1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	DAVID WILLIAMS,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 38
7	THE PEOPLE,
8	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York March 13, 2024
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	
16	Appearances:
17	CAROLA M. BEENEY, ESQ. THE CENTER FOR APPELLATE LITIGATION
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23	
24	Christian C. Amis
25	Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Last case on today's calendar is People v. Williams.

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MS. BEENEY: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it please the court. Carola Beeney for appellant, David Williams. I'd like to reserve two minutes for rebuttal, please.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes.

MS. BEENEY: Thank you. The lower court erred in denying Mr. Williams' motion for an independent source hearing. First, counsel moved for a probable cause hearing and warned that an independent source hearing would be necessary if the court found probable cause for the arrest lacking. The omnibus court - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So here the court did find that there was a problem with probable cause, correct?

MS. BEENEY: Exactly, Your Honor.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And the argument is, well, there was a hearing. So why is it necessary for yet another?

MS. BEENEY: Because independent source was not litigated. Neither party intended to litigate it. The court did not intend to make that decision on the probable cause hearing record. The two really central, important areas of independent source litigation that had to be fleshed out for the independent source determination was whether the arrest made the in-court ID possible. So



there's two areas of that. One is did the undercover ever
get a good look at the seller at the seller's face,
importantly, before the arrest. And the omission of those
details at the hearing actually suggested that the
undercover was pretty inattentive to the seller's face.
Second
JUDGE HALLIGAN: How come the face specifically.
I believe at the probable cause hearing there was testimon
that he saw I think it was he maybe it was a
she saw the defendant from the back and recognized

MS. BEENEY: That's exactly right - - -

THE COURT: So why - - - why was that not sufficient as compared with being able to see the face?

the clothing as well, right?

MS. BEENEY: That's exactly right. The prosecutor's probable cause case was based on a clothing match. So all that was covered in the probable cause hearing was that the undercover recognized the seller by his clothing, and that he had capacity to view the seller and his clothing.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: I thought also when he said he viewed him from the back, can you not infer from that that he had some sense of, you know, for example, his height, his stature, those sorts of things?

MS. BEENEY: Well, you might be able to infer a



great many things, but the fact is that there was no evidence of what the seller looked like, his race, his hairstyle, his build, his weight, and crucially, his facial characteristics. And the - - - the independent source question, of course, is whether the undercover could view the seller's face before the arrest.

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JUDGE SINGAS: Well, wasn't there a testimony that he said that he was standing with the other person, and they observed the defendant walking toward him - - - like, he walked toward him, and they stopped and had a conversation, and he said, I couldn't really make out what they were saying, but I could hear that they were having a conversation. I think right before that, he said he walked toward him, so presumably he could see his face.

MS. BEENEY: Right. So again, there's an inference that he could see him, but there was no evidence as to his actual ability to see him and what he saw. And I think generally, what happened in the record is to some degree not the issue here. The issue is that the record was insufficient as a matter of law because the defense never had notice that it should litigate independent source, should put a - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: So is your position that if there was a better record then you wouldn't need a separate independent-source hearing, or you always need a separate



independent-source hearing in these circumstances.

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MS. BEENEY: Certainly these hearings can be consolidated into one hearing, or they can be bifurcated. But what's important is that the court - - - the hearing court, provide the parties with notice as to the legal issues that will be determined on the basis of the record and an opportunity to flesh out the evidence. Because in our adversarial system, a court cannot make a legal determination based on just evidence coming from one party. It must allow the other party to put in its own evidence and challenge the adversaries - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: So if there was a full record, and let's suppose that the undercover gave testimony about several opportunities to see the lighting was good, racial characteristics, facial characteristics, there was an opportunity for cross-examination. If there was not notice per se of an independent source hearing, that would not be sufficient is your position?

MS. BEENEY: So I think that gets into a harder -

JUDGE SINGAS: Right.

MS. BEENEY: - - - question, which is essentially what happens in Marshall - - - in this court's decision in Marshall. And in there, the court did find that it was error to deny a Wade/independent-source hearing. But - -

and the same result should follow here, of course - - - but found that the error was harmless because the hearing that was had covered the same ground as a Wade/independent-source hearing would have. And that essentially counsel did treat the hearing that was had as the functional equivalent and explored the issues of independent source.

