1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	PEOPLE,
4	Appellant,
5	
6	-against-
7	ALVIN KING,
8	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York May 15, 2024
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	
16	Appearances:
17	BRADLEY W. OASTLER, ESQ. ONONDAGA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE Attorney for Appellant
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23	
	Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds
24	Official Court Transcriber



1	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Last case on today's
2	calendar is Number 64, People v. King.
3	MR. OASTLER: Good afternoon, Your Honors. Bret
4	Oastler, on behalf of the People.
5	The rule, I think, that this court should come
6	down with in this case there could be a couple
7	variations, but it could be as simple as this: the amended
8	Section 30.30, subsection 5 of the CPL should not be
9	applied to cases that were commenced and were trial ready,
10	where the People declared readiness for trial prior to
11	January 1st, 2020.
12	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Those are both necessary
13	conditions, commenced and trial ready?
14	MR. OASTLER: I I think I think that
15	is a rule that would make sense. I think you could
16	would say you could also
17	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I'm just I was just
18	trying to clear up your your articulation.
19	MR. OASTLER: Absolutely.
20	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I was just trying to make
21	sure you weren't saying if it's commenced that's enough or
22	if it's trial ready, that's enough. It's both?
23	MR. OASTLER: I I think it could be either
24	one. However, if the court wanted to narrow it down as
25	much as as we could, I think it would be consistent



with the reading of the statute and - - and all the ways in which we interpret - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And by trial ready, there would have been a - - - a statement of readiness made either on the record or off record?

MR. OASTLER: Correct. Correct. And I say that because I - - I think this is sort of the - - - the main crux of my argument is that when the People declared ready for trial in this case in April of 2019, that's a legal status. It's a effectively a legal document. And it could be, obviously, just an oral statement on the record. But it's a legal status that the - - - that the People set forth. And to apply the amended 30.30 and its connection to 245 to effectively nullify that - -

JUDGE RIVERA: No, it doesn't nullify it.

MR. OASTLER: I - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: It - - - it's just imposing requirements starting Jan 1. It doesn't nullify the fact that you declared ready, and you were in that ready status at that time. Just saying now you've got these requirements, satisfy those requirements to continue your readiness status.

MR. OASTLER: Except that's not exactly what the statute said. The statute says to - - - to declare ready, you must, you know, follow 245 et cetera.



JUDGE RIVERA: Under the new regime.
MR. OASTLER: Under the new regime.
JUDGE RIVERA: Correct.
MR. OASTLER: But when the People declared ready
there was not
JUDGE RIVERA: The prior regime, you were ready.
MR. OASTLER: Right. Right. The statute didn't
did not did not say that as of January 1st,
prior statements would be invalidated.
JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, you're not saying
I'm sorry. You're not saying that the new new
the additional discovery obligations effective January 1
wouldn't apply to your case? That that's not how I
take your argument.
MR. OASTLER: I don't think I I would
say that I don't think they were to apply to this case.
And part of the reason I would say that is because if we
looked at the timelines laid out in 245, the at this
at that time, fifteen days to comply. And then the
defense getting a reciprocal thirty days to comply with our
January 27th
JUDGE GARCIA: It seems to me if you uncouple the
discovery obligations from the 30.30 penalty or link, which
we said was the radical new thing in Glendale, you're not
upsetting any status. You're just saying you have to

provide them with this material before you go to trial. You haven't gone to trial yet. Why don't you have an obligation to provide them with it?

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MR. OASTLER: So in - - - in - - - in that way, I would agree that we could - - - the People could be said to be obligated to provide that as long as, of course, though, that did not invalidate their prior statement of readiness. In this case, I - - - you know, the - - - the items that we hadn't turned over were the grand jury minutes, which there was no obligation to before 245.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you arguing that the -
- the status of being ready should have stayed in place?

But if the law changed and they asked for those things, are
you saying you weren't obligated, or you should be given an
opportunity to then satisfy the next part?

MR. OASTLER: I think it would be fair to permit the People an opportunity to satisfy, as - - - as we attempted to do here.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And the reading here, did that allow for an opportunity to then satisfy as of the effective date?

MR. OASTLER: Well, the court - - - the trial court in this instance - - - I don't know if it's exactly clear, but I would say that it essentially did not apply 245, or at least, the connection to speedy trial. The

1	court said please provide the grand jury minutes and the -
2	you know, the electronic discovery that we we
3	also provided. But the court rejected any sort of
4	challenge to the to our prior statement of readiness.
5	JUDGE HALLIGAN: I'm a little
6	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm a I'm a little confused.
7	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Sorry, Judge.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Did you ask for more time? Did
9	you say that there are extraordinary circumstances or
10	the reason that we need more time, so that we're we
11	don't suffer the consequences under the new regime
12	MR. OASTLER: We we did not
13	JUDGE RIVERA: under 30.30?
14	MR. OASTLER: but I I don't know that
15	we needed to because we I you know, I we
16	
17	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, that's what I want to
18	clarify, if I can. I'm not sure I understand your
19	position. Is it that the 245 requirements applied to you,
20	but you should have been given more time? And if you
21	didn't comply within whatever that window would then have
22	been, that then you you could have had your case
23	dismissed? Or are you arguing that 245 applied, but not
24	the sanction of dismissal under 30.30?



