1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	TAXI TOURS,
5	Respondent,
6	-against- NO. 27
7	GO NEW YORK TOURS,
8	Appellant.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York February 15, 2024
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	Appearances:
16	Appearances:
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1 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Next matter on the calendar 2 is Taxi Tours v. Go New York Tours. 3 MR. ROSS: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May it 4 please the court. I am Maurice Ross from Barton LLP. May 5 I please reserve three minutes for rebuttal? 6 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes, sir. 7 MR. ROSS: Your Honors, in the modern world, in 8 every industry we see emerging duopolies and monopolies. 9 This case is all about an attempt by the respondents to 10 create a duopoly in the New York market. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, Counsel, in the complaint, 12 are you asserting that that complaint, liberally construed 13 as is required under our law, sets out allegations of a 14 conspiracy, an agreement, an arrangement, all of the above? 15 What - - - what's your position on that? 16 MR. ROSS: It alleges an arrangement under the 17 Donnelly Act. It alleges a conspiracy. But we think the 18 allegations are more than sufficient to draw an inference 19 of an arrangement. 20 JUDGE SINGAS: How specifically? What specific 21 allegations? 22 MR. ROSS: Your Honor - - - okay. We - - - first 23 of all, the complaint identifies a large number of attractions in the multi-attraction market from which Go 24 25 New York has been shut out, number one. We identify them



	by name with specificity. And obviously, we identify the
2	time period over which this has occurred.
3	Second of all
4	JUDGE SINGAS: I'm concerned about the concerted
5	action. Which allegations specifically speak to that?
6	MR. ROSS: Yes. Well, for example, Your Honor,
7	we actually allege that this case involves not merely
8	parallel action but horizontal concerted action. For
9	example, with regard to the One World Observatory
10	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The horizontal the
11	horizontal is generally thought of as less suspicious than
12	the the sorry. The vertical is thought of as
13	less suspicious than the horizontal.
14	MR. ROSS: Correct. And we allege horizontal.
15	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right. I got it backwards.
16	I'm sorry.
17	MR. ROSS: And here's here's here's
18	how this would
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The horizontal the
20	horizontal the horizontal is not as disfavored as the
21	do I have them no.
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Vertical.
23	MR. ROSS: As vertical.
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Sorry, as
25	MR. ROSS: I think the word, Your Honor Judge



Wilson, I think is vertical.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Vertical is - - - vertical is easier - - - vertical restraints are not viewed as unfavorably as horizontal ones.

MR. ROSS: That's true, Your Honor. Although, both tend to be evaluated under the rule of reason.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes.

MR. ROSS: But it is correct. And the issue here, and what I think the lower courts ignored, is that this complaint alleges horizontal with specificity. And here's how it works. In paragraph 37, we talked about the One World Observatory. Paragraph 37 of the complaint. It's at the record, page 69. We talked about the fact that Gray Line and Big Bus share this particular attraction, and Gray Line has exclusive rights to it. Even though Gray Line has exclusive rights, it shares that attraction with Big Bus. But Go New York is shut out. So here we have a waiver of exclusivity; that is horizontal conduct.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Shut out. And the allegations of that shut out are what?

MR. ROSS: The allegations are that when Go New York applied to each of these attractions, including that one, they were told that - - - the attraction people were told, if you do business with Go New York, we will stop doing business with Big Bus and Gray Line.



1	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
2	MR. ROSS: And this and the complaint
3	alleges with specificity that this happened time after time
4	with attraction after attraction throughout the industry.
5	And so we believe, Your Honor, that that the data at
6	least supports an inference
7	JUDGE RIVERA: So the complaint is sufficient
8	because of that. Because you allege that you were told by
9	some representative, right some representative of
10	those attractions that they if they do business with

companies?

MR. ROSS: That's right. And also - - -

you, they will not be able to do business with these other

JUDGE RIVERA: That's - - - that's the heart of the complaint, yes?

MR. ROSS: It is - - - well, the heart of the complaint is also that there's a pattern. This doesn't just happen one time. This happens everywhere throughout the industry. Go New York is shut out of the attraction pass market because of this conduct.

I believe - - - I respectfully submit - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, how many attractions do you refer to in the complaint?

MR. ROSS: Well, we refer to - - - I don't know the exact number, but - - - but - - - but eight or nine or



1	ten. I mean, it's
2	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
3	MR. ROSS: we have Top of the Rock, One
4	World Observatory, Madame Tussauds, the Intrepid Museum,
5	Broadway Inbound, courts Coach Shortline. We
6	identify each of these, and the same thing happens every
7	time.
8	Now, I submit, Your Honors
9	JUDGE RIVERA: So then you're saying it's these
10	allegations in the complaint that a representative from
11	certain attractions has said, if we do business with you,
12	we will not be able to do business with them.
13	MR. ROSS: That's correct.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: And that and they have said
15	that's the reason why they will not do business with you?
16	MR. ROSS: Correct.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
18	MR. ROSS: And
19	JUDGE RIVERA: Those are I'm sorry
20	those are those allegations. And then you're saying you
21	have additional allegations that it is a a broad
22	- right? This is broadly the experience of your company -
23	- of your client, excuse me.
24	MR. ROSS: Right. And it even involves
25	attractions where one of the other