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So I would say that that - - - that's a harder question, but in our case, it is very clear that there was no notice and that neither party intended to litigate independent - - - excuse me - - - independent source until after the hearing. And I think our best evidence as to that conclusion is that the prosecutor initially rested her probable cause case without even calling the undercover, who was the only witness who would be relevant to testify at an independent-source hearing.

The prosecutor also stated, and I believe this is at appendix 65, in her post-hearing submission, that the purpose of the probable-cause hearing was to determine probable cause for arrest and that there was no other purpose of the hearing.

So the court also had a colloquy at the start of the hearing to determine what the purpose of the hearing was. And all parties either were silent or agreed that it was limited to the purpose of determining probable cause for arrest. And that word limited is important and shows

up in the omnibus order. The omnibus court essentially received defense counsel's omnibus motion stating that first, there would be a probable cause hearing, and then there would be an independent-source hearing if and only if there was probable - - - no probable cause found. The omnibus court essentially agreed with that plan and ordered a probable-cause hearing, quote, limited to the issue of whether there was probable cause for arrest.

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So here, the onus was on the court to make it clear what the parameters of the hearing was going to be. Is that what you're arguing?

MS. BEENEY: Given the realities of the circumstance where we have one court doing the omnibus decision and then another hearing court - - - any party can assert that the hearing was ordered for a particular purpose. I think there just has to be some discussion and agreement as to what that purpose is.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Prior to it beginning.

MS. BEENEY: Of course.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: And - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: So Counsel - - - I'm sorry - - - so this is a notice argument, but what if - - - on this record, and I'm saying this - - - this hypothetically - - - there was an extensive testimony by the undercover on this issue, although it's labeled just a probable-cause hearing.

Would you still say that's not enough just because you - - only on the notice issue. We didn't know it was for that purpose.

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MS. BEENEY: So I think, as in Marshall, this court took certain questions that were asked on cross-examination to essentially infer that the defense was on notice. At - - - I'm sorry - - - 509, the court writes that such questions that defense counsel asked were wholly unnecessary if, as she contends, she understood - - - defense understood the hearing to be sole - - - limited to the - - - the sole issue.

JUDGE GARCIA: So you wouldn't infer notice from the types of questions?

MS. BEENEY: That's what Marshall asserts, I think. But again, we have a very different case here where everyone - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Understood.

MS. BEENEY: Yes. Yeah. This - - I just want to, if it's okay, just address the second issue that an independent-source inquiry had to address, which is the intervening circumstances between the arrest and the incourt ID, which is what happened at the precinct. There was no information as to what occurred there. The parties - - the court needed to know how long the parties weren't in each other's presence, the certainty with which the

undercover ID'd Mr. Williams there, his capacity to view him there, whether anyone said anything to validate that ID. That is also a crucial part of the independent source analysis, without which the court could not properly have made its finding.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MS. BEENEY: Thank you.

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MR. YARNELL: May it please the court. Brent
Yarnell for the People. The notice argument is
unpreserved. The only argument that defendant made in his
request for an independent-source hearing, in fact, showed
that defendant was fully aware that evidence from the prior
probable cause hearing could be used to make an independent

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But didn't the defendant say, if the court finds there is no probable cause, they wanted the hearing. And in other words, quite frankly, not wanting to call unnecessary witnesses and wait for the outcome of the first hearing to then go to the second part if it was needed.

MR. YARNELL: He said that in his omnibus motion, and I think the record makes quite clear that the reason he said that is because he thought that this case, the procedure would play out the way it played out in Gethers, which is that he thought - - - he expected the undercover

would not testify at the probable-cause hearing, and so he thought, like in Gethers, if probable cause was found to be lacking, then they would have a separate independent-source hearing afterwards.

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But I think there's two points to make about that. First of all, the fact that he even recognized that independent source was an alternative ground brings this case under - - - under Marshall, because what Marshall looked to wasn't whether the defendant had prior notice before the hearing, that that hearing could serve as the evidentiary record for an independent-source hearing. What Marshall looked to was simply the fact that, before the hearing, the defendant knew that an independent source would alternative was an alternative ground.

