1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PEOPLE,
4	
5	Respondent,
6	-against-
7	RAYMOND WILLIAMS,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street
10	Albany, New York January 8, 2025
11	Before:
12	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE LARA J. GENOVESI
15	Appearances:
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23	
24	Ellen S. Kolmar Official Court Transcriber
25	



1	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. And the last
2	case on today's calendar is People v. Williams.
3	Counsel?
4	MS. MISRA: Good afternoon. My name is Ayushi
5	Misra from Cleary Gottlieb. And together with the Office
6	of the Appellate Defender, we represent Mr. Raymond
7	Williams.
8	I'd like to reserve three minutes for rebuttal,
9	please.
10	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes.
11	MS. MISRA: Thank you.
12	Your Honors, this is a legally insufficient case
13	The most objective piece of evidence here is a surveillance
14	video that shows only innocent conduct by Mr. Williams.
15	And the video
16	JUDGE SINGAS: Counsel, our standard for legal
17	sufficiency isn't the finding that a finding of guilt
18	must be the only reasonable interpretation; is that
19	correct?
20	MS. MISRA: That's right, Your Honor. And
21	JUDGE SINGAS: So the dissent got that wrong when
22	they were in their dissent, the standard outlining
23	the standard?
24	MS. MISRA: So I think the dissent had focused or
25	People v. Way, and the subsequent decision by this court,



People v. Reed, did not overrule People v. Way, but we agree with respondent that the correct standard is whether the evidence provides a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which the jury could infer that the prosecution established all elements of a crime.

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JUDGE SINGAS: And you think here that reasonable interpretation doesn't exist?

MS. MISRA: Correct. And our position is that the prosecution at trial failed to establish that for a couple different reasons.

So as I was saying, the surveillance video undercuts the prosecution's other evidence presented at trial, which is an interrogation video where Mr. Williams does not confess to the crime at issue in this indictment. Simply put, there is no confession here at all. And the surveillance video clearly shows that Mr. Williams did not have an intent to steal.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Doesn't the undercutting create an issue of fact for the jury to resolve?

MS. MISRA: It does, Your Honor. But the - - - the jury in making that determination is only allowed to make reasonable inferences. And here, we are saying, because of the evidence presented, the jury made an unreasonable - - reached an unreasonable conclusion in concluding that Mr. Williams had the intent to steal.



So first, the surveillance video that the prosecution itself put into evidence at trial is entirely exculpatory. The video captures the entire time that Mr. Williams spent in the CVS store, all seventy-five seconds of it, from multiple angles. It shows that Mr. Williams entered the CVS, walked purposefully to aisle 10 to grab two cans of Red Bulls, walked to the cash registers with those Red Bulls, and left the store without removing any items. No rational jury can watch that surveillance video and conclude that Mr. Williams had the intent to steal.

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Second, the interrogation video is not a confession to the crime that Mr. Williams was charged with in this indictment.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Let me just back you up for a second on the store video.

I'm not sure I would agree that it's exculpatory, but I'm not sure you have to show that, right?

MS. MISRA: You're right, Your Honor. We don't have to show that it's exculpatory, but I'd like to highlight a few moments where it shows completely innocent conduct by Mr. Williams.

So first, at the beginning, at timestamp 9:43:45, he enters the CVS with a plastic bag in his left hand. He walks immediately right to the store down aisle 9, glances back over his shoulder once, not twice, not several times



as respondent contends, and then he continues to aisle 10, where the Red Bull coolers are located. He takes the two cans and then he walks past the exit. At that point, multiple people are entering and leaving the store. So the automatic doors are triggered. If he had an intent to steal, that would have been the perfect opportunity for him to take the two Red Bull cans and flee the store. Also, he made no attempts to conceal the cans of Red Bulls. He was carrying a plastic bag. He was wearing pants. If he wanted to steal, he could have put those two cans of Red Bull - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But isn't that equally consistent with him seeing if that was an opportunity where, in fact, he could get away with what he may have intended?

MS. MISRA: Your Honor, he - - - at that point, he approached - - - he was walking towards the cash register where store employees were located.

So based on this evidence, we would say that if he wanted to get away with it, he wouldn't have approached the store employees and continued walking towards the cash registers.

