1	COURT OF APPEALS							
2	STATE OF NEW YORK							
3	DEODI E							
4	PEOPLE,							
5	Respondent,							
6	-against- NO. 24							
7	HARVEY WEINSTEIN,							
	Appellant.							
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York February 14, 2024							
10	Before:							
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON							
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA							
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO							
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BETSY BARROS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CHRISTINE M. CLARK							
15								
16	Appearances:							
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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The last matter on today's calendar is People v. Weinstein. And I wanted to tell you, we're delighted to have our colleague from the Second Department, Justice Betsy Barros, and from the Third Department, Justice Christine Clark joining us for argument today.

Counsel?

MR. AIDALA: Thank you.

Good afternoon, Your Honors. My name is Arthur Aidala, and at the table with me is Diana Fabi Samson and Barry Kamins. And we are not only the counsel of record on the appeal, but we were part of the team that tried the case, along with our colleagues from Chicago.

And you know, just now I was in the lawyers' room and I was reading a quote from Justice - - - Judge Judith

Kaye. It says, "The role of courts as impartial protector of individual rights can provoke controversy, especially in hard cases involving unpopular causes of litigants. These cases must be decided on the law and not on opinion polls."

Your Honors, this is one of these hard cases.

And on behalf of the three of us who tried this case, who between the three of us have over one hundred years of trial experience and appellate experience in not only this state, and not only this city, but this actual borough, we could tell you with as much sincerity and credibility as we



1 can muster that our client did not get a fair trial. And 2 I'm just going to rattle off the topics - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: Before - - - before you rattle. 4 MR. AIDALA: Sure. 5 JUDGE RIVERA: If I may ask. 6 MR. AIDALA: Sure. Of course. JUDGE RIVERA: And welcome. Is there something 8 unique or particular to the kinds of conduct - - - right -9 - - with which your client was charged and then found 10 guilty that requires a rethinking of how Molineux is applied to that kind of a case. 11 12 MR. AIDALA: No, Your Honor. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: Why not? 14 This is basically a court - - - this MR. AIDALA: 15 is a case of courting, of a man courting a woman. 16 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I mean, in this sense. 18 Let me clarify. I mean, in this sense to - - - to 19 the extent that the - - - the victims who testified are, 20 perhaps given history of misogyny and sexism, start out not 21 being believed and credible, given the perhaps not well 22 understood reaction of a female who is attacked in the way 23 the government argued they were attacked by the defendant. 24 Does that matter is what I'm saying.



MR. AIDALA:

Okay. Well, first and foremost,

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1	regarding someone being misunderstood, the People called a							
2	world-renowned expert, Dr. Ziv, who was fantastic on the							
3	stand. She had all kinds of PowerPoint presentations, all							
4	kinds of statistics to explain all of that. So that does							
5	not go to Molineux. No, you do no, a jury is not							
6	going to be helped by figuring out the nuanced relationship							
7	of one woman							
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.							
9	MR. AIDALA: and man looking at five or six							
10	other nuanced relationships with a man and a woman. If you							
11	look at the appellate							
12	JUDGE RIVERA: But why aren't they right that you							

JUDGE RIVERA: But why aren't they right that you - - - I'm not going to question your point, of course, about the expert. Why aren't they right that the - - - the necessity for the other witnesses to testify - - -

MR. AIDALA: Okay. May I - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - was to - - - yes. Well, the three women specifically I'm thinking of - - - but was necessary under Molineux for purposes of the jury being able to understand intent and the consent.

MR. AIDALA: As a matter of law - - - JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.

MR. AIDALA: As a matter of law, it should not have been allowed. And the reason why it should not have been allowed as a matter of law - - -



JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.

MR. AIDALA: - - - is intent. If intent is very clear by the complaining witness who's testifying to the jury and is clearly understood, and there's no ambiguity as to what was happening to her, then intent does not come in.

As a matter of law, it doesn't come in.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I just find - - -

MR. AIDALA: So if you look at the - - - if you look at the facts of the case, she's yelling and screaming, no, no, no, I don't want this. She's kicking. She's - - - she's basically fighting for her life. That's her testimony.

JUDGE SINGAS: Excuse me, Mr. Aidala, aren't you fundamentally misunderstanding the nature of this kind of sexual assault for people that know each other? And isn't Molineux exactly the kind of evidence, if there's something ambiguous about it, if a jury might not understand what's going on, to bring in that Molineux evidence?

MR. AIDALA: But Your Honor - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: Do you think this - - -

MR. AIDALA: - - - there was nothing ambiguous.

There was nothing ambiguous about the actual crime itself.

The actual - - - there was nothing ambiguous. She - -
it's a straight up run of the mill, we went on a date. We

went home. I didn't want to fool around with him. He

wanted to fool around with me. He muscled me into my bed -1 2 - - into his bedroom. He threw me down. He ripped my 3 clothes off. He had me pinned behind my head - - -4 JUDGE SINGAS: So is that the way that you think 5 all sexual violence against women is played out? 6 MR. AIDALA: No, but I don't think it's hard for 7 a jury to understand what - - - that she was lacking 8 consent. The judge said it can be used to determine lack 9 of consent. 10 JUDGE SINGAS: But Mr. Aidala - - -MR. AIDALA: They didn't - - - they didn't need 11 12 help to figure out lack of consent. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the point - - -14 MR. AIDALA: She was screaming, I don't consent. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no. But the point is that 16 there's also testimony that the victims continue to 17 interact, and do have, at some point, at least one of them 18 consensual sexual relations. And that's the point that 19 perhaps Molineux, as it has in the past, been interpreted 20 for other kinds of cases, needs to be more flexible with 21 this kind of a case. 22 MR. AIDALA: Well, I don't think that that jives with a two-and-a-half-month-old decision from Telfair that 23 24 this court handed down, with all due respect, Your Honor. 25 I don't think you could put in a similar acts or - - - that



even though they're very far in time, there's acts that are ten years apart. You just said in Telfair that they should be similar acts proximate in time.

The fact that the young woman - - - it - - - Mimi Haleyi, here - - - she was very clear that she was not consenting. And if she - - - you found her credible, it was very clear what the defendant's intent was. How admitting a - - - another act with Tarale Wulff where he meets a waitress, says, I want - - - follow me, escorts her willingly up to a roof where she stands there and he masturbates, and then they leave, how does that help a jury?

All it does - - - it's just propensity. It does not help a jury. It doesn't answer any of the questions you just asked me, Judge Singas. Had - - absolutely not. One has nothing to do with the other except to say, look how bad he is. Look what he's done in the past. How does him - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, if it's - - - if it's nothing like it, it's not propensity then, right?

MR. AIDALA: Well, it's - - - okay, it's a bad act. It's just a bad act. She's a - - - fine. It's not propensity. He's just a bad guy.

Dawn Dunning - - Judge Singas, Dawn Dunning, she comes to his room. He says, I want you to have a threesome



with me and my partner - - - with me and my manager. She says no and runs out of the hallway crying. How does that help the jury figure out what kind of sexual assault took on Mimi Haleyi? It doesn't. One makes - - - it has nothing to do with the other, except see how bad - - - look what another bad thing he did. It was his - - - it was his character that was on trial. It wasn't the evidence that was on trial.

JUDGE BARROS: So are you making a distinction between the same victim, right, the - - - Ms. Mann, for example - - - and what may have preceded and happened afterwards as being perhaps irrelevant to what occurred and to explain her conduct and his conduct, versus bringing in people who are separate and apart from this particular relationship?

