1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
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4	FISHER,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 41
7	PEOPLE,
	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New Yorl March 14, 2024
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	Annoarangos:
16	Appearances:
17	LISA A. BURGESS, ESQ. LISA A. BURGESS ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC. Attorney for Appellant
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20	JOHN D. KELLEY, ESQ. CHEMUNG COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY Attorney for Respondent
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23	
24	Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds Official Court Transcribes
25	Official Court Hanseline



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Next case on the calendar is People v. Fisher.

MS. BURGESS: If it please the Court. Lisa Burgess for the Appellant, Kenneth Fisher.

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Nothing is more basic in the criminal process than the right of a defendant to an unbiased jury. CPL 270.35.1 states, "If at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict ... the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case or engaged in misconduct of a substantial nature, the court must discharge such juror, and if no alternate juror is available, the court must declare" - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So is your argument that Juror 6 is unqualified, or the other jurors that were also asked questions, unqualified?

MS. BURGESS: My main argument is that Juror 6 was unqualified. There's questions about Juror 3 being unqualified. I believe Juror - - - that argument of Juror 6 being unqualified is fully preserved. The argument for Juror 3 is less preserved. But I think that this goes to the essential validity of the process. There's fundamental that the - - it's fundamental that you have an unbiased juror. So I think that even though Juror 3 was not



challenged - - -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So if we focus on Juror 6 - - - MS. BURGESS: Okay.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - which you say is preserved, what makes it clear that she was unqualified here?

MS. BURGESS: What makes it clear is that they did the jury selection on a Monday. And at the time, the judge said to the jury - - - jurors the normal admonishment that if anything happens that affects your service as a juror, you need to not talk to the other jurors about it, but you need to contact the court officer and they will contact me, and I will speak with you privately. And once we speak, you're not to speak to the jurors about what we discussed. On Monday they released the jury. They don't come back until Wednesday. They come back Wednesday. They go through the entire trial on Wednesday. Thursday they go through the trial. They start their jury proceedings when they're almost through the - - - they're hours into the jury deliberations, and they get a note from the foreman saying that one of the jurors believes she may have been followed home Monday after jury selection by Kenneth Fisher.

She discussed this with the other jurors, it was clear, because the jurors were all afraid of it - - -



afraid that - - - you know, aware that she believed she - -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you also arguing that she was incapable of following the court's instructions?

MS. BURGESS: She was. Because she - - - she disobeyed the instructions immediately after they were given. They were given on a Monday. She claims he followed her home. She had no real basis to believe that he followed her home, but she believed he followed her home. And then she discussed it with the other jurors during the deliberations. Which is very concerning, because she's putting in what we - - - anyone would consider a bad act without any comment from the court on it. She's just introducing that into the jury deliberations.

JUDGE CANNATARO: The court conducted an inquiry on all of this and - - - you know, probed around what happened to Juror Number 6. And then extracted a statement from Juror 6 that she could nonetheless follow the court's rules and participate as a juror. And I believe the court then further elicited additional questioning from counsel, of which there was none. So I - - I'm - - I don't know if this is a preservation issue, but I - - I'm not sure I understand the basis of your ongoing argument that this juror was grossly unqualified to serve, given that that



hearing occurred.

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MS. BURGESS: I believe - - - she said she was -- - she was - - - could decide it solely on the evidence. But she had already introduced something into the deliberations that wasn't introduced as evidence. introduced this alleged bad act of Mr. Fisher. And what's very concerning about this is they never asked her why she thought it was Mr. Fisher. She said that - - - when they questioned her, she said she was in the parking lot of the bank, and she saw Mr. Fisher walking through the parking lot at the courthouse. She then left in her car. She never saw him get into a car. She goes through a couple of stoplights. She looks up in her rearview mirror, and she said she did that because a husband rear-ended her years And she sees this maroon Lincoln, she identifies it by the Lincoln symbol on the front, and she claims it's Mr. Fisher. He's six to eight car lengths behind her. There's no way -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Is - - is your view that - - - that there was no way, having said that, that she could have provided some adequate assurance that she could be impartial or that such assurance was not elicited from her?

