1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	FAVORITE LIMITED,
4	
5	Appellants,
6	-against- NO. 17
7	CICO,
8	Respondent.
	20 Femla Church
9	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor February 13, 202
	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15	
16	Appearances:
17	PETER JAKAB, ESQ. FEIN & JAKAB
18	Attorney for Appellants 233 Broadway, Room 930
19	New York, NY 10279-0999
	SEAN M. KEMP, ESQ.
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23	
24	Chrishanda Sassman-Reynold
25	Official court Transcribe



1 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The next case is Number 17, 2 Favorite Limited v. Cico. 3 MR. JAKAB: May I proceed? 4 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes. 5 MR. JAKAB: Good afternoon. May it please the 6 court, Peter Jakab for the appellants. If I could reserve 7 three minutes, please? 8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes. 9 MR. JAKAB: Thank you. First question presented 10 on this appeal is governed by the principles expressed by 11 this court in Rudiger and in the broader principles of the 12 inherent powers doctrine. The principle is that after an 13 appellate decision, the lower court is not just empowered, 14 but it's dutybound to consider changed circumstances. 15 Circumstances that have changed - - -16 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry before you - - - I'm 17 sorry to interrupt you, Counsel. Before you get to that, I 18 - - - I just want a little clarity about something I'm 19 unsure of regarding this record. The third cause of 20 action, was that dismissed by the First Department in its 2.1 2020 order? 2.2 MR. JAKAB: No, Your Honor, it was not. 23 here's how - - - here's how to look at that. You have the 24 October 2018 decision. That's at docket 277 of the trial



In that decision, page 6, footnote 8, the trial

court permits the third cause of action to proceed. Then you have the appeal of that decision. You have the briefing and the questions presented. In that case, the Cicos were the appellants. There's a - - - an opening brief. There's a reply brief. In none of those documents is there any argument about the third cause of action, which is brought by the individuals only, for books and records.

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And so you move to the March 3rd, 2020 appellate decision. That decision says it's reversing the October 2018 decision insofar as appealed from. And if you look at any of the documents on that appeal, there was not an argument, not a mention of the third cause of action - - - the individuals for books and records. All the arguments were about the company and its claims.

JUDGE RIVERA: But they did seek to have the complaint dismissed, correct?

MR. JAKAB: Correct. They appealed to the extent they appealed. And every argument in the appeal, every question presented in the appeal, was about the company and its claims. And so - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Did that - - - was that not the relief they sought?

MR. JAKAB: They sought to attack those claims that were being brought by the company: something was wrong



with the vote; something was wrong with the resolution; something was wrong with the jurisdiction; the company was not empowered to do what it did.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Well, do you read the 2020

Appellate Division decision on the second amended complaint as saying that the complaint is dismissed?

MR. JAKAB: Insofar as appealed from.

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I think the - - - I think
the decision - - - well, all right. The 2022 decision does
seem to state that they viewed the 2020 decision as a
dismissal of the entire complaint - - - the pleading. And
that is the position of both the majority and dissent.
Strikes me if indeed they - - - they read the chronology as
you do - - - let me put it that way - - - that someone
would have mentioned that in the majority of the dissent.
Did you mention that in the Appellate Division briefing?

MR. JAKAB: Your Honor, in that briefing - - - JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.

MR. JAKAB: - - - there was not - - - there was almost no argument about the decision that the appellate court took. That briefing was about defending an exercise of discretion by Justice Schecter in permitting the - - - in permitting the amended complaint.

JUDGE RIVERA: Did that all - - I thought it all turned on whether or not there is a pleading to amend.



And if your position is, of course there is because there's an existing valid third cause of action that was never dismissed, strikes me that one would anticipate there would be some discussion of that in the majority and the dissent below and that you would put it in your briefing and that they would argue it in their briefing. I wouldn't end up seeing it only in the reply brief to us in a - - in two-sentences, I think.

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MR. JAKAB: It --- it is certainly not our primary position with respect to that --- you know --- JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. JAKAB: - - - adage or - - - or catch phrase about there not being a complaint to amend.

JUDGE RIVERA: Let me me ask you a - - - because

I just - - it is something I'm just trying to clarify in
my own mind. Let say that you are correct, that one looks
at the record and says it may be perhaps that the Appellate
Division made a mistake when it characterized these prior
decisions as disposing of all of the causes of action.

That is to say, dismissing the complaint, right? That the
second cause of action was only permitted on derivative
claims, not on this third cause of action that the
plaintiffs bring on their own behalf. Whatever - - whatever way you want to see it. Can we say, since that is
not the basis for the Appellate Division decision here

that's being appealed, that we cannot revisit that issue?