MR. AIDALA: Yeah - - - yes, Judge Barros, especially, what happened beforehand. If you - - - an analysis of the Appellate Division ruling is it could come in to show you what the defendant's state of mind is at the time of the assault. Why it's relevant - - - what happened afterwards to Mr. - - to the defendant regarding Ms.

Mann, it's irrelevant.

In other words, at the - - - they're trying to say, well, at the time he assaulted Ms. Mann, he knew or should have known she was going to reject him because of



1	what happened after the time of assault. That doesn't mak
2	sense. What happened before, yes, Your Honor, I will
3	concede that. But what happened after, that doesn't go to
4	his mindset at the at the time of the charged crime.
5	And also Judge Singas, if you look at if
6	you look at Mimi Haleyi, when she testified, there were te
7	other acts ten other models it was a ten to on
8	ratio. That's unheard of.
9	I mean, we I don't want to talk about abus
10	of discretion at this point because I'm still at it
11	shouldn't have come in. Intent was clear from the
12	testimony. It wasn't complicated. Molineux, Alvino, thes
13	are cases where there's financial fraud and credit card
14	fraud, and and sometimes they're doing legal acts
15	that turn illegal. This was a horrible if you
16	believed her, it was a horrible sexual assault.
17	JUDGE GARCIA: And your defense, Counsel, was

that it never happened?

MR. AIDALA: Excuse me?

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JUDGE GARCIA: Your defense was it was - - never happened - - -

MR. AIDALA: It was that it was consensual. yes, they were - - - they were together - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: All right. Why wouldn't this - -- why wouldn't these acts go to intent then if it's not



consensual?

MR. AIDALA: Because Your - - - because Your

Honor, these rulings were made before we put on any

defense. These rulings were made without us saying a word.

JUDGE SINGAS: That's not how it works.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Are you saying the court wasn't aware of the - - - of the defense of consent?

MR. AIDALA: Correct. Well, excuse me, I think somewhere they said they read it in the newspaper that - - I - - I don't know if it was in the Appellate Division or the lower court. They said, oh, we read in the newspaper that Mr. Weinstein's lawyers were going to say it was consensual.

But - - - but Judge Garcia, they don't need help with intent when you have a woman, who, if they find her credible, she's telling me - - - she - - - she says the vice. He takes me, throws me on the bed. I'm screaming, no, no, no. He gets on his knees. He rips a tampon out from under me and puts his mouth on my vagina. What is his intent? What - - what does a New York City jury need help with? And if they did, they had the expert. They had the expert. All of those ten other acts were just in there to say, he's a bad guy. Look what the - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: What can - - I don't understand the comment about the expert. What can an



expert tell you about the defendant's intent to commit a nonconsensual sexual act?

MR. AIDALA: She addressed, I think, what Judge Singas or Judge Rivera was just saying about how often - - not often, but more often than you would think, women stay friendly with the people who have assaulted them, and

JUDGE CANNATARO: That explains the failure to report. You know, I could see it going to that. I could see it going to explaining the dynamic of how you could have, with the same person, both consensual and nonconsensual sexual episodes. But I don't understand what it tells us about the defendant's state of mind, vis-a-vis his intent to engage in a nonconsensual act.

MR. AIDALA: Judge, having been at the trial, you can - - - when you read the transcript, those words are dead, but they're still there, and they still check off the box that as a matter of law and shouldn't come in. But when you were there and you watched her telling the jury, there was no doubt what his intent was. I - - - she said, I wanted to leave. He didn't let me leave. He used his body. He used his girth, and he backed me into my bedroom and put me on a bed. What is his intent? It's not to make her macaroni and cheese. His intent is to sexually assault her. The intent was not an issue. I could read to you - -



JUDGE	CANNATARO:	But	that's	what	she	said	his
intent was	_						

MR. AIDALA: - - - black letter law that says when intent - - - it - - - excuse me?

JUDGE CANNATARO: That's what she says his intent was. But if $-\ -\ -$

MR. AIDALA: And if she's believable - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: But - - but your - - your defense - - and with all - - you know, I'm letting you have your argument that they didn't - - this wasn't known at the time the Molineux ruling was made, but certainly by trial, your defense is these are - - it's not what she's saying they are, they're consensual acts. And the evidence seems to be equivocal about whether these - - some of these episodes are being entered into with both sides consenting or only one side wanting to move forward and the other side not wanting to move forward. And that to me seems like what Molineux was made for.

MR. AIDALA: Judge Cannataro, we were there.

There was no equivocation. This was a woman, a grown,
intelligent woman on the stand looking at the jury, saying,
I did not want that. Any man - - any man living in 2020
knows when a woman is screaming, I don't want this. Get
off me. She's kicking and pulling and scratching, I - - -

do we really - - - do we need to have - - -

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JUDGE SINGAS: Mr. Aidala - - -

MR. AIDALA: - - - ten other acts to know what his intent was? It's obvious what his intent was. If you believe her, his intent was despicable.

JUDGE SINGAS: I believe you're describing a case like Vargas, and I would agree with you that intent there is clear. But in some sexual violence, intent is not so clear. And his position is, look, this is very transactional. I give them movie roles. I invite them to my hotel room. We have consensual sex. The jury has a right to know that when these women are put into that position, that he has done this time and time again, and he knows this isn't a consensual situation because he knows these other women haven't consented to that and have run out. And amongst all the power plays of his power in Hollywood, his power over their careers, there has to be a different assessment because sexual violence is different in these kinds of cases than in a stranger rape rooftop Vargas situation. Do you reject that?

MR. AIDALA: I reject the fact that you think - - with all due respect, Your Honor - - and that - - - that's been the problem with this case in the lower court and at the Appellate Division because - - - because he's an executive and who became the poster boy for a movement,



there's a different standard. 1 2 JUDGE SINGAS: I didn't say anything about a 3 movement. 4 MR. AIDALA: I know you didn't, Your Honor, but 5 the bottom line is the - - - it was so obvious that the 6 jury did not need help figuring out his intent. We could 7 talk about - - - would I have been able to bring in the 8 thirty other relationships where there was quid pro quo, 9 where he did have sexual relations consensually. Would I 10 been able to do that? Of course not. I wouldn't even ask to do that. That's not how I was trained to practice law. 11 12 It would be inadmissible. But they're saying between - - -13 the decade between Jessica Mann and Mimi Haleyi, these 14 other four people he had negative interactions with - - -15 what about the forty that he had positive interactions 16 with? 17 There was - - - Judge Garcia, there was no - - -18 no one needed any help in that courtroom knowing what that 19 individual's consent was if you found the witness credible. 20 It was - - - this is what happened. They didn't - - -21 JUDGE RIVERA: An that - - - and that - - - isn't 22 that the point? And I think there - - -23 MR. AIDALA: Excuse me? I apologize - - -24 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - isn't that the point in



where there - - - where you disagree. I think you see this

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testimony of these other witnesses as merely bolstering the 1 2 credibility of the victims and doing nothing else. 3 understanding you? 4 MR. AIDALA: A hundred percent. And if you break 5 it down - - - look, it's a very fact in - - -6 JUDGE RIVERA: And that - - - and now I'm going 7 to come back to my point where I started. Are these not 8 the kinds of charges and conduct that perhaps requires a 9 rethinking of Molineux, given the history of misogyny and 10 sex discrimination and distrust of women's voices and descriptions of sexual assault. 11 12 MR. AIDALA: Not if you really look at the very 13 14 - there - - - there was - - - we could try to make this 15 more complicated than it was, but it - - - it wasn't. It 16 17

simple, precise testimony of the complainant here. It - was simple. It was - - - people who have been prosecutors and defense attorneys, there is sadly sex assault cases we try all the time. But even - - even if I follow your premise, Judge Rivera, the Molineux that came in was not helpful. How does it help - - - Judge Singas, how does it help a jury understand - - -

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JUDGE SINGAS: No, I ask the questions.