After he passes the exit, at that point a store manager stops him and tells him, stop, you don't belong here, and she takes the two cans of - - -



1 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Sorry. When you say passes the 2 exit, that's en route to the cash register; is that right? 3 MS. MISRA: That's correct. JUDGE HALLIGAN: 4 I think in the video we can't 5 see where the cash register is in that frame. 6 MS. MISRA: You're right, Your Honor. It is 7 difficult to see, but the cash registers are located - - -8 so there's two sets of cash registers from the testimony at 9 trial. 10 One is the regular cash registers with a person 11 behind them, and then the other is self-checkout. So he is 12 closer to the self-checkout, although he's not quite there. 13 So he's approaching the self - - - the self-checkout 14 registers, and the exit is right - - - right before that. 15 But he passes the exit on the way to the self-checkout 16 registers, where there's another Red Bull cooler located. 17 So at that point, he takes the two cans of Red 18 Bulls and he places them down onto the Red Bull cooler, and 19 when the store manager approaches him and asks him to give 20 it back -- it's about a fifteen-second long exchange from 2.1 the surveillance video itself -- he gives the Red Bulls 2.2 back to the store manager and then leaves the store. 23 From this surveillance video, there is absolutely

no evidence that Mr. Williams had the intent to steal.

Now, I'd like to turn -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: Do you look at the evidence in isolation, or do you look at his conduct before he entered the store, the agreement that he signed? Is the jury allowed to consider it in a collective manner?

MS. MISRA: Of course, Your Honor. And so do we.

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MS. MISRA: Of course, Your Honor. And so do we. We are looking at the totality of the evidence here.

So on the intent to steal point, I also want to point to the prosecution's evidence of intent that came from the testimony of the shift supervisor, Lateasha Menafee. Here, most of what Ms. Menifee testified to is consistent with the surveillance video. However, any incriminating statements made by Ms. Menafee are directly contradicted by the surveillance video itself. And I'd like to point out four key differences.

So first she said that Mr. Williams entered the store, quote, "Doubled back and stood in the vestibule while looking inside". That's at Appendix 77. This did not happen in the surveillance video. And as I'm sure you've all watched for yourself, it didn't happen.

Once inside the store again, he walked purposefully to aisle 9 - - - aisle 10 to - - - to get the Red Bulls.

Next, she said that Mr. Williams entered the CVS empty handed when the video clearly shows he was carrying a plastic bag in one hand.



She also said that Mr. Williams slammed the Red Bulls down on the cooler, but at that point he had already placed both cans of Red Bulls on the cooler, when the store manager asked him to leave.

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And finally, she said that the store manager scanned the Red Bulls for security procedures, and we know that that did not happen based on the surveillance video.

So taking all of that evidence into account and looking at the totality, we argued that it - - it would - - it is irrational for the jury to conclude that Mr. Williams had the intent to steal when witness testimony is contradicted, any incriminating witness testimony is contradicted by the surveillance video, and the video itself does not - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Isn't that the jury's prerogative to determine what they're going to believe and what they're going to find credible?

MS. MISRA: It is, Your Honor. But even here, as I said earlier, the prosecution still needs to prove their case, and - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Let me ask you this. Take the four facts you just ran through. Why would any of those, even if -- from the testimony -- why would any of those be incriminating? That is, suppose he walked into the store empty handed, why would that bear on - - I

mean, I've walked into the CVS empty handed. I don't think that's an indication that I intended to steal something.

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MS. MISRA: Your Honor, I think - - - so you're right that is not - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Why, the fact - - - I mean,
I have walked into a CVS and paused because I didn't know
which way the stuff I wanted was. So if that were true,
why would that indicate an intent to steal something?

MS. MISRA: So I think the first part of

Menafee's testimony where he - - - he doubled back and went

back inside, what the prosecution argued at trial was that

it's incriminating - - - it was incriminating because he

was trying to see what's happening in the store and

deciding whether he could potentially go in there. So our

point is that testimony that was presented - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah, but for evidence to be probative of a material fact or really of any fact, it has to make it more likely than not that the proposition is true. So going into a store and pausing to look around doesn't seem to me to be probative of whether you intend to steal something or whether you're trying to figure out where something you want to buy is.

