1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	CONCOLLDAMED DECEMBED AND ODC
4	CONSOLIDATED RESTAURANT OPS,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 7
7	WESTPORT INSURANCE,
8	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York January 10, 2024
10	Before:
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN PRESIDING JUSTICE FRANCESCA CONNOLLY
15	
16	Appearances:
17	ROBIN L. COHEN, ESQ. COHEN ZIFFER FRENCHMAN & MCKENNA LLP
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19	New York, NY 10019
20	AIDAN M. MCCORMACK, ESQ. DLA PIPER
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24	Christian C. Amis Official Court Transcriber
25	



1	ACTING CHIEF ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Good
2	afternoon. We are now on the last case on the calendar,
3	Consolidated Restaurant Operations v. West Port Insurance
4	Corporation.
5	Counsel?
6	And we want to welcome, of course, our colleague
7	Judge Connolly. Thank you so much
8	JUDGE CONNOLLY: Thank you.
9	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: for joining us
10	today.
11	And Judge Halligan, as you see, is on the screen
12	We will try to be cautious to be able to hear when she has
13	questions and and give her an opportunity to ask
14	whatever she needs to ask.
15	Go ahead, counsel.
16	MS. COHEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you.
18	MS. COHEN: Good afternoon. Robin Cohen on
19	behalf of Consolidated Re Restaurants Operations
20	Inc., better known as CRO. We would like three minutes fo
21	rebuttal.
22	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: You have it.
23	MS. COHEN: Okay. This appeal poses two issues.
24	One is, did the first department err when it rewrote the
25	policy, finding that the words direct physical loss or



damage can only mean tangible, demonstrable, damage to its property?

Second, even if that were the appropriate standard, did the first department err when it violated New York's Liberal pleading standards by rejecting CRO's allegations that COVID-19 physically and tangibly altered its property without any evidentiary record?

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Counsel, can I ask, are you - - over here. Thank you. Are you arguing that loss of use from some completely exogenous external event constitutes direct physical loss? Or is your position that as long as there's some physical substance on the property that renders it uninhabitable, that that's what constitutes direct physical loss or damage?

MS. COHEN: We are arguing both, Your Honor. We are arguing that if you have a physical substance like COVID and it goes onto your property and it physically causes your property to be unsafe so that you physically cannot use that property in whole or part, that - - -

JUDGE CONNOLLY: But counsel, how does that constitute physical damage or physical loss?

MS. COHEN: So physical loss is different than physical damage. Physical damage is physical harm. What we say physical loss is, is deprivation of property as a result of a physical event.



1	JUDGE CANNATARO: So is this loss or
2	JUDGE TROUTMAN: And how does the government
3	-
4	JUDGE CANNATARO: loss or damage? What are
5	we talking about here?
6	MS. COHEN: Well, that is physical loss, Your
7	Honor. So if you have deprivation of your property in par-
8	or in full as a result of a physical
9	JUDGE TROUTMAN: What about the government's
10	orders with respect to the property, how does that impact
11	your definition?
12	MS. COHEN: If we only had government orders,
13	that would be a pure loss case and we would not be able to
14	get part
15	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Wel, it might
16	it might be loss of profits. How is it physical loss?
17	MS. COHEN: Okay. So so that it's a
18	it's so loss, without the physical to modify
19	it, would be economic loss or reputational loss. So for
20	example, if the restaurant got a bad review
21	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
22	MS. COHEN: and we suffered economic loss
23	because of that, that's not covered.
24	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
25	MS. COHEN: If a competitor comes into the



MS. COHEN: If a competitor comes into the

neighborhood and we, CRO, suffer loss - - - economic loss 1 2 because of that competitor, that is not recoverable. 3 However - - -4 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But that - - - that's - - -5 that's Roundabout, isn't it? I mean, that's a completely 6 external event. So - - - so I thought I heard you say that 7 you were taking the position that a completely external 8 event was also covered. 9 MS. COHEN: Your Honor, Roundabout dealt with a 10 pure loss of use case. It did not - - -JUDGE HALLIGAN: But due to some external event 11 12 that - - - that caused that loss of use, right? 13 MS. COHEN: It doesn't matter if the physical 14 15 you have a physical substance that causes some physical 16

event is outside the property or on the property, but once event on the property, that constitutes physical loss. So it has to - - -

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: Okay. So you agree then - - - I just want to make sure I'm clear - - - that something has to basically break the plane. In other words, it - - - it has to come on to your property in order to constitute - -- in order to constitute physical loss and something that is - - - so for example, if you had not alleged that there was COVID-19 present on your property, that would not be an allegation sufficient to be physical loss; is that right?

