1	COURT OF APPEALS		
2	STATE OF NEW YORK		
3			
4	PEOPLE,		
5	Respondent,		
6	-against- NO. 8		
7	DIVINE FREDERICKS,		
8	Appellant.		
9	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor January 8, 202		
10	Before:		
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON		
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA		
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO		
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN		
15	Appoarances.		
16	Appearances:		
17	V. MARIKA MEIS, ESQ. CENTER FOR APPELLATE LITIGATION		
18	Attorney for Appellant 120 Wall Street		
19	28th Floor New York, NY 10005		
20	NICOLE NECKLES, ESQ.		
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23			
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25	Official Court Transcribe		



1 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Next case on the calendar is 2 People v. Divine Fredericks. 3 MS. MEIS: Good afternoon, Your Honors. 4 Meis, for appellant, Divine Fredericks. I'd like to 5 reserve three minutes for rebuttal. 6 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes. 7 MS. MEIS: Mr. Fredericks' detailed and specific 8 request for new counsel raised a serious possibility of a 9 breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that required 10 the court to conduct a minimal inquiry. It did not do so. 11 Moreover, counsel impermissibly opposed - - -12 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What specific complaints did he 13 make that required the court to - - -14 MS. MEIS: Okay. So he - - - there's really two 15 One is his communication with categories of areas here. 16 his lawyer. He raises the issue and specific facts that 17 his lawyer has denied requests for meetings in person or by 18 video, that his lawyer has hung up on him, his lawyer has 19 been disrespectful to him and his wife. 20 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Did he explain the circumstances 2.1 - - - context of the hanging up or the claimed hanging up 2.2 or the disrespect of his wife? 23 MS. MEIS: No. But he did give specific facts, 24 unlike in Porto, where you just have a form complaint where



the defendant circled some pre-printed ideas and didn't

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1	write anything in the factual space that was provided.		
2	This is more like Sides. What's he what he's saying		
3	here		
4	JUDGE CANNATARO: Don't don't all		
5	telephonic conversations end with someone hanging up?		
6	MS. MEIS: Well, I think the clear inference is		
7	that he hung up on him before		
8	JUDGE CANNATARO: He wanted to be		
9	MS. MEIS: He wanted to		
10	JUDGE CANNATARO: He wanted the conversation		
11	_		
12	MS. MEIS: Right.		
13	JUDGE CANNATARO: to end.		
14	MS. MEIS: But it was termed		
15	JUDGE CANNATARO: Is that a specific factual		
16	allegation that was even made in this case?		
17	MS. MEIS: He's saying he hung up on him. The		
18	clear inference of that is that I wasn't done with whatev		
19	I needed to communicate. And collectively, they're saying		
20	he's saying I'm not communicating with my lawyer.		
21	And this court has recognized in Sides that the		
22	communication between a client and a lawyer, trust between		
23	a client and lawyer is central to the attorney-client		
24	relationship. So that warranted inquiry. You have a		



separate series of - - of complaints he makes about his

lawyer sort of not fighting for him. He says his lawyer is not working in his best interest. He's not - - - he's making arguments for the prosecution. He's telling him just to plead guilty and not engaging with him in preparing for trial. So that too suggests that there's been a breakdown in communication. Those are seemingly serious complaints - - -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: Aren't those - - -

MS. MEIS: - - - that triggered - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - generalized arguments that - - or assertions that have been put forth in a number of - - - of complaints about counsel? When, for whatever reason, I just - - - I don't want this attorney. I want another one.

MS. MEIS: They're - - - they're not just generalized complaints like you've seen in some other cases. It's - - - it's specific here. He's giving facts. He's saying, look at - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: He's not fighting for me. does that mean?

MS. MEIS: Well, he said, referencing the prior court date, specific statements his lawyer made were arguments made on behalf of the prosecution. He is raising specific facts. And it's precisely because the court didn't conduct any inquiry, that he didn't allow Mr.

Fredericks to elaborate on those complaints. We have, in fact, in the record Mr. Fredericks' subsequent letters and his grievance where he says, in fact, he was only communicating with the defense investigator. He was never meeting face to face with his lawyer or having conversations with him where he was allowed to communicate and talk about his case.

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: There's a couple of other things that strike me as a little odd about the - - - the colloquy and - - - and the transcript. You know, I think, frequently, we've seen defendants who ask for a new lawyer because they're trying to delay things, and it's just lawyer number four, lawyer number five, I need a lawyer, I need a lawyer. My understanding is this is the first time he asked for anything, and one of his complaints is that his lawyer was delaying the case.

MS. MEIS: Exactly, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: It seemed a little unusual.

