1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	PEOPLE,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 120
7	PARRIS J. RUFUS,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York November 20, 2024
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	
16	Appearances:
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24	Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds Official Court Transcriber
25	Official Court Hamscriber



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: People v. Parris Rufus. 1 2 MR. FIANDACH: Good afternoon. May it please the 3 Edward Fiandach for the defendant - - - for the 4 appellant here, Parris Rufus. 5 To be quite clear, I don't think this case 6 presents a legitimate pretextual stop as we would have seen 7 under Robinson. To be legitimate, there has to be probable cause of a traffic violation. This isn't the case here. 8 9 There's no - - - there can be no probable cause of a 10 traffic violation because there was no traffic violation. 11 All that was observed, in this case, was the 12 right front tire touching the fog line on approximately 13 three occasions over one-tenth of a mile. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Is there - - is there any 15 scenario under which an - - - a driver, an individual, 16 would cross the line, perhaps multiple times, perhaps in a 17 short distance, perhaps in a way that swerves, that you 18 would say, ah, that now, gives you probable cause? 19 so, how is this case to be distinguished - - -20 MR. FIANDACH: Well, there would - - -2.1 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - from where you would agree 2.2 that - - - that is enough for probable cause? 23 MR. FIANDACH: Your Honor, that - - - that

situation may occur. But I think I would differentiate

that situation from the situation at hand where we only

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1	have the right front tire touching the touching the
2	fog line. Obviously, if the car moves over the fog line
3	extensively for a period of time, over several over
4	over
5	JUDGE GARCIA: So the Appellate Division decision
6	that says, "it crossed over the white fog crossed
7	over the white fog line three times," that's not accurate?
8	MR. FIANDACH: It's not accurate. It's not
9	it's not supported by the testimony. The testimony of Tpr
10	Tiwana basically said that he touched the fog line on
11	approximately three times over a about approximately
12	one-tenth of a mile
13	JUDGE GARCIA: There is a safety issue with
14	driving over or on the fog line, right?
15	MR. FIANDACH: I'm sorry?
16	JUDGE GARCIA: There is a safety issue when you
17	drive on the fog line, right?
18	MR. FIANDACH: Well, driving on the fog line,
19	yes. I mean, if the vehicle crosses the fog line he's
20	driving down the shoulder of the road.
21	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I don't I don't think
22	you're
23	MR. FIANDACH: It's a tremendous safety issue.
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: you're characterizing
25	the record properly. The trooper says, "I observed the



	venicle swerve across the solid white line, shoulder line,
2	on the right hand side on three separate occasions within
3	approximately a few hundred feet." Then, question: "When
4	you observed that, did the entirety of the tire pass over
5	the line? Yes, it did."
6	It's not touched the line. It crossed the line.
7	MR. FIANDACH: The entirety of the tire may have
8	crossed the fog line.
9	JUDGE GARCIA: And that's not unsafe?
10	MR. FIANDACH: I I don't believe so. No.
11	JUDGE GARCIA: But what if there's a person
12	there?
13	MR. FIANDACH: Pardon?
14	JUDGE GARCIA: What if there's a person or a
15	bike?
16	MR. FIANDACH: I wouldn't expect that there would
17	be a person on the fog line or immediately over the other
18	side of the fog line, particularly on a super highway.
19	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So when this happens three
20	JUDGE GARCIA: Even if
21	JUDGE HALLIGAN: times in ten minutes?
22	That that's not at three times in in a
23	tenth of a mile? That's not something that suggests
24	there's a problem?
25	MR. FIANDACH: The right front tire crossing the