1	MS. COHEN: That is exactly right.
2	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Okay. Thank you.
3	MS. COHEN: And that is why we are not Roundabout
4	because Roundabout was a situation where there was an
5	accident outside of the covered property and the street
6	closed and as a result the theaters closed. There was no
7	physical event on the property. We agree
8	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: But let's get back to
9	this. It says physical loss.
10	MS. COHEN: Yes.
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Explain that to me.
12	MS. COHEN: Sure.
13	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: If you've already
14	said what it's or partially said what it's not, let's
15	get to what it is.
16	MS. COHEN: So it's not economic or reputational
17	loss.
18	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Uh-huh.
19	MS. COHEN: But it is if there's a physical event
20	
21	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
22	MS. COHEN: on your property
23	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
24	MS. COHEN: that causes the air or the
25	surfaces to physically make it unsafe on your property,



1	that means and you lose money, or you are
2	dispossessed from your property that constitutes
3	physical loss.
4	JUDGE CANNATARO: So you
5	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: And how excuse
6	me for one second.
7	JUDGE CANNATARO: Go ahead.
8	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: And is there some
9	temporal aspect to this?
10	MS. COHEN: Well, for
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Right. Because part
12	of the argument is you clean off everything and you can use
13	it again.
14	MS. COHEN: Right. So first you have to
15	establish that you have physical loss or physical damage.
16	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
17	MS. COHEN: Once you do that, then the ther
18	the question is, what's the measure of damages? Then you
19	go to the temporal limitation. They want to put the period
20	of liability into the insuring agreement and really use it
21	as an exclusion or a limitation on physical loss or
22	physical damage. That is not how the policies work.
23	If you go to the first page of the policy, that's
24	record cite 84, it expressly says this is an all-rish
25	policy. It's in bold letters. And it says it's triggered



either by physical loss or physical damage.

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So how does the period of liability then come into play here?

MS. COHEN: So - - - so let's assume for the sake of argument that we agree that there's physical loss or physical damage on our property. Then the question becomes, how much are you entitled to? And then the temporal limitation comes in. You're entitled to economic damages from the physical loss or physical damage up until the point, if you could - - - and the word could is in the policy language - - - you could repair or replace the property.

JUDGE SINGAS: What - - - what factual - - - specific factual allegations did you make concerning the virus on your property?

MS. COHEN: So paragraphs 12 through 22 in our original complaint expressly discuss in detail what the process was. at that point, we filed pretty early, we were focused on the surfaces of the restaurants. And what we said is there were fomites that would come as a result of the spread of the virus. Those fomites would change the physical integrity of the surfaces. As a result, they would change, and we were entitled to damages as a result of that. Now - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: And did science contradict that at



all?

MS. COHEN: In fact, Your Honor, just the
reverse. We attached son we put footnotes of
scientific studies that supported our view, and then we
amended the complaint because this is a science
that's growing we amended the complaint and
paragraphs 12 all the way to paragraphs 38, talking in
excruciating detail what the physical process is, both the
change in the air, how the air alters and causes physical
loss or physical damage. We also talked more about how
those fomites get absorbed into the surface where it's very
difficult to clean

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: So are you saying it's physical loss or damage to the air?

MS. COHEN: Well, the - - - it's the - - - the - - - there's a physical alteration to the air - - - ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MS. COHEN: - - - that causes CRO to be dispossessed from his property. So because the air makes the place unsafe, we had a business interruption claim because no one was coming to the restaurant - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: That again sounds like economic loss. I can't run my business - - -

MS. COHEN: It's not - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: - - - because of the



1	quality the air quality.
2	MS. COHEN: It's not just the air quality, Your
3	Honor. It is that the air
4	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
5	MS. COHEN: microscopically
6	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
7	MS. COHEN: has changed to make the
8	the property from being safe
9	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. Uh-huh.
10	MS. COHEN: to unsafe.
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
12	MS. COHEN: And the surface is the same thing.
13	The fomite process is being absorbed into the surfaces to
14	make the
15	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: So let let me
16	let me take this example. Let's forget COVID for one
17	moment. Whatever it was, a couple of months ago when we
18	had or actually, I guess, during the summer
19	when we had all that smoke because of the fires in Canada
20	come in. Couldn't even see the front of your hand.
21	MS. COHEN: Yeah.
22	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: I assume there were
23	businesses that had to close. People or people
24	wouldn't go in, or coughing was affecting their eyes, thei