MR. AIDALA: I apologize. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. It was rhetorical. I apologize. But how does it help a jury understand - - - well, I - - - because I don't know



the answer. I don't know the answer. Okay. I'll be affirmative. It doesn't help. It doesn't help a jury - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, you know the answer.

MR. AIDALA: - - - understand what happened in that bedroom in - - - in 2006 by hearing what happened in a shower with Lauren Young in 2013. They're not even - - - they're not even closely related. They're not related in time, which you said that it needed to be in Telfair. They're not related - - - closely related in - - - in what took place.

JUDGE CLARK: Could they be a common - - - I know this wasn't raised this way - - - but - - - but couldn't it be looked at as a common scheme or plot? He's this powerful executive, and he gets these women alone, and they're poor, and they want a job. And if you look at those similar facts, couldn't - - - that falls under a Molineux exception?

MR. AIDALA: No, because I mean - - - not based on the fact scenarios that I - - - we've researched regarding comma, scheme, or plan. There's much more - - - there are much more acts that are much more interrelated, number one. But I believe we're supposed to be looking at what the jury was told, and the jury was told, this comes in for two reasons, to figure out his intent, and to figure

out whether they - - - whether the women consented.

Now, I don't think there's a Molineux exception for consent, but even so, if you have a witness who they find credible screaming, I don't want this. No, no, no, I don't want this. We need to call other witnesses in to explain that. To explain that, well, when I was in a shower a decade later - - - a decade later, and he started doing things, I didn't want that. How does - - how does three or four other nuanced, weird relationships explain this one? But this wasn't a nuanced, weird relationship. They met. She asked for a job. He gave her a job. It went well. They went out. They went to dinner. They went back to his apartment. And he did - - and if you believed her, he did a horrible thing. That doesn't need any explanation. There's no explanation.

JUDGE SINGAS: Well, I mean, but in some circumstances, a jury might not know that that's not the way things happen, because his position is, this is what happens. They come to my hotel room. We engage in sex acts consensually because I give them roles - - - movie roles, or I give them internships, or I give them anything. The jury has the right to know, wait a minute, this woman walked into this situation not understanding that - - - that that is what's going on. And he demonstrating his knowledge of their lack of consent because he's been down



this road before. So he just says, look, it was consensual. Just look at the facts here. And that's what we got.

But if it's not that clear because of the power dynamics, because of different levels of sexual assault and the way it looks in different circumstances, Molineux can be used to explain that to help aid the jury.

And here the jury - - - I mean, you're acting as if the jury just believed everything they said. But the fact is, the jury acquitted on some charges. So clearly they were in a position to accept some things and reject others. Right? It's not as simple as you're laying out.

MR. AIDALA: Well, it actually is, Your Honor.

The - - - the charges he was acquitted on, Annabella

Sciorra, which should have never been there because it was

the first time - - - in this trial of first - - - it was

the first time a time-barred crime was permitted to be used

as the predicate crime to charge predatory sexual assault.

The first time ever.

JUDGE SINGAS: And he was acquitted.

MR. AIDALA: Ever. And the reason why he - - - first of all, it shouldn't have been there because it taints the jury to all these horrible things.

But you know why, Your Honor - - - I don't mean to ask you a question. I'm sorry. The reason why was her



best friend - - - she didn't report it for thirty years.

Her best friend came in kicking and screaming as a witness so the defense said, yeah, she called me the next day. She said she had sex with Harvey Weinstein. She never said anything - - - and she never said anything else. And there were other witnesses that just - - - just blew her story out of the water.

And Jessica Mann, if you want to talk about another mistake that the trial court made, in her direct testimony, she never alleges force. They had no choice. He should have dismissed the rape one right there. Her testimony she didn't allege force.

To my point, Mimi Haleyi checks off all the boxes if you find her credible in a simple act. I feel like the court is making this much more complicated and nuanced. It wasn't a complicated nuance - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, your red light is on, so could you just quickly, if the Chief Judge will permit, address the juror eleven issue?

MR. AIDALA: Sure. I would just - - - yeah - - - yes, Your Honor. I just want to make sure that the court understands, when Mimi Haleyi testified regarding Molineux, an abuse of discretion, there were ten - - - ten other sex acts. We looked in every search engine possible to man. We do not see any case where anything close to ten prior

Molineux came in. If that's not a textbook abuse of 1 2 discretion, I don't know what is. And I - - -3 JUDGE CANNATARO: What - - - what's the legal 4 limit, just so we know? 5 MR. AIDALA: I'm going to say - - - I'm going to 6 quote Justice Powell about pornography. You'll know it 7 when you see it. You know that there's no legal limit. 8 But when the prejudice - - - and this is major prejudice 9 saying he's a bad guy, he's a bad guy, he's a bad guy. 10 There was no weighing by the trial court of let's see what Mimi is saying, which is already horrible. Let's allow all 11 12 this other horrible stuff to - - -13 JUDGE RIVERA: Do you - - - do you - - - do you 14 want an opportunity to talk about juror eleven? 15 MR. AIDALA: I - - - I'm sorry, Judge. 16 just answering Judge Cannataro's - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: No, I understand. I understand. 18 MR. AIDALA: And - - - and - - - we had a jury 19 consultant. It's in the record. So there's a veneer and 20 they're about to come. We do our research. We find out 21 that she's writing a book, and we get the little blurb, and 22 it says it's about a predatory professor and students. 23 voir dire, she comes into the panel, we ask her about that, 24 and she denies it. And we tell the judge, judge, you know,



and he says, I believe her. Okay.

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We move for cause. We ran out of - - - of challenges. We asked the judge for an extra challenge. We asked the judge for more time. We didn't get it - - - in a case of this magnitude. We get more information that this

book is about a predatory man.

Now, we go in the back. So there's no one around. She's not going to be embarrassed. We - - - and we confront her with it. And basically, she says, yeah, I lied. I was mistaken. I wasn't sure. I didn't know what you mean. I mean, it was a very simple question. Is it - - is the book about predatory or is it not about predatory? She says - - in jury selection she says no. And then when we actually hand her the piece of paper in the back, oh, this? Okay.

And then - - - and the judge initially says he's going to knock her off the jury. And then he's like, well, I'm not sure. I said, judge, she's going to try to sell a book about predatory men. If she acquits Harvey Wein - - - this is a - - - she's got a financial interest here to sell this book. If she's one of the jurors who acquits Harvey Weinstein, what do you think that's going to do with her book sales?

So she's not qualified, first of all, because she lied about a material issue, not how many children you have or have you ever been skiing in Vermont? It's a case about



a predatory older man going after younger women. She writes a book about predatory older men going after young women and lied about it.

JUDGE RIVERA: What - - - well, I'm going to ask, and you can correct me if I'm - - - I'm not remembering the record correctly. I thought that she tried to explain that predatory in this context was not what she thought was meant by predatory in terms of the case itself. Can you address that?

MR. AIDALA: Sure, Judge. She's - - - she's - - - she's a very smart, very well-educated woman. She could have - - she could have hedged - - - she could have explained herself, but she - - - it was an unequivocal no. In other words, is this about a predatory man? No.