MR. OASTLER: I think the latter would be the

more fair and consistent - - -

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: And why is that consistent with the language of the statute, that latter interpretation?

MR. OASTLER: Because the statute is of such magnitude or breadth in terms of - - - of the demands upon one party here.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So I mean, that - - - that, for me, raises a question I'm not sure I understood about the legal framework that we should apply here. So you cite Berkovitz and you argue that to apply 30.30 would make the prior statement of readiness a nullity, I think. And your adversary relies on Landgraf, which distinguishes between substantive and procedural rights. So what's the interplay between those two legal frameworks and how should we sort that out?

MR. OASTLER: I - - - I think - - - my interpretation of Landgraf or Berkovitz or any of the other cases that talk about retroactivity and - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Yeah.

MR. OASTLER: - - - what makes a case or - - - excuse me - - - what makes a change in the law not so procedural and more substantive, all of those would support the idea here that this statute, this change, is much more than a simple procedural change. And I say that in light of - - -



JUDGE HALLIGAN: Is what - - - they're simple or procedural? Do we need to decide if it's substantive or procedural, or is it the - - - the nature of the impact that you're relying on?

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MR. OASTLER: Well, I think the nature of the impact is - - - is an important part of - - - of how this court would determine that. And I say that because the - -- the instances in - - - in the case law that we have where something was - - - was held to be purely procedural. I'll cite very quickly Clayton v. Clement, which just amended the type of hearing that would be held at the end of - - - of - - - of a particular petition. You know, that's not something that affected any right of any party. It's not something that affected a - - - a party's ability to go forward or actually prosecute their case, in - - - in this instance. The application of the amended 30.30, and - and - - and to that - - and the connection to 245, resulting in a - - - effectively, a dismissal now twentyseven days into January, after the law went into effect. Where the People had declared ready for the previous eight or nine months, that's - - - that's not a procedural It just can't be said - change.

JUDGE SINGAS: But can it --- can it --- can it also be that we can look at this as pure statutory interpretation? And we only get to Landgraf and



retroactivity, if we perceive or read this statute as 1 2 saying the People's readiness is undone? 3 MR. OASTLER: I would agree with that as well. 4 And - - - and we have here a - - - a just flat-out 5 indisputable silence from the legislature as to whether this would apply to a case in - - - in the stance that our 6 7 case had at that point in time. 8 JUDGE SINGAS: So because you had announced ready 9 there's nothing in the statute to suggest - - - because it 10 says - - - 245 says, I believe, 50, "the prosecution shall not be deemed ready." Your position is, I take it, you 11 12 were already ready? So you don't have to be deemed ready? 13 MR. OASTLER: Correct. Correct. 14 JUDGE SINGAS: And is - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: Could you have - - -16 JUDGE SINGAS: - - - that's your distinction 17 between those cases where, coming into January 1, that 18 where you've announced ready versus the cases where - - -19 that were in an unreadiness state? 20 MR. OASTLER: Right. I think that's - - - that's 21 a - - - a - - - a distinction. If we had not declared 22 ready, I don't think I could stand here and say, well, you 23 can't really apply the law.



fallen out of readiness?

JUDGE RIVERA: Could you have fall on - - -

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1	MR. OASTLER: Could could a case
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Could you have ended up unready
3	without forget the amendment for one moment. Doesn'
4	that happen?
5	MR. OASTLER: It it does. But I
6	JUDGE RIVERA: What's the difference here? The
7	legislature passes requirements and says you must satisfy
8	these requirements, including the certificate, in order to
9	be deemed ready
10	MR. OASTLER: I
11	JUDGE RIVERA: moving forward as of January
12	1st?
13	MR. OASTLER: Sure. A a case prior to tha
14	date, the the if if it for a case
15	to be deemed unready or fall you know, having
16	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
17	MR. OASTLER: having the People's statemen
18	be deemed illusory
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
20	MR. OASTLER: as as we would term it
21	would you there would have to be some sort of
22	finding of some sort.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Or if you came in the day of tria
24	and said, we we can't proceed, Your Honor, we're not
25	ready?



1	MR. OASTLER: If if there was a you
2	know, if there was a factual circumstance
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
4	MR. OASTLER: that supported
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
6	MR. OASTLER: an idea that we had
7	JUDGE RIVERA: So it is possible
8	MR. OASTLER: Sure.
9	JUDGE RIVERA: even after declaring
10	readiness, that you're no longer ready at a future time?
11	MR. OASTLER: Yes. That that is possible.
12	It did happen
13	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. I understand.
14	MR. OASTLER: when there was some
15	JUDGE CANNATARO: I'm sorry, did you say it did
16	happen or it didn't happen?
17	MR. OASTLER: Not in this case, but I mean, it
18	could have happened conceivably.
19	JUDGE CANNATARO: Did it happen in this case?
20	Did was there ever a time when the People came in and
21	said or or especially after January 1st and
22	said, we're not ready?
23	MR. OASTLER: No.
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So I'm sorry. Go
25	ahead