And the other thing that seemed unusual in the record was that his lawyer says, you know, he - - - he's just shooting the messenger, which is an implication - - - shooting the messenger usually, the way I understand that idiom is, you're blaming the person who's delivering the message when it's really the message you don't like, but you've transferred that bad feeling to the messenger. The

1 messenger in this case is his lawyer, which at least 2 arguably seems to me that the lawyer has in some way 3 acknowledged that there's this breakdown in the 4 relationship. 5 MS. MEIS: I think that's correct, Your Honor. 6 This isn't an eleventh hour request made on the morning of 7 jury selection like in Porto or in many of the other cases. 8 This is made a year and a - - - over a year and a half 9 before trial. And he's saying, yes, my lawyer, in fact, is 10 delaying the case. He knows I don't want him on this case 11 anymore, and he's delaying it and trying to stay on, so - -12 13 JUDGE SINGAS: But can't that also go to the 14 seriousness of his complaint? I mean, the - - - the people 15 are announcing not ready, and him accusing his lawyer of 16 joining in the unpreparedness of the people, why can't the 17 judge decide that's not a serious allegation here. 18 MS. MEIS: Well, it's a - - -19 JUDGE SINGAS: Why - - - why shouldn't we defer -20 2.1 MS. MEIS: It's - - -2.2 JUDGE SINGAS: - - - to the trial court? MS. MEIS: 23 It's seemingly serious. And this



very nature of the disagreement and whether it can be

court has required that the minimal inquiry probe into the

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resolved. That wasn't done at all here. The court didn't ask any probing questions about what was really going on and whether the lawyer and - - and Mr. Fredericks could continue in a relationship that would work. You have a young man who was facing fifty to life, really serious charges, and if he's not communicating at all with his lawyer, that definitely triggered the minimal inquiry requirement. And there's no way to - - to say that what was done here by the trial court came anywhere near what was required under the minimal inquiry. He had to ask at least some questions the court. And he didn't ask anything about what was really - - -

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JUDGE SINGAS: So - - so is it because no questions were asked or because he only relied on the defense attorney? What's your position on that?

MS. MEIS: Well, it's both, Your Honor. First of all, what the defense attorney said was not really responsive to Mr. Fredericks' complaints, and it was sort of a backhand dismissal of what Mr. Fredericks had said. But the court also asked no questions either of Mr. Fredericks even after his lawyer had said things in opposition to the motion. He didn't give him a chance to respond. He didn't say, do you have anything else to add? What - - what is really going on here?

JUDGE SINGAS: Do you think it matters here in



this case where you had a detailed list in long form that counsel - - - the defendant gave him because I mean, the minimal inquiry is just to apprise the judge of what the breakdown could potentially be, to give them some minimal information.

MS. MEIS: Right. The - - -

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JUDGE SINGAS: Does the - - - does the letter here serve that purpose?

MS. MEIS: The letter said enough to make a seemingly serious request that triggered the inquiry. The inquiry - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Was the letter or grievance information before the court at the time that it made its decision?

MS. MEIS: The subsequent letter that Mr.

Fredericks later filed, no. But I think it gives this

court an example of what Mr. Fredericks might have said had

he been given the chance to actually speak about his

complaints. And so you have that in the record, and that's

relevant. But what - - what the attorney said didn't

really answer Mr. Fredericks' detailed and specific

complaints. It didn't address them, and the court didn't

ask a single question of either the lawyer or Mr.

Fredericks that was required here. You have to probe the

nature of the disagreement, see if it can be resolved. You



can imagine the court would have said, Counsel, I gave you a chance to discuss this motion with your client. Did you come to some sort of resolution? Are you going to have a way to communicate in the - - - in the future? Mr.

Fredericks, is there anything you want to add? None of that happened. That's not a minimal inquiry under this court's clear precedence. And then turning to counsel's opposing the motion, the court asked him, are you going to adopt this motion? There's here a motion for a request for new counsel. Counsel says, I'm opposing that. There's no way to - - -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: Was counsel allowed to explain what he or she has or hasn't done in a particular case, or what they kept - - - what they believe the nature of the disagreement to be so that the court can make a determination? Can they set forth information for the court to make that decision?

MS. MEIS: I think under this court's precedent, there is a line that is drawn between providing some information at the request of the court about the dispute or alleged ineffectiveness. But here, the court didn't ask a single question. Counsel sua sponte went into this sort of backhand dismissal that the first - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Did the court have the - - - so you're saying that the defense counsel was only permitted



1	to explain if the court said, please explain?			
2	MS. MEIS: Under this court's precedence, I thin			
3	so, yes. But beyond that, he clearly said, I'm opposing			
4	that. In in Mitchell, the lawyer said something			
5	nearly identical, saying I do not adopt the merits or			
6	factual assertions. This court found that crossed the			
7	line.			
8	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Did he look at the context in			
9	which those words were stated?			
10	MS. MEIS: I mean, I don't think there's any			
11	other context than the court saying, what's your position			
12	on this request for new counsel? First, was that			
13	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, he doesn't quite say			
14	that, right? The court the court asks, are you			
15	adopting the motion? Right?			
16	MS. MEIS: Correct. He asked that at the first			
17	call. The lawyer says, I don't know anything about it.			
18	The court gives an adjournment for him to			
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah. Right.			
20	MS. MEIS: discuss it. And then he			
21	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But don't you think that's			
22	the question that the lawyer is answering or is asked			
23	to answer? Let's start there.			
24	MS. MEIS: Sure. But if he's if he's			
25	saying I'm opposing the motion instead of saying I I			