She could have said, well, not really, she said it was a coming-of-age story about young people in school. She didn't touch on - - - she never used the word predatory. She didn't say, well, it was a professor who was hitting on a young person. She just made it sound like - - - like we were nuts. And it was - - - it was - - - it was more than one man. It was like three men, I think, in the - - - in the book. And that was coming after - - - and then she admits it. Then she admits it to us, and then she admits it to the world when the book comes out.

So this court's going to send the message that,



yeah, a juror on this most important case could look in a 1 2 Supreme Court judge's eye and lie about a material issue in 3 the case where they have a financial interest and it's 4 okay. It's no - - - let it sit. 5 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I have a very unrelated 6 question. I think you may be able to answer very shortly -7 - - or briefly - - - with regard to your statute of 8 limitations argument, the one that says the statute 9 continues to run until the police know that there is a 10 crime. Are you with me? 11 MR. AIDALA: Yes. Uh-huh. 12 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Where in the record can I 13 find the date that the police knew that there was a crime? 14 MR. AIDALA: I'm - - -15 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. You have a rebuttal. 16 MR. AIDALA: Okay. 17 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: See if you can figure it out 18 in between. MR. AIDALA: Yes, Judge. 19 Thank you. 20 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 21 MR. WU: May it please the court. Stephen Wu for 22 the People. The Molineux testimony here was properly 23 admitted because under the distinctive facts of this case, the evidence was material to the contested issue of the 24



defendant's knowledge and intent for the charge in this

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case - - -

MR. WU: Well, Vargas is quite different in a number of ways. One is that the actual incident in Vargas used - - had - - had extreme facts that are simply not present here. This was a stranger encounter, according to the victim. There were threats of physical violence.

There was blindfolding and gagging of the victim, and there was actual physical violence in dragging her onto the rooftop. And because of that, the court was able to say that on those extreme facts, there was really no other reasonable inference that could be drawn except that it was nonconsensual.

The other important distinction from Vargas is that there the defendant had a contrary story. He provided an account that was diametrically the opposite of the victim's. He said they met in the bar. They had a consensual relationship. He went up to the rooftop - - - rooftop at her invitation. And we don't have any competing account here similar to that.

JUDGE CANNATARO: My reading of Vargas is that when the question is binary, unequivocally binary, you don't really need Molineux evidence. One says it happened like this, it was with consent, and the other one says absolutely not, no consent. But I read Vargas as admitting



that Molineux evidence as to intent is admissible if there is equivocal record evidence of whether or not there was consent. Do you agree with that?

MR. WU: No, I agree, and I'll say two things about that. One is that it's important to put Vargas on one extreme end of the spectrum. I mean, the case that Vargas relied upon, which is McKinney, was one where somebody was stabbed in the stomach with a butcher knife, and the court said there's no way to infer anything but intent to cause serious physical injury from that act. That's sort of the standard for what's extreme here.

And the other part, and this was the subject of a lot of discussion previously, is that these were not unequivocal - - - this was not unequivocal testimony about defendant's intent or knowledge in these scenarios.

For Jessica Mann, there was testimony that she almost immediately relented upon him putting some force on her. She immediately relented and gave up because of her experience from the first assault that she had experienced from him.

And even as to the second victim here, it was not as extreme as defense counsel has tried to lay out here.

It is true she physically resisted, and she said no. But what she also admitted on the stand was she was not screaming out loud. She almost immediately gave up at some



point and allowed him to have his way with her. And as defendant kept emphasizing during the trial, she had a relationship with defendant that involved this repeated pattern where she would resist, resist, resist, and then ultimately relent to massages, to attending events with him, accepting his invitations - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So how is Molineux evidence at all like any of that?

MR. WU: Well, so the Molineux evidence was important for a couple of reasons. One, as to Mann, what it showed was it provided background and context for that relationship. Defendant's argument was that they had a consensual and loving relationship both before and after the charge incidents. And the Molineux testimony from her as to her relationship just rebutted that characterization completely. And as to the other - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Sorry. Go a little further. How did it do that?

MR. WU: Well, it did so by showing, again, contrary to defendant's characterization, that what she experienced was actually something that she described on the stand as a degrading and diminishing relationship, one where defendant had exerted control and intimidation over her, highlighted by the fact that she had suffered two sexual assaults in California, bookending the charge



incident in New York. That - - - that was how the incidents for Mann were able to come in.

And as to the other three Molineux witnesses, what they showed was something that was very distinctive about this defendant. His argument was that these were transactional relationships that he experienced. That women in Hollywood, because of his exalted position, came to him for favors and willingly - - - willingly traded sex in order to get auditions, roles, any opportunities that he could provide.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But that sounds like a common scheme argument.

MR. WU: Well - - - well, it doesn't fit within what this court has narrowly defined as common scheme, which is really an identity type argument. But what it does match is what this court has recognized, which is when there is a consistent pattern of similar behavior from somebody. So like the robberies in Ingram or other types of behavior, then the court can look to the repetition of that activity - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: No, what - - - I'm sorry - - - are you saying some unique behavior?

MR. WU: Excuse me - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What's unique about a powerful man trying to get a woman to have sex with him?



1 MR. WU: It - - - it doesn't have to be unique.
2 It just has to be distinctive, distinctive to a defendant.
3 So - - 4 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So again, what's
5 distinctive?
6 MR. WU: Well, what's distinctive is that this

MR. WU: Well, what's distinctive is that this defendant did have a distinctive role in Hollywood. He was uniquely powerful. And this was all evidence that came out. It was even emphasized by defense counsel to say, here's how you can understand why people would find this defendant attractive because he could make opportunities for them. And that fact was what the Molineux witnesses helped to highlight. What it showed - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I don't see how the Molineux witnesses do that. I mean, especially since you're - - - you're making very clear that he has, as I think you said, an exalted position. I mean, in that case, you really don't need very much to establish that. They're so well known. There's a lot of publicity around them. Why - - - why would you need other people to say, yeah, he wanted - - he made a few passes at me or whatever else they may be saying.

MR. WU: Right. And I think where I'd start is that the definition of consent under New York law requires not just that the individual not consent, but also that a



person in the defendant's situation and under all the circumstances understand that they are not consenting.

And what the Molineux witnesses showed was that defendant knew from these past experiences that just because an aspiring actress was willing to accept favors from him, ask favors, and even voluntarily go up to his room by themselves, right? By themselves, to his private space, that did not mean they were consenting to sexual activity. That's what Molineux witnesses were - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't it just - - - why isn't it just the opposite? If they're not willing to do it, but someone else is willing to do it, it must mean that it's consensual.

MR. WU: Well - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Doesn't it establish the absolute opposite of your argument?

MR. WU: Well - - - well, I guess what I'd say is this. Sure, there is a response to the Molineux evidence.

There's a way of rebutting it. But Molineux evidence doesn't have to be dispositive to be admitted. It just has to be probative to a material element.

And here the connection that was drawn that showed that these women who testified had sort of visibly, you know, physically showed that they did not consent. And that defendant recognized that in these incidents. He even



apologized to one of the women after she made clear that she was not consenting to his outreach, showed that he did not equate the two.

JUDGE CLARK: But under - - - under rape third, it's an objective standard, though, right? It's not a subjective standard. I mean, if we take out the intentional, take out the rape first - - -

MR. WU: That's correct.