fog line three times over - - - over the - - - over three 1 2 times - - -3 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I still don't see where 4 you're getting "right front tire"? Those words are not in 5 the testimony at all. 6 MR. FIANDACH: He - - - he uses the term right 7 front tire. I would - - -JUDGE SINGAS: I believe he uses the - - - the 8 9 plural, two tires. The right tires which indicate that the car swerved - - - you know, and he used the word swerved 10 too, correct? 11 12 MR. FIANDACH: I believe the word swerved 13 basically came in when he characterized the - - -14 JUDGE SINGAS: I - - - I think that's true. When 15 he characterized what the defendant said. 16 MR. FIANDACH: Right. 17 JUDGE SINGAS: But I think the second officer 18 also said swerve. That's - - - that was my recollection of 19 the testimony. The - - - the first officer definitely said 20 tires, indicating that both tires crossed that line. Not 21 that it was just one tire that touched, but that the car -22 - - if both tires are crossing the fog line, that car is 23 moving into the shoulder.

MR. FIANDACH: Where I think the testimony was

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points said the right front tire, and then the term tires was used. So I mean, the testimony was somewhat inconsistent back and forth.

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JUDGE CANNATARO: Even if it's one tire, what more is required for - - - for probable cause for this 1192 violation?

MR. FIANDACH: First of all, Guthrie says that we have to have a traffic violation. Okay? And is this a traffic - - is this a violation of 1128(a)? 1128(a) says that he has to unsafely leave the lane to travel - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Does say that he has - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Well, doesn't that apply to changing lanes, you have to - - - if you're going to change lanes, you have to make sure that you can do so safely. So do you think that this is different if you're floating into the shoulder, is that different than changing lanes?

MR. FIANDACH: Well, first of all, the fog line doesn't - - - doesn't delineate a lane, okay. And again, there was really no testimony that he drifted into the shoulder of the highway.

JUDGE SINGAS: All right. Well, we're going to disagree on that, right? Because - - - you know, whether the tires crossed over or not. My point is - - - and I think you're correct that when you're changing lanes, you have to demonstrate that it could be done safely.



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- 1	
1	MR. FIANDACH: Right.
2	JUDGE SINGAS: I'm saying that this is not a
3	lane. When you're going into the end of the road and
4	heading into a shoulder, that those rules are no longer
5	applicable. There are other rules that say you can't driv
6	on the shoulder of a highway, right?
7	MR. FIANDACH: Correct.
8	JUDGE SINGAS: Regardless of whether it's safe of
9	not.
10	MR. FIANDACH: That's very correct. But there's
11	no testimony here that he was actually driving on the
12	shoulder of the highway.
13	JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, isn't crossing the line
14	I don't know if you would call it driving on the
15	shoulder, but you can certainly call it not driving in the
16	lane in the traffic lane?
17	MR. FIANDACH: Well, no. I would say that the
18	vehicle was still being operated in the traffic lane, but
19	he had simply went over this this this line
20	which is basically placed there as as basically
21	guidance to assist motorists. As as 3B.07 says.
22	JUDGE CANNATARO: But that seems to describe, ir
23	and of itself, failure to maintain lane?
24	MR. FIANDACH: I don't necessarily believe so.



believe that the vehicle was being operated within the

1	lane. It merely touched it touched or remotely
2	crossed the fog line.
3	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Doesn't doesn't the
4	statute also say, "shall not be moved from such lane until
5	the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be
6	made with safety?"
7	MR. FIANDACH: Correct.
8	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And so so couldn't one
9	assume that if you see someone go across the line three
10	times within a tenth of a mile, that they could not
11	possibly be ascertaining whether the movement can be done
12	safely? That that's pretty erratic driving.
13	MR. FIANDACH: See, again, I disagree. I don't
14	see that as pretty erratic driving. In fact, I I
15	see that as $ -$ as $ -$ as essentially nominal driving.
16	It would
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Essentially what, I'm sorry?
18	MR. FIANDACH: Nominal driving.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, nominal.
20	MR. FIANDACH: That that line is is
21	touched
22	JUDGE CANNATARO: So everybody does that?
23	MR. FIANDACH: It Your Honor, yes. That's
24	what happens. People touch the fog line.