lungs, and so forth. But once the smoke lifts, nothing

1	inside is damaged. Every every piece of furniture
2	still is available. Is that physical loss or damage?
3	MS. COHEN: For sixty years
4	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.
5	MS. COHEN: the courts throughout the
6	country have used that example
7	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
8	MS. COHEN: specifically as causing
9	physical loss or physical damage. It
10	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Because of the
11	environmental impact?
12	MS. COHEN: Yeah, because, it
13	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Are there
14	MS. COHEN: just oh, I'm sorry.
15	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Judge Halligan.
16	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Sorry. I was just going to say
17	are there New York cases you can point us to that that hol
18	that?
19	MS. COHEN: So there's not a New York case on
20	point. But what I can point you to is the PepsiCo case,
21	because that case
22	JUDGE HALLIGAN: But there, the product itself
23	was altered, right? But the the soda, I thought
24	there became at least unmerchantable. It it sounded
25	like it was pretty bad whatever happened to it. And so I



think that's the - - - the property - - - the physical 1 2 property itself could not be - - - could not be used ever. 3 That was a permanent, I thought, effective destruction. 4 MS. COHEN: You are absolutely right, Your Honor. 5 But under the first department's decision, that would not 6 constitute physical damage. The first and fore - - -7 JUDGE CONNOLLY: But the counsel in that - - -8 I'm sorry - - - in that case, they had to actually destroy 9 - - - they actually did destroy the Pepsi product. 10 MS. COHEN: Absolutely. But that did not come 11 into play in analyzing the case. Meaning the second 12 department looked at the case and they said because the 13 function and value of that product was severely impaired, 14 not because it was destroyed - - -15 JUDGE CONNOLLY: But there was a diminution in value, which is a loss. It was a diminution in the value 16 17 of the product - - -18 MS. COHEN: Well - -19 JUDGE CONNOLLY: - - - as a result of this 20 substance that was - - -2.1 MS. COHEN: Well, the court specifically said 2.2 that in order to prove property damage, you don't need - -23 - and I'm quoting - - - a distinct demonstrable alteration 24 of the physical structure. And the court went on to say in 25



that decision that if you lose - - - if there's a physical

event and you lose the function and value of your product, 1 2 that constitutes physical damage. 3 JUDGE CANNATARO: Is that - - - why is that not a 4 loss? That sounds to me like a loss. The chemistry - - -5 the recipe for the Coke - - - Pepsi - - - excuse me -6 rendered - - - got messed up and it rendered the product 7 unusable as a - - - or at least unsaleable. 8 MS. COHEN: Yeah. 9 JUDGE CANNATARO: That to me reads total loss. 10 So what am I misunderstanding due to my total lack of 11 sophistication about the distinction between damage and 12 loss in this type of situation? 13 MS. COHEN: Because what happened in that case -14 - - and I agree it's not completely on par with the smoke. 15 And I want to get back to the smoke analogy. But in that 16 case, you had a physical event, meaning that the - - -17 there was a physical event, it was invisible, that occurred 18 to the product. And as a result, that product became 19 unsellable. Now, if - - -20 JUDGE CANNATARO: And that was damage to the 21 product? 22 MS. COHEN: Absolutely - - - absolutely. 23 invisible damage to the product. The product was altered 24 in a way that the product - - -



ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: And that's - -

1	that's the problem here, no nothing physical on the
2	premises of the restaurant is damaged as a result of COVID
3	You simply didn't make profit. You don't have customers.
4	You had to close. What whatever was that part of the
5	argument. It sounds to me like your reading requires us to
6	read loss of use into this phrase, and we cannot add terms
7	MS. COHEN: You cannot add terms, but it says
8	direct physical loss or physical damage. But I want to go
9	back to Your Honor's point, because I want to push back a
10	little bit on on that. Just because damage
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
12	MS. COHEN: is temporary
13	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
14	MS. COHEN: doesn't mean there's no damage
15	So to get back to your example
16	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: But again, it's not
17	really damage. Damage suggests repair, and there's no
18	damage to any of the property.
19	MS. COHEN: We would disagree with that
20	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
21	MS. COHEN: because repair really deals
22	with measure of damages. You're putting repair into the
23	insuring agreement and it's not. So you can have temporary
24	damage.
25	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.



ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.

MS. COHEN: Good examples. The ammonia 1 2 contamination in the District Court of New Jersey case. 3 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. 4 MS. COHEN: There was ammonia spill. 5 JUDGE CONNOLLY: But didn't that require 6 remediation? People could not go there unless this - - -7 this - - - the ammonia was remediated - - - removed. 8 MS. COHEN: Their - - - they didn't have any more 9 remediation than we've had here. Meaning - - - they - - -10 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But - - - but you - - - you had - - - you didn't allege - - - I don't think. Correct me if 11 12 I'm wrong - - - complete unusability, right? And - - - and 13 I think, actually, the complaint indicates that there was 14 some utility that remained at the - - - at the property. 15 So it seems to me we would have to accept your argument 16 that partial loss of use or diminution in use is - - - is 17 sufficient. Am I - - am I right in the way I read your 18 complaint? 19 MS. COHEN: No, Your Honor. Two points. 20 of all, paragraph 35 of the original complaint and 2.1 paragraph 50 of the amended complaint alleged that 30 of 2.2 our 55 restaurants were completely closed. So we have 23 complete disposition if that is the standard. But that is 24 directly contrary to the policy language.



ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: But that's not

because of loss of the property. That's because you didn't
have people returning to the restaurant. That, again,
sounds to me like economic loss. But Counsel, your red
light is on. I'll give you an opportunity to address that
when you come back. Do you have a re - -
MS. COHEN: Sure. Sure.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Could I - - sorry, Judge - -
could I just ask one very quick question?

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Go ahead. Yes. Yes.
Yes. Go ahead.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: I think at paragraph 63 of your

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: I think at paragraph 63 of your complaint, you also allege that the virus might not actually be present on the property. What - - - what should we make of that - - -

MS. COHEN: That - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - in assessing your
allegations?

MS. COHEN: Sure. That was dealing with the communicable disease coverage, and that is inconsistent with paragraph 36 and 61, where we made crystal clear that the virus was present and caused physical - - - physical loss or damage. And we corrected that, Your Honor, in the amended complaint to make it crystal clear that there are many causes to our - - our loss, which is both physical loss and damage caused by the virus and the orders. It was

a combination.

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And the question becomes, if this gets past a motion to dismiss, is what is the efficient proximate cause? Meaning what was the predominant cause? And the New York courts have weighed in on this so far and they say it's the virus. So if the virus - - between the virus and the - - the governmental orders - - if the virus is the efficient, proximate cause, then that is sufficient to get us past the motion to dismiss.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Okay. Thank you.

MS. COHEN: Okay.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: You have your rebuttal.

Go ahead, sir.

MR. MCCORMACK: Good afternoon, Your Honors.

Excuse me. Sorry about that. Aidan McCormack. May it please the court. Counsel for Westport Insurance

Corporation.

I think it's really fundamental that we need to look at the contract language and - - - and really look at that and look at the plain meaning of it. I think that's critical because there was a lot of use of the word physical event, and I've, unfortunately, read this policy too many times, more than I can imagine, and it does not appear - - - that phrase does not appear in this insurance



contract.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Counsel, to the - - - to the plain language, can I just ask you briefly, what meaning does the phrase physical loss have as applied to real property, which I don't think theft or displacement - - - you know, misplacement readily applies to?

MR. MCCORMACK: Right. So Your Honor, there are many courts that have interpreted that particular phrase.

It's not limited to physical loss or damage. It's direct physical loss or damage to insured property - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Right. But what - - - what meaning does the word loss distinctly have as applied to real property then?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yes. In insurance parlance, and certainly the way these insurance contracts have been interpreted, a physical loss is a total loss. Your warehouse burns to the ground. A physical damage is, you know, God forbid your warehouse is partially damaged by fire. And so in insurance parlance, and certainly the way the plain meaning of this language is, those words do have different meanings, but they're both require - - and absolutely require physical damage to insured property. In the case of the former, it's a total loss.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So the distinction is - - JUDGE HALLIGAN: And - - -



1	JUDGE CANNATARO: if it's damaged, you can
2	repair it. If it's lost, you have to replace it.
3	MR. MCCORMACK: Exactly, Your Honor. It fits
4	right in, then, with the period of liability clause
5	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And
6	MR. MCCORMACK: which we know from record
7	on page 115, which uses those two same precise words, they
8	match up and they mirror themselves. I'm sorry
9	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And what can you no, I
10	appreciate that what can you point us to as support
11	for that understanding of physical loss as distinct from
12	physical damage?
13	MR. MCCORMACK: So it
14	JUDGE HALLIGAN: You said that's common parlance
15	in the insurance industry
16	MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.
17	JUDGE HALLIGAN: but where can we look to
18	see that?
19	MR. MCCORMACK: Well, there's there's many
20	there's many cases on this phrase, and we've cited
21	them in our brief. But I would say to you, you need go no
22	further than the over 120 New York cases that have decided
23	the issue before you.
24	Now, I know they're persuasive and not binding on
25	this court and you make your own decisions, but those cases



repeatedly talk in terms of, you have to have a physical loss to the insured property, meaning - - -

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: I understand that. But - - but specifically, to the extent you're arguing that
physical loss means complete destruction as opposed to
damage, which means partial or repairable, where do we see
support for - - - for that reading of the word physical
loss?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well - - - well, I would suggest to you it's plainly in the words, Your Honor. The word damage, right, I think we can all accept means something is damaged, not totally lost. And the word loss completes the circle. When you have physical loss, you have a total loss of the property. And when you - - -

JUDGE CONNOLLY: But can't loss also mean diminution in value?

MR. MCCORMACK: Not with the word physical in front of it, Your Honor. And also, just to be very clear, the definition of insured property does not include air.