JUDGE CLARK: - - - and the criminal sexual act, which are intentional, if we're talking about when the judge gave the instructed and said it can only - - - it can come in for intent - - - and I'm talking about the three women, it can come in for intent, but it can also come in as far as consent. When you're talking about rape third, it's an objective standard, though. It's not his state of mind.

MR. WU: Well, it's an objective standard, Your Honor, but it still relies upon somebody in a situation under the circumstances. Right? It is saying somebody standing in the defendant's shoes. And I think the key for this trial is to understand how defendant defined what his situation was like, what the relevant circumstances were like. And what they emphasized over and over and over again with all of the victims in this case was that they were out there to get something from him. They got things



from him. They said repeatedly, for example, that one of the victims, the day after the charged incident, accepted a plane ticket from him to go to Los Angeles for - - - JUDGE CLARK: But I'm not talking - - I'm

MR. WU: That's correct.

talking about the other three women.

JUDGE CLARK: I - - - I can understand relative to their own actions, because that state of mind is important relative to their consent, but when we're talking about his state of mind, his state of mind is not an element of rape in the third degree.

MR. WU: Well - - - well, what - - - I think, what the other incidents still show - - - and there's a second thing that I do want to mention too - - - but what they still show is that somebody in his position sort of receiving favors from these ambitious women who are willing to be personal and friendly and somewhat flirtatious with him is not the same as consent. Right. That that is what it showed for someone in his situation.

But there's another - - - an important, closely related inference that can be drawn, which is the fact that defendant here didn't do this just one time. That he had - - I won't call it a common scheme - - - but he had a pattern where he would reach out to these women, make offers for them to come to his place in the guise of

1 getting some sort of reward from him professionally, and 2 then immediately moved to a sexual encounter - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: That - - - that sounds like 4 propensity. 5 MR. WU: Excuse me? 6 JUDGE RIVERA: That sounds like propensity. 7 Well, it's - - - the reason - - -MR. WU: 8 JUDGE RIVERA: He did it before. He likely did 9 it now. 10 Well, so - - - so propensity is only MR. WU: 11 when repeated behavior is used for nothing more than the 12 possibility that somebody will do it the same way. 13 repeated behavior is permissible under Molineux when it 14 sheds light on the defendant's state of mind. And what 15 this - - - and for instance, this is what Alvino said, the repetition of the unlawful conduct makes an innocent 16 17 explanation unlikely. And - - -18 JUDGE CLARK: Right. But you said the 19 defendant's state of mind, and that's what I'm struggling 20 with, because when we're talking about consent and rape 21 third, his state of mind is not an element of that crime. 22 MR. WU: He - - - he still or somebody in his 23 position still has to be aware that the acts or words 24 expressed by the individual is expressing a lack of



Now, that is an objective standard, but it is

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consent.

1 about his - - - it is about evaluating this particular 2 defendant's state of mind here. So it doesn't have to be 3 like what's going on through his head at the moment. 4 And the reason that the - - -5 JUDGE SINGAS: Are we - - - are we constrained at 6 all by Telfair? 7 MR. WU: Excuse me, I - - -8 JUDGE SINGAS: Are we constrained by Telfair? 9 No. Telfair made a point of emphasizing 10 that the incidents in that case were both temporally 11 distant or a decade removed, and importantly, factually not 12 similar to the charged incidents in that case. And there 13 was no attempt by the People there to draw that action - -14 15 JUDGE BARROS: It was similar - - - they were gun 16 charges. 17 MR. WU: Well, they were gun charges. But I 18 think what both this court and the court below sort of 19 emphasized was that these were gun charges that had nothing 20 to do with each other. Right? The gun was in different 21 places. There were different times. He had different 22 excuses for them. But the difference in this case was that 23 these are - - -JUDGE GARCIA: 24 The main excuse was, I didn't know 25 I had a gun there. It was somebody else's, right?



MR. WU: And look, could an inference be drawn, it could draw - - - this court decided otherwise in Telfair because there was no attempt to show that there was a consistent pattern of behavior from the defendant with regard to his gun possession. And that's what's different here.

In this case, the defendant, the Molineux witnesses here testified to a type of outreach from defendant bringing them into their rooms, their private rooms, and then immediately - - - immediately moving to sexual behavior.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So the consistent pattern here, just so I understand, is this promises of career opportunity, career advancement, something like that. In order to get the individual, whether it's a complainant or a Molineux witness, in - - isolated, alone, or maybe with a third person, and - - and then to do what? I kind of have a little bit of a difficulty making the leap to whatever it is that the intent - - subjective intent of the defendant is.

MR. WU: Well, it was to immediately that initiate a sexual encounter without waiting for any indication of consent from the other side. And the point of raising this - - - and again - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Is that problematic in terms of



if you - - - if you approach this from the view - - - and I think we heard it in a question before - - - that in his mind, this is all transactional. I say I'm going to do these things. And we all know that the reason why, you know, I'm saying I'm going to do them is because you're going to give me sex and that's - - - we have a deal. So I'm not sure if that really is what we're saying his frame of mind is why you need intent to do something nonconsensual.

MR. WU: Right.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Because in his mind it is consensual.

MR. WU: Well, and I think part of our answer is that that was not the mind - - - that was not his mindset entering into these encounters. It was not - - - they - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: He knew he was going to meet resistance.

MR. WU: Well, and he knew he was going to initiate a sexual encounter regardless of their consent.

And the point - - - the point of this is to say that if you believe that mindset - - and again, the jury was free to reject that inference from the Molineux evidence. But if you accept that mindset, that is inconsistent with somebody being attentive to consent, being willing to pay attention



to consent, even inconsistent with somebody who is just 1 2 going to wait to see if somebody is willing to give him 3 sexual favors for his professional help. That is not the 4 story - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: So did you make - - - did you make 6 the argument the way you're making it now about a pattern 7 of behavior as the basis for the court permitting this 8 particular Molineux evidence? 9 MR. WU: Yes, but both of these arguments were 10 The argument that says he couldn't just assume from made. the fact that these women were coming to him - - -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: That it's a - - - that's a 13 pattern. 14 That's right. So the pattern went -MR. WU: 15 correct. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: But you presented it that way. 17 It was presented to the court that way. MR. WU: 18 The court referenced that. And I think most clearly in the 19 re-argument decision where the court said, you know, I'm 20 going to allow Molineux evidence for this reason. It was 21 actually one of the arguments made to the jury about the 22 Molineux evidence was to adhere to this very narrow theory 23 of admissibility for Molineux. And - - -24 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So let me ask you this. 25 would agree, I guess - - - I hope - - - that if the purpose



of introducing somebody's past bad behavior or crimes was propensity, Molineux forbids that?

MR. WU: That - - - that's absolutely correct, yes.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So an element of the crime is intent. So why is it that you could introduce it essentially for propensity of intent, but not for propensity of the crime?

MR. WU: Well, I think this is maybe using the word propensity in two different ways. I mean, what, you know, Alvino and other cases have recognized is that in situations where somebody's intent can't readily be inferred - - and - - and as I've explained, it can't readily be inferred in these cases - - you can look to what the defendant has done in similar situations to discern their intent.

And Alvino is the case that that is most clear on this. The defendant was the driver of a getaway car. He said as to the charged incident, I had no idea that my accomplice was going to go rob a store. People came in and said, you did the same thing. You did the same thing just a few weeks later. And the court agreed that the fact that the conduct repeated made this innocent explanation, we had no idea what was going on, seemed really unlikely.

JUDGE CLARK: Is it different from Alvino in



respect that that was all allowed on rebuttal, where here, all of this came in on the case-in-chief before you heard any sort of defense?