We have to take it on - - - do we have to accept - - - let

me put it another way - - - what the Appellate Division

says in the decision that's being appealed now? That,

indeed, it had disposed of all those claims? It had

dismissed the complaint.

MR. JAKAB: I don't believe it was before the Appellate Division in that sense. In the initial appellate briefing and - - - and ruling, none of this comes up and none of this comes up because none of these arguments were made. And in connection with the second appellate ruling, nobody anticipated a rule of the kind that the Appellate Division ended up making, and that's under review here today.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

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MR. JAKAB: Rudiger, the principle is that a trial court - - lower court is dutybound to look at changed circumstances different from those that were before the appellate court and form the basis of the appellate decision. And the reason for this rule in Rudiger is because we learned from Judge Cardozo that looking at the changed circumstances, it's - - it's not a negation of the appellate decision. It is a - - an enforcement of it. And - - and the prime example is our case here. In our case, after the 2020 appellate decision comes down, job

one for the company was to come into compliance with it.

And it retained Delaware counsel. Went to Delaware

Secretary of State. Showed Delaware Secretary of State the

2020 appellate decision. Figured out how to come into

compliance with it. Complied.

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Same thing in the trial court. Job one in the trial court was to make sure that there's been compliance with the appellate decision. Justice Schecter looked at the new certificates from the Delaware Secretary of State, analyzed them against the background of the appellate decision - - - the 2020 appellate decision. Satisfied herself that there is compliance, and only then goes on to the question of how now to proceed.

different to me, though, in the sense that there - - between the time the Appellate Division acted and when it
got back to supreme court, some facts had changed, which
necessitated the court's modifying the relief that was
given in the Appellate Division order. Here, it - there was no dispute, you know, the fact that the dismissal
for lack of standing was made in 2020 was accepted by
everyone, including the court. It didn't really modify the
Appellate Division's order. It was a de novo
determination, almost, in your case because now we had new
certificates that granted standing where there were none



before. Do you - - - do - - - do you see the distinction I'm making?

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MR. JAKAB: Not really, Your Honor. Is it the - is the question directed to when the changed
circumstances happened?

JUDGE CANNATARO: The court didn't question this

- - - upon the remittitur, the court didn't question the

validity of the Appellate Division's order. It did - -
you know, it accepted the dismissal and didn't change

anything in the order. It then entertained a motion

following the issuance of the new certificates. But it

just seems like a slightly different scenario between what

happened here and what was going on in Rudiger.

MR. JAKAB: Well, it looks exactly the same to me. The circumstances have changed and the - - - the appellate remittitur said dismiss. What was dismissed? What was dismissed was a claim by a company that had been revived prior to the vote authorizing the revival. That's what had been dismissed. Now the circumstances have changed. We have a company bringing a claim that was revived after the vote authorizing the revival. That hasn't been dismissed. So that - - it's not that the trial court is changing anything about the 2020 appellate decision. It - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But that revival was not



retroactive, right? It was effective as of the date granted? That is to say, there would have still been a period during which the company is not - - - not revived, if I can put it that way.

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MR. JAKAB: I believe, Your Honor, the way these statutes work is that once you get revival - - - once you get a good standing certificate from whichever state you're chartered in, it ratifies everything that you've done before that. I know the New York statute works that way.

So to complete the thought for Judge Cannataro, the - - - the trial court then goes ahead with what has not been dismissed. A claim by the company that has been properly revived. Just as in Rudiger, the trial court went ahead with what had not been considered by the - - - by this court. And that was a number of things: the city's condemnation, and also the waste of the natural resources on the land. And so - - - and it looks perfectly analogous to me.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. JAKAB: Yeah. If I could address the - - - just the second question presented on the appeal having to do with the statute of limitations. This is governed by the principles of C.P.L.R. 3025. Those principles say that when you have a - - an amended complaint that neither offers new facts nor advances new legal theories, it

relates back to the filing of the original complaint and so there is no statute of limitations issue. There is a lot of reference in all three opinions below, as well as in the briefing to C.P.L.R. 205. And let me just explain its relevance.

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Its relevance is that sometime - - - under 3025 motions to amend, there is no time limit to bring those. There's nothing in the statute about how much time you have to bring those. And so in the exercise of discretion, sometimes some courts look to 205 as a kind of yardstick to determine if that's a reasonable amount of time to bring the motion to amend. And so that's what you see in the cases cited in the briefs. It's the motion to amend is timely, look at 205, it was brought within the six months. And so that's what happened here. As a yardstick, we are well within the six months of 205. We have about less than three months between the time of the 2020 appellate ruling and the time of the motion for leave to amend.