attractions where one of the other - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: So the the attractions are
2	examples.
3	MR. ROSS: That's correct.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. You said it that happens
5	broadly. So when it happens broadly, is that also true
6	because a representative of those attractions, these other
7	attractions, kind of broadly out of the market, has made
8	the same or similar statements, again, that if they do
9	business with your client, they will not be able to
10	MR. ROSS: Yes.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: do business with these othe
12	companies?
13	MR. ROSS: Yes. We allege that very specificall
14	
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
16	MR. ROSS: throughout the complaint. And
17	here's the thing. I think that should be sufficient at th
18	pleading stage to draw an inference of a potential
19	conspiracy arrangement
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Do you do you allege
21	anywhere why or how or when the representative from those
22	attractions came to this understanding this
23	this knowledge that if they do business with your company
24	or with your client excuse me they will no
25	be able to do business with the other companies?



1	MR. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. We allege that
2	either Big Bus or Gray Line in every instance told them -
3	_
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
5	MR. ROSS: that if you do business with Go
6	New York, we're going to pull our contract with you.
7	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So suppose that is done
8	unilaterally by Gray Line let's just take Gray Line
9	for a second is that sufficient evidence of a
LO	horizontal conspiracy or an arrangement?
L1	MR. ROSS: No, Your Honor.
L2	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Is it evidence of a
L3	MR. ROSS: This is not a case this is
L4	distinguishable from, for example, State v. Mobil Oil,
L5	which I think the court correctly decided that case. That
L6	involved unilateral action. This is distinguishable from
L7	the from that case. It's very important. That case
L8	was unilateral action.
L9	But we are alleging a conspiracy, and we have a
20	real basis for it. And the key to this is these
21	attractions where both Big Bus and Gray Line operate, but
22	one or the other has exclusive rights, and yet they waive
23	those exclusive rights to permit both of them to share tha
24	attraction, but not Go New York.



JUDGE HALLIGAN: But what - - - where are your

allegations that the action is concerted?

MR. ROSS: For example - - - well, in paragraph

37, for example, we talked about the fact that the One

World Observatory is shared despite an exclusive

relationship. So that shows that there has to be something

going on there. There had to be a waiver of exclusivity.

That shows exclusivity - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So you're basically saying that there's an inference that can be drawn, given the nature of the relationships up the - - - up the chain, as it were?

MR. ROSS: I think it's more than an inference.

In other words, I agree with Your Honor that an inference can be drawn. But here we have exclusivity in the hands of one party. They allow the other party in. They know that the - - - that both parties are sharing - - - I mean, this is a small industry. It's not like they're blind to the fact that they are sharing this attraction. They know that. So there had to be a waiver of exclusivity. That is - - that is a concerted action.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel - - -

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ ROSS: And I think - - - let me come back to the - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Because they don't object - - - because they don't object to the entity that has the exclusive rights?



2 JUDGE RIVERA: Or the nonexclusive rights - - -3 I'm sorry - - - the entity that doesn't have the exclusive 4 rights to be able to have the attraction listed on, you 5 know, the stop - - - stop on, stop off, hop on, hop off 6 access. 7 MR. ROSS: Yes, that's correct Judge Rivera. But 8 also because they have to know about it. And the 9 attraction, unless the attraction had permission - - -10 They may know about it, but do you JUDGE RIVERA: assert anything else? I mean, do they know about it? 11 12 MR. ROSS: Well, no, we - - - we - - - we don't. 13 But this is the problem with - - - with the decision of the 14 They say, well, you don't assert the lower court. 15 They use the word discussions both in the discussions. 16 First Department and the trial - - - Judge Schecter, the 17 trial court. 18 Where are the discussions? Where - - - where - -19 - where are the - - - the meeting minutes? You don't say 20 when the meeting occurred. With whom? I don't believe, 21 respectfully, under the liberal pleading standard in this 22 court, we have to go that far. That's asking us to prove 23 the case at the trial. 24 JUDGE CANNATARO: Justice Schechter didn't say

MR. ROSS: Sure. Yes - - - Judge - - -

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there was an absence of minutes. I mean, she specifically

noted that there was a failure to identify a specified place. How, to whom, who did it. It's there are no allegations concerning the specifics of the arrangement or the collusion or whatever it is. MR. ROSS: Well, respectfully, I think that's incorrect. I think the complaint - - -JUDGE CANNATARO: Wait a second. That there are no allegations - - -MR. ROSS: There are allegations that identify each attraction over what - - - which period of time. There's even that - - - for example, in paragraph 37, we talked about - - - we had identified Mark Marmurstein, the president of Gray Line.

There are very specific allegations, but I would also submit, Your Honor, that at the pleading stage - - - this is a notice pleading state. The Donnelly Act is supposed to be supporting the broad policy of maintaining free competition in New York markets.

I think the pleadings that we have that identify all of these attractions, that identify some at least concerted activity, should be sufficient to allow us to get into discovery and to get beyond the motion to dismiss.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So is that your argument that your allegations represent the extent of what you know, and they're - - - they're sufficient on their face, and you



need discovery to fill in the blanks?