MS. MISRA: And that is the point that we're trying to make here too, Your Honor. There is no evidence. There is no witness testimony here that - - -



1 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I mean, I quess - - -2 MS. MISRA: - - - would - - -3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 the intent to steal. 16

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: - - - the question I'm

getting at is, I understand your point is that when you look at the video, none of this actually happened. even if it happened, I don't understand why it's probative. And maybe that's a better question for me to ask the DA.

MS. MISRA: Your Honor, again, I think what we're arguing here is there is absolutely no evidence that's probative of Mr. Williams' quilt, whether it's the witness testimony or the surveillance video, because everything shows that he only engaged in - - - in conduct, as you described, that any normal person would have done, and he did not enter the CVS store at 300 Park Avenue South with

> JUDGE TROUTMAN: Did he enter unlawfully? MS. MISRA: I will get to that - - - to that

next, Your Honor.

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So on the interrogation video, he was issued a trespass notice in September of 2016, so about four months earlier than the date of the incident. However, despite respondent's characterization of this video as a confession, this is not a confession at all.

So he was issued that trespass notice, but there are various moments in that interrogation video that - - -



1	that indicate that he did not understand the full scope and
2	consequences of that trespass.
3	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Would that have been a defense
4	to unlawful entry?
5	MS. MISRA: Yes, Your Honor, and his at trial
6	counsel did argue that.
7	JUDGE CANNATARO: That that would mitigate
8	or somehow negate the lawfulness of his entry that he
9	didn't understand what he had agreed to six months earlier?
10	MS. MISRA: Oh, sorry. To be clear, it would not
11	negate the trespass itself.
12	JUDGE HALLIGAN: It it would not negate the
13	the fact that the entry was unlawful, right?
14	MS. MISRA: Correct. Yes.
15	However, what the import of the
16	interrogation video and the statements that he made go to
17	his intent to steal.
18	JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about the claim that Red
19	Bull was in involved in that incident also? Or
20	I'm sorry. Never mind.
21	MS. MISRA: So back to the interrogation video.
22	I want to flag that every single material fact that he made
23	in his $ -$ in $ -$ in that video: where he was, when he
24	was there, what happened inside the store, his own actions
25	inside the store, all of these facts are simply not on the

1 surveillance video. The only rational conclusion to draw 2 from the statements he made is that he's admitted - - -3 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So is it - - - is it your claim 4 that every movement that he made was included or covered by 5 the video? Every angle? Every movement? 6 MS. MISRA: From the surveillance video? 7 - - - it did capture all angles from the store. JUDGE TROUTMAN: So all of his movements were 8 9 covered; is that what you're saying? 10 MS. MISRA: Based on what I saw in the interrogation video, I think most of them were covered. 11 12 There are some angles - - -13 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But not necessarily all? 14 MS. MISRA: All the relevant movements are 15 covered - - - are covered. So you can see where he is in 16 the store, what he's doing. 17 JUDGE GENOVESI: How do you know it's - - - it's 18 not relevant? If it's not on the video, we don't know. 19 MS. MISRA: Well, Your Honor, the point is, when 20 he - - - from the time he walked into the store, from the 2.1 time he left, we can see where he goes and what he picks 2.2 And I think there is one - - - one area where we can't 23 fully see the interaction. It's a fifteen-second angle. 24 But other than that fifteen seconds - - - again, he's only



in the store for seventy-five seconds total - - - other

	chan that angle, we can see every other movement and every
2	other action in the store. So I see
3	JUDGE RIVERA: But what about the interrogation
4	video? Do you is it your argument he's not
5	confessing to the theft of a Red Bull?
6	MS. MISRA: Our argument is that he's not
7	confessing to the theft of two Red Bulls at 300 Park Avenue
8	South on January 19th, 2017.
9	JUDGE HALLIGAN: He may be confessing to the
10	theft of Red Bulls at some other time and location, though,
11	right?
12	MS. MISRA: And and that
13	JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't that for the jury to
14	determine?
15	JUDGE CANNATARO: Isn't that yeah. What
16	Judge Rivera said.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: For the jury to determine whatever
18	may be this level of confusion.
19	MS. MISRA: It is. But here again, because of
20	the other because of the objective surveillance video
21	and again, that's sort of what makes this case unique
22	compared to to other instances. We have the entire
23	incident captured on video.
24	JUDGE TROUTMAN: But couldn't the jury make a



