1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PEOPLE,
4	
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 121
7	JERRY WATKINS,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New Yorl
10	November 20, 2024 Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	
16	Appearances:
17	JANE I. YOON, ESQ. MONROE COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
18	Attorney for Appellant 10 N Fitzhugh Street
19	Rochester, NY 14614
20	MARTIN P. MCCARTHY, II, ADA MUNROE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
21	Attorney for Respondent 99 Exchange Boulevard
22	#545 Rochester, NY 14614
23	
24	Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds
25	Official Court Transcribe:



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: People v. Watkins.

MS. YOON: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it please the court. Jane Yoon for Jerry Watkins. May I reserve four minutes for rebuttal?

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes.

2.1

2.2

MS. YOON: Where Mr. Watkins had already surrendered to a police officer, was seated in the snow, with his hands empty by the time Ofc. Santiago caught up to him, it was unreasonable for Ofc. Santiago at that time to then yell at Mr. Watkins to roll over, handcuff him behind his back - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about the circumstances that took place prior to the actual encounter of the defendant, hearing of shots?

MS. YOON: Well, that was appropriate to consider for purposes of whether the pursuit was lawful, and we're not contesting that because it's our - - we understand that's outside of the scope of this court's review. But that does not rise to the level of probable cause. If it did, the suppression court as well as the Appellate Division, I believe, would have said so. So under these circumstances, I think everyone agrees that there wasn't enough probable cause, and that the probable cause never happened until the officers recovered the gun.

JUDGE GARCIA: But your argument in the



1 suppression court was that they lacked probable cause or 2 reasonable suspicion to stop. That's the language in your 3 motion. So it seemed that argument was aimed at the 4 lawfulness of the stop, not the level of the stop. 5 This seems to be a different argument you're 6 making? 7 MS. YOON: Well, the motion papers actually 8 articulated that defendant was challenging that the police 9 did not have probable cause for the arrest or reasonable 10 suspicion for the - - - the - - - the stop and seizure - -11 - stop and search, which would be the level 3. 12 In addition to which, defense counsel set forth 13 in his motion - - -14 JUDGE GARCIA: So you're conceding, or you're not 15 contesting, as I understand it, that they had enough for a 16 level 3 stop, a Terry stop? 17 MS. YOON: We did in the lower court. 18

MS. YOON: We did in the lower court. We understand that there is a reading of the facts of this record that would support the suppression court's finding of that.

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

JUDGE GARCIA: And I thought you also said it wasn't preserved in your brief here, but I might have that wrong. So you're saying it in this stage, that they unlawfully arrested him at the time he was stopped, rather than a level 3 Terry stop?



MS. YOON: Yes. And we also argue that in the trial court. Again, I would go back to what - - - this is preserved for two reasons. I understand the court is looking to see, first, if this argument has been preserved. And in addition to the motions, I would remind the court that the suppression court actually did decide the issue.

But going back to the motions, defense counsel set forth - - - you know, we're challenging - - 
JUDGE GARCIA: I read, though, that the suppression court motion is saying once they found the gun, they had probable cause to arrest, right?

2.1

2.2

MS. YOON: That's correct.

JUDGE GARCIA: So if the Terry stop is lawful and the pat-down on the Terry stop is lawful - - - and I understand you're not challenging that - - - I don't see how that preserves this issue?

MS. YOON: Well, I would like to address two parts of that because I think there's actually two questions in that, and I think - - - when the suppression court ruled that there was probable cause once the gun was found, the suppression court necessarily ruled that the gun was found pursuant to some sort of proper - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Stop, right.

MS. YOON: - - level 3 stop. The problem with that is the record doesn't support that conclusion. We



don't actually know if this was a Terry stop or a frisk or some other reason that - - -

2.1

2.2

JUDGE GARCIA: But I thought you weren't arguing

MS. YOON: - - - the gun was discovered.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - that here? I - - - I thought you were arguing that he was unlawfully arrested when they stopped him?

MS. YOON: That's correct, Your Honor. And that's because the court's ruling that the probable cause did not occur until after the arrest, necessarily means that the court found there was no arrest. In which case -

that ground. You weren't challenging that the stop was an arrest at that time. You were arguing they had no lawful reason, either reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop or probable cause justifying an arrest. The court decided that, saying there's reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop, got the gun, then they could arrest him. But I don't see anywhere in the record where you made an argument about the circumstances of his custody, initially, being an arrest. There's no probing on that guns were drawn in here. None of that is in - - in the suppression argument.