1 -- I'm taking no position, which is permissible, or 2 maybe even - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, could he say I'm not 4 adopting it? That's what you asked me. 5 MS. MEIS: I think he could maybe say no, but to 6 actually oppose it affirmatively makes him an adversary 7 against his pro se client. 8 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So is it - - - those words - - -9 those words alone, that's the end of it. It doesn't matter 10 what follows if one deemed it an explanation? MS. MEIS: I think what follows makes it even 11 12 more problematic because he, first of all, doesn't really 13 address the substance of Mr. Fredericks' motion. 14 the extent that he does, he backhandedly dismisses it and 15 suggests that it has no merit. That's addressing the 16 merits. That's opposing his client's motion. All of that 17 is prohibited under this court's clear precedent. 18 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: He does address it a little 19 bit in that he says, I think, I or my private investigator 20 have met with him any number of times. 2.1 MS. MEIS: He says, I have given him everything. 2.2 We have gone over this, essentially. But that doesn't 23 really say - - -24 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Did he say, met with him any 25 number of times, but he doesn't distinguish between himself



and the investigator?

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MS. MEIS: No. He says, I or my - - - and - - - and my - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes.

MS. MEIS: - - - investigator have gone over I quess there's some inference that someone has met with him. But - - - well, Mr. Fredericks is saying, I've never met with the lawyer. Meeting with the investigator isn't a substitute for counsel. And even if the lawyer does have an obligation to give his advice of the triability of the case, the strength of it, whether Mr. Frederick should take a plea, it's - - - it's Mr. Fredericks' right to go to trial and his right to testify. And if he said, I want to go to trial, the lawyer has to be able to work collaboratively with him, prepare the case for trial, prepare him to testify. And so it doesn't really address it in any substantive way that will be consistent with what this court has required under the minimal inquiry or what's permissible in describing his conduct in response to a request for new counsel.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Focusing just on the minimal inquiry claim you're making, if we were to agree with you on that alone, what relief would flow? Would - - - would your counsel be - - - would your client be entitled to new counsel?



1	MS. MEIS: New trial, yes.
2	JUDGE HALLIGAN: New trial. But what about new
3	counsel?
4	MS. MEIS: Yes. New new trial, new
5	counsel.
6	JUDGE HALLIGAN: If if only we agreed on
7	the minimal inquiry and not on the conflict point?
8	MS. MEIS: Yes, I think so. It would be a better
9	course, certainly, to I I first of all, I
10	don't think that the lawyer who handled this case is
11	perhaps still in practice, but in any event, I think new
12	counsel would be required under these circumstances.
13	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And why not I I
14	believe your adversary argues that remittal would be
15	appropriate. Why not that?
16	MS. MEIS: Well, this court has in in
17	Sides, has said that reversal is appropriate, and here
18	you're six years later. A trial has already happened, a
19	grievance has been filed, things happened later. It would
20	be almost impossible to go back now and try to recreate
21	that moment of when this request was made, so this court
22	should follow its prior precedent and reversal, and a new
23	trial would be the remedy.
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.
25	MS. MEIS: Thank you.



for the office - - -2 3 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What do you say in this instance 4 about the complaint that there were specific serious 5 allegations made and the court failed to meet its 6 obligation in making the appropriate inquiry? 7 MS. NECKLES: Your Honor, none of the complaints 8 listed in the letter were specific or seemingly serious. 9 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Was the letter dated? 10 MS. NECKLES: It - - - it was. I believe it was 11 November 2018. And at the next appearance that they had, 12 the court addressed the complaint. But I think it's 13 critical what happened at that moment. The court advised 14 counsel that this complaint had - - - that this letter had 15 been raised. It contained a motion for new counsel and 16 said to defense counsel, take it, review it, go and talk to 17 your client about it, and then come back to me. When they 18 came back, counsel advised the court the issue is, 19 defendant is not happy with the advice I have given him. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the - - - the - - - the - -21 - before it got to that, he said, I oppose the motion. 2.2 MS. NECKLES: But -23 JUDGE RIVERA: Right? That - - - that - - -24 that's - - - that's a term of art. A lawyer knows what 25 they're saying when they say to the court, I oppose the

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MS. NECKLES: Good afternoon. ADA Nicole Neckles



But if I can, it just struck me as odd the rest of motion. what this lawyer said because it seems to be both an attempt to respond to the motion, but it is also, as I read it, an attempt to tell the court that there's not much to the - - - to the defense, right? He wants to kill the messenger. He doesn't like what I have to say to him or what my investigator is communicating. That - - - that strikes me as not going solely to the motion because the motion is, I am not talking to you. So it's very hard to say you want to kill the messenger and I've had conversations when the motion is - - - we're not having those conversations. It struck me that that - - - that kind of language is going to the quality of the defense itself.