MR. ROSS: Yes, Your Honor. And - - - and here's the thing, as a matter of public policy, attorneys such as myself ought to be encouraged to enforce the antitrust laws and to take steps to support free competition in the market. And I think what's happened here is the courts have been too reluctant to allow these cases to go forward into the discovery phase. I think we should be permitted, given this pleading - - - this pleading is more than sufficient, I think, to support an inference of concerted action and anti-competitive action.

And let me say one thing. One of the - - - one of the - - - sorry.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The federal - - - the federal court didn't allow you to go forward with the - - - essentially these allegations, right, but said try them out in state court effectively, right?

MR. ROSS: Correct. And - - - and - - - and that

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So why is it that you can succeed here and not there?

MR. ROSS: Well, thank you for that question,

Judge Wilson. The pleading standard in federal court is

much stricter. And in federal court, the judges are

encouraged to look at whether or not there might be a



rational, good faith reason for this conduct, okay? I 1 2 submit that in New York State, the decision about whether 3 there might or might not be a rational reason for this conduct or for this concerted action is a - - - is a 4 5 question of fact that should be determined by the jury. 6 should not be determined at the pleading stage. 7 And in Judge Schecter's opinion, and in the First 8 Department's opinion, they talk about the fact, well, there 9 may be rational reasons for this conduct. Well, that's 10 We - - - we acknowledge there may be rational true. reasons for this conduct. We don't believe that's the 11 12 We think the - - - the conduct was in bad faith and 13 was anti-competitive. But those are questions of fact that 14 should be decided by the jury. 15 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So are you saying - - - so are 16 you saying because here, taken as true against the

nonmoving party viewing the - - -

MR. ROSS: That's - - -

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - that that's why you could succeed in state court or be able to at least proceed at the initial juncture?

MR. ROSS: Yes, I think so, Your Honor. that's true. And also, the Donnelly Act is broader than -

JUDGE GARCIA: But Counsel, just to the pleading



1	point, didn't the Appellate Division find in this case that
2	nor does the record support Go New York's contention
3	that Supreme Court applied the more restrictive federal
4	pleading standard?
5	MR. ROSS: Well, the First Department said that,
6	but I think if you examine both the First Department's
7	opinion in its substance and the trial court's opinion, the
8	trial court talks about discussions, you haven't shown
9	discussions. And the trial court goes on about how there
10	may be rational reasons for this behavior. But that's a
11	determination of substance at the pleading stage, and I
12	believe, under the policy of New York, that's improper.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: But what what
14	- what's the conspiracy arrangement that you say is
15	inferable? Are you saying the other two entities
16	MR. ROSS: In cross, yes.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: get together, talk to each
18	other, and put pressure on the representative from, you
19	know, the observation tower, whatever you want to call it?
20	MR. ROSS: Correct. The theory in this case
21	_
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. The and and was
23	that an allegation you made?
24	MR. ROSS: Absolutely. The theory the



basic theory - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Where where is that? What
2	paragraph what paragraph on this
3	MR. ROSS: I'm not sure that's the basic
4	theory of the complaint from the at the very outset.
5	The theory of the complaint is that Big Bus and Gray Line
6	conspired
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
8	MR. ROSS: or agreed, or engaged in
9	arrangements
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
11	MR. ROSS: to shut Go New York out of the
12	attraction market. I mean
13	JUDGE RIVERA: But again, that that's based
14	on the fact that a representative from one of one or
15	more attractions, fair enough, said said to you, if
16	do business with the your company, I I will no
17	be able to do business with these other two companies.
18	MR. ROSS: Correct. And we've alleged throughou
19	the the pleading
20	JUDGE RIVERA: It's not that the other entities
21	said something, whispered something to your company. Where
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23	MR. ROSS: No, we don't have a smoking gun that
24	says there was meeting
25	JUDGE RIVERA: No no, I understand. I'm



1 just - - - I - - -2 MR. ROSS: Yes. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - I - - - yes, I - - -4 MR. ROSS: But - - - but it's because we - - - Go 5 to New York, was told, and every place they turned in the 6 market, that either Gray Line or Big Bus said, if you work with us, we're going to stop working with you, we're going 7 8 to cut you out. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. 10 MR. ROSS: And then that even occurred on attractions where the two share the attraction. 11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. 13 MR. ROSS: So I think it is reasonable in that 14 circumstance to infer a conspiracy. 15 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So - - - so the - - - the nub of 16 the relationships is you have several tour companies, each 17 tour company has a purportedly exclusive relationship with 18 an attraction, and they enforce that exclusivity as against 19 you, but they don't enforce the exclusivity as against one 20 of the other defendant tour companies. Do I have that 21 right? 22 MR. ROSS: You have that right. That's one part 23 of the allegations at play. 24 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Okay. What's the other part



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then?

