Opinion 24-167

October 30, 2024

Digest:    The Rules Governing Judicial Conduct do not preclude a judge from presiding in cases involving a particular litigant, merely because that litigant has brought a federal action challenging the judge’s legal authority to preside in those cases.  We cannot comment on legal issues, including the merits of the federal action.

Rules:      Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.3(E)(1); Opinions 20-61; 16-126; 14-105; 13-41; 12-94; 10-69; 98-69; 88-54.

Opinion:

The inquiring judge has several cases pending in his/her court involving a particular litigant.  That litigant has now brought a federal action against the judge challenging the judge’s legal authority to preside in such cases. The judge asks if he/she is “automatically disqualified” from presiding over matters involving the litigant while the federal action is pending.

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and act to promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]).  A judge must disqualify in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]), including in specific circumstances required by rule or law (see generally id.; Judiciary Law § 14).

          It is well-established that a judge may continue to preside in a matter after a litigant files a federal lawsuit against the judge or other collateral attack on the judge’s decision, provided the judge can be fair and impartial (see e.g. Opinions 20-61; 16-126; 14-105; 98-69; 88-54; see also Opinion 12-94 [judge may also preside in unrelated proceeding where the litigant appears]).  As we stated in Opinion 13-41 (citations and most quotation marks omitted):

[T]he fact that a litigant has asserted various claims, in different forums, against the presiding judge alleging judicial, civil and criminal misconduct, does not provide an adequate basis by itself for requiring disqualification in the proceeding.  Indeed, any rule requiring automatic recusal under such circumstances could enable disgruntled litigants to engage in “judge shopping.”

          Here, too, we conclude that the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct do not preclude the inquiring judge from presiding in matters involving the litigant, provided the judge believes he/she can be fair and impartial. 

          Given that the federal action apparently raises questions about the judge’s legal authority to preside in certain cases, however, we emphasize that we cannot comment on legal issues, including the merits of the federal action.

          Finally, for completeness, we note that our prior opinions address a judge’s obligations while he/she is being represented in his/her official capacity by the Attorney General’s office.  During the representation, the judge must disqualify in matters involving a specific assistant attorney general who is representing the judge, but need not otherwise disclose or disqualify “where the Attorney General is not in fact directly or personally involved in the case, the assistant attorney general who is appearing is not the same assistant attorney general who is currently representing the judge in the federal court case, and the judge believes that he/she can be impartial” (Opinion 10-69).