MS. BURGESS: There was no way she could provide an assurance that she was impartial, because there was no way she could have identified the driver of that car is



Kenneth Fisher.

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: What - - - what - - -

MS. BURGESS: She's - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - tell me - - - tell me why it is that having - - - having said that she thought the defendant was following her, why she could not then have established sufficiently her ability to be impartial? What about that statement makes that impossible?

MS. BURGESS: I think it's impossible because you're a juror in a trial. It deals with drugs. You're driving home. You have someone you believe is following you, and you don't follow the judge - - - the judge's orders. Instead, you keep this to yourself. There had - - she was never asked how it made her feel. All she said was she only came forward because other jurors were scared for their safety.

me follow up on Judge Halligan's question. Suppose that the juror was told, or maybe - - - maybe shown to the juror that Mr. Fisher drove a white Chevy, not a maroon Lincoln, and she said, oh, you know, I must have been wrong. If that had happened, and then she gave an assurance that she could be fair, would that suffice?

MS. BURGESS: I think there had to be more. Maybe that would - - - what was concerning about it is



during the trial, there was never anything about a maroon Lincoln. And - - - and I mean, she said a maroon Lincoln. I don't know whether that was the car that was behind her.

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I mean, did she - - - did say that she was ninety-five percent sure that it was him.

MS. BURGESS: She was ninety-five percent sure it was him.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And I'm - - - I guess what

I'm asking is, suppose she said, you know what, I was

wrong. I know I was wrong and it's actually - - - I - -
I'm sure it wasn't him. Would that plus a - - - a - -
you know, a firm statement that - - - you know, I can be

fair now that I know this; would that have cured it?

MS. BURGESS: I think if she acknowledged that she made a mistake, I think that would - - - that would be it. But she - - - she maintained the entire time by ninety-five percent certainty that it was Mr. Fisher. And what I find in Bufort, they want this thorough - - - you know, this probing inquiry. No one ever - - - when they asked her why she thought it was Mr. Fisher, she said because years ago I was rear-ended by an ex-husband, and I look in my rearview mirror a lot. That doesn't answer the question of how she thought it was Mr. Fisher. There - - - there was nothing - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, the implication of



that is she saw him in the rearview mirror, right?

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MS. BURGESS: But he was six to eight car lengths behind her, which would be impossible to see someone that far behind you in a car, in a rearview mirror.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right. And so I take it which - - and it does seem to be counsel's argument at - - in the trial court, was that that reflected a racial bias on her part?

MS. BURGESS: I - - - I believe it did.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I mean, he used those words, I think. Counsel - - -

MS. BURGESS: I believe it did. And to be perfectly honest, I don't even know if she could have told - - - looking in her rearview mirror, six to eight car lengths behind her, I don't know if she would have even been able to tell if it was an African-American man, or if it was just a man. The other thing is, there was not - - - no distinguishing characteristics about Mr. Fisher. He - - he was just a very clean cut, average, everyday-looking man. She wouldn't have identified him. And this is important because during the trial, he was with someone when the - - when the drugs were allegedly sold and the person had dreadlocks. So they kept making a big issue out of the fact that Mr. Fisher did not have dreadlocks, Mr. Fisher was clean-cut and they identified him like that. So

1	it's not like you could say, well, I looked in my rearview
2	mirror and I saw the dreadlocks. The only thing she could
3	have identified him by was actually seeing his face,
4	because there was nothing that would have stood out other
5	than that's what Mr. Fisher looked like. And
6	JUDGE SINGAS: So is your position that it's jus
7	a per se violation? It's just per se that because she
8	says, I think it was the defendant who followed me home
9	that she's grossly unqualified?
10	MS. BURGESS: No. I think what it is, is she wa
11	so sure it was the defendant that followed her home, and
12	she introduced this into the jury deliberations. And this
13	is what makes me feel she's unqualified is, what happened
14	during those deliberations that made her introduce that?
15	JUDGE SINGAS: But isn't that more a question of
16	of misconduct on her part rather than her
17	qualifications?