MR. ROSS: The other part is that - - - that 1 aside from the attractions that have these exclusive 2 3 relationships - - -4 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Yes. 5 - - - there are other attractions that MR. ROSS: 6 are not exclusive, but nonetheless, Go New York is shut out 7 because they - - - they have relationships with both of the other defendants but not Go New York. 8 9 JUDGE HALLIGAN: And so from the pattern of 10 relationships, I take it you're alleging that the 11 attractions have with the defendant tour companies, you 12 think that's sufficient to - - - to put together either 13 conspiracy or an arrangement? 14 MR. ROSS: Look, it - - - yes, Your Honor. Ιt 15 makes no sense from an - - -16 JUDGE HALLIGAN: I just want to make sure I 17 understand the theory. 18 MR. ROSS: - - - from an economic point of view, 19 it makes no sense, in my view, for each of these 20 attractions to say, we're not going to do business with Go 21 New York. 22 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Just one other question, if I 23 What is the difference, in your view, between what's can. 24 required to allege a conspiracy and what's required to 25 allege an arrangement?



MR. ROSS: I think that's an important question, 1 Your Honor. I think under - - - this - - - this court, 2 3 under State v. Mobil Oil, framed the issue as follows. 4 There has to be proof of a reciprocal - - - a concerted 5 reciprocal commitment. And I think the term commitment 6 itself is somewhat ambiguous. I would say that there has 7 to be a reciprocal arrangement that involves mutual benefits. That is, the parties are - - - have a mutually 8 9 beneficial relationship. 10 JUDGE HALLIGAN: And how is that distinct from a conspiracy? What's the difference between the two? 11 12 MR. ROSS: Because a conspiracy or an agreement

reflects something more formal. There doesn't have to be a meeting of the minds that, you know - - - like, such as a criminal conspiracy. There can be an informal implicit arrangement which is mutually beneficial.

I'd like to - - - I see my red light is on. I'd like to finish this one thought.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes.

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MR. ROSS: I think the concept of mutual beneficiary - - - mutually beneficial really is what the State v. Mobil Oil standard should be clarified. clarify it that way, then you look at the allegations in this complaint, I believe they are sufficient to allow this case to go forward.

Thank you, Your Honors.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MR. EDELSON: Good afternoon, Your Honors, and may it please the court. I'd like to start to correct something that Mr. Ross said. There are no allegations at all in the counterclaims that specifically name Gray Line, Big Bus, or any other counterclaim defendant, as ever, having said, we'll cut you off if you work with Go New York. That's simply not there.

JUDGE SINGAS: Well, why isn't your adversary right that at least you can raise the inference of a concerted action with this idea of exclusivity that's only exclusive to everyone else except each other? Why isn't that enough?

MR. EDELSON: Sure. I'd be glad to address the theory of waivers of exclusivity. To begin with, it's only alleged for two of the ten attractions named in the complaint. And there are no facts in the pleadings that support concerted action connected to waivers of exclusivity between Gray Line and Big Bus. This is the best they have.

The One World Observatory said it had an exclusive with Gray Line. Big Bus also sold tickets, and the One World Observatory - - - Observatory decided not to partner with Go New York, all at unspecified times.



JUDGE SINGAS: But do you think it would be a 1 2 little difficult for them to come up with more proof, given 3 the nature of conspiracies and how secretive they are 4 without getting to a discovery stage? 5 MR. EDELSON: Well, Judge Singas, I'll put it 6 this way. They need to plead facts that support concerted 7 action to survive a motion to dismiss, and they haven't 8 done that. So absent some allegations of contacts, 9 coordination, they can't survive a motion to dismiss. 10 JUDGE SINGAS: So in your mind, they haven't met the Mobil Oil baseline requirements? 11 12 MR. EDELSON: No, they haven't, Your Honor. 13 these reasons, State v. Mobil defined an arrangement as a 14 reciprocal relationship of commitment. There are two 15 problems here. There aren't facts that point to a 16 17 between them. But more fundamentally, there aren't any 18 facts that connect allegations of a relationship between

connection between Gray Line and Big Bus, or a relationship Gray Line and Big Bus with any of the alleged vertical pressure, whether related to exclusivity or not related to exclusivity for any of the attractions.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: What about the allegation in paragraph 35 that with regard to Top of the Rock?

> MR. EDELSON: Yeah.

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: That Top of the Rock said,



1 we're not going to deal with you, Go New York, and if you 2 want to change that, go talk to the president of Gray Line. 3 MR. EDELSON: Your Honor, and - - an allegation 4 that the president - - - that the tourist attraction said 5 talk to the president of Gray Line is not an allegation 6 that the president of Gray Line is colluding horizontally 7 with Big Bus. 8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, clearly they're not in 9 the same business horizontally, Top of the Rock and - - -10 and - - - but that does infer that there's some arrangement, right, where Top of the Rock has ceded its 11 authority to partner with people to Gray Line. 12 13 MR. EDELSON: To the extent they are alleging 14 that relationship as something that violates the Donnelly 15 It's a vertical relationship. 16 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah. 17 MR. EDELSON: It's treated much more leniently -18 19 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah. 20 MR. EDELSON: - - - than a horizontal one. Under the antitrust laws, they'd need to show market wide harm to 21 22 competition under global reinsurance to do that. 23 haven't come close to that because they only plead harm to 24 themselves.