MR. WU: Well, let me say two things about that.

One, it is not distinct in a way that harms us. It is true that Alvino said that you could bring that up in rebuttal.

But Alvino also said - - - and I believe - - - I believe the exact line is that people could have brought it up in their original case and probably should have, right, I think is what the court said in Alvino. So I don't think these are mutually exclusive. Molineux is not exclusively available to rebut a defense theory.

But the other point is that it was fairly clear before the trial what defendant was going to say here, in both his omnibus motion and in press statements that the lawyers and the court referenced without dispute, the defendant had been saying these events, sure they happened, but they were consensual. That was similar to his trial strategy as well, where he never disputed that these events occurred, but said that they were consensual, and the women were lying by claiming otherwise.

JUDGE BARROS: You - - - you keep talking about it as if he testified. He didn't testify, right? So it's one person's word against the other, and now he can't testify. Am I correct? This Sandoval ruling, I don't



think anybody in their right mind would testify.

So how is this a fair trial when you're not able to put in your side of it? Believable or not, it's - - - the evidence was slim by your own - - your own account and as much as you needed the other - - - the Molineux evidence. Right. You know - - you needed that to - - - to strengthen your case. So how is this Sandoval ruling, as a matter of law, abuse of discretion?

MR. WU: Well, let me address the Molineux part of that and then I'll talk about Sandoval. I think the argument that says that it was permissible to admit the San - - - the Molineux evidence is not premised on the case being weak. The point is not that the case is weak, but rather that it doesn't fit within that narrow band of cases like Vargas, like McKinney, where the act is so unequivocal, so unequivocal that there's no need to bring in additional evidence. So I don't think it's the same type of argument we're making here.

But the Sandoval ruling here was also appropriate. And I think the - - - I'll say a couple of things - - - as a threshold matter, the question before this court is only whether the court followed the right process in adjudicating Sandoval. This court made very clear in Walker that it does not redo the balance. It doesn't disagree with the balance. And it specifically

said that the sheer amount of Sandoval evidence and the 1 2 timeliness of it is not a basis for overriding the lower 3 court's discretion. So I think it's the threshold argument 4 5 JUDGE BARROS: We'll also look at the prejudice, 6 though, right, and the type of act that is being permitted 7 in. 8 MR. WU: Well, I think encompassed with - - -9 JUDGE BARROS: Encompassed you have - - - you 10 mentioned Walker, which is a narcotics case, the - - - the sale of narcotics or the purchase of narcotics, very 11 12 different type of - - - and they didn't allow the 13 underlying facts in that case, right? 14 MR. WU: Sure. But - - -15 JUDGE BARROS: You rely on that case. 16 case, you're allowing, I think, maybe eight sexual offenses 17 and an additional, I don't know, thirty other bad acts, 18 also not convictions - - - but - - - so untested in that 19 sense. MR. WU: Well - - - well, so - - - so if we set 20 aside that the legal question is not about rebalancing, I -21 22 - - the judge did - - - the judge severely limited the



Sandoval evidence that was permitted by the prosecutor.

And you can see that from the hearing where the judge from

the beginning said, I'm not going to allow anything about

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1 sexual misconduct and adhered to that - - - outright 2 excluded categories of Sandoval evidence that was about 3 sexual misconduct that was different from the Molineux 4 evidence. For instance - -5 There were inferences, right, that JUDGE BARROS: 6 - - - that he led the woman up into an elevator to the 7 wrong floor. 8 MR. WU: Right. 9 JUDGE BARROS: There was at least two - - - two 10 inferences he did sanitize - - -Well - - -11 MR. WU: 12 JUDGE BARROS: - - - because they were originally 13 charged - - - would have been charged as or described as 14 sexual acts. So he did sanitize, but the inference was 15 also that there were these additional women. 16 MR. WU: 17 18 here, because the judge in his ruling said, for those

Right. But I think the sanitizing, what you're accurately referring to as a sanitizing is important incidents, you may not talk about the sexual misconduct. You can only focus on the things that Sandoval is designed to address, which is his honesty and credibility.

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And beyond that, in his re-argument ruling, when the judge also did the same thing, he said no sexual misconduct, but evidence of dishonesty is perfectly fine. The judge said, if on those incidents that he's limiting,



you start talking about the sexual misconduct, you can't ask about them at all, right? So the judge put out there in his ruling that he was going to vigorously enforce the restriction there. And I think that shows that the judge was very careful in determining and limiting the Sandoval evidence to those pieces of evidence that would go to what Sandoval is meant to address, which is his credibility on the stand. Right? And - - and what he ended up focusing on were incidents of dishonesty where defendant showed that he couldn't be honest with respect to other people, and repeated incidents where the defendant showed that he considered himself above the rules of society, and which is again a classic Sandoval category that (indiscernible) - -

JUDGE RIVERA: So - - -

TUDGE SINGAS: Shouldn't we be concerned about the Molineux witnesses? I'm talking about the three of them, that they distracted the jury in the sense that now that we - - they had to assess credibility of three additional witnesses that had nothing to do with the charged crimes. And Molineux speaks to that, that we don't want to - - we want to make sure that trials don't turn into mini trials on credibility issues that might distract the jury. How do you respond to that?

MR. WU: Well, a couple of things. One is the



judge was very attentive to that. There was a specific exchange on this question where the judge referenced exactly that concern, said, I don't want this to become a series of mini trials. I don't want this to drag on forever. I think it's one of the reasons it was limited to just those three witnesses, not the People's originally request for five.

It is also important to note that this was a case where, although there was - - - there were these three Molineux witnesses, in addition to Ms. Mann, they occupied maybe a quarter of the trial. The vast majority of the trial was about the charged incidents and corroborating evidence for those witnesses. And the judge was very careful to repeat over and over again his limiting instructions, to make sure the jury could follow the principle that says, you only use this for permissible purposes, and repeatedly invited defense counsel to propose any other limiting instructions that they wanted.

And we know that this worked. We know that this worked because the jury ultimately did acquit defendant, not just of a random assortment of charges, acquitted defendant of all the top charges in this case. The most serious charges - - including the more serious charge against one of the victims in this case.

And what this shows is that the jury was able - -



with all the Molineux evidence in here - - - was able to evaluate the evidence carefully and draw distinctions both between the different witnesses - - - different victims - - - as well as for the same victim. They were able to draw a distinction.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, I want you to get back to the Sandoval question, but what was the judge's limiting instruction on Molineux? Because I feel like it was something along the lines of, you should only consider the evidence for intent to use forcible compulsion and lack of consent of the - - - the complainants.

MR. WU: Right.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Neither of which sound exactly like what you're arguing here today. So can you just make sure I'm - - check me on what the limiting instruction was?

MR. WU: So that's not inaccurate. That is what the judge's - - - he basically followed the CJI instruction for Molineux purposes. Made a point of saying don't consider this evidence for propensity.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Right. Right.

MR. WU: But the thing I will say about that is that that was entirely appropriate. That is consistent with our theory. Our theory from the trial to the appeal is to say the evidence was relevant to intent and

knowledge. And although the judge - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Yeah, but the judge didn't say intent. He said intent to use forcible compulsion, which seems very limiting.

MR. WU: Well - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Like we're talking a lot about intent. And at times it seems to me like we're talking about the defendant's intent to engage in a nonconsensual sex act, which has - - - you know, doesn't really - - - there might be forcible compulsion involved, but there might not be. So there seems to be a disconnect in my mind between the limiting instruction and what we're now saying the purpose of the evidence was.