JUDGE RIVERA: Okay, but - - - that's what I

started out asking you where - - - I didn't ask it this
way, but I'll ask it now. Where is the rule, then, for
you? Because I might very well be persuaded that if you
just cross over just with your front wheel just a moment
and you come right back, that perhaps that's not probable
cause for a stop. But if you do it, as has already been
said, three times within a very short period of time,
within a very short distance, that might indeed raise a red
flag. But where is your rule then?

MR. FIANDACH: Well, my rule - - - I mean, I've had cases where - - - you know, a vehicle crosses halfway over the fog line. I mean, obviously, that indicates a problem with the motorist. It indicates that the vehicle is not being operated properly. But again, I do not believe that the testimony at this hearing establishes that - - - that - - - that level.

JUDGE RIVERA: But does the - - - I'll go with you. Does the de minimus, right, crossing over - - - we'll call it that - - - does that get outweighed by the fact that it's several times within a very short period of time and within a very short distance?

MR. FIANDACH: I - - - I don't know that - - you know, with three - - - three times within a tenth of a
mile is really all that short of a distance. That's - - you know, three times over 500 feet. This trooper



1	apparently had been following the the motorist for a
2	period of time and this was all that was observed. So I -
3	I just don't see a sign of unsafe driving. I don't se
4	to to reiterate what I said earlier, I just
5	don't see operation which in any way deviates from nominal
6	driving of a perfectly normal motorist.
7	JUDGE HALLIGAN: What does nominal driving mean?
8	MR. FIANDACH: Well, nominal driving means the
9	way people drive a car. The way people drive cars. Peopl
LO	do touch that line. It it's
L1	JUDGE GARCIA: If this had happened in the
L2	centerline, same testimony that we heard. What would your
L3	answer be?
L4	MR. FIANDACH: Well, my answer would be far
L5	different
L 6	JUDGE GARCIA: Why?
L7	MR. FIANDACH: because at that point in
L8	time, at the centerline he would actually be moving into
L9	another lane of travel and would have to demonstrate that
20	that was being done safely.
21	JUDGE GARCIA: So but I think we were
22	agreeing that crossing the fog line unsafely, if you drift
23	over a certain amount, that would qualify. Right?
24	MR. FIANDACH: Qualify?
25	JUDGE GARCIA: Under the statute as a violation?



1	MR. FIANDACH: Of 1128(a)? I think if the
2	if the the vehicle crosses say half of the
3	vehicle crossed the fog line, that it would probably
4	yes.
5	JUDGE GARCIA: But it has to be half on the fog
6	line, but it could be what the testimony was here, in the
7	centerline? That would be unsafe?
8	MR. FIANDACH: Well, it the the
9	again, the centerline I would would be different
10	because the centerline is in fact you're crossing into
11	another lane of travel.
12	JUDGE GARCIA: So
13	MR. FIANDACH: That would be a whole other
14	it would be a whole other situation than 1128(a).
15	JUDGE GARCIA: So it's the risk it would be
16	the risk that there is a car in the other lane would make
17	it unsafe rather than
18	MR. FIANDACH: Very possibly. That's a very good
19	point. There'd be a risk of the cars going up on the left
20	hand side.
21	JUDGE GARCIA: So it's the fact that it's
22	unlikely there's a pedestrian or a bicyclist or another
23	stopped car on the far on the shoulder that makes
24	this not that makes this safe?
25	MR. FIANDACH: That's correct. This was a super



MR. FIANDACH: That's correct. This was a super

1 highway. 2 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So it doesn't matter if he kept 3 moving in and out, twenty times? 4 MR. FIANDACH: Twenty times? I think that would 5 make a difference. 6 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Okay. 7 MR. FIANDACH: And that would be some indication 8 -- - in fact, that may -- - that would be, under Guthrie, 9 you'd have to show - - - you'd have to show a reasonable 10 suspicion of the - - - of a crime, and that might be an 11 indication that the motorist was intoxicated. 12 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But three is not enough? 13 MR. FIANDACH: Pardon? 14 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But three isn't - - -15 MR. FIANDACH: Three is certainly not enough. 16 least in my book. 17 There remains the - - - the - - - the issue of 18 the testimony at trial was whether or not it's established 19 that the motorist was in an intoxicated condition. 20 that score, I'd like to - - - to - - to go to the portion 2.1 of Cruz wherein we talk about the ability to understand the 2.2 nature and effect of a contract or a - - - the - - - the 23 ability to testify truthfully. 24 I mean, clearly this particular motorist had very 25 strong cognitive abilities.