And secondly, the fact that defendant is even citing Gethers in his papers, and not just citing it, but quoting it extensively over several pages, shows that he clearly read Gethers. And Gethers itself says that if there is sufficient evidence of independent source - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about the record being clear as to the parameters of what was going to take place at the hearing before it began?

MR. YARNELL: Sure. So I think that the key thing here is the context in which the court made its statement. And I think when you look at the context, the

court was simply saying that we don't need a Wade suggestiveness hearing because defendant isn't asking for that, and so we're just going to have a Dunaway hearing. And you know, there's sort of two points to make First of all, ordering a probable-cause hearing does not put defendant on notice that independent-source evidence won't be examined because as this court, you know, said in Marshall - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Do you agree that the two hearings are in fact different?

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MR. YARNELL: I don't agree that the evidence adduced at the two hearings would be different, because any evidence that was relevant to independent source is also relevant - - - or no - - - that - - - is also relevant to probable cause. Any - - - any evidence that's relevant to probable cause is also relevant to independent source - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: The extent of how you would - - you explore certain questions; doesn't it change
depending upon the determination of a lack of probable
cause?

MR. YARNELL: I mean, I think you could argue that in theory defendant might have had an extra incentive if he knew that this evidence would also be used for - - for - - for independent source. But even if you think that he would have an extra incentive, I don't think that



extra incentive really changes the balance of incentives all that much because he still had two powerful incentives to explore any evidence of independent source. Number one, he had the powerful incentive because any evidence of the undercovers ability to observe defendant at the time of the crime was obviously highly relevant to probable cause - - -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you - - - are you suggesting that he was to assume that independent source type information should be explored, that he was to just go ahead and go into that area, regardless of what - - - what the court may ultimately determine as to probable cause, just to be safe?

MR. YARNELL: I mean, we're not suggesting that.

I mean, first of all, what we're saying - - - we're saying that he was aware before the hearing that if evidence relevant to independent source was adduced at the hearing, then that evidence could be used to make a probable source finding. He was aware of that because he extensively discussed Gethers in his omnibus motion papers.

And then, you know, I think that we would say,
even if this was a case where you didn't have that, the
question ultimately is whether, you know, a defendant - whether the court abused its discretion in not holding
another hearing. And - - - and - - - so I would say that
even if you assumed that the defense counsel was not

unaware, I think the fact that he had a very powerful incentive to, you know, develop all the same facts anyway is relevant to the question of whether another hearing really would explore new facts, different facts, or whether it simply would be duplicative and thus and thus a waste of - - of the court's time.

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So you're arguing, even if it was a mistake, no harm here?

MR. YARNELL: There's no harm here. And I think what's important to note, you know, first of all, defendant did cross examine the undercover about facts probative to whether the undercover had an opportunity to see the defendant's face.

So there were two points in - - - in the interaction that are worth focusing on. First is when defendant initially crosses the street and walks over to where the undercover is standing with Elfe. The defendant cross examined to ask questions about whether there was anything obstructing their view. He asked questions about how far away the defendant was from the undercover, and he asked whether the undercover could hear what defendant was saying to Elfe, given that defendant was walking towards them at that time. All those questions were probative to whether the undercover could see the defendant's face.

And the second point is, after the sale actually



occurs and defend - - - and the undercover and Elfe are standing sort of north of the barbershop on - - - on the west side of the street, defendant asked the under - - - the undercover, "So did you get any other opportunities to observe defendant after that point?" And the undercover said, "Yeah, because that's when Elfe brought me over to defendant." And so the fact that Elfe is bringing the undercover over to defendant is obviously probative of whether, you know, he - - -

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JUDGE SINGAS: So is that your best evidence as to the independent source? Because the record is weak here. You know, it makes me question whether the prosecutor even knew that there was an independent-source hearing going on here. What's your best evidence of an independent source?

MR. YARNELL: The best evidence of the independent source is the moment when the undercover walks over to the - - - the point on the corner where Elfe is standing with defendant and the undercover is only a few feet away. He's so close that even though the - - - Elfe and defendant are talking in low tones, the - - - the undercover can still - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Do we have any idea what time of day that is, lighting, conditions, or anything like that?

MR. YARNELL: Yeah, it's about - - - it's about

4:45, I mean, so the whole thing started at 4 o'clock. It took a long time to get to the point that defendant was coming over, and then - - - and then I think that it ended around 4:55. So this would be around 4:45 - - - 4:50 in the afternoon.