MR. WU: Well, the reason there isn't this disconnect is because in every sex offense under article 130, lack of consent is an element whether or not it's explicitly stated. This court has recognized that the element of forcible compulsion subsumes that the victim did not consent because otherwise, as this court has explained, you wouldn't need to forcibly compel somebody who was consenting. And although the judge just used the phrase lack of consent, that has a very defined meaning under the statute. It isn't just sort of the common meaning of the word lack of consent. It instead is whether the victim clearly expressed lack of consent, and then whether the



defendant or somebody in the defendant's situation under the circumstances would understand it to be lack of consent.

JUDGE CANNATARO: You stand behind the notion that the Molineux evidence was properly admitted for showing the - - - the complainants' or the victims' lack of consent?

MR. WU: Well, only - - - only to the extent that by doing so it informed how the defendant would perceive what was happening in these encounters, which is a convoluted answer to give you. But - - - but I think the point is to say it wasn't brought in just to bolster their credibility. I disagree that that was the purpose for this evidence. It was instead brought in to explain how someone in defendant's situation, who hasn't done this for the first time, might understand this unique situation, which would be unfamiliar to most jurors, right? Where many young women were willing to have certain types of relationships with him and to appear in his hotel room, his apartment, on a terrace, alone with him, and yet were not consenting to sexual activity - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I have to say, I don't know what's unique about that. What is unique about that? A powerful man expects sex in return for favors. What - - - please connect - - choose any of those Molineux witnesses to



show me how that connects to what you say is something that a juror could not understand.

MR. WU: So okay, two things. One is I don't think it has to be unique. As I said the Molineux doesn't come in only for one-off cases. It is meant to highlight aspects of a case that might be unfamiliar to a juror.

But the second is, and I want to be clear about this, the juror - - - the Molineux witnesses were not coming in to say Harvey Weinstein is a powerful man. That came in throughout the trial. Defense counsel admitted to that in the opening statement. What they were coming in to say - - - the first thing was that I was in a situation where I was like the victims in this case. I was asking for favors. I was accepting the favors. I was showing up by myself to his hotel room without any chaperone or with a chaperone who, like, stayed behind, right?

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. WU: But I did not consent to sexual activity and he knew that. Right. This is what Judge Kaye - - - Chief Judge Kaye referred to in in Alvino as something like giving defendant a warning. He should have known from these encounters, and clearly did know, that it was not the same for a woman to show up at his - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.

MR. WU: - - - invitation to get a favor from



1 It was not the same that they were showing up and him. 2 they were consenting to sexual activity - - -3 JUDGE RIVERA: But in that example, it's because 4 that particular person said no. 5 MR. WU: Right. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: And then you've got a victim who 7 gets up and says, I said yes. So again, I don't - - - I 8 feel like there's a mismatch. I am trying to understand 9 your argument, but I'm - - -10 MR. WU: Yeah. 11 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - perhaps it's my - - -12 perhaps it's my block. 13 MR. WU: There may - - - there may very well be 14 other individuals who will come in and say under the same 15 circumstances I said yes, right. 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. 17 MR. WU: I won't dispute that. If - - - if they 18 had wanted to bring that forward, sure. 19 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. 20 MR. WU: But what these witnesses showed was that 21 it was not invariably true in these circumstances that 22 somebody in, even in defendant's unique shoes, would 23 interpret their willingness to come to him as consent to sexual behavior. 24



And the reason that that was important - - - and

the reason that that was important was because - - - it was in part because that was the defense that defendant came in with. What he said throughout the trial - - - and again, this is from opening to summation - - - was he said, these victims - - - these victims got - - - got something from me, right? But the reason why in cross-examining these individuals, one of their defenses was to say, well, didn't you actually get the role? Didn't you actually get the audition was to repeat over and over again that they got the benefit of the bargain, and that bargain was to give him sexual favors. And - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Your time is up, but do you want a minute on the juror issue?

MR. WU: Sure, sure. So the juror issue, under whatever standard of review, is not a basis for reversal here. What defense counsel points out here is a supposed lie was not a lie whatsoever. The juror was asked about the contents of her book and accurately described it as not being about nonconsensual sex. When she was originally approached and said, was it about predatory older men? Without being confronted with her author website, she said, no, this is a coming-of-age story. You know, this is like an unusual relationship, but it was consensual, and she made that very clear.

What they are referring to is that in the second



round of questioning, when they confronted her with the author website, they used the phrase predatory older men. And far from saying that she had lied, what the juror said when confronted with this was, no, that is not an accurate description of my book, and again repeated - - - and again repeated, like, sure, she did have this time where she said, sure, they're predatory older men, but the relationships were consensual. And - - -

JUDGE BARROS: But wasn't the suggestion - - the argument that she was withholding that information?
She wasn't being candid. You have to be candid, especially
in a case where they're delving into your attitude about
predatory men, right?

MR. WU: Well - - -

JUDGE BARROS: I mean, it was right on point.

MR. WU: Yeah. She was consistent throughout about the contents of the book. If you look at the contents of the book, what she described, she was consistent throughout. The one thing - - - and she - - - the judge talked to her about this - - - the one thing that she was embarrassed about was being confronted with the copy from her website, and she explained what happened. She said, I didn't write that. That was from my publisher, and I disavow it. I don't think it's about predatory older men, right? There are older men in here, but these are

consensual relationships.

And then for purposes of the juror, the really important thing is, multiple times the judge said, can you be impartial notwithstanding this? And she unequivocally said yes. She understood this defendant had rights, would respect them. I think both of those factors permit her to sit on the jury.

JUDGE BARROS: Just - - - just a real quick

question about that. I'm not sure about - - - I'll check

the record, but the three - - - was there evidence or

testimony about who the three people were in the novel, the

men, or is that something that's outside of the record?

MR. WU: It's - - - it's outside of the record.

I mean, they - - - you know, I mean, the book is public, obviously.

JUDGE BARROS: I understand that.

MR. WU: There's no factual similarity between the book and here. I mean, as described in the Atlantic article and in some of the descriptions of the book, this was meant to be a coming-of-age story about teenage girls with their teachers. All right. That - - - that's the story - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Didn't she at one point testify, there are predatory older men in my book?

MR. WU: So this is in the same exchange. And I



think you'll have to forgive a juror from being discombobulated at this point where she is confronted with the author website. And - - - and - - - and the question is, you said before there were no predatory older men, as a factual statement about the book, not did you ever say this? You said before there are no predatory older men. Here's a website that says they're predatory older men in this book. What is your answer? Is that an accurate - - - a fair and accurate description of the book? Her initial answer is no, not exactly. Right. Not exactly. What she says that after is, there are predatory older men in the book, but everything here is consensual, right? This is not about a nonconsensual relationship here.

And again, that - - - there's never been any dispute that the book is not about a factual circumstance like this case. The victims in this case are not teenage girls. They did not have consensual relationships with the defendant. This is not a coming-of-age story for them, right? They were adults when they were assaulted by the defendant. So the - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: What about her interest in the #MeToo movement?

MR. WU: I'm not sure that that came out that extensively there. I mean, the focus of the arguments on this appeal are about these three books. One that she



wrote, one that she reviewed, one that she marked as currently reading on Goodreads.

And - - - and there's no - - - I mean, I want to take a step back here. I mean, the notion - - - the notion that a juror's sort of fiction reading, right, is going to be a basis for disqualifying her as either partial or as grossly unqualified when she has given unequivocal assurances that she can set aside her prejudices and judge this trial fairly, I think that is a truly unprecedented argument here. And they have nothing more than identifying a few instances of what she enjoys in reading fiction.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MR. AIDALA: Judge Barros, just to follow up, we asked to enlarge the record in the Appellate Division to include the book so there'd be no issue, and they objected, and they won.