Okay. It only includes the real estate and the furniture and the chairs and the table. And you can study this complaint all day long - - all day long - - and including the amended complaint. And there is not a single factual allegation of a table or a chair or a knife or a fork or a refrigerator or an oven that was damaged and

1	needed to be discarded, needed to be repaired or replaced.
2	JUDGE CANNATARO: So in all risk
3	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Is there any coverage
4	I'm sorry. Go ahead.
5	JUDGE CANNATARO: Right. If you have an all-ris
6	policy and it they they don't typically cover
7	the release of noxious gases or something like that? Would
8	that would require some special rider?
9	MR. MCCORMACK: So it depends upon what the
10	noxious gases
11	JUDGE CANNATARO: Because you said you can't
12	- you know, air is not property, and I just want to explore
13	that
14	MR. MCCORMACK: Oh, okay. Yes. Okay.
15	Certainly. If the ifthe air is just in the air,
16	right, you are correct.
17	JUDGE CANNATARO: But the air is always in the
18	air, Counsel.
19	MR. MCCORMACK: It's but if in the case of
20	the of the Oregon wildfires wildfire case,
21	right, where it permeates property such that the property
22	the insured property
23	JUDGE CANNATARO: Yeah.
24	MR. MCCORMACK: has to be discarded or
25	repaired cleaned, it's heavily built in then



you have an insured loss resulting from a gas.

JUDGE CANNATARO: But if you had a dangerous gas leak and you had to evacuate the premises and you couldn't reopen for three weeks, that's not going to cut it under this kind of policy?

MR. MCCORMACK: That would not cut it under this policy. That's right, Your Honor. Now, let's look - - - let's look at Gregory Packing, right. They - - - they love to cite Gregory Packing, which is a New Jersey case, so it's not New York law. It's an unreported decision from the Federal District Court. That case involved pneumonia - - ammonia, not pneumonia - - ammonia entering the premises and permeating the premises. So much so, when I - - one of the - - - one of the judges mentioned it - - so much that they had to go in haz - - hazmat suits and remediate the whole property. And the court in that case said that is a physical loss or damage and therefore it's covered.

But what they don't want to mention to you, because they don't, is that since Gregory Packing, ten New Jersey cases have ruled on COVID, and they've all affirmed dismissal of the complaint because they don't allege threat of physical loss.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So in the case that you just described, do you agree that that is - - - that was lost?



MR. MCCORMACK: I really - - - I will say this 1 2 about Gregory Packing. There's not a lot in the decision, 3 but I really don't have any quarrel with it, nor do I have 4 any quarrel with PepsiCo. I mean, PepsiCo, the product was 5 the soda. The product was infiltrated by another product. 6 I think it was damaged sugar. It destroyed the product. 7 The product had to be thrown out. That's destroyed. 8 That's repair or replace. That's replaced - - -9 So is it focused more on -JUDGE TROUTMAN: 10 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So why is - - -11 JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - some action that you then 12 have to take? 13 MR. MCCORMACK: That's right. And Roundabout 14 weeds that out. Roundabout doesn't say - - - and just for 15 the record - - - I want to be clear on this - - - the 16 period of liability clause is an insurance clause. 17 look at page - - - record 113, the time element cover, 18 where they're seeking coverage, Section A, period of 19 liability is built into the insurance clause. So these

But the - - - the way it's built out is you have that period of liability clause, which Roundabout looked to and said, when you look at that, that informs us, reading the contract as a whole, that in order to have physical

repeated references to it not being the insurance clause

are frankly inaccurate.

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4 happened. Was COVID - - -5 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Counsel, you - - -6 MR. MCCORMACK: Certainly. 7 JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - you - - - you say you have 8 no problem with - - - no quarrel with Gregory Packing. 9 MR. MCCORMACK: It's - - -10 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So tell me if you would, why is 11 ammonia different from COVID? I take your point about the 12 subsequent New Jersey cases, but why is COVID 13 distinguishable from ammonia? 14 MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah. I did caveat and say 15 there's not a lot of facts in Gregory Packing in the 16 decision. 17 JUDGE HALLIGAN: I understand. 18 MR. MCCORMACK: But - - - but what happened there 19 is that the ammonia got into the building. Hazmat suits 20 were needed to go in and environmental remediation needed 21 to be performed. That - - - I don't know the details of 22 what they did, but it sounds to me like they need to do 23 some serious remediation of the premises, meaning the 24 insured property. Obviously there's - - -25 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So - - - so is the point that