1	JUDGE SINGAS: Is this didn't he give his -
2	the air freshener wrapper as his license?
3	MR. FIANDACH: He did. But as I noted in my
4	brief, it very very closely resembled the the
5	registration certificate. Just about
6	JUDGE HALLIGAN: An air I didn't understand
7	that. How does an air freshener wrapper I assume
8	it's plastic of some sort? How could it resemble a
9	driver's license?
10	MR. FIANDACH: It's
11	JUDGE CANNATARO: Registration.
12	MR. FIANDACH: roughly the same shape
13	shape.
14	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Sorry. The registration. The
15	registration? I mean, I have one in my glove compartment.
16	It's it's -
17	JUDGE CANNATARO: I'm sorry. You said was
18	your answer just that they were both rectangular?
19	MR. FIANDACH: The that yeah. The -
20	the air it was this it wasn't the air
21	freshener, it was
22	JUDGE CANNATARO: It was the wrapper. But one -
23	as Judge Halligan just said, one is correct us,
24	but one is probably made out of plastic
25	JUDGE HALLIGAN. A plastic wrapper



JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - the other one's made out 1 2 of paper. And one's got printing on it and the other one, 3 presumably, is clear? 4 MR. FIANDACH: In all candor, I understand this 5 is the weakest point of my argument. Okay. All right? If 6 we can just - - - if I can just be honest with you? And 7 that is the point that I would rather not elaborate on, all 8 right? 9 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Fair enough. 10 MR. FIANDACH: I would like to talk about the 11 nine-step walk-and-turn, however. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what - - - what - - - before 13 you get to the nine-step walk-and-turn. What about the 14 observations of the bloodshot eyes and also the smell of 15 alcohol and the slurred speech? What about that? 16 MR. FIANDACH: Well, as the testimony in the - -17 - - - there is no - - - no direct correlation between the 18 19 intensity of smell of alcohol on one's breath and whether

- as the testimony at the trial established, the - - - the or not an individual's intoxicated. The smell of alcohol on his breath certainly didn't indicate that he was intoxicated. In other words, that he - -

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JUDGE RIVERA: Slurred speech, having to hold onto the car to be able to walk?

MR. FIANDACH: Well, let - - - let me deal with



both those issues separately. The - - - the slurred speech issue, I think was somewhat questionable. Because if we look at the way he performed the - - - the alphabet test, the C through J, all he - - - all that Tpr. Tiwana testified was that he did it somewhat slowly. In fact, I believe he was specifically asked did you notice anything about his speech as he did the C through J, and said yes, he did it somewhat slowly. There was no talk about slurring or mumbling or anything else.

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And then there's the cognitive ability there, okay? That's the important part about driving while intoxicated, it's the cognitive ability. He did that C through J flawlessly.

I go back to the nine-step walk-and-turn. Never missed heel to toe. Never stepped off the line, to which Tpr. - - Tpr. Tiwana said, well, it's a - - - it's a pretty wide line or something. Well, we're talking about the fog line, okay.

He - - - the nine - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But there were other parts that he failed, correct?