MS. YOON: Well, I would disagree that it's not in the suppression argument. It is set forth in defense counsel's motion. I understand that at the hearing there was a different focus at the hearing. But in the motions, defense counsel said that Mr. Watkins did not match the general description that came over the 911 call, that Mr. Watkins was then chased, after a short chase was stopped at gunpoint. And that the gun was not discovered until he was seated at - - on the ground. So I think there he does challenge that.

2.1

2.2

I understand the focus of the hearing was slightly different, but that doesn't mean that the - - - the argument wasn't made. The people - - - defense counsel was kind of constrained by the people's proof at the hearing. But the people were also on notice that defense counsel was challenging whether or not there was probable cause for the arrest.

So the people then had an initial burden to establish the legality of each step.

JUDGE GARCIA: But again, your challenge seems to me to be a challenge that there was neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to make a stop, right? That seems a clear reading of your papers. Which is the alternative, right?

So once they showed there was a reasonable



1 suspicion justifying a stop - - - a frisk, which we've said 2 - - - then they've answered that challenge. 3 MS. YOON: Well, I - - -4 JUDGE GARCIA: There never was any articulation 5 of a theory that the circumstances of the stop itself was 6 an arrest. 7 MS. YOON: Well, I would disagree with that in 8 the fact that defense counsel, I understand, focused his 9 cross-examination and his questioning based on the proof 10 the people provided. But defense counsel made the argument 11 initially. And the defense counsel's burden was never 12 triggered to establish the ultimate burden of persuasion 13 because the people never established that beyond the - - -14 beyond the level 3 stop, that the level 4 stop, if there 15 was one, was appropriate. 16 Because the people at the time they were 17 presenting their proof at hearing - - -JUDGE GARCIA: Well, they established that once 18 19 they found the gun, they could arrest your client. 20 MS. YOON: But we don't know how the gun was 2.1 found. The people chose not to produce Ofc. Thomas knowing 2.2 that - - -23 JUDGE GARCIA: But that's not an arrest question. 24 That, to me, seems like your argument you made in the



Appellate Division that this gun - - - they didn't prove

25

this gun was found as a result of a Terry stop. That what

- - - they didn't show it came out of his pocket, they

didn't show it came out of the hoodie. That argument which

I take your brief to have abandoned at this point as

unpreserved, is different than, when you stopped my client

he was under arrest.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

MS. YOON: Well, he was under arrest at that Because based on the proof that was provided at the hearing, the undisputed proof including the body-worn camera of Ofc. Santiago, what we see is Mr. Watkins seated on the ground with his hands displayed to the police. He's They don't - - - there's no testimony or evidence that he had thrown anything, that there was any bulge. And to the extent that there may have been factors that the court considered as to whether or not this was an appropriate level 3 pursuit, it doesn't rise to the level of probable cause at that point, for Ofc. Santiago to then say, roll over - - - turn him over on his stomach so that he's facedown in the snow, handcuffing him. reasonable under the circumstances of this case. And I - -- I don't know how else you're not challenging that that That was a - - - you know, on the facts was not an arrest? of this case, as a matter of law, that was an arrest. Which is not supported - - - which - - - which means that the court's decision to find that the arrest didn't occur



until they found the gun is not supported. Because all that activity happened before the gun was discovered.

2.1

2.2

A reasonable person in Mr. Watkins' circumstances at that point would not feel free to leave the situation. So the court's decision preserved this issue - - - expressly decided this issue, because the only - - - the only interpretation of the court's decision, which decided that probable cause comes after the gun was found, was that this wasn't an arrest. But Mr. Watkins challenged that his arrest was done without probable cause.

So you can't have the finding of the gun to support the arrest.

JUDGE RIVERA: Except, if I'm understanding this line of questioning, it's whether or not the argument was that they could even look for the gun?

MS. YOON: I'm sorry?

JUDGE RIVERA: Whether or not there was a - - a legal basis to look for the gun?

MS. YOON: We don't know that on this record.