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But will you pair that,

though, with the various horizontal reciprocal exclusivity and the refusals? I mean, there are other refusals that don't specifically say we have an exclusive relationship, but they say we don't want to annoy our other trade partners, those sorts of things.

MR. EDELSON: Sure.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Wrap that all up. Isn't that enough to suggest that, especially if you believe, as we have to, the allegations in the complaint - - -

MR. EDELSON: Yeah.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: - - - that Gray Line and Big
Bus are not shutting each other out. Right. They're
waiving exclusivity, or at least they're partnering with
all these same tourist attractions. And Go New York is the
only one shut out of all this and using different sets of
words different times. Why isn't that plus the vertical
enough?

MR. EDELSON: Judge Wilson, this is the point of the argument about parallel conduct in our brief. It's a neutral fact from an antitrust perspective that they were turned down by a handful of tourist attractions at unspecified times. I mean, these are businesses that are in the same position. They're evaluating a partnership with Go New York. It's rational for them to make a decision about whether they want to partner or not in the

same way.

What you don't have that you'd need to state a Donnelly Act claim under New York procedural and substantive law is facts that support concerted action on top of that. So some indication that Gray Line and Big Bus had a relationship with each other and that that was connected to efforts to get tourist attractions to exclude them. You don't have any facts that support those - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel?

MR. EDELSON: Yes?

And - - and I'm - - - I understand the argument you're making, but it seems to me that people don't - - - if they're colluding in a horizontal fashion like this, they don't advertise that fact. That's not something you want people to know. And - - - and it further seems to me that if you want to find out about it, you kind of need to see some text messages or emails or - - - so that's where you might discover some evidence of it. So can you just explain to me how a successful claimant might allege these facts in a way that would be sufficient because - - - because I don't understand what's missing in their claim.

MR. EDELSON: Of course, Judge Cannataro. Here's what you need. You need facts that show coordination. And here's where 3013 comes in. This is insufficiently



1 particular to show coordination. They make these 2 allegations about exclusivity, but there's no time - - - I 3 mean, these attractions transitioning from exclusive 4 relationships to nonexclusive relationships, we don't know 5 if they're in any kind of temporal proximity to each other 6 to suggest that, you know, exclusivity and waivers of 7 exclusivity were swapped between Gray Line and Big Bus. 8 And there's only allegations with regard to those two on 9 that front. JUDGE CANNATARO: And how would one - - - in the 10 normal course of things, a successful claimant, how would 11 12 one come across that information? 13 MR. EDELSON: They could have put facts in, for 14

MR. EDELSON: They could have put facts in, for example, that said, this specific attraction told us that this specific, you know, defendant told us on this date, and then the dates line up in close proximity. And you have - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: The theory - - -

MR. EDELSON: Yeah.

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: I take it you're saying the theory could be viable, you just think there's not enough specificity with respect to who - - - who denied whom access on what date?

MR. EDELSON: Those facts would be needed to start bringing it closer, Judge Halligan. But I think the



1	main problem that they would still have is that there is -
2	are no facts that suggest a connection between the two
3	of them.
4	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Okay. And how, absent discover
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6	MR. EDELSON: Yeah.
7	JUDGE HALLIGAN: might one obtain that, to
8	Judge Cannataro's question? I take it you mean
9	MR. EDELSON: Yeah.
10	JUDGE HALLIGAN: something along the lines
11	of a text or email as between the two the two
12	defendants, correct?
13	MR. EDELSON: Your Honor, there it doesn't
14	need to be a text or an email, necessarily, but there need
15	to be facts pled in the complaint that suggest
16	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So how how would you
17	you come across that evidence without without
18	discovery?
19	MR. EDELSON: You could be much more specific
20	about the experiences that their client had with regard to
21	these rejections and when they happened and what was said
22	to them.
23	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Okay. But that, I take it, is
24	about the circumstances of the interactions
25	MR. EDELSON: Yes.



	JUDGE HALLIGAN: that your adversary has
2	with the attractions
3	MR. EDELSON: Yeah.
4	JUDGE HALLIGAN: and the responses they get
5	about why they won't do business with them.
6	MR. EDELSON: Yes.
7	JUDGE HALLIGAN: I I thought I heard you
8	say that something beyond that, that more directly evidence
9	of communications as between the the defendants was
10	necessary, but but maybe you're suggesting that's not
11	the case.
12	MR. EDELSON: I mean, as as an example, in
13	conspiracy cases, sometimes it's alleged these two
14	companies were at the same trade show at the same time, and
15	we're we know that. I mean, there are particular
16	facts that come up time and again where contacts come in -
17	
18	JUDGE RIVERA: But the same trade show at the
19	same time, and therefore you can infer that they had a
20	meeting during which they conspired?
21	MR. EDELSON: When a certain quantum of facts are
22	piled up, courts begin to infer that potentially there are
23	horizontal connections. We are way short of that bar here
24	because there's nothing that suggests any connection.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm interested if you could to go