1 JUDGE CANNATARO: No, no, no. It's okay. 2 JUDGE RIVERA: You were not ready as a matter of 3 law, because you didn't turn over the grand jury minutes? 4 MR. OASTLER: Well, that's what the - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: And you didn't ask for more time? 6 MR. OASTLER: Well, the - - - I mean, the Fourth 7 Department, I think, is effectively saying you - - - you 8 failed to declare ready at any point in time in - - - in 9 the month of January, and therefore those twenty-seven days 10 are - -11 JUDGE RIVERA: Or otherwise act within what would 12 have been appropriate under the law; to seek an extension 13 or an opportunity to respond, or to be somehow not burdened 14 --- let me put it that way ---15 MR. OASTLER: Correct. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - with the obligations without 17 the risk of the 30.30? 18 MR. OASTLER: Right. And we - - - we did not do 19 that, but that - - - my - - - again, I would - - - I would 20 --- my --- my rebuttal to that is simply that we were 21 ready and that I - - - I think it is effectively a 22 retroactive application to undo something that - - - a 23 status that we - - - that we previously had. 24 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But there was no date on which 25 you came in after having declared ready and said, today we



1	are unready because a witness is unavailable, or the
2	prosecutor, you know, is is in another courtroom or
3	something like that
4	MR. OASTLER: Correct.
5	JUDGE HALLIGAN: is that correct?
6	MR. OASTLER: Yes.
7	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Were there items of
8	discovery required by the new law that you hadn't produced
9	as of January 1st?
10	MR. OASTLER: My reading of it, I believe, would
11	just be the grand jury minutes that would not have
12	otherwise been discoverable.
13	JUDGE GARCIA: When did you disclose those?
14	MR. OASTLER: So those were turned over, I
15	believe it was on January 17th, ten days prior to trial.
16	And the ultimate challenge by the defense was brought up
17	shortly before trial, and then and then the argument
18	continued on the first date of trial.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: So the 911 tape, just to clarify,
20	that had been turned over?
21	MR. OASTLER: The the grand jury minutes?
22	JUDGE RIVERA: The 911 tape.
23	MR. OASTLER: Oh. I'm sorry. The I
24	believe the 911 call was not. But it would have not been
25	attainable by the point well, by the start of Januar



2020, because they're simply not retained beyond a - - - a - - - a short period of time, given that the case was in September of 2018.

JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, but I thought pre-Jan 1 the prosecutor's representation was that indeed these were within the control of the People and would be turned over at the first practicable - - - at an - - - an appropriate time.

MR. OASTLER: So we had - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm trying to remember the exact quote, "practicable moment".

MR. OASTLER: We had certain information in our file. There were photographs. I believe some other electronic - - - electronic evidence. There was, I believe - - - yeah, perhaps a recorded interview of the defendant. So those were in our file and were - - - were - - - you know, offered to be viewed at any point in time. I - - - I guess, I don't want to promise without reviewing the record, whether or not 911 was included. But that wasn't really - - - you know, that wasn't really the bulk of the - - - the argument in any way at the time of trial.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you arguing that upon the effective date of the new obligations, there was no opportunity given for the People to be in compliance with the additional requirements?



1	MR. OASTLER: I well, I think there's
2	certainly an there was a practically speaking,
3	an opportunity. There were twenty-seven days, I suppose,
4	where the People could have submitted a a certificate
5	of compliance. But my position would be that it was not
6	necessary, given our our our previous
7	readiness.
8	JUDGE CANNATARO: But it's a it's
9	it's a little more than that, isn't it? Because there was
10	also a period between when the statute was enacted and when
11	it became effective? So
12	MR. OASTLER: So except that that lead-in
13	time does not suggest that the People were expected to,
14	going forward, comply with that.
15	JUDGE HALLIGAN: But it might suggest they could
16	have?
17	MR. OASTLER: It could suggest that they could
18	have.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Might have been a prudent course.
20	You wouldn't be here.
21	MR. OASTLER: Well, it that's that's
22	certainly true. Except that that then goes against how we
23	typically interpret statutes, and whether they're going to
24	apply prospectively or retroactively.



JUDGE RIVERA: You took the high-risk venture.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: You could have accounted - - -1 JUDGE SINGAS: Yeah, but your office filed their 2 3 COCs with - - - in regard to other cases prior to January 4 1st, or on January 1st? 5 MR. OASTLER: I - - - I - -6 JUDGE SINGAS: What was the - - -7 MR. OASTLER: - - - I quess - - -8 JUDGE SINGAS: - - - policy? 9 MR. OASTLER: - - - I don't necessarily know what 10 the individual - - - what the practice of individual ADAs 11 were. 12 JUDGE SINGAS: Is there a policy for the office 13 that you're aware of? 14 MR. OASTLER: Not in - - - not in our - - - not 15 on the record here, in any event. 16 JUDGE SINGAS: Yeah. 17 MR. OASTLER: I mean, I think the - - - as you 18 just mentioned, Justice Rivera - - - or Judge Rivera, it 19 would be the prudent course of action to attempt to comply. 20 But therein runs - - - and I - - - I don't want to strongly 21 rely on this, but therein - - - therein we run into a real 22 practical problem of how on earth do you do this on all the 23 pending cases, all the newly arrested cases going forward? 24 JUDGE RIVERA: Can I - - - can I - - -



MR. OASTLER: It's really not possible.