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MS. NECKLES: I would disagree with you on one instance. The - - in addition to the, we're not communicating, the letter also says, this attorney has just given me this advice. He's, you know, encouraging me to plea. That is not what I want. So it - - - it also goes to that.

JUDGE RIVERA: But - - - but that phrase - - - do you not understand that phrase? That they don't like the information. And they - - - they want to just shoot the messenger. Isn't that more than just about the motion but about the actual defense itself?



1	MS. NECKLES: No. I think it is counsel			
2	explaining to the court his understanding of the factual			
3	issue, that the defendant is not happy with his advice.			
4	And counsel			
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. The advice is going to the			
6	defense; is it not?			
7	MS. NECKLES: No. His advice the t			
8	defendant has indicated that the advice counsel is			
9	advising him to accept the plea, and he disagrees with			
10	that. But that falls within the purview of counsel's dut			
11	Counsel must give the defendant an accurate or his			
12	interpretation of the evidence and defendant's likelihood			
13	to succeed.			
14	JUDGE RIVERA: But again, isn't isn't			
15	isn't that putting to the court that your			
16	MS. NECKLES: I'm sorry, Your Honor?			
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't that putting to the court			
18	that the client has a weak case?			
19	MS. NECKLES: No, Your Honor.			
20	JUDGE RIVERA: And and that is not what ou			
21	case law permits.			
22	MS. NECKLES: That is not that does not go			
23	to			
24	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Let's try this. Doesn't			
25	our case law only permit counsel to explain what they may			



or may not have done in --- in --- in response to the allegations raised in a motion?

MS. NECKLES: Your Honor, I think two things are being conflated.

JUDGE RIVERA: It - - - it - - -

MS. NECKLES: One, counsel - - - I believe counsel has a duty to explain to the court - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What they have and have not done -

MS. NECKLES: Not just what they have - - - JUDGE RIVERA: - - - not the quality of the defense.

MS. NECKLES: Not just what they have and not done. What is the issue? What is the issue that is potentially creating the conflict? And what he said to the court is, the issue is about the advice that I am giving him. And so that, just from that alone, indicates to the court that this is not a - - a seemingly serious complaint because counsel has a duty to give that - - - the defendant that advice whether or not it's advice that the defendant isn't going to like. Because if counsel doesn't give the appropriate assessment on this case - - - and in this case, that advice was warranted because given the defendant's statement placing himself in - - with the - - the victim, given the victim's identification of the

1 defendant - - -2 JUDGE RIVERA: When you - - - when you preface 3 that - - - when you preface that, given our precedent, by 4 saying, this is when I have met with my client. I've met 5 with him X number of times. I've done it over the phone. 6 I couldn't do it in person, but we have spoken in the 7 following ways. Isn't that what you do rather than saying, 8 and by the way, the content of what I told them is 9 something they don't like? 10 MS. NECKLES: Your Honor, I think - - - you know, 11 in Washington, the court has said defense counsel should 12 have an opportunity to explain his conduct. I don't think 13 there's anything that - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Conduct, not advice.

MS. NECKLES: No. He said - - - he doesn't say what advice he's given. He's merely indicated - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well - - -

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MS. NECKLES: - - - that the defendant does not like - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - he wants to kill the messenger. He's saying his advice that the - - - right?

That the defendant is not pleased with. It can't possibly be advice that furthers the defense.

MS. NECKLES: But it - - - it's - - - if defendant does not like the advice, I think, that is



counsel attempting to give the court the information without invading into the - - - the attorney-client privilege that is so sacrilegious. That counsel is here attempting to satisfy both goals. Give the court information it is required to give, to tell the court, you know, what his perception of the issue is with the defendant. And here, that is given in the presence of defendant. Certainly, if defendant believed that it was - - - this is not the issue, that the issue is really about the communication, he could have said so. His silence in the - - - in the - - - in the presence of counsel making that statement certainly tells us that was the issue. That the issue was, he wasn't happy with the advice. And that was the advice counsel was required to give him in that.

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JUDGE SINGAS: Does it necessarily have to be advice? Maybe he wasn't happy with the plea offer, and the defense attorney says, you know what? He wants to kill the messenger. The people are offering thirty years. He doesn't like it immediately.

MS. NECKLES: Exactly.

JUDGE SINGAS: Is there any evidence in the record that it was advice?