1	a little bit further on your point of the exclusivity
2	contracts, if they could have had some additional facts
3	that might suggest that I think what you were saying
4	please correct me if I'm misunderstood if they had
5	something else, that from which well, factual
6	allegations from which either the facts expressly or
7	one could infer, that there are indeed these exclusive
8	contracts that are not abided by with respect to the other
9	two Big Bus companies, at the time that they allege they
10	are informed by a representative from the attraction that
11	they will not do business with them. Is that what you were
12	saying, something like that would be enough?
13	MR. EDELSON: That would be a start, Judge
14	Garcia, but that still wouldn't be enough because if we put
15	
16	JUDGE RIVERA: Rivera, but thank you.
17	MR. EDELSON: Excuse me?
18	JUDGE RIVERA: It's okay. Go ahead.
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Garcia is over there.
20	MR. EDELSON: Oh, I'm sorry.
21	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Rivera is over here.
22	MR. EDELSON: I'm Judge Rivera.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: It's okay.
24	MR. EDELSON: That would be a start, but it would
25	not be enough to put a reciprocal relationship it



would not be enough to plead a reciprocal relationship 1 2 between them, and it would not be enough to put that 3 reciprocal relationship in connection with any of the 4 allegations of vertical pressure on tourist attractions. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: So okay, if they said that - - -6 MR. EDELSON: Yeah. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - then what else might I - - -8 I - - I think I understand your point that that they 9 might be able to get without discovery, they might have 10 some way, and maybe they only need to do it for one or two attractions, not for every single attraction that's 11 12 involved in this market. Then - - - then what would be the 13 plus? You're saying there's a plus that needs to go with 14 that. What - - - what might that look like? Given the 15 nature of this industry - - -16 MR. EDELSON: Yeah. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - and - - - and - - - and what they're claiming they believe is going on, and they want an 18 19 opportunity to prove that. 20 MR. EDELSON: If they said, for example - - - I 21 mean, so these allegations are nonspecific as to the time 22 in which any of this happened. If they said all of these 23 rejected us within a span of - - - within a short amount of 24 time - -



I see.

JUDGE RIVERA:

MR. EDELSON: - - - that would be potentially 1 2 something from which you could infer this, but I - - - for 3 the - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Because it's looking like it's not 5 just happenstance, and it's looking like it's not just 6 perhaps business choices that have nothing to do with arrangements that would be in violation of the statute. 7 Am 8 I understanding that part of what you're arguing? 9 MR. EDELSON: Yes, I think that's something where 10 you could say, on a reasonable reading of the facts, we're going to infer that this was coordinated. But we're not -11 12 - - we're not close to that. And this is public 13 information. We don't need to rely on this, but the court 14 should be aware that Go New York's website, topviewnyc.com, 15 shows that it's currently partnered with the Empire State 16 Building and the One World Observatory and The Intrepid for 17 its attraction pass. It's not true that they're cut out of 18 all of the attractions in the complaint. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - what's the share, if 20 you know, of the market that, not their company, obviously, the other two companies have? 21 22 MR. EDELSON: So Your Honor, it's - - - it's in 23 The facts are not in the pleadings that would allow 24 us to - - - to know. What I can say is that - - -



Uh-huh.

JUDGE RIVERA:

2 entrant, and our client's bus business has shut down 3 because of the COVID pandemic, and the ticket business is 4 still open. So the - - - the market is dynamic and new 5 parties are entering, and they're obviously -6 JUDGE CANNATARO: This really comes down to the 7 tickets more than the buses, right? Because I imagine 8 buses can still take people anywhere. The streets are 9 public. You don't need anyone's permission to use that. 10 It's about these special discounted passes, right? 11 MR. EDELSON: Those - - - that seems to be the 12 allegation is how - - - who can we partner with for our 13 pass. 14 JUDGE CANNATARO: Right. So - - - so - - -15 They become more attractive JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. 16 --- sorry, who was that --- they become more marketable 17 and get more share of the market. Of course, if I wanted 18 to ride their bus and they're saying, look, these are all 19 the attractions that have partnered with us. And then I go 20 to another bus company and they say, we've got double the 21 attractions, or I've got the hot attractions, and they're 22 not able to get the hot attractions - -23 MR. EDELSON: Right. 24 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that everyone wants to go 25 to, right, that's - - - that's sort of what's going on with

MR. EDELSON: - - - there is a new tour bus



1 the attractions. 2 MR. EDELSON: It's true. Although, they do plead 3 that they've grown rapidly since entering the market in 4 2012, and that they have become roughly equal as of the 5 time of the - - - the pleadings in size and revenues with 6 the others. So it doesn't appear just from the facts in 7 the complaint that having a - - - either differentiated 8 passes has had a competitive impact on them. And it's 9 clear that also they're - - - they're achieving these 10 partnerships. JUDGE RIVERA: I'll - - - I'll show my business 11 12 ignorance, which will not surprise any of my colleagues 13 with these questions. Why - - - why would an attraction 14 buckle under - - - let me put it that way - - - to what they allege has happened. Why would you - - - doesn't the 15 16 attraction have the leverage because people want to go to 17 your attraction? 18 MR. EDELSON: I - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: They don't care what bus gets them 20 there, but they just want to go to your attraction. 21 MR. EDELSON: So just going on the facts that are 22 alleged - - -

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MR. EDELSON: - - - I - - - I cannot tell you why

JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. Yeah.