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - clarify, because you said 1 2 something, and I thought - - - I may have misread the 3 record, so please help me here. I thought that the 4 prosecutor had - - - had indeed tried to serve the 5 certificate, and defense counsel refused to accept it? 6 MR. OASTLER: So - - - correct. We - - - he did. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: So I don't know how you do that, 8 but okay. 9 MR. OASTLER: Well, and that's where I - - - I10 think - - - you know, in this, the first - - - we're in the first four weeks of January, there's obviously no court 11 12 quidance and there's going to be differing opinions on - -13 - on whether - - - whether the People did or could comply 14 or how we go about doing that. So yes, the defense 15 attorney at trial stated that he rejected it. I - - - I'm 16 not really sure what effect that has. I'm also not sure 17 that it really impacts the decision here, because the court 18 --- the trial court didn't really --- it --- it essentially, didn't hold that the People needed to or - -19 20 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it is an - - -21 MR. OASTLER: - - - filed - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - example of an effort to 23 comply with the statute? 24 MR. OASTLER: Sure. It - - - it was. But, you 25



know, it - - - it was not considered strongly in the

moment, I don't think.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And then part of the problem here was the fact that even before the People declared ready initially, they had used up so much of their speedy trial time, correct?

MR. OASTLER: Correct. Correct. And as we just discussed a moment ago, in terms of the amount of time that we could use for planning. Well, while it's - - - I will admit, probably not advisable to use 175 days of your speedy trial time before you indict a case and declare ready, that was not really a risk in April of 2019, the way it might be now where there are - - you know - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But it still was pretty risky to eat up as much time that was taken up here. Although, the complexity of the nature of the offense was such that sometimes you can't proceed as expeditiously as you would want.

MR. OASTLER: Yes. But it would also be, I think, fair to say, quite unwise to use the bulk of your six months now where you have very onerous discovery obligations, including grand jury minutes, which you won't have until you - - you actually indict the case.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And - - - and was compliance impacted by having resources available to go through the files to get the information to turn it over?



MR. OASTLER: I - - - there - - - there's - - - there's a practical aspect of the - - - the - - - the - - - the hours it takes for the - - - the staff in our office to actually go through each file, upload it as we do now, and disclose it digitally. We were also limited on the number of grand - - grand jury stenographers that we had by statute, which was then amended because - - I'm not sure, frankly, many of us were aware of that fact. But it - - - suddenly we had these time limits to comply with, and the number that we were legally permitted was just flatly insufficient.

So there - - - there were a lot of aspects to this law that not only were impossible to foresee in - - - in early 2019, but I think applying them in 2020, months and months later, where we were - - we had declared ready and were validly relying on that for a long period of time. That makes it quite unjust, I would say.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.



1	MR. OASTLER: Thank you.
2	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
3	May it please the court? Philip Rothschild from the Frank
4	H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, on behalf of respondent Alvin
5	King.
6	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Counsel, how is it that this
7	wasn't a retroactive application here?
8	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, first of all, the it
9	had no effect on any prior announcements. Those were still
10	valid, as Judge Rivera pointed out. It only prospectively
11	applied as of January 1st. In Majewski, this court said,
12	"While retroactive retroactivity is generally
13	disfavored, statutes governing procedural matters "
14	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So as of January 1st
15	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes.
16	JUDGE TROUTMAN: there were new obligations
17	that the People had that they did not have earlier; is that
18	correct?
19	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes. And they hand
20	JUDGE TROUTMAN: And and how were they
21	- were they given an opportunity? Were demands made or
22	were they just supposed to sua sponte deliver up these new
23	things in order to be ready?
24	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, under the statute, they



were required to disclose all these items under 245.

1	JUDGE TROUTMAN: As of midnight?
2	MR. ROTHSCHILD: As of no, as of January
3	1st. Well, I mean, as as of the applicable time
4	_
5	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Yes. And
6	MR. OASTLER: time period of which they had
7	nine months of lead time.
8	JUDGE SINGAS: Yeah. But in Galindo, we said the
9	lead time spoke more to prospectiveness than retroactivity,
10	right?
11	MR. ROTHSCHILD: True. But I believe that
12	the legislature makes the laws
13	JUDGE SINGAS: Correct.
14	MR. ROTHSCHILD: the People follow them.
15	JUDGE SINGAS: And the legislature here said, "in
16	order to be deemed ready." It didn't say, from this point
17	forward the only way to be ready, or all prior readiness
18	statements are null and void until X, Y, and Z.
19	I mean, it said, "deemed ready" and the People
20	were ready. Like, where can you point to me forget
21	retroactivity for a minute. Where can you point to any
22	language that suggests, either in 245 or 30.30, that the
23	legislature meant to undo readiness?
24	MR. ROTHSCHILD: I would submit that under 245.50



subdivision 3. Because we look at the language of the

statute when we're interpreting them.

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JUDGE SINGAS: Right.

MR. ROTHSCHILD: That's the first thing we look at. The legislature said, "Notwithstanding any other provision - - - provision of any other law, absent any individualized finding of special circumstances, the People shall not be deemed ready for trial until they have provided both discovery and a proper certificate."

JUDGE CANNATARO: But the problem with that language is, if the People have already announced ready prior to the effective date of the statute, technically they're not asking any court to deem them ready for trial because they've already announced ready.

MR. ROTHSCHILD: As of - - - for the prior ones, correct. But this - - - the use of the term
"notwithstanding", as this court recently said in Aaron
Manor, "means superseding any inconsistent provisions of state law." The legislature didn't hide this. They made it quite clear. They wanted - - - and it wasn't put in that section by mistake. And by the way, they didn't put it anywhere else in this whole comprehensive statutory scheme. They said, "notwithstanding", and they - - - and what they - - what they meant by that was, look, we are - - we have this big stick here. If you don't comply with the - - this discovery - -



JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you saying that that effectively says that even if they were ready prior to January 1st, the effective date of the new statute, they were no longer ready?

MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes. And that's what the Four

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MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes. And that's what the Fourth

about the big stick. We said in Bay that this is an incentive, and it certainly is, right? It's an incentive to comply. And the idea was that government is - - - the People are taking their time producing this material and then declaring ready and that. So we're going to clarify that, and if you step back and you look at the mechanism which was - - - we've described, quite new, that you were tying the 245 to - - - new discovery obligations to a 30.30 (5) provision. I don't see how that fits with on January 1, the People have done what they needed to do up to that point. They've declared ready months and months before. There's one day left on the clock. January 1 comes, they have one day, twelve hours to provide you with all the new discovery. How is that an incentive?

MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, because of the comprehensive statutory scheme, it's not like you have this - - - they also had opportunities under 245.70 for an - - - for additional time. They had opportunities under 245.50



subdivision 3, to make an individualized statement saying, hey, this item is lost ---

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JUDGE GARCIA: No. But I'm just thinking when I step back and I look at the way the legislature structured this and what they were trying to do with this very new incentive stick, why would it ever apply as of January 1 to a case where they have been ready for nine months and they have one day left on the clock?

MR. ROTHSCHILD: Because they've redefined readiness. Because this is what the legislature wanted. They wanted to make sure that everyone, everyone was on the same page regarding this and that no one would be deprived - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: That's - - - that's - - -

- - - of that discovery.

MR. ROTHSCHILD:

TUDGE GARCIA: - - - your result. But what in this statute tells me that that was the intent? That on January 1, if I had one day left on the speedy trial clock, I am now unready? I was ready. I've been ready for nine months. I've been ready to go. But on January 1, I'm not ready. And now I need the incentive of having the case dismissed under 30.30, which the new provision says when I declare readiness, I have to have done this. I've already declared readiness. Now, I have to re-declare readiness with this obligation, and I have twelve hours to do it.



1	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, under that situation, you
2	can obviously, you can move under 245.50 subdivision
3	3 for more time. Or you can ask for the court to say, hey
4	we want
5	JUDGE RIVERA: No, I don't think Judge Garcia is
6	asking about how they how a a prosecutor in
7	that position might mitigate the the demands in a
8	very short period. If I'm understanding him correctly
9	- he'll correct me if I'm wrong. I think his question is,
10	if the legislature is intending to incentivize prosecutors
11	but they have this in this case, prosecutor already,
12	right, has announced readiness, ready to go to trial, where
13	is the incentive to apply this law to those cases?
14	MR. ROTHSCHILD: The incentive is if they don't,
15	they get their case
16	JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, but they've already
17	declared readiness. That's his point.
18	MR. ROTHSCHILD: So
19	JUDGE RIVERA: What's the incentive to get to
20	readiness? I thought you were going to say because the law
21	is not only about readiness
22	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Right.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: it's about discovery.
24	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Absolutely.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: And that's what you're trying to



2 JUDGE GARCIA: Can they - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: So I'm just trying to understand 4 what - - -5 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - discovery obligations 6 without the incentive? I mean, you still have - - - you 7 still have remedies for failure to produce discovery, which 8 I think include dismissing the case. So you have these new 9 discovery obligations, but in - - - under your view, if I don't ask for more time on January 1, right? Or let's say 10 January 2. If I don't ask for more time and I come in the 11 12 next day, I'm done because clock's run? 13 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, I mean, as far as the 14 first fifteen days, I believe the Fourth Department said, 15 okay - -16 JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah, but they made that up. 17 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, I mean - - -18 JUDGE GARCIA: I mean, that's nowhere in the 19 They made that up. That's fifteen days from 20 arraignment or something. We'd have to judicially make up 21 a fifteen-day grace period for that. 2.2 MR. ROTHSCHILD: So I started off by saying the 23 legislature makes the laws, the People follow them. 24 Interpretation, that's open to debate, the wisdom of the 25 law is not. What they're claiming here is this was too

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get.



much. This was absolutely too much for the - - - for the

People to have to comply with.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: To try - -
JUDGE GARCIA: Do you still think it's wise? I'm

sorry.

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - to try to come at this a little bit differently. Doesn't your argument about incentives have a whole lot more force with respect to cases that are commenced, but where there is no statement of readiness that has been filed? In other words, that's where the - - - that's the window in which I think those - - - those incentives, in any case, going forward, would have particular application and in the legislature's view, importance.

MR. ROTHSCHILD: So if we look at - - - you know, I - - - if we look at the purpose of the old law, the reliance - - - or the purpose of the new law, the reliance upon the old law and the effect upon the impact - - - or the impact upon the administration of justice. In this case, the legislature made it quite clear this is - - - this is going to apply as of January 1st. And they specifically and deliberately linked it to 30.30, because they said, look, you know, they use this "notwithstanding" - - you know, language. And that's very powerful.