MS. NECKLES: No. He just said he was not - - - what counsel says is, you want to kill the messenger, you know, because you don't like the message. We're not - - -



it's not clear. Counsel, I think, is walking a tightrope.

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JUDGE RIVERA: So just - - - just doesn't like what I have to tell him. That doesn't sound like just doesn't like the prosecutor's offer.

MS. NECKLES: It is an array of issue, and what he's generally saying is he's not - - - the defendant is not happy with what I'm saying. But that does not rise as a - - - a basis for substitute counsel. It does not go to whether or not counsel can provide competent representation. And there's nothing here that says that this - - - that just - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Would you - - - would you agree that the court didn't do a minimal inquiry? I'm putting aside the question of whether it had to.

MS. NECKLES: Well, because I - - - I - - - I
would say the minimal inquiry is intended to - - - for the
court to acquire the information it needs to ascertain
whether or not a serious issue exist that may impact
counsel's ability to represent the defendant. The
conversation that occurred here, while brief, because a
minimum inquiry does not have to be extensive, did that.

It gave the court the information it needed to permit it to
make a decision. And so I would say that this conversation
between counsel and the defendant - - - counsel and the
court satisfies that minimal inquiry because it advised the

1	court. The court was aware of what the the issue			
2	was, and it was able to conclude that it's not a serious			
3	thing that requires further			
4	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So how how does that			
5	how would that how would what how would the court's			
6	inquiry address the allegation that the defendant's wife			
7	was disrespected by counsel?			
8	MS. NECKLES: But Your Honor, that, again, is not			
9	a seemingly serious matter. That does not go to counsel's			
10	to to whether counsel			
11	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I was asking us to put aside			
12	the question of whether a serious inquiry was called for i			
13	the first place and sorry, minimal inquiry was called			
14	for in the first place. Was there a minimal inquiry done?			
15	MS. NECKLES: As to?			
16	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: As to the things that the			
17	defendant complained about.			
18	MS. NECKLES: Well, we don't we only get to			
19	that minimal inquiry if it's a seemingly serious complaint.			
20	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Absolutely.			
21	MS. NECKLES: And my position is that those other			
22	things that he complained about was not seemingly serious.			
23	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Were not serious.			
24	MS. NECKLES: To the extent we might extrapolate			
25	about the communication, that might be seemingly but			



defendant did not say his attorney was never speaking to him. That's not what the letter said. What defendant said is, he did not have an in-person visit, possibly at - - - at Rikers or facilitate a video conference call. But you know what? Each defendant, Your Honor, certainly may want their attorney to see them in person every day and speak to them every day. But that's not the reality. What the record shows is that prior to this appearance where this discussion is - - is happening, defendant - - there were at least about eight prior appearances where defendant and counsel appeared together. And the general practice is that each time before an appearance and typically after an appearance, defense counsel meets with their clients, and they discuss the case.

JUDGE RIVERA: So why didn't counsel just say that? Why did - - - that would just be a fact.

MS. NECKLES: Right.

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JUDGE RIVERA: That would just be a fact. He wouldn't be taking a position, and therefore, the motion should be denied. It's just a fact.

MS. NECKLES: But that's separate from the - - - whether or not the court can glean from the record if a serious complaint is raised. And from the record, the court could recognize that this - - - I'm not communicating with my client is not really reflected. It's not serious.



The communication is apparent from the record. And - - - CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But it sounds like the - - -

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the - - - the position the - - - the rule you're sort of advocating then is, however seriously a defendant says my counsel is refusing to meet with me and hasn't met with me, the court can take a look at the record and see that there have been five pre-trial conferences where the defendant has been present and reject it without any further inquiry.

MS. NECKLES: No, Your - - - well, I think the court gives the trial court some leeway because it understands it is most familiar with the trial practice. It's most familiar with the counsel before it, understands whether or not these are, as I said, men of reason and integrity able to handle the prosecution. But we don't just have that. We have counsel saying, I have met with him. I have spoken with him. We provided him with the discovery.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, he doesn't quite say that. He doesn't quite say that.

MS. NECKLES: He - - - well, he says, I and my investigator have gone over this stuff with - - - with - - with defendant any number of times. I think a fair inference is we have met; we have discussed this. And you know, we - - - we are - - - we have a full record beyond this, right? And defendant, quite frankly, has indicated



in his other motions, he had the discovery. He - - - he had provided a list of the discovery that counsel allegedly provided with him. He - - - he actually, subsequently has stated he had talked with counsel. He had conversed with. He had met with the investigator. All of those things, really, I think, flesh out the record and show that counsel was providing the defendant with competent representation.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: If this had been right before trial and the defendant says, he hasn't met with me to prepare me for trial, would it be different then?