MR. FIANDACH: Well, the one-leg stand, it looks like he kept his foot elevated for the thirty-second period that he was required to keep it and may have even kept the foot elevated more than that thirty-second period. Then



1 there's the - - - the horizontal gaze nystagmus. I want to 2 comment about that, if I can? 3 The horizontal gaze nystagmus, Tpr. Tiwana 4 testified that it - - - that a - - - a positive indication 5 indicated the presence of a central nervous system 6 depressant. However, he never specified that the central 7 nervous system depressant he observed is alcohol. 8 simply said it showed he was under the - - - the influence 9 of a central nervous system depressant, which doesn't 10 indicate that the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus 11 examination indicated that he was under the influence of 12 alcohol. 13 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Am I right, in the - - -14 JUDGE SINGAS: But he also said that he smelled 15 like alcohol? MR. FIANDACH: Well, again - - - but like I said, 16 17 the smell of alcohol in and of itself does not indicate - -18 19 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I guess these things aren't 20 in and of themselves. We've got a whole bunch of things 21 we're putting together and - - -2.2 MR. FIANDACH: But - -23 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: - - - the question is 24 whether you can draw an inference from that? 25 MR. FIANDACH: - - it wasn't as though he - -



1	whether he profoundly failed the nine-step walk-and-turn,
2	or profoundly failed the the the
3	- the one-leg stand, or or failed to perform the
4	alphabet. All these things were kind of halfway. They
5	don't indicate that he was in an intoxicated condition. I
6	just don't see where where the results of wher
7	the evidence in this trial indicated that he did not have
8	the nature to the ability to understand the th
9	nature and effect of a contract.
10	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Did he didn't he say
11	MR. FIANDACH: Or to form a specific intent.
12	Excuse me? Yeah.
13	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Pardon me.
14	MR. FIANDACH: Excuse me.
15	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Didn't he say on the ride that
16	he wouldn't have been drinking if he didn't get hit?
17	Referring to the accident?
18	MR. FIANDACH: He said he wouldn't have been
19	drinking if he'd been hit, but you you it is
20	legal. And I believe the question he was asked, the
21	in it one of the I believe, Tpr. Tiwana
22	was asked at trial was that, you know, it's not illegal -
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24	TUDGE HALLIGAN. YAS



MR. FIANDACH: - - - to drink and drive.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: He - - he also, if - - - if 1 2 I'm recalling the record, declined or refused to take a - -3 - a chemical breath test; is that right? 4 MR. FIANDACH: He did. But remember that under 5 1194 they have to establish persistence for that to become 6 an operative inference. And the - - - as I discussed in my 7 brief, there was some question about the persistence in the 8 failure to take that. I did not see the testimony in the 9 trial where he - - - he refused to take the - - - the - -10 the evidentiary breath test on - - - on three mandated 11 occasions. There was even a question in - - - in the 12 vehicle, as to whether or not Tpr. Tiwana testified it was 13 done in the vehicle but Tpr. Statt seemed to think it was 14 I may have that reversed between Statt and Tiwana. 15 But there was a - - - a - - a variance there as to 16 whether or not he had refused to submit to the - - - to the 17 evidentiary chemical test while he was in the vehicle. 18 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 19 MS. WALENDZIAK: Good afternoon. May it please 20 the court. Amy Walendziak on behalf of the people. 2.1 In this case, the troopers had probable cause to

In this case, the troopers had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle for a violation of Section 1128(a).

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At risk of quoting the statute to the court, I'm
--- I'm aware that Judge --- or all of the panel is



2 particular subsection of the statute. First of all, "A 3 driver shall drive their vehicle as nearly as practicable 4 within a single lane" and "They shall not move the vehicle 5 unless it's safe to do so". And I think looking at the 6 first component of the statute, that shows us why, here, 7 defendant violated the statute. He did not drive his 8 vehicle as nearly as practicable within the single lane. 9 The testimony, I believe, on pages 186 - - -10 JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, we all - - - we all do -11 - - in - - - in an effort to try to maintain lane, we all 12 do touch lines when driving. At least, I know I did when I 13 drove up here on Monday. So is there something about the 14 frequency, the distance that adds to that discussion? 15 MS. WALENDZIAK: Respectfully, I didn't touch the 16 line when I drove here, but we can - - -17 JUDGE CANNATARO: You're just a better driver 18 than me. 19 MS. WALENDZIAK: We can - - - we can agree to 20 disagree on that. But I would say that the degree to which 21 you cross the line and also, the - - -2.2 JUDGE CANNATARO: And oh, by the way I had - - -

aware of the wording. There are two components to that

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again, touching the line, I don't know that you've

MS. WALENDZIAK: No, absolutely. But I think,

I didn't drink at all.

necessarily left the lane. Once you have crossed over the line you're on the shoulder. And I think if your vehicle is partly on the shoulder of the road, you are not entirely within the lane.

