Opinion 25-01

February 6, 2025

Digest:   A judge need not disqualify in matters involving the judge’s former election opponent, provided the judge can be fair and impartial. 

Rules:    Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(E)(1); Opinions 19-78; 90-136; People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403 (1987).

Opinion:

          The inquiring judge was opposed during his/her recent election campaign by a practicing attorney who may appear before the judge in the future.  The judge describes the campaign as uneventful, without “debates or any acrimonious interactions.”  The judge asks if he/she must disqualify when the former election opponent appears.

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety and act to promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]).  A judge must disqualify in any proceeding where the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned,” including where required by rule or law (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]; Judiciary Law § 14).  Where disqualification is not mandatory, however, the judge is the sole arbiter of recusal, a discretionary decision within the personal conscience of the court (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405 [1987]).

          A judge need not disqualify merely because an attorney appearing before the judge on behalf of a client is the judge’s former election opponent (see Opinions 19-78; 90-136).  As we explained in Opinion 90-136:

Whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned in this case depends on the facts and circumstances, including the time elapsed, the bitterness of the campaign, and the personal quality of the campaign. This Committee is not in a position to pass on such factual issues and the judge must decide for himself or herself whether his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Of course, if the judge doubts his or her ability to be impartial, the judge must disqualify himself or herself.

Indeed, considering these factors, we have advised that a former opponent’s legal challenge to the judge’s nominating petition does not, by itself, mandate disqualification (see Opinion 19-78).  We reasoned that the filing of litigation challenging nominating petitions is a “common circumstance in contested election campaigns” that does not by itself establish a level of “bitterness” mandating disqualification (id.). 

          Here, as the judge indicates the campaign was neither controversial nor acrimonious, the judge need not disqualify in matters involving the judge’s former election opponent, provided the judge can be fair and impartial.