JUDGE SINGAS: Right. But how - - - how does



that not connect back to the People's rights pre-January 1, Because now they're saying, look we're now tying this to your readiness, which was never the case. suppose there's a - - - there's a case that the People had prior to January 1st. There's a police officer who He goes to Florida. The People make a - - - a retires. - - a decision, we can't find him. We're not going to Florida. We're not getting sheriffs there to get us his memo book. They wouldn't have needed that, right? that person was testifying. Now, suddenly come January 1, that would be discoverable. So what might have been before, a preclusion of that witness, some kind of instruction to the jury, an adverse inference charge, now suddenly becomes a dismissal of your indictment. How does that not impact your status and your rights, pre-January 1, That's what I - - - I can't get. I - - - I hear what you're saying. It's sort of moving forward, you have discovery rights. But the penalty brings you right back to the decisions that you were making all along during the pendency of this case.

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MR. ROTHSCHILD: Two things regarding that.

First of all, I think that the People are conflating - - - you're calling it the right to readiness. It's actually a continuing obligation for readiness. And that obligation, as Judge Rivera pointed out, continues even after they've



announced ready. And they could be made unready by any 1 2 number of things. In this case, the legislature - - -3 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So then do you agree that their 4 legal status was, as he said, nullified by the change of 5 the statute? 6 MR. ROTHSCHILD: No. That prior announcement was still valid. But going forward - - - nine months forward 7 8 in this case, they have an opportunity - - - an obligation 9 to - - - to comply with this. They had ample notice of 10 this. 11 JUDGE TROUTMAN: And you dispute that it - - -12 the application does, in fact, cause that status to be 13 nullified because now the People are unready, because 14 they're required to give up what they weren't supposed to 15 before they declared ready? 16 MR. ROTHSCHILD: But is that readiness is depend 17 -- as I said, it could be changed by any number of And in this case, the legislature made - - -18 19 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Right. It's - - -20 MR. ROTHSCHILD: - - - a conscious decision - -2.1 JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - different, though, from 22 the old law where - - - illusory - - - you declared ready, 23 but you weren't really ready in the first place. 24 difficulty that I'm having in this particular instance is, 25



the People followed the law as it existed up until the date

that it changed. And then the question is, what's the effect going forward? The effect going forward here is, you're no longer ready, even though the statute doesn't say we're going to take away your readiness, it says you can't declare ready until you provide these things. But the effect here did that. It took away their status.

MR. ROTHSCHILD: To an extent, yes. But in continuation of my earlier answer to Judge Singas, there is available remedies under the comprehensive statutory scheme. In that situation, they wouldn't necessarily have to dismiss this, because they wouldn't necessarily knock out the statement of readiness. Where you have the sheriff who went down to Florida, they could always ask the court, say, hey, we - - - we're - - - we're asking for basically an exception from this under 2 - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So is that opportunity available here, for them to take those steps to not be unready?

MR. ROTHSCHILD: Absolutely, these were available. And there's no indication on the record that they even attempted to do this.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Counsel - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: But for them to take advantage of those opportunities, they would have to share in your view that their ready status changed on January 1st?

Because you know, you - - you don't go to court and ask

1	for relief, if you if you if you still think
2	you're ready only to find out later that you weren't.
3	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, I I don't think
4	- I think it's the legislature's view. I don't think it's
5	my view. Because the legislature specifically tied
6	JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, no, it it
7	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Can I just try to find out
8	go ahead.
9	JUDGE CANNATARO: No, I was just going to say
10	it's your reading of the statute. I I I mean,
11	unless I'm missing some very clear language where the
12	legislature said, if you're not in compliance on the
13	effective date of this statute
14	MR. ROTHSCHILD: You shall not be deemed ready -
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16	JUDGE CANNATARO: you you are not
17	ready, even if you previously declared readiness.
18	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well
19	JUDGE CANNATARO: I don't see that.
20	MR. ROTHSCHILD: In terms of statutory
21	interpretation, appellant says, well, this is bad drafting
22	I think that first of all, they they say that you
23	should be they should have specifically listed the
24	cases included or those cases already pending. First of



all, that language is superfluous. Second of all, that

1	introduces the risk of exclusio unius, which means when yo
2	start listing people, you may inadvertently omit others.
3	And I think if they wanted to say these people are
4	specifically excepted, they knew how to do it.
5	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I just want to try and walk
6	through, so I understand what happened, what your position
7	is what happened with readiness. So December 31st, 11:59
8	p.m., People are ready?
9	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes.
10	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. Clock switches over.
11	We're now on January 1st, are they now unready?
12	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes.
13	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And that's true, even if
14	they have previously produced all of the discovery that's
15	required by the new legislation?
16	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Here okay. In this case
17	here, they didn't, they clearly it was it was
18	
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I'm asking you a question -
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21	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes.
22	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: that is maybe not tru
23	here, but I want to know your answer, so I understand what
24	your view is about readiness.
25	MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes.



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: They've produced everything 1 2 under the sun that's required in the new legislation. 3 clock switches over. They are now ready or unready? 4 MR. ROTHSCHILD: If they have not filed the 5 certificate - - -6 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right. They've not filed 7 the certificate of compliance. 8 MR. ROTHSCHILD: They're not ready. 9 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: They're not ready? 10 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Pure and - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. 12 MR. ROTHSCHILD: - - - they're - - - they're not 13 ready, because that's what the statute says. If they want 14 to have an exception from that, they certainly were capable 15 - - capable of doing so. I assume they read the statute. 16 I assume they knew that the - - - of the remedies and 17 rights available to them. They didn't take advantage of 18 And as far as retroactivity - - - you know, this is --- I believe, this is a no --- no new substantive 19 20 right was created here. This case is clearly 21 distinguishable from Galindo. In Galindo, they had no idea 22 because those people weren't even subject to - - - didn't -23 - - didn't even have speedy trial rights, those traffic 24 infraction people. Here, it's - - - it's - - - this case



was not on appeal. This case was pending.