Judge Cannataro, Alvino and Leonard say evidence of prior criminal acts to prove intent will often be unnecessary and therefore should be precluded, even though marginally relevant, where intent may be easily inferred from the commission of the act itself. And you picked up on the fact that the act itself is not intent in general.

The jury was charged. They could use the Molineux evidence for intent to use force. You do not need



help from any Molineux witnesses when a man - - - they got into the size disparity between the complaining witness and the defendant. And every act that he did, there was no question that a reasonable common-sense juror knew what his intent - - his intent to use force. It was as simple intent. There's - - - there could be no question that he didn't mean to use force. She said, he had me pinned over my head. I was kicking him to let me go and he wouldn't let me go. Why do we need to hear about what happened a decade later in a shower, in a hotel room about him masturbating? How does that help the jury figure out that essential element of was he using force or wasn't he using force?

JUDGE GARCIA: Do you think Telfair is relevant to that point?

MR. AIDALA: Evidence of prior incidents may be admissible to prove - - - to prove a subjective element such as state of mind but held that conduct similar only in broad respects and occurring at a remote, indeterminate time, would disclose only the defendant's violent propensity and the manner of its expression, and not sufficiently relevant. Those are your words in Telfair, Judge, if I - - if I may.

JUDGE SINGAS: If we agree with you, are we effectively going to say that Molineux evidence - - - we



1 cannot use Molineux evidence in rape cases? 2 MR. AIDALA: No, Your Honor. I think if you 3 disagree with me, I think you're going to throw Molineux 4 out the window. And it's already started, by the way, in 5 the courthouses around the state. Oh, the Appellate 6 Division said we could let it in. Let it - - - Molineux 7 and Sandoval. It - - - the floodgates have been opened by 8 People v. Weinstein. And just the opposite, there are 9 plenty of times when Molineux is very, very valuable over 10 the last 120 years - - -11 JUDGE SINGAS: How in a rape case? So you're 12 saying it's - - -13 MR. AIDALA: Excuse me? 14 JUDGE SINGAS: How in a rape case? You're saying 15 it's not. It's not admissible in a case like Vargas where - - - where it's evident what's going on, a violent 16 17 incident sexual assault - - -18 MR. AIDALA: Well, I didn't say it's not - - -19 JUDGE SINGAS: Okay. And you're saying here it's 20 not admissible to explain, you know, the dynamics of a sexual relationship between people with different power - -21 22 23 MR. AIDALA: Well, I mean, here - - -24 JUDGE SINGAS: So give me an example where you



would be able to use Molineux in a sexual assault.

MR. AIDALA: Oh, M.O., modus operandi, for the
- the exact same way, the exact same time. And I will

tell you, listening to my - - my friend - -
JUDGE RIVERA: So you think he's wrong about this

pattern of behavior?

MR. AIDALA: Yeah. And - -
JUDGE RIVERA: Address that, please.

MR. AIDALA: Okay. I was just about to Judge Rivera. I mean, I'll be honest with you, I'm a little offended by it. You know why I'm a little offended by it? If you follow his theory - - and which is - - he's mimicking what they said in the Appellate Division - - JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.

MR. AIDALA: - - - do you know what they're saying? All women are alike. All women react the same way. So if I'm a high school senior right now, and I want to ask a young lady out to the prom, and she says no, and she rejects me, I'm - - that's lack of consent to go to the prom with me. Am I now supposed to assume, if I ask the next young lady, she's going to reject me as well? All women are different. This isn't like fire. If you put your finger on the fire once, it burns. Ten times later it burns. A year later it burns, and 10,000 years later it burns. They're saying, well, because this one man had this negative interaction with this one woman, he is supposed to



assume every woman is alike, and she's going to reject me as well. That's against humanity. It makes no sense. It's a ridiculous argument.

Before I run out of time, I have to address

Sandoval and Judge Singas is talking about mini trials.

First of all, the - - - the ten Molineux - - - it was a ten

to one ratio talking about abuse of discretion, and the

trial judge allowed in corroborating witnesses to the

Molineux. So it was - - - there were all these mini

trials.

He went from being charged with three to six because then they got to bring in their - - - my friend from the Manhattan DA's office says, oh, the judge kept tight reins. Yeah, he kept tight reins on us putting anything good in, but he didn't put tight reins - - - and then I've never had a trial where a Molineux - - - three Molineux witnesses get to have their - - - their backing up witnesses behind them. It did turn into a mini trials - - - three other mini trials.

And we had a defendant who was begging to tell his side of the story. It's a he said she said case, and he's saying that's not how it happened. Let me tell you how it - - - it had - - - there was an interaction. I'll tell you how it happened.

And this Sandoval ruling came down unlike



anything we've ever seen. We've looked everywhere in every county in the State of New York. There's never been anything like it. We all know, those of us who are criminal practitioners for years, in the beginning of a trial, the people, what's your position on Sandoval? Your Honor, this is the first arrest. There is no sense. We're not bringing anything in.

In this case, you have a sixty-eight-year-old man. No contacts with the system ever. Had he been thirty-five and arrested three times with five felonies, a trial judge says, well, I'm going to let you bring in this felony and that felony, but none of the underlying facts, and we'll move on.

But the precedent that would be set here is, if you don't have a criminal record, we're going to go back to the Ronald Reagan administration. We'll go back forty years, because that's the first thing. And he flipped over a table somewhere. He had a fight with his brother. Are we going to start mini trials where, well, you can talk about the fight with your brother. Let's see. How did you guys get along when you were five years old? And what about when you were in high school? The things that were allowed in had nothing to do with truth and veracity. It was all, he's a bad guy. And this trial, they - - - they - - - they tried his character to the point where they



stripped him naked literally and took pictures and handed it to the jury in a case where identification meant nothing - - - meant nothing.

Why was the jury looking at naked pictures of him? They had - - - they had a hotline, Your Honor, after he was arrested for the first time ever. It wasn't a tip line like we have a crime. Who did it? They had him, the chief of the Manhattan DA's office held a press conference. Call us if you know anything bad about this guy. 1-800-GetHarvey, and they got calls, and they got - - - then they - - it's everyone who ever interacted with said something bad about him, and they went in front of a judge. They wanted to put in fifty bad acts.

The right to testify on your behalf is such a God given right in the United States of America. And judges, thank God, over the last fifty years of Sandoval, they've been very, very tight with letting things in. So you don't - - you don't want to stop a defendant from testifying?

Yes. Jurors should know if someone has cheated on his taxes, et cetera, et cetera.

But the last thing I'll say is, of all this evidence that came in and that was going to come in on Sandoval and did come in on Molineux, the one that was subjected to the adversarial process, one Lauren Young in California, and he was acquitted.



Your Honors, please. Please. Molineux and Sandoval, of course they affect my client. They affect everyone. Tomorrow morning when we start trials in this -- - in this state, the first thing is going to be, I'll hear you on Sandoval. As of today's ruling, everything comes in. You would be giving judges unfettered access to, he's a bad guy. I'm going to help the prosecutor. We got to tell prosecutors you can't have 1-800 numbers. CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. Thank you. MR. AIDALA: Please, re-instill our faith in the Thank you so much, Your Honors. I appreciate your system. time. And happy Valentine's Day. (Court is adjourned)

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