You know, we know that they had some information to justify the pursuit, as found by the Appellate Division. As - - - as this court knows, we - - we don't agree with that decision, but we understand it's outside of the scope of this court's review.

But by the time Ofc. Santiago reached Mr. Watkins



1 he was already in a position of submission. So Ofc. 2 Santiago's actions at that point became unreasonable. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: So just so I'm understanding this 4 argument. It is that at the time he's restrained after the 5 chase and he's sitting down, that is an arrest, right at 6 that point? 7 MS. YOON: Yes, Your Honor. 8 JUDGE GARCIA: Okay. 9 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And at that point, you had -10 - - the police had no basis to look for a gun? 11 MS. YOON: At that point, no. Because Mr. 12 Watkins had already submitted to Ofc. Thomas. We don't 13 know what Ofc. Thomas saw because he didn't testify. 14 prosecution chose not to call him, even though knowing that 15 his body-worn camera was unavailable. All we know at that 16 point is that Mr. Watkins had already given up in 17 submission. 18 JUDGE GARCIA: But - - -19 There was nothing in his hands. MS. YOON: 20 There's no testimony that there was a bulge in his pocket, 2.1 that he disposed of anything during the very short - - -2.2 JUDGE SINGAS: Well, there is testimony that when 23 he was running he was holding onto - - - in his sweatshirt, 24 he was holding onto something on his side, as he was



25

running, right?

1 MS. YOON: Correct. But that was not - - - that 2 doesn't rise to the level of probable cause. Because if it 3 rose to the level of - - -4 JUDGE SINGAS: But it goes to the reasonableness 5 of what they could do once he stopped, doesn't it? 6 MS. YOON: I would disagree with that. 7 if it was, then I think the court would have found there 8 was probable cause to then arrest him - - - for Ofc. 9 Santiago to then arrest him at the time he approaches him. 10 JUDGE GARCIA: But we do have cases that say when 11 you make a Terry stop you can restrain, especially if you 12 think they have a gun, there's information giving you that 13 reasonable suspicion, then you can do a pat-down search in 14 the area that he's holding because you think there might be 15 a gun there, right? 16 MS. YOON: But there's no evidence that there was 17

MS. YOON: But there's no evidence that there was a pat-down search. There was no evidence - - - we - - - we don't know how the gun was found. We just know that Ofc. Santiago handcuffed Mr. Watkins after he ordered him to roll over on his stomach and walked away.

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

JUDGE GARCIA: Your argument now, that doesn't matter. Because I think your argument now is that as soon as they approach him and restrain him, he's arrested at that point and it's unlawful.

MS. YOON: When Ofc. Santiago catches up to them,



2 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 3 MR. MCCARTHY: Good afternoon. Marty McCarthy 4 for the people. 5 This argument was not preserved. You can start 6 with the motion papers. The motion papers were very barebones, and they refer to probable cause. So when they 7 8 litigate the hearing, the focus is on the pursuit. 9 initial approach and the pursuit. 10 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, let me ask you about the motion papers. Paragraph 37 in particular says, "Under 11 12 the circumstances the police lacked either probable cause 13 to arrest the defendant or reasonable suspicion to believe 14 the defendant was engaged in or about to engage in criminal 15 activity." 16 MR. MCCARTHY: Yes. 17 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: That looks like preservation 18 of the question of whether there was probable cause to 19 arrest? 20 MR. MCCARTHY: If you - - - if - - - if you look 21 at what he said at the close of the hearing, though. 22 says at the close of the hearing that he is focused on the 23 encounter at its inception. 24 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, there - - - there's

yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

1

25



language in De Bour that suggests that what you say at the

oral hearing doesn't vitiate - - - unless you expressly disclaim it, I think - - - it - - - an argument that you preserved in your papers?

MR. MCCARTHY: I'm sorry. Can you - - 
CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Sure. I mean, I - - - look

- - - you can take a look at De Bour. I think De Bour has

some paragraph in it that says, somebody made an argument

in the motion papers. They didn't make that argument at

the - - - orally. But that doesn't mean the issue is not

preserved. Now, it's a different thing if they say, I

expressly waive it, that - - - that's not addressed in that

case. But it seems to me there's - - - you know, the fact

that you didn't raise it orally, but if you did raise it in

the papers, I think De Bour says that's okay?

