Opinion 24-159

October 30, 2024

Digest:  A Family Court judge may not accept payment from an animal legal defense fund to teach a law school course on animal law.

Rules:   22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.4(A)(1)-(3); 100.4(H)(1); Opinions 23-233; 19-143.

Opinion:

          A Family Court judge asks if he/she may accept an adjunct position that is funded by a grant or stipend from the Animal Legal Defense Fund to teach an animal law course at a law school.  The Animal Legal Defense Fund is, according to its website, an advocacy group that “files high-impact lawsuits to protect animals from harm, provides free legal assistance and training to prosecutors in their fight against animal cruelty, supports animal protection legislation, and provides resources and opportunities to law students and professionals to advance the field of animal law.”   We understand that the proposed grant would be given to the law school, which would in turn compensate the inquirer in the amount of the grant.

          A judge must always avoid even the appearance of impropriety and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2[A]).  A judge may engage in extra-judicial activities not incompatible with judicial office if they do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially, detract from the dignity of judicial office, or interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties (see 22 NYCRR 100.4[A][1]-[3]).  As relevant here, a full-time judge may “receive compensation” for permissible extra-judicial activities, “if the source of such payments does not give the appearance of influencing the judge’s performance of judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety” (22 NYCRR 100.4[H][1]). 

          Clearly, a full-time judge may be employed and compensated for teaching as an adjunct professor at a law school if other ethical considerations are satisfied (see e.g. Opinions 23-233; 19-143).  The issue presented here relates to the source of the judge’s teaching stipend. 

          While it is unlikely that the Animal Legal Defense Fund will appear as a party in Family Court, issues relating to ownership of a pet, terms of a protective order, abuse of a pet as a factor in custody or parental fitness, or use of a pet as leverage in domestic conflicts, may and do arise in Family Court proceedings.  A judge known to receive funding directly or indirectly from an animal rights advocacy group, however well-intentioned, might well be perceived to harbor a predilection in such cases, or to accord issues relating to animal welfare undue importance.  Accordingly, we find that accepting compensation from this animal rights advocacy group is impermissible.  We find the two-step process of compensating the inquirer to be of no ethical significance to this outcome.

          Finally, as the inquirer has expressed a willingness to teach an animal law course without compensation, we see no ethical bar to such an arrangement, assuming the judge concludes he/she will be able to perform judicial duties fairly and impartially, even if they involve animal rights.