loss damage, something must need to be repaired or

same furniture, same walls, same ceiling. Nothing's

replaced. And we're all sitting in this courtroom today,

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the physical property and not the air was affected or that 1 2 the air was affected in a really bad way? I'm trying to 3 understand your distinction. 4 MR. MCCORMACK: Yes, it's the former, Your Honor, 5 that the ammonia damaged the property and it had to be 6 remediated. So it was the same just colloquy we just had, 7 which is if something is bad in the air, is that direct 8 physical loss to insured property? Answer, no. 9 air - - -10 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So with the smoke - - - sorry. Go ahead. 11 12 MR. MCCORMACK: - - - if that air penetrates the 13 surface in the Schlam and Stone case, for example, the 14 debris is from 9/11, if it permeates the surface and 15 requires repair or damage to the property, in that 16 eventuality, absolutely covered. 17 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Can you address the -18 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So with just - - -19 20 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, I'm sorry. 21 ahead. Go ahead. 22 No, I'm just going to say, with JUDGE HALLIGAN: 23 Judge Rivera's smoke hypothetical, it sounds to me then if 24 the smoke permeates all of the furniture, the carpets, et 25



cetera, and they have to be replaced, you would say that

counts. But if it's just in the air and no one can come in for a week, that - - - that doesn't count because why?

That's just loss of use?

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MR. MCCORMACK: That's right, Your Honor. There's no direct physical loss or damage to insured property in that instance. And I also wanted to - - - to just remind or just if I may mention to the court that remember that the loss - - - the financial loss, which Consolidated certainly incurred, as many businesses did during the pandemic, unless you were, you know, allowed to stay open, unfortunately, like hospitals, it was a very bad time for businesses. I don't - - - I don't - - - I don't dispute that. But the financial loss that they incurred was not because the tables and chairs were destroyed or Right. It was because there was no foot traffic. And why was there no foot traffic? A, people were afraid, rightly, and B, the government said, you're not allowed to go in there, but you can, as paragraph 31 of the complaint alleges, you - - - they could have takeout, they could have, you know, delivery services and things like that, which they did perform to - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: But pre-mandate, didn't they voluntarily close some of their dining spaces, like, because of the risk inherent in using them?

MR. MCCORMACK: That's right, Your Honor. My - -



- a member of our yacht club, we closed our dining space 1 2 long before the - - - the orders came - -3 JUDGE CANNATARO: That - - - that's got sort of 4 lost sound to it. They felt that the risk that was posed 5 by the virus, both in the air and on the surfaces -6 MR. MCCORMACK: Uh-huh. 7 JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - because I was going to 8 ask you that question as well, because it's - - - you know, 9 part of their argument is that the viruses are in the air 10 then they become fomites and they fall to the surface where they stay for some period of time. That sounds a lot like 11 12 the ammonia that damaged the property in Gregory Packing. 13 Be that as it may, they voluntarily, in a - - -14 you know, out of caution, closed their space to account for 15 that hazard in their restaurants. How is that not a loss? 16 MR. MCCORMACK: If you use the word loss alone, 17 we'd, probably, we would agree, but that's not what the 18 policy requires. The policy requires that the financial 19 loss you incurred is resulting from direct physical loss or 20 damage, and there is no physical loss or damage that caused 2.1 their financial losses. 2.2 JUDGE CANNATARO: That brings me to my counter 23 question. Fomites on the counter. Not direct physical 24 damage or loss?



MR. MCCORMACK: It's a fancy word for a surface

that may transmit, sadly, a virus from one person to another. It does not harm the surface, Your Honor. And the plain meaning in any ordinary person on the street would tell you if you said my chair - - - this chair right here was damaged by a virus, wouldn't believe it.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Is that because you can clean it?

MR. MCCORMACK: You can clean it? That's right, Your Honor. And - - - and yes, may need to clean it many times, but what's the difference - - - I mean, I know - -

Your Honor. And - - - and yes, may need to clean it many times, but what's the difference - - - I mean, I know - - it's - - - I don't want to make light of the situation because we all know it was very serious. We all lived through it. But what - - - they're cleaning it with Lysol instead of Pine-sol every night. Okay. That's what we're talking about. And regular cleaning of a restaurant, we all hope, is occurring anyway. I'm not suggesting that they didn't have to do more, but it isn't physical loss or damage to insured property where you can wipe it down.

JUDGE CONNOLLY: But counsel, aren't you asking us to evaluate - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Over here.

JUDGE CONNOLLY: - - - over here.

MR. MCCORMACK: I'm sorry.

JUDGE CONNOLLY: Aren't you asking us to evaluate scientific allegations prematurely at the pleading stage?



MR. MCCORMACK: Not at all, Your Honor. 3211 was given by the legislator to the court system for a reason.