JUDGE RIVERA: Was it - - - was there some obstacle to filing a new action?

MR. JAKAB: Was there an obstacle?

JUDGE RIVERA: When you assessed what options you had and you took a particular choice? I'm not asking you about that. I'm asking was there an obstacle to actually filing a new action, as opposed to seeking an amendment?



MR. JAKAB: Many obstacles, Your Honor. 1 Chief 2 among which was the situation in northern Italy in the year 3 2020. Northern Italy and specifically the Lombardy region, 4 was the epicenter of Europe's outbreak of COVID-19. 5 Lombardy region had the highest per capita deaths from 6 COVID-19 of anywhere in Europe. This is - - - the Lombardy 7 region is where, as we last knew, Carla Cico lived. And so 8 the advice we were getting from Italy counsel was that 9 Haque Convention Service in northern Italy was not 10 functioning. Haque Convention Service in Italy has to go 11 through either the Italy central judicial authority or a 12 local judicial officer, and the advice we were getting was 13 that it is not functioning. Nobody could tell us when it 14 would begin functioning, when it does begin functioning, at 15 what capacity it would function, what a backlog would be. 16 And then, of course, in COVID, many people moved 17 away from where they were, particularly if it was 18

And then, of course, in COVID, many people moved away from where they were, particularly if it was dangerous. Nobody could tell us - - - we had no idea where Carla Cico actually would be. So that the risk - - - to answer Your Honor's question is, it's possible we could never again establish jurisdiction over Carla Cico or Benedetto Cico for that matter.

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JUDGE RIVERA: Did she have - - - did she have counsel at that time? Were they also in Italy?

MR. JAKAB: I don't know what her counsel



situation is in Italy. My colleague is her counsel here.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. JAKAB: But we would have to have service of

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process in a new action. The Cicos have made clear that they would be of the - - of a mind to challenge that when the time came. It would be traverse hearing with Italy process service professionals. Not to mention the year that it would take to get through this, the \$100,000 that it would take to get through this. Yes, there were many obstacles to filing a new action.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, to just go back to your first point for one second before you leave. Would it have changed your argument in this case in any way, had supreme court entered a judgment on the remittitur before the motion to amend?

MR. JAKAB: It would change my argument, to answer your question, in the sense that it would have changed the process that I used to get the relief.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So it just would have been a different kind of motion - - -

MR. JAKAB: Correct.

JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - but the same relief? And you don't see any bar post-judgment that would be damaging or fatal to your - - - to your - - - to the relief you were asking for?



MR. JAKAB: No, Your Honor. Under 5015, it's 1 2 directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 3 5015(B) says new circumstances - - - it says new evidence, 4 but there are cases that interpret it broadly. 5 circumstances and good reason for they couldn't have been 6 brought earlier; prejudice, timing, all of the things that 7 go into the discretionary calculus. So that's what we 8 would have done had there been a judgment. 9 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. MR. JAKAB: Thank you. 10 11 MR. KEMP: Good afternoon. May it please the 12 court. My name is Sean Kemp, and I'm arguing on behalf of 13

court. My name is Sean Kemp, and I'm arguing on behalf of respondents.

Your honors, the First Department majority got it

right. The - - - after the First Department dismissed appellant's claim in its entirety, there was no longer a pleading pending before the court that could be amended.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, let me --- let me ask you whether --- over here. Sorry.

MR. KEMP: All right.

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Whether - - - so put aside count 3 for a moment. Let's just leave that aside, pretend it didn't exist. There were counterclaims here, right?

And so supreme court still had in front of it counterclaims between these two parties.