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MS. BURGESS: It's - - - I believe it - - - it's both, I believe. I believe she engaged in misconduct, and I believe she - - - she was unqualified. And I - - - I don't believe she had the state of mind that could be unbiased because she picked Mr. - - - she said Mr. Fisher did something that would be concerning to anyone to be followed home by someone, let alone - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: I understand that. I guess, the -



-- my issue is what do we do with that when we had a court that made an inquiry and she said the words that are on the pages that we're reading, that assured the court that she could be fair? Do we give any kind of deference to the trial court who had the opportunity to engage with her, to talk to her, to see her demeanor? The words on the page, that's what our case law requires. She said I could be fair.

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MS. BURGESS: Well, I'm concerned about the - - - you know, and I - - - I don't know, but I'm concerned about the way the judge handled the whole thing because she walks out of the room, says I'm ninety-five percent certain that it was Mr. Fisher. And when Juror 3 comes in, they ask Juror Fisher if she has any - - - Juror - - - if she - - - Juror 3, if she has any concerns. And she said, I didn't today until Juror 6 said Mr. Fisher followed her home on Monday. And - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, I'm certainly sensitive to your concern about the way the judge handled it. But at the hearing itself, after the court indicated that it was disinclined to believe Juror 6's story and noted that he did get an assurance from the juror that she could be fair and impartial. He then threw it back to counsel, and I believe, asked for any applications that they wanted to make, which at that point, seems to me to be

1 an invitation to raise these concerns about the way the 2 judge handled the hearing or about something that was 3 missing from the hearing. And there - - - there were no 4 applications made. And it seems as if at that point it's 5 over. 6 MS. BURGESS: The - - - there wasn't. But when 7 they went - - - after - - - they - - - they had to give 8 more instructions to the jury after that, which they did. 9 They went back in, and that's when Mr. Fisher said, hey, 10 this - - - he - - - he was the one who was pushing forward

JUDGE CANNATARO: Yes. And then there was an application for a mistrial.

MS. BURGESS: Yeah.

that this isn't right. You know, I - - -

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JUDGE CANNATARO: A different - - -

MS. BURGESS: Yeah.

MS. BURGESS: - - - form of relief.

MS. BURGESS: And - - - and I just think it does go to Juror 6's state of mind that the judge's - - - the judge just interviewed her, said - - - and she's ninety-five percent sure that it was Mr. Fisher. The next person walks in, he says, well, we've already determined that it - - - that probably never happened. And that shows that Juror 6 has a very different mindset than the way the court is looking at her mindset.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you counsel. 1 2 MS. BURGESS: Thank you. 3 MR. KELLEY: May it please this court. John 4 Kelly of the Chemung County District Attorney for the 5 People. Your Honor, as this court in People v. Spencer 6 recognized that there's no such thing as either perfect 7 jurors or perfect trials. And that's precisely what we 8 have in this case. 9 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But in this case, we have a 10 juror - - -11 MR. KELLEY: Yes. 12 JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - when the court inquires, 13 she says, "I can be fair and impartial juror, yes. I say 14 that because the other juror members encouraged me because 15 their safety may be at risk." How are - - - how does that 16 establish that she was qualified to remain on the jury? 17 MR. KELLEY: Well, Your Honor, I believe that in 18 --- in reference to Juror 6, she did equivocally ---19 unequivocally state that she could be fair and impartial. 20 I believe the coming forward was the - - -2.1 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Doesn't it require more than 22 just saying the words? That there is evidence that she 23 actually can be a fair and impartial juror? 24 MR. KELLEY: Well - - - well, remember, Your 25 Honor, I believe under People v. Buford, a lot of what is



