Opinion 22-181

December 15, 2022

Digest:         A trial court judge may hire a law student for a judicial internship for academic credit while the student is simultaneously employed part-time in a non-legal paid position at an investment bank which has cases before the judge. Assuming the judge can be fair and impartial, the judge may still preside in cases involving the bank, but must disclose to the parties the student’s relationship with the bank and insulate the student from those cases.

Rules:          Judiciary Law § 14; 22 NYCRR 100.2; 100.2(A); 100.2(B); 100.3(C)(2); 100.3(E)(1); 100.3(E)(1)(a)-(f); Opinions 15-14; 13-80; 09-111(B); 09-111(A); People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403 (1987).

Opinion:

         The inquiring full-time judge asks for guidance about hiring a law student for a temporary, short-term judicial internship in the judge’s trial court. The student currently has a paid, part-time job working in a non-legal position at an investment bank which currently has cases before the judge. The student wishes to continue working for the bank while also doing the judicial internship with the judge for academic credit. If the judge may hire the student as a judicial intern, the judge asks what to do in the bank’s cases that are before the judge.

         A judge must avoid even the appearance of impropriety (see 22 NYCRR 100.2) and must act to promote public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[A]). A judge must not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment (see 22 NYCRR 100.2[B]) and must require the judge’s staff to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[C][2]). Further, the judge must disqualify from any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned” (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1]), including where expressly required by rule or law (see 22 NYCRR 100.3[E][1][a]-[f]; Judiciary Law § 14). If objective criteria do not require disqualification, the judge “is the sole arbiter of recusal” (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403 [1987]).

         Ordinarily, we advise “that a judge’s impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned based solely on his/her law clerk’s conflict; instead, it is generally sufficient to insulate the law clerk as needed,” provided the judge can be fair and impartial (Opinion 15-14). Likewise, in Opinion 13-80, we said a judge may hire a law student for a judicial internship and may preside in cases in which the student’s parent’s law firm regularly appears, if the judge can be fair and impartial, discloses the student’s relationship with the parent’s law firm, and insulates the student from involvement with those cases. Notwithstanding the presumed lifelong and intimate connection between the student and their parent, and that the parent’s law firm appears “regularly” before the judge, we found that disclosure and insulation of the student intern from cases involving their parent’s law firm was sufficient to dispel any possible appearance of impropriety, provided the judge can be fair and impartial.

         Here, the law student’s employment relationship with the bank is presumably shorter in duration and less personal than the connections involved in Opinion 13-80. We conclude this judge’s impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned in cases involving the bank, simply because the judge’s temporary student intern also has a part-time non-legal job with the bank, provided the student’s paid employment with the bank is disclosed and the student is insulated from any involvement in the bank’s cases.

         Accordingly, this judge may hire the law student as a judicial intern and permit the student to continue paid employment with the bank, provided the judge insulates the intern from the bank’s cases and discloses the insulation and the basis for it. Assuming the judge can be fair and impartial in matters involving the bank – a matter left to the judge’s sole discretion – the judge may preside after insulation and disclosure.¹

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¹ We distinguish Opinion 09-111(B), which involved an appellate court’s proposal to “engage volunteer attorneys who are being paid stipends by private law firms in exchange for deferred employment” as part of a temporary judicial fellowship program. That program, as proposed, had the potential for widespread disruption of operations and a strong appearance of impropriety, which simply is not present here in the hiring decision of an individual trial judge (cf. also Opinion 09-111[A] [noting that “procedures with respect to disclosure, insulation and disqualification” are different at the appellate level]).