determination that there was a point of clarity within that

1 video that they could make that finding? 2 MS. MISRA: It could, but here it was irrational 3 for them to make the conclusion that Mr. Williams intended 4 to steal exactly because of all of the evidence. And if I 5 can just wrap up - - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: But if he's at the register, he's 7 approached by an employee, why not just offer to pay it? 8 Doesn't that allow the jury to infer that the intent was to 9 never pay? 10 MS. MISRA: Well, Your Honor, the - - - his 11 failure to offer to pay is not - - - does not mean that he 12 intended to steal. It's not - - - it's not equivalent in 13 that way. So you know, once he was stopped at - - - by a 14 store manager telling him to leave, he didn't put up a 15 fight, he didn't argue with her, he gave the Red Bulls 16 back. 17 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Couldn't one argue that that was 18 consistent with his guilt being caught before he could 19 complete it? 20 MS. MISRA: No, Your Honor, because he - - -2.1 JUDGE RIVERA: And trying to get out before it 22 goes any further? 23 MS. MISRA: No. No, Your Honor. I think he was 24 simply just following the instructions of the security 25 officer, returning the Red Bulls, and then walking out of



the store.

JUDGE CANNATARO: And you're saying it wouldn't be reasonable for a jury to conclude that the alternate motivation was he just wanted to get out of there before it escalated to a detention or something like that?

MS. MISRA: Yes. That is what we're arguing.

And he couldn't - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Why? Why - - - why would that be impermissible for a jury to make that conclusion?

MS. MISRA: So it's impermissible because the evidence - - - because of the surveillance video. If he wanted to leave before it escalated or got out of hand, he had the opportunity to do so about thirty seconds before he was asked to give the Red Bulls back.

JUDGE CANNATARO: No, but I'm saying it's the confrontation itself by the manager that says, uh-oh, I better get out of here now before this becomes an arrest or a detention of some sort.

MS. MISRA: Well, based on the testimony in the record, the manager never told him that, you know, he is - - he's going to be arrested or - - she just said stop, you don't belong here, give me the Red Bulls. So he followed that order. She did not say, hey, you have a trespass notice. Hey, you're going to get arrested for a crime. You're going to be charged for burglary. So - - -



so based on the evidence, I don't think it's reasonable for 1 2 us to infer that he knew that it would escalate. 3 asked him to give the Red Bulls back, and he did so and 4 walked out of the store. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Is it not reasonable to infer that 6 if you don't offer to pay, you didn't have the money to pay 7 to begin with? 8 MS. MISRA: I would say no, Your Honor. I think, 9 again, if you're confronted by someone in a position of

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again, if you're confronted by someone in a position of authority telling you you don't belong here and give me back the merchandise, you would give it back and leave the store. And maybe he went to another store to try to buy those Red Bulls elsewhere.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And that a lack of protest you would say is consistent with he was doing nothing wrong?

MS. MISRA: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.

And just to conclude, for all of these reasons that we discussed, we would ask the court to vacate Mr. Williams' conviction. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honors, and may it please the court, Anna Notchick for the people.

Under the deferential standard applicable to a claim of legal insufficiency on appeal, which requires this court to uphold a verdict if there is, A, a valid line of



reasoning and permissible inferences from which the jury 1 2 could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a 3 reasonable doubt - - -4 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What do you say with respect to 5 the argument that all of his conduct was equally consistent 6 with innocence, just being a shopper? 7 MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, we disagree that his 8 conduct was that of an innocent shopper. And also, even if 9 we accepted that, we also have the confession where he 10 admits that that during the second week of January - - this is January 19th - - - he went into the CVS at 300 Park 11 12 Avenue South and he took two Red Bulls. 13 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Let's pare the two things 14 apart. 15 If all you had was the video, would you have 16 legally sufficient evidence? 17 MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, we believe we would, 18 because defendant's conduct in the store is not - - -19 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But what specifically? What 20 motions that he made in the store would you point us to? 2.1 MS. NOTCHICK: Well, Your Honor, walking by the 2.2 store first and then coming back in. The inference that 23 can be drawn from - - -24 JUDGE HALLIGAN: I'm puzzled by that, because I 25 think I probably do that all the time. I walk by, I think,



oh, I should pick something up in CVS and - - - or some other place, and I turn back around and head in the door.