1	going on here is speculation, and speculation is not a
2	- a reason to say
3	JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about her own words,
4	"because others" and she's mentioning safety.
5	MR. KELLEY: Yes.
6	JUDGE TROUTMAN: You're saying that's
7	unequivocal?
8	MR. KELLEY: Your Honor, as a as was
9	pointed out, during the inquiry that was conducted with
10	Juror 6, the court found that Juror 6 that he
11	believed Juror 6 could be fair and impartial.
12	JUDGE TROUTMAN: The court found it. But what
13	I'm asking
14	MR. KELLEY: Yes.
15	JUDGE TROUTMAN: is this response, the type
16	of response that clearly establishes that she was qualified
17	to remain on the jury? And if so, why is this response
18	sufficient?
19	MR. KELLEY: Your Honor, I believe that it is
20	sufficient. I don't agree
21	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Why?
22	MR. KELLEY: that I believe, as a
23	- appellate counsel has stated, that she believes that it's
24	an introduction of a bad act. But if we remember for
25	if we look at the record, I believe that attorney ADA



Thweatt had asked - - - you know, is it - - - is it 1 2 possible that he could have just been - - - you know, 3 driving in the same direction as you, not that he was 4 following you home. And she's like, yeah, he may have 5 been. 6 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But with respect to her 7 assurance itself - - -8 MR. KELLEY: Okay. 9 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Right? She says, "I can be a 10 fair and impartial juror. Yes." But she doesn't stop 11 there. She continues and says, "I say that." And I assume 12 "that" means I'm telling you I can be fair and impartial, 13 "because the other juror members encouraged me because 14 their safety may be at risk." Doesn't that confuse or 15 muddy her assertion that she can be fair and impartial, 16 even setting aside - - - you know, for a moment everything 17 that came before that?

MR. KELLEY: You know, Your Honor, I don't think so. And - - - and - - -

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, why not - - - why not?

MR. KELLEY: Well, because I think that she's

combining two different things. We're combining about why

she came forward versus if she can be fair and impartial.

Which - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: I'm just reading what she said



though. 1 2 MR. KELLEY: Right. And again, that's - - -3 that's why we give such deference to the trial court in 4 these matters. 5 JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, Counsel, if you don't 6 think that's a red flag, let's - - - let's go a little 7 earlier than that. 8 MR. KELLEY: Yeah. 9 JUDGE CANNATARO: And - - - and the court says, 10 "Is there a reason why you're bringing this up now rather 11 than when we - - - when we were here on Wednesday". And 12 she says at that point, "Because other juror members were 13 scared for their own safety - - -14 MR. KELLEY: Right. 15 JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - "because of certain 16 people that were sitting watching the trial through the 17 week". I mean, if you don't consider that other statement 18 a red flag - - -19 MR. KELLEY: Right. But again, - - -20 JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - is this not a red flag? 21 MR. KELLEY: - - - Your Honor, I - - - think it's 22 referencing other people, not her concerns. So what we're 23 talking about is - - -24 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: What we're concerned about



is her state of mind, right? And part of her state of mind

1	is what she thinks about the other jurors as well. And she
2	thinks the other jurors are afraid for their safety, which
3	presumably they've communicated to her. That all seems to
4	go into her state of mind.
5	MR. KELLEY: Well, again, we don't know that,
6	Your Honor
7	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: She just said those words,
8	right?
9	MR. KELLEY: Well, no, about the other jurors
10	being
11	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: No, no. I I'm making
12	a different point.
13	MR. KELLEY: Okay.
14	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I don't know about the other
15	jurors either.
16	MR. KELLEY: Right.
17	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right? But we do know that
18	she believes that the other jurors have safety concerns.
19	MR. KELLEY: Um-hum.
20	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right? Is that fair?
21	MR. KELLEY: I think that's fair from the record.
22	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. And that's her state
23	of mind. We're asking about her qualification to be a
24	juror.
25	MR. KELLEY: Yeah. All right.



1 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So we have two things, 2 We have her statement that you've been asked about 3 by my colleagues. Right? 4 MR. KELLEY: Yes. 5 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Which seems equivocal to me 6 at least. And you also have her statement that Judge Cannataro just read to you, which suggests her state of 7 mind is a little troubled. Is that fair? 8 9 MR. KELLEY: Well, I - - - we keep on pushing a 10 troubled - - - no. And again, Your Honor - - -11 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So you don't think it's a 12 fair conclusion that she thinks that some of the other 13 jurors are afraid of their safety because of the people who are in court with Mr. Fisher? 14 15 MR. KELLEY: I don't know that that's a fair 16 conclusion. I believe that she says that - - - and I agree 17 that that's what she says. I don't know if that's 18 definitively a conclusion. She's just saying I came 19 forward. 20 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But isn't that part of the 21 problem? Every person accused of a crime has the right to 2.2 have a fair and impartial jury. Every member that's going 23 to judge their guilt or innocence in a case. When someone 24 says that, isn't that a problem?