MS. NECKLES: I - - I think, certainly, closer to trial, the court gets more - - more privilege to deny it without having to engage that because it might be - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: No. With respect to it being a serious claim. I'm getting ready to go to trial, but my attorney hasn't sat down with me. I haven't met with him. It's right before trial. If - - if the defendant's trial is on Monday - - -

MS. NECKLES: Right.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - the defendant is appearing on Friday before the court, making a complaint that I want a new attorney. Yes, you look into issues, is he simply trying to delay? But if he says, I haven't met or prepared for trial, is that not a serious accusation that the court would have to make an inquiry of in a robust manner?



MS. NECKLES: I think it would call for certainly 1 2 more information. If the - - - he's saying that throughout 3 our representation he has not spoken to me about this, it 4 would call counsel's ability to represent him. 5 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you suggesting that a 6 defendant can say that my attorney has not prepared me for trial, my trial is on Monday, and there's no obligation for 7 8 the court to ask further? 9 MS. NECKLES: You Honor, what - - - I mean, A, 10 what does it mean when he says my attorney hasn't prepared me for - - - for - - - for trial? The question is, is 11 12 counsel prepared for trial? Does counsel have an 13 understanding of the facts and the law? 14 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Doesn't the defendant have the 15 right to participate in his or her defense? 16 MS. NECKLES: Certainly. Certainly, Your Honor. 17 JUDGE TROUTMAN: And how can they do that if 18 with them? You - - - you've made some valid points, but 19

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And how can they do that if
their attorney - - - if their attorney is not communicating
with them? You - - - you've made some valid points, but
you're losing me at, I'm getting ready to go to trial and
my attorney doesn't have to talk to me and/or prepare me so
that I can make a decision as to whether I wish to exercise
my right to testify, give him information as to witnesses --

MS. NECKLES: Right.

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1 JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - et cetera. If that's what 2 you're saying, that's a problem. 3 MS. NECKLES: No. I am - - - I am not saying 4 that, Your Honor. I've said that, certainly, defendant 5 here has not - - - did not allege - - - make such a broad 6 allegation that there has been no communication, that he has not been able to talk to - - - to counsel. And such an 7 8 inference can - - - it's, A, disputed by counsel's 9 statement that he has spoken to the defendant, he had 10 provided him with information, and it's also belied by the 11 record. JUDGE RIVERA: Actually, he doesn't say that. 12 13 says, I or my investigator. MS. NECKLES: I don't think that there's - - -14 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Right? MS. NECKLES: - - - a substantive difference. 16 17 JUDGE RIVERA: And then he doesn't say he's met. 18 That could mean he - - - he had one communication. MS. NECKLES: Your Honor, A, I think the 19 20 investigator the - - - some of the things the defendant was 2.1 saying in his letters were geared to the investigator, 22 right? 23 JUDGE TROUTMAN: That is why I ask you the 24 question: does the - - - whether he needs to talk to -25 quite frankly, there are assigned attorneys who have



1 investigators go to penal institutions, speak to the 2 accused all the time to get certain background information. 3 But there is an obligation for the attorney to communicate 4 with the client so that the client is prepared to make 5 decisions - - -6 MS. NECKLES: Right. 7 JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - as to whether to accept 8 the plea, whether to go to trial, and in fact, be prepared 9 for trial. That is where I see you seem to be blurring the 10 line. 11 MS. NECKLES: I - - - I think I agree with Your

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MS. NECKLES: I - - - I think I agree with Your Honor that, certainly, counsel needs to communicate with his client. And I believe here, the - - - the record supports that that communication occurred in that when counsel says, I have spoken to him. I have - - - he doesn't like the message. My investigator has spoken to him. We have met and gone through the discovery any number of times, that - - - this record support - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Does he actually say, I have spoken to him?

MS. NECKLES: Your Honor, I think that's a fair inference from what counsel has said.

JUDGE RIVERA: No. No. What does he actually say?

MS. NECKLES: And I'll read. He says, I and my



_	investigator, John Bruno, have gone over this stuff with
2	Mr. Fredericks any number of times. This is on 812 of the
3	record. And we have gone through everything, and Mr.
4	Fredericks just doesn't like what I have to tell him. I am
5	required to give him an honest assessment of the case. And
6	I think a fair inference is to say, we have met. We have
7	talked, and I I believe the the letter
8	JUDGE RIVERA: And the honest assessment of the
9	case, you don't think that, however, is counsel informing
LO	the court of counsel's assessment of the weakness of the
L1	defense?
L2	MS. NECKLES: I disagree, Your Honor. That is
L3	just
L4	JUDGE RIVERA: I see.
L5	MS. NECKLES: a factual statement of what
L6	defense counsel understands the conflict is. And we note
L7	that the defendant
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, yeah. So other than
L9	other than he wants to shoot the messenger, if all he said
20	is, we've met and I've given my honest assessment of the
21	case.
22	MS. NECKLES: I I would say, Your Honor,
23	that on the record reference, that the very fact that
24	defendant says that the defendant that counsel hung
25	up on me suggests that they were having conversations but



he may not have liked what he was telling him - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Hung up on the wife. I thought it was hung up on the wife. MS. NECKLES: I believe he - - - I would look at the letter, but I - - - I would say he - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Maybe you're right. MS. NECKLES: - - - he said the - - - the both of But just to briefly address, Your Honor, as to the conflict, I think the counsel's use of the term I oppose cannot create a conflict. That - - - that is, you know, mere verbiage that counsel may have used to just speak about whether or not, you know, he's - - - it's - - -JUDGE TROUTMAN: But it may be unartful perhaps. 