MR. MCCARTHY: So you - - you have to start with preservation.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah.

MR. MCCARTHY: But then you also have to look at the issue of the fact that the - - - there - - - there's the defendant's burden of persuasion. So - - - so if you want to look at it either as a preservation issue or as the defendant's burden of persuasion. Here, when you talk about the defendant's burden of persuasion, the argument that they're trying to persuade you now that when - - - when they got - - - when they caught up to him and they



asked him to - - - they told him to roll over and they
handcuffed him, that was an arrest. They never made that
argument below. That argument was never made.

So when you talk about - - 
JUDGE CANNATARO: And that argument's not covered
by the language that was just quoted to you, that there was
no probable cause for an arrest?

2.2

MR. MCCARTHY: Because again, we're - - - if you want - - - if you want to say, okay, that's preservation, you still have the burden of - - - you still have the burden of - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Yes. I agree that there's a - there's a logical issue that I think Judge Garcia was
alluding to. That once you make the finding that there was
reasonable suspicion justifying a De Bour 3 stop - - a - a Terry stop, the - - - the question of whether there
was probable cause for an arrest is immaterial, so that - - you - - - you know, you don't have to go on. But on
preservation alone, had you failed at level 3, the court
could have then gone on to look at whether there was
reasonable - - - probable cause?

MR. MCCARTHY: But I would also direct you to some of this court's precedents. So for example, in Miranda, 2016. That was a suppression motion. So the issue was, is whether the proper - - - the - - - the



defendant argued, in his motion papers, whether the seizure of property taken from his person should have been suppressed. They litigate the hearing. They don't focus on search incident to arrest. The defendant does not focus on that question. The judge alludes to it in his decision. It goes up to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division affirms. He comes to this court - - Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals says that argument is not preserved for us under CPL 470.05 because the defendant did not focus on that at the hearing.

2.1

2.2

So in the - - - the - - - although the judge decided the search incident to arrest, the defendant didn't focus on it. And as a result, it wasn't preserved for the court's review. So the court said it lacked the ability. It lacked the ability under the law and the Constitution to review the question because the defendant didn't litigate the issue at the hearing.

They did that again - - - you did that again in Wallace in 2016. You did that again in Passino in 2009.

And in 2019 you did it in Britt. Where the issue there was De Bour, as to whether that was a proper level 3 De Bour encounter.

They never argued at the trial level that a open container would never justify a level 3 encounter because it's a violation that you can't go to jail for. Never



argued that below. But at the Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals - - - you said, sorry, you didn't argue that below, we can't reach it. It's not preserved.

2.1

2.2

So just because you are - - just because you use a general title, I - - there was no probable cause. That's not sufficient. Very similar to making a general trial order of dismissal under Gray. You have to articulate the bases.

Never articulated this particular basis that they're doing now. They never - - - when - - - when they were prompted to say, okay, what's your argument? Why should I suppress this evidence? He focuses on the stop at its inception. When they bring this case to the - - - the Appellate Division, they focus on the stop at its inception as well.

They also raise this second issue, the one that was never argued below. The Appellate Division correctly determined that there was reason, under the circumstances, to believe that there was a gun and that the police officers were justified in chasing this defendant. They then decided the particular circumstances surrounding the search were not preserved because the defendant didn't argue them below. That was not the focus of the hearing.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So when he's on the ground handcuffed before they found the gun, is he under arrest?



MR. MCCARTHY: I - - - well, he might be, and he might not be. And I'll point your - - - your attention to People v. Allen, where the use of restraint doesn't necessarily dictate whether somebody's under arrest or not.

2.1

2.2

Allen, you had a very similar circumstance where the police had every reason to believe that defendant was armed, and he was in a dark alley at the time. So what they did is they handcuffed him, and then they - - - they conducted a search. So the use of handcuffs alone isn't indicative of whether there's an arrest or not. So I - - - I would point your attention to that.

Now, here, what's the - - - what is the proof of whether this defendant may be armed? Well, it wasn't just the 911 calls - - - the two 911 calls they received of gunshots. The - - - these police officers were one block away. They heard the gunshots, right? So much like a firefighter that runs into a burning building, these officers actually do know that what they're doing is they're running into a scenario where there is - - - there - - - there is somebody who may have a gun, right? They did that.