MR. KELLEY: Well, it definitely needs to be

delved into, which it was by this court - - - by the trial 1 2 court, Your Honor. And again, the - - - the process was -3 - - included defense counsel. And I believe the only 4 question he asked Juror 6 was something about and it wasn't 5 6 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But wait, Counsel - -7 MR. KELLEY: - - - it was about - - -8 JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - just - - - just to return 9 to that for a minute. When Juror 6 says what Judge 10 Cannataro read to you, "because other juror members were scared for their own safety because of certain people that 11 12 were sitting watching the trial through the week", the 13 court responds, "Okay. And without getting into what other 14 those concerns may be, does this affect your ability to 15 remain on the jury". So he's not - - - I - - - I don't see 16 how he's probing that at all, which seems to me like a 17 fairly significant statement. 18

MR. KELLEY: Well, again, he's - - - he's the - - - I agree with you, Your Honor, on paper, that that - - - that would be - - - that would seem to be at least somewhat troubling. But again, the trial court is there observing not just what we have on the written record, but the - - -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: The trial court's not only there, it is the trial court's responsibility to clarify, make the inquiry, not to just hear words, but make sure



1	that that jurors qualify or are you disagreeing
2	with that? By asking subsequent
3	MR. KELLEY: No, no, no. I'm not disagreeing
4	with that at all, Your Honor. But I'm saying that they are
5	also there being in present. It's not just what's on
6	in writing. We can all agree that there's
7	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Court's present, but on on
8	appeals we review the record.
9	MR. KELLEY: Right?
10	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Correct?
11	MR. KELLEY: Correct. And that's also why
12	deference is given, Your Honor, because I believe, as the
13	appellate court.
14	JUDGE TROUTMAN: If the record supports that it
15	should be in certain instances. Would would you not
16	agree with that?
17	MR. KELLEY: Oh, I would agree with you, Your
18	Honor.
19	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So if this court failed to make
20	its record that we can be assured that the court made a
21	sufficient inquiry, why should
22	MR. KELLEY: Well, Your Honor, again, I think
23	that as as you had brought up with my opposing
24	counsel, there are issues with preservation here. Again -
25	vou know as a suit right after when the court



1	was satisfied with Juror 6, he opened it up to defense
2	counsel and actually, the People too
3	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, and then there was -
4	- and then there was a motion for mistrial, right?
5	MR. KELLEY: Right.
6	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Is that not
7	MR. KELLEY: And that's
8	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: is that not preserved
9	as to Juror as to Juror 6?
10	MR. KELLEY: Well, Your Honor, I think that that
11	motion had to be supported because where I we're
12	- we're confused with is when it says
13	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Supported is a little
14	different from preserve
15	MR. KELLEY: racial bias.
16	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: support is a little
17	different from preserve. No?
18	MR. KELLEY: Okay. Yeah. No, you're
19	you're correct, Your Honor.
20	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But so and I think
21	there's a fair argument that things that happened after
22	that, having to do with the qualification of the other
23	jurors -
24	MR. KELLEY: Correct.
25	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: may not be preserved.



