1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	
4	CELINETTE H. H.,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 60
	MICHELLE R. and WILLIE R.,
7	Respondents.
8	20 Eagle Street
9	Albany, New York September 12, 2023
LO	Before:
L1	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
L2	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
L3	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
L4	Appearances:
.5	CAROL KAHN, ESQ. CAROL KAHN
L 6	Attorney for Appellant
_7	P.O. Box 1592 New York, NY 10028
L8	GEOFFREY P. BERMAN, ESQ.
	GEOFFREY BERMAN
L9	Attorney for Respondent Willie R. 2005 Palmer Avenue
20	Suite 176 Larchmont, NY 10538
21	PHILIP KATZ, ESQ.
22	FINK & KATZ
23	Attorney for Children 299 Broadway
24	Suite 1803 New York, NY 10007
	Ashley Bennett
25	Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The next matter on the calendar is number 60, matter of Celinette H.H. v. Michelle R. Counsel.

2.1

2.2

MS. KAHN: Carol Kahn, attorney for Celinette
H.H. The mother, Celinette H.H., dismissal of her
enforcement without prejudice to refile as a custody
petition when the COVID siege was over - - I'm sorry.
The - - the mother appeals the dismissal of her
enforcement writ without prejudice to refile as a custody
petition when the COVID freeze lifts, to reclaim three
children wrongfully detained by the father in South
Carolina after overstaying a three-month vacation. And the
writ was dismissed without prejudice to refile the custody
petition.

The trial court ruled the mother lacked subject matter jurisdiction to file her writ because she never previously filed a custody petition. What we claim is wrong with this is that New York takes a functional approach to the foundation proceeding that will support an enforcement writ. For example, in matter of Miranda D. (sic), you didn't need a custody petition or even a visitation petition to create a jurisdictional foundation for a mother, who was the respondent in a neglect proceeding, to bring in an enforcement writ to enforce her right created by the neglect petition brought by ACS, which



gave her supervised visitation in New York. What I'm saying is, a liberty interest create - - - can be created in a petition where the person who has the liberty interest is not the petitioner. So long as they're a party to the foundation proceeding, they - - - their liberty interest can be created and can be enforced by a subsequent writ.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

In this case, it was not the mother who filed the foundation proceeding; it was the paternal grandmother. Now, the paternal grandmother originally filed a custody proceeding which was converted into a visitation proceeding. And you have to look at the UCCJEA, which is an interstate compact to which New York and South Carolina are both signatories. And the UCCJEA says a visitation petition, as a term of art, is a first custody proceeding as to all the parties to that visitation proceeding. this case, there was a visitation proceeding in New York Family Court in 2018 initiated by the maternal (sic) grandmother. She initiated it as a custody proceeding; it was converted into a visitation proceeding. But whatever it was called, under the UCCJEA, it functioned as a first custody proceeding as to everybody for the following - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Did it matter whether the father participated in that proceeding - - -

MS. KAHN: Yes.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - or not?



MS. KAHN: Yes. He was a party to it. I - - - I got to explain further. One of the problems with this case is the law is interesting, but the facts are very complicated. And you can't understand the relevant law until you understand this horrible mess of facts. And the facts that you need to understand are in the foundation proceeding, the visitation case. The - - - the rest of it is pretty - - relatively straightforward. Not to - - -

2.1

In the visitation case, you have to look at three documents. You have to look at the visitation petition, you have to look at a stipulation between the mother and the maternal (sic) grandmother, and then you have to look at the consent order, which says there was an allocution to which the father was a party.

Now if you look - - - first of all, the petition in the prior visitation case says the mother and the children have lived at 140th Street in Manhattan for nine years. The paternal grandmother also lives in New York. The father lives in South Carolina. The grandmother is seeking custody - - - she was originally seeking custody, and she converted her custody petition into a visitation petition. And the stipulation between the mother and the paternal grandmother is the paternal grandmother will pick the kids up at school in New York and deliver them to the physical custody of the mother every night she has

1	visitation, in New York at the mother's at the mother
2	and children's residence. Now, this is established both in
3	that stipulation and in the petition, the visitation
4	petition.
5	Now, the grandmother is acknowledging she's not
6	getting custody out of thin air, she's getting it from the
7	physical custody of the mother in New York where the mothe:
8	lives with the children for nine years. And the father, in
9	the consent order on the visitation case, allocuted
10	he consented to this. He appeared and allocuted knowing
11	what was the contents of this order. Now, that means many
12	things. That means number one, the mother had physical
13	custody. Number two, the father appeared and was a party
14	to that. Number three, New York is the home state, which

Now, the reason - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Excuse me, can I ask you, is - is that what Judge Arias meant when she came on a call
and said, I have a custody order here. Is it the - - -

has exclusive jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law 76.

MS. KAHN: Yes.