They saw this defendant holding something. He was - - he had his hands in his waistband or his - - - his - - his pocket. And when he was running, he was holding that waistband area. They had every reason to

1 believe that he was the one with the gun, he was the one 2 that did the shooting. Which is why they were justified to 3 take those protective measures to ensure that he - - -4 whether he did or didn't have a gun. And it turned out he 5 did. 6 So if there are no other questions, I rest on my 7 brief. 8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 9 MS. YOON: I could address the handcuffing 10 question first. Here we have more than just handcuffing,

MS. YOON: I could address the handcuffing question first. Here we have more than just handcuffing, and we don't have the factors that existed in Allen. If we did, the people didn't present that at the hearing. Here we have handcuffing plus gun drawn. So this is more than just Allen. This is more than just Chestnut, which is a gunpoint - - gunpoint interrogation that they found was appropriate and not an arrest.

And I think the delineation - - - because I know that this court, and all criminal defense practitioners, criminal prosecutor practitioners, love De Bour and all the different delineations in - - - in the levels. But we have - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: They do?

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

MS. YOON: - - - we still have these levels.

JUDGE RIVERA: They do? You sure?

MS. YOON: That's my understanding of the



1 precedent. That's my reading, anyway. 2 But we still have these levels. And if probable 3 cause was appropriate for a level 3, then I think we 4 wouldn't be having this question. But we know from De 5 Bour, we know from - - - you know, all the cases, that you 6 need - - - before you arrest someone, you need probable 7 cause. In this case, the - - - the court decided there 8 9 was no probable cause until the gun was found. 10 JUDGE SINGAS: But in this case, the courts also 11 below didn't make any factual findings concerning the gun 12 drawn or the handcuffs, right? 13 MS. YOON: I would disagree. If the court - - -14 if this court looks at the court's decision in its factual 15 findings, the court sets out the - - - the factual - - -16 JUDGE SINGAS: But its decision doesn't mention 17 it in the way that you just did. So does that undermine 18 your preservation argument? 19 MS. YOON: I would say no. I would say that 20 because the court, when they - - - the court sort of set it 2.1 up as these are my factual findings, these are the legal 2.2 conclusions. And the court sets out - - -23 JUDGE SINGAS: This is my decision? 24 MS. YOON: Right. The court sets up - - - you 25 know, he was - - - he was chased. He was - - - he was - -



- he - - - he - - - they - - - he doesn't call it an arrest, obviously, but he does say the gun was found and that gave rise to the probable cause. So I - - - I believe the court's express decision is actually that. JUDGE SINGAS: No. I'm talking about the handcuffing and the - - - and Santiago's gun? MS. YOON: He's - - - he says - - - the court said - - - he - - - "Ofc. Santiago chases Mr. Watkins. comes upon defendant seated on the ground in the driveway." Oh, I'm sorry. JUDGE SINGAS: It's okay. I don't want to ruin

JUDGE SINGAS: It's okay. I don't want to ruin your track of thought.

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, could I - - -

MS. YOON: I believe the chronology that the court sets out, though, is that he was - - - he was chased. He was then stopped at gunpoint. I think the court actually does recognize that he was chased and stopped at gunpoint and that their probable cause didn't follow until they found the gun.

But we don't know how the gun was found, and that's extremely problematic here because that's a huge piece of whether the police conduct for the encounter was appropriate.

JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah, but again, it doesn't seem to go to what you're arguing here. You argued that in the



Appellate Division, but I thought you weren't arguing that here. What you're arguing here is, it doesn't matter how they found the gun because they found it once they arrested him, and they didn't have probable cause to arrest him? MS. YOON: That's correct, Your Honor. didn't have probable cause to arrest him. And Officer - -- it's Ofc. Santiago's conduct that was the arrest. And the court's decision is that it was after Ofc. Santiago's conduct. So I believe that is - - - has been decided by the court. Thank you. CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. (Court is adjourned) 



## CERTIFICATION

I, Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Jerry Watkins, No. 121 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

Agency Name: eScribers 

Suite 207

Signature:

Date:

Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street

November 29, 2024

Phoenix, AZ 85020