Is that really a reasonable inference? I would hope that when I do that folks don't think, oh, she must be intending to come in here and steal something.

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MS. NOTCHICK: Well, it - - - it's that inference that goes into his arguably furtive behavior also inside the store.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: And what is that specifically?

MS. NOTCHICK: It's that he goes down aisle 9, which is not where the Red Bulls are located, he looks over his shoulder twice. He looks over once, and then at the end of the aisle, he looks over and he appears to watch the area of the cash registers. That - - the inference that can be drawn from that is defendant was trying to ensure that he was not - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, it has to be a reasonable inference, right?

MS. NOTCHICK: Yes.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So how is that a reasonable inference? I mean, I would think that the reasonable inference - - - and maybe your view would be it's not the only reasonable inference, but would be I'm looking for the register. I'm trying to figure out whether I know how to work the self-checkout well enough that I should do that

instead of going to look for the human being. I'm trying 1 2 to understand why those particular actions are consistent 3 with an inference of intent to steal. 4 MS. NOTCHICK: Because, Your Honor, they all have 5 to be taken together. And after he appears to look towards 6 the register, he goes - - - he takes the Red Bulls. then when he's approached by a store employee, he doesn't 7 8 offer to pay. He doesn't explain, oh, I maybe have cash in 9 my hand. He doesn't - - -10 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, except that he's 11 confronted by the store officer - - - security officer 12 doesn't tell him you have to pay for these. She says you 13 don't belong here. In fact, he doesn't belong there 14 because there's a trespass order, right? 15 MS. NOTCHICK: 16 back the items, and he doesn't try to explain - - -

True. And she also says, give me

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, if he - - - right. But if he doesn't belong there, he can't - - - he's - - you know, he needs to get out of there so he's not arrested for trespass.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: And the only other option, I quess, would have been for him to say I do too belong here and I want to pay for them. It seems, because of the content of the statement, as the Chief Judge says, leaving is actually what one would expect him to do, and saying I



intend to pay for them would be more confrontational. 1 2 MS. NOTCHICK: Well, he also apparently does get 3 upset because he gets upset and he slams the Red Bulls 4 down. That was the testimony at trial. The fact that he 5 gets angry also shows that - - -6 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What do you say about the claim 7 that the video shows the contrary with respect to slamming down? 8 9 MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, the - - - the 10 testimony at trial was very clear that he got upset and 11 slammed them down. This portion of the video is shown very 12 small across from the - - - it's from - - - all the way 13 across the store. I can't personally tell when he puts the 14 Red Bulls down, but the evidence at trial, the testimony at 15 trial was very clear. 16 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Don't the videos cover every 17 second of every movement he made in the store? 18 MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, not every second of 19 every movement. It does cover a majority of while he is in 20 the store, but it is from all different angles, and they do 21 all have - - -2.2 JUDGE CANNATARO: There's no video of him 23 drinking a Red Bull, right? 24 MS. NOTCHICK: There is not, and - - -25 JUDGE CANNATARO: That's your last statement; the



slamming down. I'm trying to figure out what that - - -what could reasonably infer from slamming down a couple of cans of Red Bull regarding intent. I - - - I'm not making that connection, which is troublesome to me. MS. NOTCHICK: Well, Your Honor, it's that he slams them down and also doesn't offer to pay for them. And also, we have be told he - -JUDGE HALLIGAN: Because he's been told - - -JUDGE TROUTMAN: It's wholly consistent with - -

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - he doesn't - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: --- I'm indignant that you are approaching me. I'm just a customer.

MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, even if it's equally consistent, this is intent we are talking about. And when there are conflicting inferences regarding intent, that is a jury question.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: No, I think that's a different issue. If the piece of evidence is equally susceptible of an innocent and not innocent explanation for something, it's not probative, right? To be probative, it has to make a proposition more likely than not. If I have a trespass order, I might think to myself, I'm really thirsty. I'm going to go into Red Bull and buy it - - - go to the CVS and buy a couple of Red Bulls. And I could be

really upset that the security officer recognizes me and says, oh, no, you're the guy who has a trespass order, which is exactly what actually happened. And I might get very mad that my plan didn't work, slam down and go. MS. NOTCHICK: Well - - -CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But that isn't - - - that has to be probative of my intent to have stolen them. MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, we believe it is. the jury also believed that it was. The jury thought that all of this - - -CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: We don't know what the jury relied on. MS. NOTCHICK: Well, what we do know is that the jury deliberated on this issue and found that defendant intended to commit a crime at the time. JUDGE CANNATARO: But on appellate review, where we're talking about whether or not permissible inferences have been drawn from the evidence, I think it's incumbent

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JUDGE CANNATARO: But on appellate review, where we're talking about whether or not permissible inferences have been drawn from the evidence, I think it's incumbent on you to tell us when we're discussing a particular piece of evidence like slamming down two cans, what a permissible inference would be from that other than guilt, you know. What did the jury get from that?

MS. NOTCHICK: The permissible inference is that he knew he had been caught trying to take the Red Bulls.

And we also have to take this with his confession when he



admits that he tried to take two Red Bulls and that the store manager took them back.

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, at some point, but not -
- it appears - - - there are significant inconsistencies,

are there not, between his statements in the interrogation

video and the video in the store?

MS. NOTCHICK: There are inconsistencies, but there are enough consistencies for the jury to have determined - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, but isn't on this point what's relevant, at least with respect to what appellate counsel is arguing now, is that he didn't know he couldn't be there. I thought that was their position. He didn't know he couldn't be there. So one would assume he would be upset and offer to pay because he thought he could be there.

MS. NOTCHICK: Well, Your Honor, I think the evidence - - - the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence that this trespass notice was explained to him, that he said he understood the trespass - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I understand. I'm talking about the way counsel has argued this case to us. They've argued it that the inference that one would draw from that interrogation with respect to this issue is that he did not understand that this notice applied to this CVS. And if



that's the case, someone - - - if that's the argument,
someone coming up to you and saying you don't belong here,
one would say, of course I belong here. Why don't - - why wouldn't I belong here or offer to pay - - MS. NOTCHICK: Well - -
JUDGE RIVERA: - - - as opposed to, oh, I've been
caught, I've got to go because I violated the trespass
notice. He may believe that, oops, I've got to go because
I've been caught, because I was going to steal the Red

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I've been caught, because I was going to steal the Red
Bull, that's true. That's a different argument. But with
respect to an awareness of the trespass, seems to me it's
foreclosed by the argument that counsel is making to this
court.

MS. NOTCHICK: Well, Your Honor, an innocent

MS. NOTCHICK: Well, Your Honor, an innocent shopper would have said something in response to that confrontation. Especially, you don't belong here; give me back the items. She's saying both. You don't belong here, and an inference can be drawn that she's talking that he's stealing the items, and he doesn't protest that at all.

And I would also point to his - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But why can you draw the inference from her saying you don't belong here that he's stealing the items? Did I understand you correctly?

MS. NOTCHICK: Because she says you don't belong here and give me back the items. And he doesn't protest



either, oh, I wanted to buy these items or what do you 1 2 mean; I do belong here. And I also want to point - - -3 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But wait. Why is that not 4 something which suggests that he knows he doesn't belong 5 there, and how does it suggest instead that he's intending 6 to steal the Red Bulls? 7 MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, it can suggest both 8 that he knows he's not supposed to -9 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But why specifically can it 10 suggest that he's intending to steal the Red Bulls? 11 MS. NOTCHICK: Because he doesn't offer to pay 12 for them. 13 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But in the face of a statement 14 that he - - - if, you know, it were not for the statement 15 you don't belong here, perhaps that argument would have 16 some more merit, but he's just been told he doesn't belong 17 there. So how is his response consistent with an intent to 18 steal? MS. NOTCHICK: Because when she says give me back 19 20 the items, he could have said, I just wanted to purchase 21 these. 22 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But she just you don't belong 23 here. So if we look not just at the specific act of 24 leaving the store without offering to pay, and couple it 25 with what's prompted that response which is her statement