MS. NECKLES: It - - - it may be unartful, but I don't think it gives any different information than when counsel say, I don't adopt the motion. It - - - it really - - - you know, it - - - it elevates form over substance. It says the same thing. What we need to look at, and this court has always said we look at the context, is what counsel says afterwards. Does he take a position that's really adverse to his client? And as we've discussed, I don't think that that happened here, that all counsel did was outlay - - given an - - an outline of the conduct he took on behalf of defendant, that's responsive to the complaints the defendant said. And he did not cross the

line that this court has set forth. And just to say, defense suggests that counsel can only provide that information when asked by the court. And I think that would remove from - - - Washington says counsel should be given the opportunity to speak on his behalf, and to say, you know, what he has done. And to say that that can only be done if asked a direct question, I think that would - -- would give a right with no - - - no substance to it, and that, really, counsel should be able to speak, whether it's directly by the - - - the court or not. And what we need to look at is what counsel said. And here, we do not believe that counsel created a conflict by his statement, and that defendant did not identify a seemingly serious question that required further inquiry. I don't know if the court has any questions about defendant's last claim about the 440 motion. I would just briefly say that the court here - - - I apologize. That defendant proposed rule that, you know, every pro se motion should be inferred, a -- - a question of fact is raised, then that should have a hearing, that that rule is inconsistent with the mandates of Article 440, which anticipates that - - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: I thought that in their reply,
they disclaimed that they were seeking a pro se rule. I - - I - - - I didn't - - - I - - - I thought they said
that's not what they were doing.



MS. NECKLES: That was my reading of it, that they - - - they may have said that, but what they've argued is that if it's a pro se motion, it should be presumed to raise a question of fact and should require them to get a hearing. And I think this is in absolute conflict with the language of - - of 440, which contemplates that, you know, before a hearing is even granted, a defendant is required to meet a minimum burden. Defendant did not do that here. He - - he raised no question of fact, and therefore, a summary denial was a prudent exercise of the court's discretion. And to have hearings where there is no question of fact, would merely just place a burden on trial court, unnecessary.

JUDGE RIVERA: Does 440 require that he get an

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JUDGE RIVERA: Does 440 require that he get an affidavit from his lawyer?

MS. NECKLES: It does not, Your Honor. And really, all that happened here is, a defendant - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Or even explain why he couldn't?

MS. NECKLES: It - - - 440 requires that their claim be substantiated. And he could substantiate it through a question for - - - affidavit from counsel. He could have substantiated by his own statements of personal interactions with counsel. All the court really did here was say, you did not substantiate this claim. You didn't - - and it's a very low burden. It's not saying that you

must have the affidavit. All it asks is that you reach out to counsel and ask if counsel will provide an affidavit. If he does not - - -JUDGE RIVERA: Well, if he filed a grievance, what - - - what would be the point of that? MS. NECKLES: I apologize, Your Honor. JUDGE RIVERA: If he filed a grievance, why would you be reaching out to counsel to support your claim? MS. NECKLES: Your Honor, it's not - - - it's to merely say he might - - - you might file a grievance. doesn't mean that counsel would not respond to the motion. And we note - - - I - - - I would note here that defendant did file a grievance. The grievance did not find any issue with counsel. JUDGE RIVERA: No, I understand. 

MS. NECKLES: But critically, he did not include counsel's response to his grievance complaint. I think the absence of that is telling. But the - - - what I would say is defendant does not have to provide that complaint. He could support it in other ways. Here, he did not provide that support or any support. And so all we had here was the court simply applying 440 and the precedence of this and other courts.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel.

MS. NECKLES: And we ask that you affirm.



1	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.		
2	MS. NECKLES: Thank you.		
3	MS. MEIS: Mr		
4	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Counsel, on the		
5	MS. MEIS: I'm sorry.		
6	JUDGE HALLIGAN: if I can on the conflict		
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8	MS. MEIS: Yes.		
9	JUDGE HALLIGAN: argument, you're relying		
10	on the statement, I'm opposing that. Anything else?		
11	MS. MEIS: I'm also relying on what he said		
12	afterwards without any question		
13	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Specifically		
14	MS. MEIS: by the court where he, instead		
15	of laying out what he did, I met with Mr. Fredericks on		
16	each court date		
17	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Right.		
18	MS. MEIS: I've had calls with him		
19	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Specifically, he where he		
20	said, you mean, don't shoot the messenger?		
21	MS. MEIS: Yeah. He's shooting the messenger.		
22	He doesn't like what I have to say. That's not just		
23	explaining what he may or may not have done in the case.		
24	That's not explaining his conduct. That crosses the line		
25	because he's saying he's opposing the merits there.		