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - visitation - - -

MS. KAHN: That's - - - that's - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - order - - -

MS. KAHN: --- what I'm --- that's what I'm saying. That was her shorthand way of saying there's a

custody order here. And that's why she was - -1 2 JUDGE CANNATARO: Can I - - - can I also ask you 3 4 MS. KAHN: Yeah. 5 JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - how did we know that 6 that's true as opposed - - - there were a number of 7 temporary orders of custody that had been issued at some 8 point previously, or maybe - - - I don't know when, you can 9 tell me when, but I'm - - - I'm just curious to know why we 10 know that what Judge Arias is talking about is the visitation order and not something else. 11 12 MS. KAHN: The reason we know it is because she 13 said to the father - - - I think it's about A33 to A35 of 14 the - - - of the record. She said the mother has custody. 15 She said I'm granting this writ. She said if you - - - if 16 you have safety concerns, she said, you can file a 17 modification petition. And obviously, since the only 18 petition that had been filed in the past was this so-called 19 visitation petition, which under the UCCJEA is a first 20 custody petition - - -2.1 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I'm sorry. Are you - -2.2 MS. KAHN: Yeah. 23 JUDGE GARCIA: - - - are you - - - is your 24 argument that that proceeding, which resulted in these



visitation rights, resolved custody between father and

25

1	mother?
2	MS. KAHN: Well, it resolved
3	JUDGE GARCIA: Impliedly.
4	MS. KAHN: that the mother was the physical
5	custodian, and that the father, if he wanted to to
6	modify and he had consented to the grandmother's only
7	getting one hour of visitation during you know,
8	during a school week. And any other visitation in that
9	same order was limited when they weren't in school, was
LO	limited to one hour.
L1	JUDGE GARCIA: Is your argument that then by
L2	doing that he is conceding that mother has sole custody?
L3	MS. KAHN: He's conceding physical custody to
L4	her. Assuming that he has joint custody, in order to
L5	modify that that relationship with the grandmother,
L6	he's got to come to New York and modify it.
L7	JUDGE GARCIA: So if those proceedings had never
L8	taken place
L9	MS. KAHN: Excuse me?
20	JUDGE GARCIA: If those proceedings had never
21	taken place, hypothetical
22	MS. KAHN: Exactly.
23	JUDGE GARCIA: hypothetical. If they had



judge entertain this habeas?

24

25

not taken place and this proceeding was brought, could the

,	MC KAIN, Wall the maint the maint was
1	MS. KAHN: Well, the point the point was
2	this, the mother filed her habeas petition
3	JUDGE GARCIA: No, no, but could you answer my
4	hypothetical?
5	MS. KAHN: Yeah.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: So this is not this case, I
7	understand, but if there were no prior proceedings, could
8	the mother come into this courtroom with this habeas
9	proceeding?
10	MS. KAHN: I think she could because what
11	what she well, she would say instead that the father
12	has to file a modification petition to establish what
13	visitation he wants.
14	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, let me let me
15	try Judge Garcia's question differently a little bit. I
16	look at DRL section 70 and it seems to say that you can -
17	- you can file a habeas petition without any it
18	doesn't it makes no reference to any prior proceedir
19	at all. It seems to say, on its face, that you can
20	initiate a proceeding under habeas. So I'm not I
21	mean we understand
22	MS. KAHN: Okay.
23	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: at least I understand
24	the argument you've made that



MS. KAHN: Right.

25

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: - - - turns - - - right.

But it seems to me you have a simpler argument, that I do

find in your papers, although not - - - you know, not as
- it's not like in - - - highlighted.

MS. KAHN: Uh-huh.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But that the Domestic Relations Law, section 70, and then you also refer, I think, to Family Court Act 651 and DRL 240.

MS. KAHN: Right.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: All either together or independently give you the right to start the proceeding even if there had been no prior order.

MS. KAHN: Okay. I'm - - I'm happy to concede that, but I mean my - - - my real concern in this case, and I don't want to jump ahead, but I don't have - - - I don't know how much extra time I'm going to get - - - is that assuming the mother certainly has an enforcement writ because the father - - - the grandmother was not - - - the grandmother clearly, under her visitation right from the first proceeding, didn't have the right to leave the kids in South Carolina. And the judge, in the middle of - - - in colloquy says to the grandmother, go down and get the kids. And the grandmother says, no, I like - - - I think the father's a better custodian. So she was clearly in violation of her visitation order. But the judge said, if

I put her in jail for contempt, I don't get the kids back.

2.2

So at that point, the judge - - - anyhow, the judge on the writ was careful to serve him properly by - - by a 3085 order for the only way she could reach him at that point since he had cut off all contact with the mother. Oh, well, he violated the mother's right to custody by cutting off all contact. She couldn't get the kids back. So since he was a party to that first order, you know, her - - her rights, and - - and the children were still New York residents because they lived with her, and then they went south and they were there for five months. It takes six months to create new home state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, look at Domestic Relations

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But Counselor, as the Chief Judge just said, couldn't she just have proceeded with the habeas?

MS. KAHN: Well, the problem - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Regardless.

MS. KAHN: Yeah. The problem with a habeas, it's more complicated because I have a feeling that the trial magistrate who dismissed this case without prejudice, dismissed it not because she thought, really, that there was a lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the habeas, but because she had been told that the South Carolina

Marshal would not enforce the writ unless she could establish emergency temporary jurisdiction to show that the mother - - - the father had been a dangerous father to the children. That's not necessary where there has been a wrongful taking. That's under 76-c, and that's a whole other layer.