1 you don't belong here, how is there an inference of intent 2 to steal? 3 MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, because of also his -- - the rest of his conduct. 4 5 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Okay. But if we look 6 specifically at this action that you're asking us to rely 7 on, which is not offering to pay, given her statement, how 8 can we infer - - - why would it be more likely than not 9 that that's because he was intending to steal the Red 10 Bulls? 11 MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, opposing counsel 12 mentions that he maybe had cash in his hand. If he had 13 cash in his hand, a reasonable, innocent shopper - - -JUDGE HALLIGAN: I'm not - - - I'm not asking 14 15 about cash in the hand. I'm just saying, if we look at his 16 action in relation to what prompted it, which I think we 17 should and probably must, which is her statement, how is 18 that response something that could yield an inference that 19 he intends to steal? 20 MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, again, it's just that 21 he doesn't offer to pay in any way. 22 And I would also point this court to Exhibit 7, 23 which is the wanted poster. And defendant actually 24 initials that wanted poster during his confession and



acknowledges that on January 19th, 2017 he went into the

1 CVS at 300 Park Avenue South and he took two Red Bulls. 2 During - - he never said that he wanted to pay for them. 3 And also, throughout the confession, even if there's 4 inconsistencies, he never said, oh, I was intending to buy 5 those, and that is just inconsistent with innocence. 6 And also, this court can weigh the fact that 7 defendant, only a few months earlier, had signed this 8 trespass notice and that he knew he was banned from the CVS 9 store. 10 Just turning quickly to the knowingly unlaw - -

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Just turning quickly to the knowingly unlaw - - - knowingly unlawful entry, defendant has - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Does it matter why he was, in fact, banned to use that evidence in conjunction with - - - or connection with the alleged theft at issue?

MS. NOTCHICK: Your Honor, the jury couldn't weigh that - - - this - - - weigh the prior shoplift for propensity purposes. But it is relevant that defendant had previously been given - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: It's giving context.

MS. NOTCHICK: It is context, and it's relevant that defendant had been given this trespass notice, had said that if he - - - I'm - - - that Nunez had told him if he entered again, he would be arrested for the crime of shoplifting and said - - - he actually said that instead of trespass. But the trespass notice says - - - says that he



1 would be arrested for the crime of trespass. 2 I can touch briefly on the preservation argument, 3 if Your Honors would like, but if there are no further 4 questions, we ask that you affirm. Thank you. 5 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 6 MS. MISRA: Your Honor, I would just like to 7 address a few points raised by respondent. 8 So first, as to the point about - - -9 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Does the prior trespass notice 10 come into play here? 11 MS. MISRA: The trespass notice itself? Yes. So 12 that is what - - -13 JUDGE TROUTMAN: What is the jury allowed to do 14 with that information, if anything? 15 MS. MISRA: I think the jury is allowed to 16 determine whether he was unlawfully there. But for 17 burglary in the third degree, one of the elements, as you 18 know, is whether Mr. Williams knew that the entry was 19 unlawful. So it's two separate points. 20 And on the confession, there are a few moments in 2.1 the video that kind of indicate to us that Mr. Williams did 2.2 not understand the full scope and consequences of the 23 trespass notice. So at the begin - - -24 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Is there not an argument that



there were points in the video where he isn't quite - - -

he is lucid enough to confess as the prosecution allege? 1 2 MS. MISRA: Your Honor, he's lucid enough to 3 confess to some other time where he was inside a CVS store 4 and he drank a Red Bull. But that's not - - -5 JUDGE SINGAS: Didn't the jury determine that, 6 no, he was talking about this instance. He said, "I took 7 two Red Bulls", and then he talks about another time, I 8 think, where he took four Red Bulls from another place; is 9 that right? 10 MS. MISRA: Your Honor - -11 JUDGE SINGAS: So couldn't the jury have 12 reasonably decided you know what, we think that this is an 13 admission to his intent to steal these two Red Bulls at 14 this incident, and that's what we decide based on just this 15 statement. Forget the video. 16 MS. MISRA: So - - - so he - - -17

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JUDGE RIVERA: And he explains what - - - what the serial Red Bull interest, stealing, whatever you want to call it is, right, if he's saying it's related to his health and these other issues. So certainly providing a motive for why he might - - - might take this act. But I don't know if I was being clear with my point before.