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a particular - - -

1 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Fair enough. 2 MR. EDELSON: - - - attraction made it - - - made 3 the particular choice that it did. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Okay. 5 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But they're alleging that there is no rational business reason that would lead them to do 6 7 I think, to Judge Rivera's question and - - - and I 8 understand we're at the pleading stage, but there's not 9 something that is apparent that you want to share with us. 10 MR. EDELSON: I would say the following. 11 conclusion that there is no rational reason, therefore 12 there must be a conspiracy is a - - - there are two ways of 13 seeing that - - -14 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Uh-huh. 15 MR. EDELSON: - - - that's a legal conclusion. 16 It's the equivalent of having a sentence that said, this 17 happened, therefore they violated the Donnelly Act. 18 language conspiracy comes straight from the pleading 19 standard and the First Department. 20 It's also - - - if you look at the New York 21 motion to dismiss cases, can they succeed on a reasonable 22 view of the facts? Justice Schecter, when she rejected 23 that inference of conspiracy, was saying this is not a reasonable view of the facts. She was empowered to make 24



that determination when she rejected that, and she was not

2 that rule out other reasons they might have done this. 3 was just saying - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: But it's a de novo question of law 5 for us whether or not - - -6 MR. EDELSON: Yes. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the complaint satisfies our 8 liberal pleading standard, right? 9 MR. EDELSON: Correct. 10 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. MR. EDELSON: Got it. 11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Thank you. But just 13 following up on this - - -14 MR. EDELSON: Sure. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the argument to be that they 16 say, look, everything we've said means that, at a minimum, 17 you can draw the inference that, yes, these other two bus 18 entities are conspiring, have an arrangement, have an agreement to - - - to ensure we don't get access to these 19 20 attractions. And I think your point in your briefing was, 21 they may have other reasons. Yes? 22 MR. EDELSON: Is - - - I'm sorry. Can you - - -23 JUDGE RIVERA: That the attractions may have 24 other reasons - - - business reasons, even assuming for one 25 moment - - -

applying federal law and saying, you need to plead facts



	MR. EDELSON: Yes.
2	JUDGE RIVERA: that they are indeed
3	specifically choosing not to do business with his client,
4	but to do business with one or both of these other
5	entities.
6	MR. EDELSON: That's right, Your Honor. The
7	rationale and there were a number of facts in the
8	pleadings that suggest maybe why that was the case. You
9	know, they were a new entrant. These businesses already
10	had multiple partners. Perhaps they didn't want to
11	JUDGE RIVERA: So his so under our liberal
12	pleading standard then, does however, regardless of
13	whether or not there might be other reasons
14	MR. EDELSON: Uh-huh.
15	JUDGE RIVERA: is does it
16	boil down to the question whether or not he's just made
17	enough allegations that you can infer factual
18	allegations that one could either expressly or infer from
19	those allegations that there might be something to his
20	reason?
21	MR. EDELSON: Your Honor, I would not make it
22	about the reason. I would say
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
24	MR. EDELSON: if the pleading standard is
25	liberal but it has limits you need facts to support every



element of a claim. You don't get the benefit of conclusory allegations. It has to be sufficiently particular and you - - - inferences are made subject to it being a reasonable view of the facts in the complaint. So I would say, you need factual matter in the complaint to support the element of concerted action. connection between Gray Line and Big Bus that is somehow then brought into relationship with the vertical pressure on the tourist attractions that's missing at both stages.

And that's why we think under the pleading standards, they

11 don't have a Donnelly Act claim.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: What do you make of the distinction between arrangement and conspiracy? I know what we said in Mobil Oil, but in your view, how does that translate into what one would need to plead to allege each of them, or is it the same?

MR. EDELSON: Your Honor, I don't think it's that far. And to the extent that the Donnelly Act is broader than the Sherman Act because of the addition of the term arrangement, and to the extent that notice pleading is more liberal than Twombly, we know because of the basic motion to dismiss case - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, in - - - in Mobil Oil - -

MR. EDELSON: Yeah.



JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - we do suggest, I think, that it's broader because Mobil Oil says that - - - that arrangement is similar to, but not embraced within, what we call the more exacting terms: contract, combination, or conspiracy -MR. EDELSON: We agree with Your Honor. JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - which suggests to me is -- - okay - - - so what does that translate into in terms of - - of kind of practical pleading requirements in your view? MR. EDELSON: It would mean in that court's language that you need a commitment between two entities

MR. EDELSON: It would mean in that court's language that you need a commitment between two entities and that routine bilateral business dealings don't cut it. Mere bilateralness, as the case says, isn't enough. There has to be some kind of commitment, and there are no facts to support that here. And we accordingly say that they don't have a case under the - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But you think the same types of facts - - - there's not - - - there's not a difference, in your view, about the sorts of facts that would - - - that would evince a reciprocal relationship of commitment and a conspiracy?