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I don't know if there was testimony about the lighting conditions, but what we do know certainly is that - - is the defendant was cross-examining - - - was cross-examining the undercover about his opportunity to see defendant at this point.

And so we have that moment. We have the fact that the undercover saw across the street that defendant and Elfe were exchanging items. He couldn't see exactly what they were exchanging, but he could see him at that point. And then we have the third point where the - - - where Elfe brings the undercover back over to where defendant is, and defendant says, "No, I don't want to meet him at this time."

So all those points are points where - - especially the first and the last one are points where they
were in very close proximity, they were facing each other.

And that is obviously highly probative to the question of
whether - - of whether there was an independent source
and whether he had - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: There also has to seem - - -



there seems to be some confusion in the record - - - the testimony about where the buy occurred and therefore where these different people were. You've got it in paper occurring at 22:51. You've got the undercover saying they moved north to avoid the cameras there, and you've got Det. Rivera saying they moved south to 115th Street, and that's where the buy occurred. And so it casts some doubt on how - - how valuable the evidence about the observation is and how reliable the independent source is, no?

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MR. YARNELL: I disagree. I can explain, sort of I think, where that confusion came from. So the undercover was very clear about where the buy occurred. It occurred on the corner, which was sort of on the south end of that block.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Of 116?

MR. YARNELL: Right. Exactly. Oh, I think it's 115. The south end of 115 on the - - on the north end of 115 - - of 115. So I think that it happened on the corner - - of the south corner - - the - - I'm sorry - - the north - - northwest corner of 115th and First. And then a little bit up the block - - sort of midway in the block - - was the barbershop.

So basically, what that means is that, sort of, the barber shop where defendant was arrested was, sort of, less than a block away from where the sale occurred. The



undercover was not confused about that, but I think the - - the arresting officer was. And you know, I think that - the court even said the real problem with the arresting officer's testimony isn't that the arresting officer was confused in the paperwork. He thought that that confusion was somewhat understandable. He thought the problem with the arresting officer's testimony was that when her error was revealed, she just denied that she made any kind of mistake. And it was her denial, her - - her reaction when she was confronted with the mistake that - - that cast doubt on her - - her credibility, not the mistake itself. But the undercover was very clear about where the buy occurred.

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And if there are no further questions, we ask that you affirm. Thank you.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MS. BEENEY: The defense's cross-examination at the probable-cause hearing was classic probable cause cross-examination. It was a question of whether the suspect had committed a crime, and what information the arresting officer had at the time of the arrest.

Most of the cross-examination is, it's true,
based on whether the undercover could see the seller. But
that was only as to his clothing, because that's what the - the prosecutor was making its probable cause on was a



clothing match ID, not a facial match ID. The question for independent source is whether the undercover saw his face before the illegality rather than after it. But for the arrest, could he have reliably made an ID in court of the seller?

JUDGE SINGAS: I think the court was also relying on the fact that this was a trained observer. Do you think that that should enter at all our determination?

MS. BEENEY: Gethers at 163 writes that that is - that the - - - whether or not it's a confirmatory ID,
which - - - which coincides with that inquiry, simply has
no relevance in a determination of whether an
identification is the product of an illegal arrest. The
confirmatory ID analysis, the facts that you need to
establish a legal determination of a confirmatory ID, are
entirely separate - - - wholly separate from a Fourth
Amendment taint analysis. And even - - - even if that's
not true on this record, we have no facts as to what the
quote confirmatory ID consisted of. We have one - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Well, I was talking about the - - during the - - - for the independent source inquiry. I think the judge relied on the fact that you had, not a lay witness looking at this person, but a trained observer.

MS. BEENEY: Yeah. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

JUDGE SINGAS: That's okay.



1	MS. BEENEY: Gethers also says that a tainted ID
2	is equally tainted, whether made by a lay person or a
3	trained observer. So that quotation, I think, speaks more
4	directly to your question.
5	If Your Honors have no further questions, we ask
6	that you reverse and remand for a new trial to be preceded
7	by an independent-source hearing.
8	Thank you, Your Honors.
9	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.
10	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Christian C. Amis, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of David Williams v. The People, No. 38 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. C. Choily Clim Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: March 20, 2024