As I understood your argument, your argument was that the interrogation video, the inference to be drawn from what he says there is that he did not understand that



1 the notice covered this CVS.
2 MS. MISRA: That's right.
3 JUDGE RIVERA: And if tha

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JUDGE RIVERA: And if that's so, my point to opposing counsel was, doesn't that then make us wonder, and would allow the jury to infer that the failure to offer to pay, the failure to be incensed or upset when you're told to leave and you don't belong here is explained, right?

It - - you have that contradiction between the position you're taking now and how one would view the video.

MS. MISRA: I understand the question, Your Honor.

So we're saying that the interrogation video showed that he did not understand the trespass notice, but that doesn't mean that he had to then necessarily offer to pay when he heard that he did not belong here. There are moments in the interrogation video where he doesn't understand that the notice applies to all - - - every single CVS, but that does not mean that he has to - - - at the incident of the crime itself - - - the purported crime, that he had to understand at that point that he was there, justifiably.

So - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm not not sure I'm understanding your argument.

MS. MISRA: So I think the - - -



1	JUDGE RIVERA: Either he thinks he can be there
2	lawfully or he can't. I took your argument to be that he
3	did not understand that he could not enter this CVS.
4	MS. MISRA: Correct.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: That entering the CVS would be
6	unlawful, would be a trespass. I thought that was your
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8	MS. MISRA: Yes.
9	JUDGE RIVERA: position that that would be
10	the only inference one would draw from the interrogation.
11	And if that's the case, again, we're back to what's the
12	inference, then, that a jury could draw when he is
13	approached by I think it was the manager
14	anyway, an employee saying, you don't belong here; give me
15	the Red Bulls, right?
16	MS. MISRA: I think the inference there is that
17	he I don't think that there's an inference of guilt
18	to be drawn there, though.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Fair enough.
20	JUDGE SINGAS: Can you answer my question,
21	because I think we got cut off?
22	So why can't the jury determine, based on the
23	videotape that they saw, that that was a confession to him
24	stealing, and all the other evidence corroborates that, and
25	that's that's a jury prerogative?



MS. MISRA: So to your earlier point about the four Red Bulls, that was not presented in front of the jury. So that's a - - - that's not at issue here. But the interrogation video itself, where he actually starts making these so-called admissions and saying he was there, he did it. All of the material facts that he's admitting to are not on the video.

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So our point is simply that because the - - - the so-called admissions that he makes are directly contradicted by the most objective evidence in the record - - - that's the surveillance video - - - it was irrational for the jury to conclude otherwise. And I can point to a couple of details that indicate that.

So at the beginning of the interrogation, Mr. Williams - - - the detective asked Mr. Williams where he was, and he keeps asking her which CVS she's talking about. He says a couple of different times, this CVS. Which CVS is this? Is it the same CVS? That starts at timestamp 14:53.

Later on, he admits that - - - that - - - actually the detective had asked that someone had approached him and he had already placed a Red Bull inside the plastic bag, and the store manager took it out of the plastic bag, and he just admits it in the interrogation video. But the surveillance video shows that did not

happen.

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for a jury to compare the second of the

He also said that he drank a Red Bull inside the CVS as you all alluded to earlier.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Isn't that equally consistent for a jury to determine that he's just trying to figure his way out of things, and he's saying different things, and it's up to them to assess the issue of credibility, period.

MS. MISRA: It is up to the jury, Your Honor. But again, given - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Or what weight to give to any piece of evidence.

MS. MISRA: It is - - it is in the jury's province to decide that. But again, viewing all of this evidence in totality, the surveillance video, all of the material contradictions in the interrogation video that are contradicted by the surveillance video itself, it was irrational in this case for the jury to conclude that he was - - that he was guilty.

So again, for all of these reasons, if the court has no more questions, we'll rest on our briefs, and we would ask the court to vacate Mr. Williams' conviction.

Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)

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CERTIFICATION I, Ellen S. Kolman, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Raymond Williams, No. 10 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Ellen S. Kolman Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: January 14, 2025