JUDGE GARCIA: Wasn't there an eight-month time 1 2 lag though for Galindo too? 3 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yeah. 4 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - was there? So why didn't 5 they have notice they should have done it in the amount of time under your theory? 6 7 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, I think under Galindo, I 8 believe that - - - you know, that the - - - the law had 9 been the same way for forty years or so. 10 JUDGE GARCIA: So the eight months didn't matter because it was there for forty years? 11 12 MR. ROTHSCHILD: And here the nine - - - but here 13 the eight or nine months, I think the intent of it was 14 basically to give the prosecution the opportunity just to 15 get up to speed with this. And they're - - - getting back 16 to what I originally said was - - - you know, the appellant 17 is saying, oh, this is too much, this is unworkable - - -18 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, I quess that that's a 19 question of what it was they were trying to get given time 20 to get up to speed for. Because I assume that just 2.1 complying with the new discovery requirements in a timely 2.2 manner on a prospective basis would require changes to the 23 offices, ramping up personnel, all sorts of things like 24 that. So they were given more time for something, but it's



not clear to me, unless, you have something you can point

to in the legislative history, what that something was. 1 2 MR. ROTHSCHILD: I think it was given time to 3 comply with the statute. 4 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: What - - - well, that begs 5 the question. 6 MR. ROTHSCHILD: 7 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: That - - - that doesn't - -8 9 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, I don't know what 10 specifically it was. CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah. 11 12 MR. ROTHSCHILD: I mean, they did talk about 13 having to get more court reporters or things of that 14 nature. But they - - - they had - - - they - - - they were 15 on notice of it. They knew this was coming down the pike, 16 yet they failed to act. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Do you - - - do you have a sense -18 - - you may not. I know it's not in the record. But do 19 you have a sense, given the practice - - - I'll ask that 20 also to the prosecutor. Do you have a sense of how many 21 offices took the same position, that it was not going to 22 apply to them until a case was filed after January 1st? 23 MR. ROTHSCHILD: I - - - I do not, Your Honor. 24 One more thing. As far as the items that were missing, I 25



would ask this court to look at page - - - I think it's

page 73 of defense counsel's motion made on the day of 1 2 trial. It's more than just the grand jury minutes. It's -3 - - it's a number of things: recordings, other - - - other 4 items which were just not provided. And some of the items 5 6 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But again those items were the 7 items that were required after the effective date of the 8 statute to be turned over, correct? 9 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Yes. 10 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Thank you. 11 MR. ROTHSCHILD: And included among them, I 12 believe, was - - - I lose my - - - losing track here. But 13 these items included matters which were just absolutely - -14 - they - - - they turned them over to the judge instead. 15 And they said, well, that's sufficient to have the judge 16 review it, and that doesn't comply with the law. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, then, why - - - why - - -18 unless you take a different position. Why were they trying 19 to serve a certificate? 20 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, they did that after the 21 speedy trial motion was made. And they figured, well, we 22 can maybe get in here late, and - - - you know, by that 23 time they were - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. The certificate is a 25



representation that they're in compliance.

1 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, I believe it shows that 2 they were trying to be in compliance, but I think that they 3 just missed the dates. Thank you. If there's nothing further, we would 4 5 ask that the lower court decision be affirmed. 6 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 7 MR. OASTLER: Your Honors, I don't really have 8 anything to add other than to note that I - - - I - - I9 think two quick points. The Fourth Department dissenting justice pointed to the idea that the People were reverted 10 11 to a state of unreadiness. And - - - and that's the - - -12 that's the issue, I think, I have with the majority's 13 interpretation of - - -14 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. But the problem is that's 15 not accurate. At least, I don't see it that way. 16 regime in place that you declared readiness under, is no 17 longer in place. That remains. No - - - no one was saying 18 that you weren't ready under the old regime. There's now a 19 new regime. And you've got to comply with the requirements 20 of that regime. 2.1 MR. OASTLER: Right. But I think, I mean - - -2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: Readiness has a different - -23 all I'm suggesting is readiness has a different meaning - -24



MR. OASTLER:

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Come Jan 1.
2	MR. OASTLER: I I
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Right?
4	MR. OASTLER: certainly understand and I
5	would agree with that, except to the extent that, as
6	as I think we've been bouncing back and forth
7	JUDGE RIVERA: It can't be you're unready because
8	it's not the same regime. That's the point.
9	MR. OASTLER: But I I that's
10	JUDGE RIVERA: It's a different regime.
11	MR. OASTLER: that is what I would say has
12	happened, though. Is that the that interpretation
13	has forced the People into a state of unreadiness, which -
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15	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it's forced the People to
16	comply with the law. And if they needed more time, they
17	could have sought to get more time, but they did not. But
18	can you try and answer my other question? Do you know how
19	many offices took this same position
20	MR. OASTLER: I I don't
21	JUDGE RIVERA: in terms of their statutory
22	
23	MR. OASTLER: I I don't.
24	JUDGE RIVERA: interpretation?
25	MR. OASTLER: I I couldn't answer.



JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel - - - Counsel, I do see cases with the same remedy - - - the same incentive being applied from Queen - - - in Queens and Manhattan.

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MR. OASTLER: A - - - there has been, I believe, a mix of lower court authority in terms of whether this would be applied, as I would say, retroactively, or at least in terms of - - - of finding the People unready as of January 1st.

JUDGE GARCIA: I mean, I think the fact that they were considering cases in Queens and the New York DA, the Manhattan DAs, and dismissing indictments seems to indicate that, at least, some of the prosecutors in those offices weren't filing certificates.

MR. OASTLER: Oh, I - - - I mean, I - - - I would assume because otherwise there wouldn't be dismissals, you know, sort of shortly after January 1st. The only other brief thing I would like to mention is with respect to that "notwithstanding" language.

I - - - I think it would be more reasonable to see that word inserted sort of in the middle of a paragraph, kind of buried in the statute in terms of how we analyze the People's readiness inasmuch as you, it seems, accept it now. We look at 245.50 first, as in, have the People actually complied, filed a valid certificate of compliance? And then, if so, then we move to 245.80 where



we would look at if there's any prejudice to the defense for any sort of delayed disclosure or something like that, whether there would be a remedy. I think that that "notwithstanding" might signal that sort of two-step process. I don't think it's fair to say that the insertion of that one word there is meant to signify the application of the - - of the whole new regime, and to tie the speedy trial to all those cases that had been declared ready prior to that point.

JUDGE RIVERA: So is it your position that without the mandatory consequences, if you're not in compliance and you're not ready within the time frame under the new regime, that then requires a dismissal if you've gone over your time frame, that a court nevertheless would have had the discretion to dismiss?

MR. OASTLER: It's - - - if - - - if we had not declared ready, I - - - I think the - - - I - - - I don't think I could come up here and make the same arguments as I am. Because you - - - if we're declaring ready in January, we - - we have to comply with the law in effect at that point.

JUDGE RIVERA: No, I get that. But let - - - let

- - - let me try it a different way. Let's decouple the

penalty from the - - - from the requirements. Would the

judge still have had available the discretion to dismiss,



1	even if not mandated under the new regime?
2	MR. OASTLER: It it would have I
3	think it would have come about.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: If the judge had decided, well,
5	you're still subject to these to these discovery
6	requirements?
7	MR. OASTLER: I I think what would have ha
8	to have happened there, would be a finding that the initia
9	statement was illusory, i.e., the People I I
10	think, somewhat mirroring the current the current -
11	_
12	JUDGE RIVERA: So that would be the only basis -
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14	MR. OASTLER: I I that that's
15	the way that remedy
16	JUDGE RIVERA: under the law at the time?
17	MR. OASTLER: would come about, I think.
18	Yes.
19	JUDGE GARCIA: Before before this became
20	effective, if the People didn't fulfill their discovery
21	obligations, wasn't wasn't one remedy a judge could
22	impose forget the new legislation, was the dismissal
23	of your case?
24	MR. OASTLER: I I I mean, I think,
25	it, broadly speaking, would would fall within the



1	discretion of the judge. In my experience, though, I mean
2	I I think that's coming about where there's
3	JUDGE GARCIA: Hopefully, you don't have a lot o
4	experience.
5	MR. OASTLER: No, no. I'm an appellate attorney
6	
7	JUDGE RIVERA: You're a bold lawyer, you're
8	MR. OASTLER: so I can always shift the
9	blame. But it's where there was a a such a
10	significant failing, you know, we've we declare read
11	but we've really
12	JUDGE GARCIA: There were a wide range of option
13	available to
14	MR. OASTLER: There were there were. It
15	was
16	JUDGE CANNATARO: Under the new statutory regime
17	when the People made their 30.30 motion that they made
18	here, was it within the judge's discretion to provide an
19	opportunity to you know, if the judge said, yes, it'
20	after January 1st, you have to be in compliance. You're
21	not in compliance. I'm giving you ten days to do it. Or
22	was there, in your view, no option, no discretion on the
23	part of the court other than to dismiss pursuant to 30.30?
24	MR. OASTLER: I I think given the



extensions that were - - - have have been built into the

law, the judge could have allowed the People time to comply or correct some sort of oversight or error, just as we do now with supplemental certificates, if that is the scenario that the case is in. So sure, I think the court could have given the People some leeway without - - without resorting to a finding that their prior statement was - - - was invalid.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, given what you said before about the - - - the stenographers, that might have been that argument that you're short-staffed for that purpose, for the grand jury minutes. And perhaps that's an exceptional circumstance and you need more time to be able to put resources to that because of the budget issue.

MR. OASTLER: Sure. I - - I mean, it's - - - again, I mean, this is - - I don't want to speak anecdotally because obviously I don't really have anything in the record to support this. But I think it's - - - it - - it could be accepted. I don't think it's really a disputed statement to - - to say that district attorney's offices were going to be hard-pressed to comply with this.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.

MR. OASTLER: Even now, even with all the lead time, just because of the - - - the demands that it requires. But - - - $\frac{1}{2}$

JUDGE RIVERA: Fair enough.



1	MR. OASTLER: you know that we are subject
2	to, and so I recognize that.
3	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.
4	MR. OASTLER: Thank you.
5	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Alvin King, No. 64 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020

May 21, 2024

Date:

