Opinion 24-202/24-203

 

February 6, 2025

 

Digest:   A judge may participate in the appointment or reappointment of the county jury commissioner, even if the commissioner’s first-degree relative was the judge’s election opponent.

 

Rules:    Judiciary Law § 503; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(E)(1); Opinions 23-16; 21-54; 19-128; 19-78; 16-84; 90-136.

 

Opinion:

 

          The inquiring judge serves on a county jury board pursuant to Judiciary Law § 503.  The judge asks if it is ethically permissible to participate in the appointment or reappointment process for a prospective or incumbent jury commissioner whose first-degree relative by blood or marriage (i.e. a spouse, parent, or child) was previously an election opponent of the judge.  Nothing in the inquiry suggests any particular acrimony during the campaign, and the judge is confident in their ability to be fair and impartial in discharging their judicial duties.

 

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]).  A judge must disqualify him/herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]).

 

          We have seldom had the opportunity to address judicial ethics questions concerning a judge’s service on a county jury board.  Indeed, in Opinion 21-54, we concluded that we cannot advise on whether Part 8 of the Rules of the Chief Judge precludes a county jury board from appointing or reappointing a jury commissioner whose spouse has assumed full-time judicial office within the same county.

 

          Since the present inquiry appears to be a matter of first impression, we turn to our precedent concerning direct political opponents for guidance.  We have advised that a judge need not recuse when an attorney appearing before the judge was the judge’s unsuccessful opponent in a political campaign a year and a half earlier (see Opinion 90-136).  As we explained (id.):

 

Whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned in this case depends on the facts and circumstances, including the time elapsed, the bitterness of the campaign, and the personal quality of the campaign. This Committee is not in a position to pass on such factual issues and the judge must decide for himself or herself whether his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Of course, if the judge doubts his or her ability to be impartial, the judge must disqualify himself or herself.

 

          Likewise, we advised that a judge need not disqualify when an attorney appearing before the judge was the judge’s recent election opponent in a now concluded political campaign during which the candidates challenged the sufficiency of each other’s nominating petitions (see Opinion 19-78).  We reasoned that the filing of litigation challenging nominating petitions is a “common circumstance in contested election campaigns” that does not by itself establish a level of “bitterness” mandating disqualification (id.).  Again, we reiterated that the judge must “decide for himself or herself” whether, in light of the litigation or other circumstances touching upon the bitterness or personal quality of the campaign, his/her impartiality might reasonably be questioned (see id., citing Opinion 90-136; see also Opinion 16-84 [reaching the same conclusion where the attorney who previously represented the judge’s election opponent appeared before the judge]).

 

          Here, the potential conflict is far less direct, as the prospective or incumbent jury commissioner was never the judge’s election opponent, but is only a first-degree relative of that former election opponent.  Moreover, the factual circumstances as described do not evince bitterness or acrimony during the judge’s campaign.  Accordingly, we conclude there is no reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality with respect to participating in the appointment or reappointment process for the prospective or incumbent jury commissioner (cf. Opinion 19-128 [concluding that a village trustee’s spouse may serve as village court clerk, even though a village trustee may not]).  We note that it is ethically immaterial if the judge’s spouse volunteered on the campaign of the commissioner’s relative’s election opponent(s), as “we have routinely acknowledged that spouses retain independent political identities” (Opinion 23-16).

 

          Accordingly, we conclude this judge may participate in the appointment or reappointment of the county jury commissioner, even if the commissioner’s first-degree relative was the judge’s election opponent.