And there are jurisdictions, not this one, which say that that should be very, very rarely used. But in New York, it's a tool that eliminates cases early and for good reason. This is a contract dispute. This is perfectly suited - - perfectly suited for 3211 dismissal. It - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Well, even if - - - I

- - - and perhaps I've misunderstand - - - stood the

science arguments, so you can, you know, correct me on

rebuttal. But again, this is my question about the

temporalness of this. It's not like you can never use the

chair if COVID got on it. You clean it.

MR. MCCORMACK: You clean it, and you sit back down.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: And - - and that was known even then.

MR. MCCORMACK: That's right. That's right, Your Honor. But so to your point, in the first department, if you read 2074 of the record, not only read the complaint, they went the extra step and read the proposed amended complaint. And my reading, their reading, same, said there's no there there. It's just there is no direct physical loss or damage to insured property that caused their financial losses. It's not the warehouse was damaged



or the warehouse was burnt to the ground or something like that.

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ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: You're also making the argument that even if we didn't agree with you, there are these particular exclusions that would apply. Is there anything you want to add about what's already written in the brief?

MR. MCCORMACK: That's correct, Your Honor. I would just say this, that the contamination exclusion that's in the contract can readily dispose of this case. You know, I think there's quite a few Supreme Court justices who wouldn't want you to stop there to be blunt because there's a huge caseload below me. And so resolving the primary issue is - - - for what it - - - it's your discretion, but I think it's important.

But the contamination exclusion specifically says there's no coverage for virus. And unlike some of the arguments that have been made, it doesn't require physical loss or damage. It's when you look at it, it doesn't alter the meaning of the insuring clause. It's just an exclusion. It's read seriatim under the Latin, meaning on its own, can't create ambiguities, can't increase coverage. And so I would say that that exclusion certainly bites in and resolves the issue on its own. But I leave it to your discretion as to whether to think of other things.



The - - - I think I would just close by saying 1 2 that, you know, obviously very important issue and thank 3 you for taking it up. I think a lot of the lower courts 4 are looking towards this decision. And you know, there was 5 one argument made that a lot of the cases that are out 6 there are only dealt with the exclusionary issue. 7 would respectfully say that's just not the case. 8 There's 172 federal appellate court decisions on 9 this issue, every single one of them unanimously dismissing 10 these kinds of allegations. There are a handful that dealt with the exclusion, but by and large, they all said there's 11 12 no direct physical loss or damage.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Right. Because there may not be these kinds of exclusions, but the language is more commonplace in the policy.

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MR. MCCORMACK: Yes. This is - - - this phrase, direct physical loss or damage, and the requirement that the losses result from that, I wouldn't say it's in every policy. Schlam and Stone had slightly different wording.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.

MR. MCCORMACK: But it pretty much is standard. If there's no further questions. Thank you, Your Honor.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you.

Before you get to everything else you want to say. And I certainly appreciate counsel's comments about



the necessary quidance. Why isn't he right that the 1 2 contaminants exclusion addresses this case? Perhaps not 3 others, but addresses this case? 4 MS. COHEN: Because Belt Painting - - - this 5 court in Belt Painting made it clear if you have prefatory 6 language that is in this exclusion - - -7 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. Uh-huh. 8 MS. COHEN: - - - that is only applies to 9 traditional environmental pollution. And so that's not 10 what we have here. So for example, this policy is almost identical to the policy in Belt Painting. That's why it 11 12 doesn't apply. 13 JUDGE SINGAS: Ms. Cohen, did you find any SARS 14 or COVID virus in any of your restaurants? 15 MS. COHEN: Yes, Your Honor, we did. We did. 16 17 complaint is we started closing the - - - many of the 18

fact, one of the facts that we have alleged in the amended restaurants, not - - - not voluntarily, but - - - well, it was voluntarily. But it was because the air and the surfaces were dangerous; and therefore, we had to close down a lot of the restaurants.

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JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, to go to these other cases - - - you mentioned federal cases, and they're not binding, of course, on us - - - but to the extent we might find them persuasive, cases like Northwell, right, in the



Southern District, Judge Rakoff. Is there anything you 1 2 would say to distinguish your case from those decisions, or 3 would your argument be that they just were wrongly decided? 4 MS. COHEN: Three points, Your Honor. Ninety-5 nine percent of the COVID cases that are cited in the first 6 department decision are all loss of use cases, are all 7 governmental order cases. And what I mean by that is they 8 did not allege that there was any COVID on the property. 9 In fact, the Michael Seda case, which is one of the 10 predominant cases, expressly distinguished its case, 11 meaning its facts from a case where you have a physical 12 event, where you have intrusion of COVID on its property. 13 JUDGE GARCIA: But that doesn't seem to be the 14 Northwell analysis, right? 15 MS. COHEN: True. 16 17

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MS. COHEN: True. That's my second point. On Northwell, the difference in the policy is this policy not only expressly says that it's an all-risk policy, but this policy expressly covers contamination from ammonia, radiation, mold, a lot of different invisible contamination - - contaminants that can be temporary, that do not cause structural damage or structural repair. So if you're a reasonable policyholder and you see this policy that's in all risk policy that expressly covers - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Is that Kim-Chee?