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That's correct, Your Honor. MR. KEMP: 2 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Had that not been true, had 3 there been no counterclaims, then, clearly, I think the Appellate Division's dismissal order would have been final. 4 5 Right? It would be a final appealable order. You could 6 appeal it here. 7 That's correct, Your Honor. MR. KEMP: 8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But because of the pendency 9 of the counterclaims, it was not - - - you couldn't take an 10 appeal here, correct? 11 MR. KEMP: That's correct. 12 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. So then if there's 13 still something pending between these parties in supreme 14 court after the Appellate Division's ruling, why can't the 15 plaintiffs there file? You could even think of it in the form of counterclaims to the existing claims that are 16 17 there; the exact same thing they filed before? MR. KEMP: Because I think that there - - - there 18 19 was an action pending before the trial court, for sure. 20 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Right. 2.1 MR. KEMP: But there was no longer a complaint 2.2 pending that could be amended. And the motion under 23 3025(B) was to file an amended complaint. If the First 24 Department had contemplated that, they could have very

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simply added with leave to amend or file an amended

complaint within a certain period of time. They didn't do 1 2 that. 3 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: They could have, but they 4 didn't say with prejudice either. 5 MR. KEMP: No. Your Honor, it wasn't on the 6 merits. That - - - there's no dispute there. This was a 7 capacity issue, a standing issue. 8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So putting aside for a 9 moment the statute of limitations issue. The - - - what 10 your position is, I guess, then, is that what they should 11 have done is to file a new proceeding alleging exactly the 12 same things in Supreme Court? 13 MR. KEMP: Correct. After - -14 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Instead of - - - instead of 15 seeking leave to amend, to add these claims with the same 16 parties in front of the court that already had them? 17 MR. KEMP: Yes, Your Honor. And that's how it's 18 contemplated by the C.P.L.R. Is that you have the six-19 months grace period under 205, and they could have 20 recommenced an action, purchased an index number, and - -21 JUDGE SINGAS: Shouldn't we be - - -2.2 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Is the reason - -23 JUDGE SINGAS:: - - - concerned with judicial 24 economy? And - - - and why should the plaintiffs have to 25 buy another index number, only to have it meet up with this



1 case later on? And doesn't the trial court have some 2 discretion in how to move their calendar, and why should we 3 interfere with that? MR. KEMP: I think that the trial court does have 4 5 discretion to manage their calendar, but I don't think that 6 that trumps the decision from an Appellate Division. 7 there is a sense of judicial economy, I suppose. But at 8 the same time when you look at the fact that the only thing 9 that was pending before the court was our answer and 10 counterclaims, they - - - the appellant hadn't even filed 11 any type of reply. They - - - they moved to dismiss. 12 JUDGE HALLIGAN: So any - - -13 MR. KEMP: - - - so while their motion - - - I'm 14 sorry. 15 It's okay. No, go ahead. JUDGE HALLIGAN: 16 Finish. 17 MR. KEMP: While their motion to dismiss was 18 pending, then they went and did the work with the Delaware 19 Department of State. And then months - - - a month later 20 or so, they decided to make a motion to amend. 2.1 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Is there any reason to think 2.2 that the Appellate Division had top of mind the 23 counterclaims? And if so, where in the opinion would we 24 see that? 25 Well, the Appellate Division affirmed



1	the dismissal of the counterclaims the second time around.
2	I don't think that it was top of mind on the March 3rd,
3	2020.
4	JUDGE HALLIGAN: That's what I mean.
5	MR. KEMP: Yeah. That's correct.
6	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And so to the extent that
7	that their order doesn't take account of those and those
8	remain in the trial court, is it your is it your
9	position that the C.P.L.R. simply won't allow for it? Tha
10	that's not a sufficient hook in order to allow for an
11	amendment of the complaint? I'm trying to understand why
12	that is.
13	MR. KEMP: My reading of the cases and the
14	C.P.L.R. is that if there is no longer a pleading pending,
15	then there is no motion
16	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And you would distinguish a
17	pleading from counterclaims, I take it?
18	MR. KEMP: There's well, that would
19	the counterclaims were respondents pleading that was
20	pending before the court.
21	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Um-hum.
22	MR. KEMP: Okay.
23	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So it has to be your own
24	pleading, not your adversary's pleading, you're saying?
25	MR. KEMP: That's correct. Yeah.



JUDGE HALLIGAN: And where in the text of the C.P.L.R. or the cases do you see that limitation?

MR. KEMP: I think that the issue is in - - -

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established in the caselaw regarding whether or not a party can amend the pleading after it's been dismissed.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: If the only place where -
in the Appellate Division majority's opinion when they

get to that issue, there's a single case they cite which is

a Third Department case. In that Third Department case

there was no - - - there were no counterclaims. The whole

action was gone. So I'm not sure where the authority is

for that position, at least not in the Appellate Division's

decision.

MR. KEMP: I think that the - - - one of the reasons why there isn't an abundance of authority on that point in particular, as the facts are set forth in this case, is that most people will go and just commence a new action. So it wouldn't get to an appellate level.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Or maybe it's because they are granted leave in that circumstance to restate the claims they had when they fixed the - - - you know, nonfatal defect and nobody cares because they're going to be in litigation with each other anyway.