MR. EDELSON: No, Your Honor, and we're - - - we're not aware of any case law that says - - - that suggests that this particular constellation would be a



1 conspiracy where - - - or I'm sorry - - - an arrangement 2 where something else would not. 3 In concluding, a number of judges have looked at this under federal and state law and concluded that the 4 5 facts don't support an antitrust claim, and we request 6 affirmance of the First Department. Thank you. 7 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 8 MR. ROSS: I'll be brief, Your Honors. The 9 problem that I have is I believe the Donnelly Act, as a 10 matter of policy, wants lawyers like me to file complaints to support the New York policy of free market competition. 11 12 But how do I draft the complaint with sufficient detail to 13 satisfy my friend? I don't have emails. I don't have text 14 messages. I can only infer from the business environment 15 that my client endures that something must be going on. 16 And I don't have just - - - I'm not just guessing - - -17 JUDGE GARCIA: But Counsel - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Doesn't it just boil down to 19 whatever the representative from the attraction said, 20 because otherwise they just don't want to do business with 21 you? 22 MR. ROSS: No, Your Honor, there's more to it 23 than that because it's not just one representative. 24 There's a pattern throughout the industry - - -



JUDGE RIVERA: But that's what I'm saying.

1 that - - - oh, I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Go ahead. 2 MR. ROSS: I'm sorry, Your Honor. But no - - - I 3 don't mean to interrupt. There's a pattern throughout the 4 industry, number one. And number two, we have these two 5 instances where exclusive arrangements are being shared. 6 That is, to me, a smoking gun, if you will, that there is 7 some concerted action going on here. I believe at the 8 pleading stage I should not be required to do more. 9 don't have the text messages. I don't have the emails. 10 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Where exactly are you - - where exactly are you alleging that exclusive relationships 11 12 are shared? 13 MR. ROSS: In paragraph 37. 14 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Uh-huh. 15 MR. ROSS: For example - - - and also, with 16 regard to Madame Tussauds exhibit. Madame Tussauds - - -17 Madame Tussauds is the Big Bus side of this. Madame 18 Tussauds is exclusively owned by Big Bus and let - - - yet 19 they let Gray Line in. So they're sharing their exclusive

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So in paragraph 37, you say that One World Observatory told you that it has an exclusive relationship with Marmurstein, I think, at Gray Line.

Where are you - - and then are you - - is your point that when you say counterclaim defendants also advertise

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rights with Gray Line.



1 and sell One World Observatory admission, is that where 2 you're alleging - - -3 MR. ROSS: Correct. 4 JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - sharing? 5 That - - - that means that - - - that MR. ROSS: 6 they are allowed in the door. Despite the exclusive 7 relationship, they have been allowed in the door. And of 8 course - -9 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Okay. That other - - - others 10 are allowed in, but you're not, would show sharing? 11 MR. ROSS: That's correct. And - - - and it must 12 be because they have knowledge of each other. This is - -13 - you know, this isn't happening in secret. One World - -14 - the One World attraction is a big deal in the New York 15 market. It's one of the most valuable attractions that 16 there is. And here, Go New York is shut out, and these two 17 guys are sharing it. That seems to me to be pretty 18 powerful evidence that there's something concerted going 19 on, and certainly it should be enough at the pleading stage 20 to allow me to conduct discovery. 21 And here's the policy issue. How do - - - how do 22 we support - - - how do we enforce the Donnelly Act if at 23 the pleading stage, we impose these - - - these 24 requirements that essentially make - - - make me prove my



case at the pleading stage before I get discovery -

JUDGE GARCIA: But you're arguing for a standard 1 2 lower than the New York pleading stage, right? 3 MR. ROSS: No, I'm arguing for the same standard, but the New York standard is much more liberal than the 4 5 federal standard. JUDGE GARCIA: Understood. Understood that 6 7 argument. MR. ROSS: And I think that under that standard, 8 9 we have more than satisfied it. I mean, if this was a 10 discrimination claim, for example, and you show a disparate 11 impact, that's enough to allow the discrimination claim to 12 go forward. Well, we've shown disparate impact here. 13 We've at least done that. Why shouldn't I be allowed to 14 pursue - - - to prosecute this case? 15 Now, maybe at the summary judgment phase of this 16 17 about it. But - - -

case, I will lose. Maybe - - - maybe - - - maybe I'm wrong

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JUDGE GARCIA: Well, I think we're struggling with - - - what I'm struggling with here, Counsel, is that line between - - - I mean, the pleading stage, there are requirements even under the New York liberal pleading standard, and enough to get by that standard without imposing too high a burden, especially given the aims of Donnelly Act, but more than, I alleged a secret conspiracy, so how do you expect me to prove it now?



1	MR. ROSS: Well, my red light is on. May I		
2	answer this, Your Honor?		
3	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Go ahead.		
4	MR. ROSS: Because we've alleged way more than a		
5	conclusion a conclusory conspiracy. We go through		
6	ten attractions. We have separate paragraphs on each one		
7	where we talk about why Go New York is shut out. We then		
8	have the paragraphs that talk about the sharing of certain		
9	of these attractions. I think that specificity should be		
10	sufficient under the liberal pleading standard of the Stat		
11	of New York.		
12	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.		
13	MR. ROSS: Thank you.		
14	(Court is adjourned)		
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