MS. COHEN: Well, Kim-Chee is actually helpful to



us.

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JUDGE GARCIA: But Kim-Chee says persistently, to the contrary, we agree with the district court that the virus's inability to physically alter or persistently contaminate property differentiates us from radiation, chemical dust, gas, asbestos and other contaminants whose presence could trigger coverage.

MS. COHEN: So two points. Kim-Chee made it clear if you have an invisible contaminant that causes physical loss - - it doesn't have to have be structural damage - - if it causes physical, invisible damage, that's sufficient.

Where Kim-Chee went wrong is that Kim-Chee said there is this spectrum and dust is on one side, that's innocuous dust. And then you have these E coli in ammonia on the other side. And then the question is, where does COVID fit? Now, Your Honor suggested COVID should fit more like innocuous dust because you can just clean it up. That is directly contrary, not only to our allegations in the complaint, not only to the scientific studies that we attach to the complaint, but the Erie Medical Society weighed in along with five other medical societies and said those facts are junk science, that you cannot easily clean it. Now that's a fight for - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: For there's a



difference between easily clean and clean.

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MS. COHEN: And they said you cannot clean it.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Even so. So if if I don't know where you found the COVID, but let's say you found it on a table where someone eats, are you saying these studies now say you have to somehow properly discard this table because you can never use it again?

MS. COHEN: No, Your Honor, what they're saying is and this was a Northwell study actually that came out very recently that the Erie Medical Society put forth.

They said even if you do very, very deep cleaning, you can't clean it. It has to basically do. First by itself.

Now, the problem with that, obviously, is that new COVID is being reintroduced as the restaurant is being opened. So the bottom line is you really cannot clean it now. Counsel suggested you can. And he's entitled to those facts, but not on a motion to dismiss. We've alleged facts that make it clear that the surfaces had been physically damaged through the fomite process. He disagrees. We've made it clear in our complaint that you cannot.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: But even with the science that you allege makes this point for you, you can use the table. There will come a time when you can use that table and you are using the table.

MS. COHEN: That is true, Your Honor. But this



2 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: What's temporary? 3 What's the point of the word physical? Okay. 4 MS. COHEN: Physical. It has to be a physical 5 event. 6 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Like he says, there's no such thing as physical event, as a phrase recognized in 7 8 the policy. Well, so why should we read in the extra word? 9 MS. COHEN: Because first you have to look at the 10 word loss, because physical modifies loss. Loss is not defined in the policy. It's construed against the 11 12 carriers, their form. If you go to the dictionary, it says 13 dispossession. Okay. So then you have to figure out how 14 does physical modify dispossession? And a reasonable 15 policyholder would assume that if you have a physical, 16 dangerous substance that goes on to your property and 17 physically makes the property unsafe, that you are 18 dispossessed. But you're modifying. 19 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Something else with 20 that. 21 MS. COHEN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. 22 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: You're modifying 23 something else now with this, what you're advocating should 24 be the proper analysis and reading. 25 MS. COHEN: I'm not. Because physical has to

policy expressly contemplates temporary damage.



1 mean something. And what I'm saying. Physical means 2 something. Physical happens on your property. And that if 3 we -4 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: If we disagree, you 5 lose. Correct. 6 MS. COHEN: Disagree, we lose with that. 7 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Particular view. 8 MS. COHEN: With respect to physical loss. 9 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, I know counsel 10 never likes to admit it's a yes or no answer, but it really 11 is. 12 MS. COHEN: But Your Honor, this is what I would 13 this is what I would really request is the entire argument 14 was based upon his view of what COVID can and cannot do. 15 This is on a motion to dismiss stage. And so we would ask 16 we've alleged the things that we need to ask. 17 Now, one other point I wanted to make. Judge 18

Now, one other point I wanted to make. Judge

Garcia kept on asking, and I believe maybe others did too,
is what does physical loss mean that's different than
physical damage? And counsel said it means complete
dispossession. And the question was, what's the support
for that? There is no support.

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In fact, the policy expressly says the otherwise.

If you go to record site 113 expressly states that economic damages due to physical loss or damages can be as partial



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1	or in whole. So the policy expressly contemplates that the
2	physical loss can be partial or in whole there is no
3	support. That physical loss means complete dispossession.
4	It doesn't say complete loss. It says physical loss.
5	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you.
6	(Court is adjourned)
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1		CERTIFICATION
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3	I, Christian C. Amis, certify that the foregoing	
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5	Consolidated Restaurant Ops v. Westport Insurance, No. 7	
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