MR. KEMP: I don't think that would be the case,
Your Honor, respectfully. I think that when an action's



1 been dismissed, not on the merits - - - non-merit - -2 non-merits dismissal, that the appropriate thing to do is 3 to go purchase an index number and - - -4 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes. But I guess you're not 5 -- - you're saying something a little -- - you said 6 something a little different before, which is that that's 7 not what people do - - - that that is what people do in the circumstance where there still is - - - are counterclaims 8 9 pending, they pay the extra fee instead of just joining it 10 in the existing action between the same parties. I don't -11 - - I don't know that. 12 MR. KEMP: I don't know that to be the case 13 either, Your Honor. But I know that there's provisions 14 made in the C.P.L.R. for exactly what happened here. And 15 making a motion to - - - for leave to amend is not the same 16 as commencing an action under 205. 17 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: There is no question that 18 the supreme court still has jurisdiction over the parties 19 because of the pendency of the counterclaims, right? 20 MR. KEMP: That's correct. 2.1 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. 2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, on the counterclaims, who 23 are the parties? 24 MR. KEMP: I - - - I'm sorry? 25 JUDGE RIVERA: Is it - - - who are the parties?



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1	Is the company a party in that counterclaim?
2	MR. KEMP: The individuals?
3	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
4	MR. KEMP: The individuals are a party.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: But is the company a party?
6	MR. KEMP: I don't believe so, Your Honor.
7	JUDGE RIVERA: They were limited. And I know
8	there's another company, but that's the company we're
9	really talking about.
10	MR. KEMP: Yes. I I don't believe so, Your
11	Honor.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. What's your position on
13	this issue I was asking about before regarding the third
14	cause of action?
15	MR. KEMP: My position is that the complaint was
16	dismissed in its entirety, that's what we were seeking.
17	And that the third cause of action went out with the
18	dismissal.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: But it does perhaps I've
20	misunderstood supreme court, but it does seem supreme court
21	didn't see it that way. There there's 's a bit of
22	tension there, I agree, because I do think supreme court
23	recognizes that it's a dismissal. But there are various
24	notations about this third cause of action. And it is set



forth in the second amended complaint. It's set forth in

the third amended complaint.

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MR. KEMP: It's set forth in the - - - in both complaints; you're correct, Your Honor. However, I don't think that the Appellate Division made any distinction when it rendered its - - - its decision and it said that the action was dismissed in its entirety. It was an unconditional dismissal. Like I had mentioned before, they could have said very easily - - - you know, dismissed with leave to amend.

JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. Or these causes of action against these parties are dismissed. Was this issue about that third cause of action raised in the briefs to the Appellate Division? Again, he raised it in his reply.

MR. KEMP: No, Your Honor. I don't believe that that third cause of action issue is raised in any other briefing.

JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you.

MR. KEMP: If there's nothing further, I'll rest on my papers.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MR. KEMP: Thank you.

MR. JAKAB: Just very briefly to respond to Judge Rivera's question. It's in the record at 57, first counterclaim, breach of operating agreement against Upper East Side Suites; that's the company. The company is party



to the counterclaims. A simple answer. I wish all the
answers were so simple.

JUDGE RIVERA: Thank you. Let me - - - I'd like
to follow up on some of these questions regarding the
counterclaims. Let's assume for one moment the complaint
is dismissed. Let's put aside this third cause of action

issue. Could you have moved to amend if all that is

pending are counterclaims? What would be amended?

MR. JAKAB: It's an - - it's an excellent question, and it's a - - it comes from this adage that we see in the decision below. We heard counsel just say, no pleading left to amend.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

MR. JAKAB: Okay. I - - - I tried to touch on this in the briefing. That adjudication by catchphrase like this is usually not the best idea. You have to get beneath the catchphrase, see what its origins are. What are the principles underneath it? How do they apply to your case?

JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't it - - - isn't it correct textually that the C.P.L.R. does speak of pleadings?

MR. JAKAB: Yes, certainly.

JUDGE RIVERA: I mean, supreme court referred to the action, but that's not what the C.P.L.R. says.



MR. JAKAB: It - - - this adage that there's no pleading to amend, you know, it conjures the image of a - - of a claimant who is looking for the pleading to physically try to amend it. That's not what goes on. What goes on is the claimant comes with a revised pleading and asks to be permitted to proceed with it. And the question is should he - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And at that point there isn't a pleading because the court has already dismissed it, right?