And that's impermissible under this court's precedent. JUDGE HALLIGAN: And - - -MS. MEIS: And I'm opposing that as well - - -his starting words. There's no way to interpret that other than as an adversarial statement. JUDGE HALLIGAN: You - - - you point us to Mitchell, where, I think, counsel says perhaps a little more than - - - than here. But are there any other cases that you would point us to where there is, you know, a similarly - - - you might disagree with characterization, but I'll say - - - brief exchange that gives rise to a claim? 

MS. MEIS: Well, Mitchell and the companion case in Mitchell, there were actually two cases in that. And in each of them, counsel said something more along the lines of what counsel said here. And this court found that impermissible. In Mitchell, it was, I do not adopt the merits or factual assertions. And in the companion case, it was in regards to whether the plea had been coerced that he - - - the plea was knowing and voluntary, taking a position - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But those are the - - - those are the most on-point cases from your point of view? That's what I wanted to ascertain.

MS. MEIS: Yes, certainly. Cases from this



court, and I think they're directly applicable here and show that what counsel said, including his direct opposition and everything afterwards, that was not the kind of permissible explaining his conduct that was found in Washington or any other case.

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And returning just briefly to the seemingly serious request, it was made here a year into the case.

And the case was on for trial. So going to what Your Honor and Judge Troutman said about the timing and whether he's communicating, he's - - - you have to look at everything he said, not just the one complaint and if that makes enough.

Altogether, he's saying, I'm not communicating with my lawyer. He wants to go to trial. The case is on for trial that day. It's still a year and a half until the ultimate trial is had. He's only communicating with the lawyer.

And - - and counsel never, in fact, said that he was - - had spoken with him or met with him. He gives a sort of generic thing about he and his investigator. And so yes, that - - that is a seemingly serious - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what about when he says, we've gone over it?

MS. MEIS: I - - - we don't know what they went over. I mean, because Mr. Fredericks said a lot of things. So what is it that they went over?

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But if he went into the



particulars of things I reviewed with my client, wouldn't that more readily support a claim that he's spilling out into the public privileged information and undermining the defendant's defense?

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MS. MEIS: Yes. It - - - it - - - that could be problematic, but he - - - he could still have detailed, here's what I did. I've met with my client each time the case was on. I meet with him down in the courthouse in the pens. He doesn't have to go visit him at his jail facility. That's not required. But is he having meaningful conversations? Is he allowing his client, who has expressed a desire to participate in - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So your argument is that he needed to affirmatively assert that he, in fact, did so?

MS. MEIS: He could provide facts about what he did that the court can then use to decide the motion. And of course, the issue here is not whether it rose to good cause, but simply whether the minimal inquiry was required. And it was here, and it wasn't done. Just turning briefly to the pro se motion for the 440, if I may, the - - - the - - - the court denied it for his failure to get an affirmation from counsel or explain that failure. That failure could not have been more apparent to this court. Mr. Fredericks asked for new counsel at the sentencing proceeding. He had filed a grievance. He provided those

1 materials to the court to show that he had done that, 2 requiring additional statement - - - a sworn statement, I 3 tried to get a letter from my client or I tried to an affirmation - - -4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Did - - - did defendant have 6 counsel's response to the grievance? 7 MS. MEIS: I'm sorry, Your Honor? JUDGE RIVERA: Did defendant have counsel's 8 9 response to the grievance? 10 MS. MEIS: I don't know whether he - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Do you know? I don't know if you

MS. MEIS: I don't know whether or not he did, but he submitted, at least, to the court that he had filed a grievance to - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.

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MS. MEIS: - - - explain, obviously, that he and his lawyer weren't communicating and then the issues that he raised there, including that counsel failed to prepare him for trial, failed to impeach the detective, failed to call an alibi witness, those required information from counsel. And that was the factual dispute to decide whether or not there was a strategic reason. There's no way that that didn't create a factual dispute that warranted a hearing, and summary denial was inappropriate.



1	Thank yo	ou.	
2		CHIEF JUDGE WILSON:	Thank you.
3		(Court is adjourned)	
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1		CERTIFICATION	
2			
3	I, B	randon Deshawn, certify that the foregoing	
4	transcript of	proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People	
5	v. Divine Fredericks, No. 8 was prepared using the required		
6	transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record		
7	of the proceedings.		
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9	Brandon Despaun		
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