1 MR. KELLEY: Right. CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But I don't know if - - - if 2 3 you disagree, tell me. But it seems to me that as to Juror 4 6, there's not a preservation issue. 5 I - - - I disagree, at least, I MR. KELLEY: 6 think it's arguable to disagree with you about that, Your 7 Honor. Especially because the motion for a mistrial 8 specifically talks about racial bias, which in reviewing 9 what we have, I don't see any implication where that was 10 brought up by anybody other than defense counsel on their 11 motion for mistrial. So the record doesn't support that. 12 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I'm sorry. You mean in the 13 trial record there's no mention of racial bias? 14 MR. KELLEY: Anything to support that other than 15 - than his - - - in his motion for a mistrial. 16 wasn't asked by - - -17 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: You think that the motion 18 for the - - - just so I understand your position. And you 19 think that the motion for the mistrial is limited to racial 20 bias? 2.1 MR. KELLEY: Correct, Your Honor. If that's what 2.2 he's making the grounds on. But what we have with the 23 record, I think there's an issue with saying, well, where -24 - - where's defense counsel coming up with this?



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Not just -

1 MR. KELLEY: The - -2 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: - - - so you don't read - -3 - you don't read the motion for mistrial based in part on 4 the jurors' bias against the defendant, regardless of his 5 race? 6 MR. KELLEY: Well, he shows that he - - -7 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Because somebody followed me 8 home - - - because somebody followed me home, and I'm 9 afraid. 10 MR. KELLEY: Um-hum. I - - - again, I have to go with what he said in the record in this case, Your Honor, 11 12 he said racial bias. Now, I did - - - I did learn that Mr. 13 Fisher is black, but I don't - - - we don't know what - -14 what Juror 6's race is, at least as far as I can tell, we 15 don't know. We're throwing in a component in here, Your 16 Honor, that I - - - I think is - - - is very sensitive but

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JUDGE RIVERA: But wasn't - - - wasn't the point of the motion that counsel was arguing that it appeared that Juror 6 was apprehensive. She was fearful regarding defendant because she thought ninety-five percent certain that he was following her in the car?

I also don't see where it's supported in the record that

the - - - that that should be reviewed in terms of - - -

MR. KELLEY: Well, that - - - you're correct,
Your Honor. But I guess, going back to again the grossly



unqualified. If he chose not to make that motion exactly - he didn't make any further application after when he
had the opportunity with Juror 6. Then should he be - - you know, in terms of meeting that standard under the
Buford inquiry, are we prepared to say then, that - - - you
know, when he makes a motion for mistrial later on and say
- - in order to say that, you know, it's so gross - - she's so grossly unqualified, Your Honor, because - - -

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of the mistrial motion as being separate from the qualification of Juror Number 6. I see it, based on what counsel said in making the motion, that he was introducing the notion that the - - - the entire jury had been poisoned by something that was going on in there. And indeed, counsel asked for an inquiry of all the other jurors and all the other jurors were interviewed, and they had various things to say. I mean, do - - - do you view the mistrial as still being confined to Juror 6, or - - - or is that bringing up a much broader issue?

MR. KELLEY: No. I believe that it's confined to Juror 6 in particular, because he hadn't - - - nobody had talked to the other jurors, obviously, at that point. So there's nothing to base that on.

MR. KELLEY: But he was alerting the court to his concern that by - - - because of what he heard from Juror



6, that there might be something more pervasive going on 1 2 with the entire jury. And indeed some - - - some other 3 jurors expressed concern for their safety. 4 MR. KELLEY: Yes, Your Honor, that - - - that is 5 true that some other jurors did express within the 6 confines, I believe, of the type of case. I don't know 7 that it was ever referenced to Mr. Fisher specifically. 8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel. 9 MS. BURGESS: I forgot to reserve. 10 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: You did forget, and I forgot to ask you. I'll give you a minute if you need it. 11 12 MS. BURGESS: Sure. Thank you. I just wanted to 13 address that no other person brought up their safety 14 concern with respect to Mr. Fisher. Juror 3 clearly said 15 that she had no safety concerns until today when Juror 6 16 told her that Mr. Fisher had followed her home. And Juror 17 7 said that she had no safety concerns and then they were 18 talking about it today. And it was clear that one of the 19 things they were talking about was Mr. Fisher allegedly 20 following Juror 6 home. So I - - - I think it's a 2.1 mischaracterization that none of the other jurors' concerns 2.2 related to Mr. Fisher. 23 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 24 MS. BURGESS: Thank you.



(Court is adjourned)



CERTIFICATION

I, Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Kenneth Fisher v. People, No. 41 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

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