The fog line is - -
CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Also, is doing that once sufficient to pull a car over?

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MS. WALENDZIAK: I believe so, unless it is not

practicable to stay within the lane.

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - - so you think that we should adopt, as the dissenters claim, this per se rule that the department has adopted? Just one? Just go over that - - not even completely over. Just touch it once and that's enough?

MS. WALENDZIAK: I would say under certain - - - certain circumstances, going over the line. I would draw this court's attention to its decision in Schoonmaker, I believe is how you pronounce it? It - - - while it's not a criminal case, I recognize that. It was cited in Chief Judge Wilson's decision in People v. Hinson in footnote 4, I believe. And in Schoonmaker it was a single movement across the white fog line onto the shoulder and then back onto the road.

JUDGE SINGAS: In Schoonmaker we - - - we also said the driving was erratic. And - - - and that testimony



1 is not present here. 2 MS. WALENDZIAK: Well, I think driving over the 3 fog line three times within a tenth of a mile on a highway, 4 does tend to establish some erratic driving. 5 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So since there's three 6 incidents, though, we don't need to decide whether one time 7 would be enough, do we? 8 MS. WALENDZIAK: I suppose not. At risk of 9 issuing an advisory opinion, because those aren't the facts 10 of this case. However - - -11 JUDGE HALLIGAN: In other words, if - - - if we -12 - - if we have a concern about whether driving over once 13 might not provide sufficient basis on a regular day 14 outside, absent something else to pull somebody over, that 15 - - - that isn't presented here, right? 16 MS. WALENDZIAK: No, it's not. Here, it was 17 three complete crossings of both tires; I believe both of 18 the troopers testified to. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: But would you get behind a rule 20 that says, there's no per se rule about the number of 2.1 times, distance; it is fact-specific? 2.2 MS. WALENDZIAK: I would say it is fact-specific, 23 and I would - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: So that one time might, under the



circumstances, be enough to provide probable cause of a

violation of 1128(a)?

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MS. WALENDZIAK: Yes. One time might and one time might not. For example, I believe it was in Schoonmaker. The - - - I believe this court drew attention to the fact that there was nothing that necessitated the movement from the lane. So for example, if there was one movement and the troopers had observed, say a deer run across the road, I think that does necessitate your departure from the lane. Because at that point staying in the lane if there is a deer in the road, it's not practicable to continue driving entirely within that lane. You would want to leave to not hit the deer, and you can do so provided that you do it in a safe manner. I don't - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Do you think there's a difference between crossing a lane - - - a lane of traffic versus the fog line? Is there a difference there?

MS. WALENDZIAK: Not in this particular statute. It says that you have to drive entirely within one lane. So it does not say that leaving the lane to - - - to the right across the fog line is okay, but leaving the lane across the yellow, perhaps, double solid line or one of the dashed lines that would delineate the middle from the right lane of traffic - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Are you aware of any other VTL violations for crossing into the shoulder?



MS. WALENDZIAK: There is a prohibition against driving on the shoulder.

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JUDGE SINGAS: And does that have anything to do with whether you can do it safely or not?

MS. WALENDZIAK: I believe that says that you cannot drive onto the shoulder unless you are doing so in one of the circumstances provided there. So that would be 1131. And you can stop on the shoulder if there's a tow truck attending to a disabled vehicle, or if you're being directed to do so by a law enforcement officer effectuating a traffic stop. That's okay to drive onto the shoulder.

But here, at the time that we observed these three crossings over the fog line, he was not being directed to pull over by the police officer yet.