MR. JAKAB: Right.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And you typically - - - forget about an appeal, right? You're just in supreme court.

MR. JAKAB: Okay.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The defendant moves to dismiss, right? And it's past the twenty days, so you've got to get leave to amend. Defendant moves to dismiss; court grants the motion to dismiss and grants leave to amend the pleading. When the court grant - - - dismisses the pleading, there isn't any pleading any longer, yet you can still amend it?

MR. JAKAB: Precisely. Dismissed pleadings are amended every day. This happens normally. This adage that there's no pleading to amend is a - - - it's a terrible



adage and - - - and it should be disapproved. It's - - the question is, should you be allowed to proceed with your amended pleading or not? And if it was a dismissal on the merits, with prejudice, like each one of the cases that uses this adage is, that's a threshold question and the answer is going to be no. There are ways to get relief from dismissals with prejudice. But -JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. We can - - -MR. JAKAB: 3025 is not one of them. JUDGE RIVERA: - - - I understand your point there about amending something that was dismissed coming back to the well, but it depends on what you want to amend it for. So we're back to my question before about the

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MR. JAKAB: The answer to your Honor's question is, yes, the counterclaims are another hook for what should be amended. The answer to that is yes.

resuscitation, if you will, of this company.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But your view is, I take it, is that any dismissal without prejudice, provided that there's no entry below, can still be amended; notwithstanding the Appellate Division's dismissal?

MR. JAKAB: No. My position is that it can be brought to the court for exercise of its discretion.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Yeah. But the - - - but the court has discretion - - -



MR. JAKAB: Has discretion.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - -in any circumstance, even where the Appellate Division dismisses, provided that it's without prejudice.

MR. JAKAB: It's very circumstance-specific, but yes. Rudiger says if there's changed circumstances, yes. The inherent powers doctrine says if it's about docket management and litigation management before the trial court - - like this case is, then yes. The trial court should always have discretion to say whether it's going to proceed with a new action or a - - an action in the existing case where everybody is already a party; where there's been lots of rulings in the case already, important ones; where discovery is more than half done; and it has - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But again, doesn't it - - doesn't it turn on what it is you wish to correct? And
it's whether or not that can be corrected through an
amended pleading. The Appellate Division's position was
no, at that point the only corrective action you could have
taken was to file. You - - - you've dealt with the
certificates, but then you file - - - then you have to file
a new action. Right? That's the import of that.

MR. JAKAB: I - - - I don't see why that would be the case. You certainly have to comply with the substantive ruling of the appellate decision - - -



2 MR. JAKAB: - - - and that's what we did. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - because at the time you 4 filed, you didn't have standing. And you can't cure that -5 - - you can't go back to correct that. I understood the 6 Appellate Division to be - - - majority to be taking that 7 position. You cannot correct that, other than by 8 addressing the standing issue and then you file again. 9 MR. JAKAB: Addressing the standing issue and 10 then coming to the court and asking to proceed. Now that the standing issue has been - - -11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Except that doesn't cure - - - as 13 I understood the majority, that doesn't cure the actual 14 basis for the dismissal. The basis for the dismissal was 15 you didn't have standing at the time you filed, and that 16 cannot change. You may - - - you may now be in a position 17 to be able to file a claim, but you didn't have it at that 18 time and that's why that's dismissed. That's, again - - -19 that's how I understood the majority. And I just want to 20 be clear on what your response is to that? 2.1 MR. JAKAB: I'd like to respond to exactly that. 2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: Yes. 23 MR. JAKAB: The - - - the company had standing 24 when it filed the action. There came a time when Mr. Cico 25 resigns quietly, without telling anybody at the Delaware

JUDGE RIVERA: Because - - -



1 Secretary of State, as the person authorized to accept 2 service of process. That resignation resulted in the loss 3 of good standing at Delaware Secretary of State, happened in the middle of the case. The Cicos, in one of their many 4 5 motions, brought that to the court's attention. 6 addressed it. We addressed it the way we thought we were 7 supposed to address it; go and put somebody else in that 8 position at the Delaware Secretary of State and then 9 The 2020 appellate decision said it happened in 10 the wrong order; should have voted first, revived second. 11 We disagreed with that, but we acknowledge that it's 12 binding and we went and complied with it. 13 compliance should relate back to the very beginning. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 15 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. 16 MR. JAKAB: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 (Court is adjourned)

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CERTIFICATION I, Chrishanda Sassman-Reynolds, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Favorite v. Cicos, No. 17 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: February 20, 2024

