingly <sup>2</sup> possesses any loaded firearm <sup>3</sup> and also commits (<u>specify underlying violent or drug trafficking felony</u>)<sup>4</sup> arising out of the same criminal transaction. <sup>5</sup> Such possession shall not

The December 2022 revision was for the purpose of adding the text accompanying footnote (10).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In July 2016, in light of *People v Parrilla*, 204 NY 397 (2016), the charge was revised to better state the law with respect to the element of "knowingly."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The word "knowingly" has been added to this definition to comport with statutory law (see Penal Law § § 15.00(2) and 15.05 [2]) and with case law. People v Persce, 204 NY 397, 402 (1912) ("the possession [of a slungshot] which is meant is a knowing and voluntary one"); People v Saunders, 85 NY2d 339, 341-42 (1995) ("'Possession,' as part of the forbidden act, includes the Penal Law definitional component of '[v]oluntary act,' which incorporates the attribute of awareness of the possession or control . . . . Thus, the corpus delicti of weapons possession . . . is the voluntary, aware act of the possession of a weapon"); People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 440 (1985) (the offense of possession of a loaded firearm requires that the possession be knowing).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The words "possesses any loaded firearm" are inserted to replace "commits the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as defined in subdivision three of section 265.03 of this article."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Here the statute reads as follows: "any violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this chapter or a drug trafficking felony as defined in subdivision twenty-one of section 10.00 of this chapter."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The term "criminal transaction" is not defined by this statute. There is a definition of that term in CPL 40.10 (2). Whether that definition, as set forth in that section in its subdivision (a) or (b), or both, applies here remains to be determined (see generally People v Duggins, 3 NY3d 522, 533 [2004]).

constitute a violation of this law if such possession takes place in such person's home or place of business.

The following terms used in that definition have a special meaning:

A FIREARM means any pistol or revolver.6

A LOADED FIREARM means any firearm loaded with ammunition which may be used to discharge such firearm [or, any firearm which is possessed by one who, at the same time, possesses a quantity of ammunition which may be used to discharge such firearm.]<sup>7</sup>

POSSESS means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.8

A person KNOWINGLY possesses a firearm when that person is aware that he or she is in possession of an object that is a firearm.<sup>9</sup> That person need not know (that is, be aware of) the object's name or whether it meets the definition of a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Penal Law § 265.00 (3). The statutory definition of a "firearm" also includes certain types of shotguns or rifles, and an "assault weapon," and excludes an "antique firearm." If the firearm in issue is an applicable shotgun or rifle, or if it is in issue whether the firearm is an "antique firearm," see the "Additional Charges" section at the end of the "table of contents" of the charges for this article for the appropriate charge.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Penal Law § 265.00 (15). For an expanded charge on the definition of "knowingly," see Instructions of General Applicability, Culpable Mental States, Knowingly.

<sup>8</sup> Penal Law § 10.00 (8). Where constructive possession is alleged, or where the People rely on a statutory presumption of possession, insert the appropriate instruction from the "Additional Charges" section at the end of this chapter.

<sup>9</sup> See Penal Law § 15.05(2). For an expanded instruction on the definition of "knowingly," see Instructions of General Applicability, Culpable Mental States, Knowingly.

## firearm.<sup>10</sup>]

Under this count, the firearm must be loaded and operable. To be operable, a firearm must be capable of discharging ammunition. The person in possession of a firearm is not required to know that the firearm was loaded or operable.<sup>11</sup>

[If in issue: "Home" has its ordinary meaning as a structure within which a person lives. "home" also includes those areas around the home in which a person would reasonably be entitled to the privacy normally associated with a person's home.]

10 See People v Parrilla, 27 N.Y.3d 400, 405 (2016) (when possession of a gravity knife was a crime, defendants were required to know that "they possessed a knife" but the People were not required "to prove that defendants knew that the knife in their possession met the statutory definition of a gravity knife"); People v Hernandez, 180 AD3d 1234, 1237 (3d Dept 2020) ("Contrary to defendant's contention, the court was not required to instruct the jury that the People were required to show that defendant was aware of the legal definition of a blackjack. The characteristics of the blackjack at issue—a lead core, surrounded by leather, which is flexible and used as a weapon-make 'the inherently dangerous nature of the prohibited object be readily apparent, so as to put [defendant] on clear notice that the object is potentially subject to government regulation or prohibition' . . . . Accordingly, the People did not have to prove that defendant was aware of the statutory definition of a blackjack"); People v Steinmetz, 177 AD3d 1292, 1293 (4th Dept 2019) ("The People were not required to establish that defendant knew the rifles met the statutory criteria of an assault weapon but, rather, only that he knowingly possessed the rifles"); People v Abdullah, 206 AD3d 1340, 1344 (3d Dept 2022) (knowing possession of a slungshot is required but a defendant need not know the dictionary definition of slungshot).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Case law has added "operability" of a firearm as an element of the crime (see People v Longshore, 86 NY2d 851, 852 [1995]), but has further held that there is no requirement that the possessor know the firearm was operable (see People v Parrilla, 27 NY3d 400 [2016] ["Defendants need only knowingly possess a firearm, they need not know that the firearm was loaded or operable"]; People v Saunders, 85 NY2d 339, 341-342 [1995]; People v Ansare, 96 AD2d 96, 97 [4th Dept 1983]). In December 2022, the last sentence was substituted for: "The defendant is not required to know that the firearm was operable."

"Home" does not include any area around the home that is subject to unlimited public access, no matter how closely related a person may feel to that particular area as part of what that person calls "home," or the extent to which a person uses the area as one would a part of his or her home.<sup>12</sup>]

## (Specify name and definition of underlying crime)<sup>13</sup>

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, the People are required to prove from all of the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, each of the following five elements:

- 1. That on or about (<u>date</u>), in the county of (<u>County</u>), the defendant, (<u>defendant's name</u>), possessed a firearm;
- 2. That the defendant did so knowingly;
- 3. That the firearm was loaded and operable;
- 4. That the defendant possessed such firearm in a place that was not the defendant's home or place of business; and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See People v Powell, 54 NY2d 524, 530 (1981) ("[T]he common though unarticulated thread of all of the decisions above referred to is, as the Appellate Division suggests, whether the possessor of the weapon was entitled to 'privacy, as one would have in his home' in the area where he was apprehended with the weapon. The very antithesis of privacy is unlimited public access, no matter how closely related the possessor, as a subjective matter, may feel to the particular area as part of what he calls 'home,' or the extent to which he uses the area as one would a part of his home.")

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> With respect to defining the underlying crime, if the underlying crime is a separate count within the indictment, reference to the crime or count is sufficient.

5. That the defendant also committed (<u>specify violent</u> <u>or drug trafficking felony</u>) arising out of the same criminal transaction.

If you find the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt each of those elements, you must find the defendant guilty of this crime.

If you find the People have not proven beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of those elements, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.