JUDGE RIVERA: Can I just ask you? You mentioned the first part of 1128(a) and your - - - your view that that's - - - that - - - there was probable cause of a violation of that part. Is it your position that there's not probable cause of a violation on the second part? Or that there also is, but the first one, perhaps, is much more obvious?

MS. WALENDZIAK: I would say that it is much more obvious of the first one. Again, because of the number of crossings that we have here. And I think also, it matters that they were relatively close in time to one another.



This was a tenth of a mile, and when you're driving on the highway at fifty-five miles an hour, you're going to cross that distance much quicker than, say, if you were only driving thirty-five miles an hour. I think that matters for where this was done and the speed at which - -
JUDGE RIVERA: Is the record clear that he was driving at fifty-five?

MS. WALENDZIAK: The - -
JUDGE RIVERA: As opposed to less or more?

MS. WALENDZIAK: It could have been less. The officer testified that he was driving within the speed limit. So I would say, even if it was forty-five miles an

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MS. WALENDZIAK: It could have been less. The officer testified that he was driving within the speed limit. So I would say, even if it was forty-five miles an hour, I believe I did out the math - - - and apologies for dragging the court back to high school algebra. But this happened in a relatively quick amount of time. This wasn't he crossed the fog line once and then ten minutes later he did it again. So you know, he may have accidentally drifted. This was within a tenth of a mile.

And again, I would say that doing so relatively quickly is just not a safe movement. Swerving indicates a lack of control of your vehicle, and I don't think that we can agree that that's safe - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Is the record clear that the officer said he observed him swerve?

MS. WALENDZIAK: The officer didn't say swerving.



Defendant himself characterized it as swerving. However, I would note that the officer testified to facts that I think we can infer that it was swerving. I know this court recently decided one of the excessive window tint cases.

And in that particular case, it was concluding that - - - or the officer testifying that the window was excessively tinted, didn't allow this court to determine what exactly excessive was. Here we have the facts to reach the conclusion that he was swerving because he crossed the fog line three separate times within a tenth of a mile.

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And if I may briefly touch upon the legal sufficiency issue?

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Do we know - - -

MS. WALENDZIAK: Oh, sorry.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Do we know from the record what kind of car he was driving?

MS. WALENDZIAK: Yes. It was a black Camaro. So $I \ --- \ I \ don't \ recall \ the \ other \ --- \ I \ remember \ it \ was a$ Camaro.

And then if I could briefly touch upon the legal sufficiency issue? It would be our position that this issue isn't even preserved for this court's review because defendant made only a general motion for an order of - - - a trial order of dismissal. But in any event, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that he was



intoxicated. While the particular instances identified by defendant viewed on their own in isolation may not, we have all of them together.

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I would go back to the registration card which is a completely different material from a plastic air freshener wrapper. He had slow and slurred speech at times. He also smelled of alcohol and had admitted to the officer that he had been drinking earlier that evening. He used the car door for balance. While he had the cognitive abilities to recite the alphabet, there's - - that's not the only thing you need to - - to operate a vehicle safely. You have to physically be able to do so.

And I think the fact that he can't even step out of the car on his own, and also he was swerving his car three times before the stop, leads to the conclusion that the defendant didn't have the ability to - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: I'm sorry. What do you mean when you say he couldn't step out of the car on his own? That he had needed to use the door to brace himself?

MS. WALENDZIAK: Yes. I believe the testimony was that he grabbed the upper door part to get out of the vehicle.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Didn't some police officer testify that they do the same thing in this case?

MS. WALENDZIAK: I think he testified that



1	sometimes he uses the door, but he also opined that in this
2	particular instance he saw defendant using the door to
3	balance himself. Which I think is a little bit different
4	when you require the door to balance yourself versus just
5	using it at you know, for like easiness-sake.
6	And unless there are any further questions, I
7	would rely on my brief and ask this court to affirm the
8	Appellate Division's decision.
9	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.
10	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Parris Rufus, No. 120 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: November 29, 2024