2.1

2.2

But one of the problems under the UCCJEA is the different - - different states interpret it differently. So I think what the reason why the trial judge acted - - - and the reason why, it seems to me clear, that the magistrate who dismissed the case knew that there had to be subject matter jurisdiction for the writ, was Judge Arias, who had conducted prior colloquy, had already said I - - - you know, the writ is granted, and - - and a temporary custody order had been granted. And then it was revoked by the magistrate because the magistrate heard that the South Carolina Marshal would not enforce the writ order - - would not issue a warrant unless the mother could establish emergency jurisdiction under 73 - - Domestic Relations

Law 73-c (sic).

JUDGE GARCIA: So Counsel - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So Counsel - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - was your - - - was your position in front of the family court that - - -

MS. KAHN: I wasn't the trial lawyer.



	that we have what is, in essence, a custody order, we don't
3	need anything else, we just want the writ X, or
4	MS. KAHN: Yes.
5	JUDGE GARCIA: did you ask for custody
6	- your client ask for a custody determination?
7	MS. KAHN: Well, she did both, and the reason for
8	it was because she felt that South Carolina would, if she
9	got a custody order, she could then docket it in South
10	Carolina and South Carolina would have to honor it.
11	JUDGE GARCIA: Did she ask for that order based
12	on the prior proceedings, or did she ask for that order in
13	a new determination of custody between the parents?
14	MS. KAHN: I $ -$ I think the idea was that
15	under 103(c) of the CPLR, if you've got subject matter and
16	personal jurisdiction under the writ and the writ isn't the
17	appropriate form of proceeding, it can be converted.
18	JUDGE GARCIA: And where in the record is that?
19	That your client asked for that in family court?
20	MS. KAHN: It's I know I cited it in the
21	brief, I I don't remember it the the
22	- it's the citation to the record is there. I know it was
23	her trial counsel who specifically asked, under 651(b),
24	that the custody order be granted.
25	JUDGE SINGAS: And Counsel what what relies

JUDGE GARCIA: Your client's, was the position



are you asking for from us? 1 2 MS. KAHN: Well, I would - - - I would like you 3 to do both, I would like you to grant the writ, but I would 4 also like you to look at - - - to analyze this underlying 5 problem that I think - - - I mean what do you do when - - -6 and - - - and this happens a lot, the two - - - two states 7 interpret the UCCJEA differently. In fact, there's a law 8 review article, which I didn't tell you about, but you 9 might like to read on your own, called Jurisdictional 10 Boomerang, and it's about the problems with the UCCJEA 11 because two states interpret it differently. 12 So what I'm saying is, what good does it do the 13 14 15

mother if you give her a writ and the kid is still in South Carolina at an unknown - - - I mean, I got an address from the police department, but they didn't give it to me under oath. And I - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry, Counsel, just a little clarity on this point about the analysis under the - - -

MS. KAHN: And - - - and - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - under that particular Is your argument that if a - - - if there had statute. been an order of custody in favor of the mother -

> MS. KAHN: Yeah.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - that the - - - that - -

MS. KAHN: So -



1	JUDGE RIVERA: the other jurisdiction would
2	not have recognized that order?
3	MS. KAHN: No, no, they
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Put aside the writ for the moment.
5	MS. KAHN: would have.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Just the order.
7	MS. KAHN: They well, they would have
8	she could have docketed it as a custody order in South
9	Carolina.
10	JUDGE RIVERA: So what is it that then that
11	Judge Arias did or didn't do that created an obstacle
12	MS. KAHN: Well, she got
13	JUDGE RIVERA: to the mother doing exactly
14	
15	MS. KAHN: she got off
16	JUDGE RIVERA: what you described?
17	MS. KAHN: the case. Judge Arias got off
18	the case, gave it to a magistrate to hold an inquest, and a
19	and issue a warrant on the writ because she felt that
20	there was
21	JUDGE RIVERA: So
22	MS. KAHN: jurisdiction.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Judge Arias issued the writ
24	even though she was talking about custody and didn't sign
25	an order of custody? Just to be clear



1	MS. KAHN: Yeah, there was a
2	JUDGE RIVERA: obviously this writ
3	MS. KAHN: temporary
4	JUDGE RIVERA: and what the judge
5	MS. KAHN: Oh, oh.
6	JUDGE RIVERA: did or didn't do.
7	MS. KAHN: Well, there was a temporary order of
8	custody issued. And then Judge Arias said to the
9	magistrate, hold an you know, send a notice of
10	inquest, hold an inquest, and then issue a warrant. But
11	the whole trouble was the magistrate never issued a notice
12	of inquest. She then held an inquest, but it would have
13	it would have lacked due process because she it
14	says right in the record there was no notice of inquest.
15	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So after that, Counsel
16	MS. KAHN: Yeah.
17	JUDGE HALLIGAN: it looks to me like the
18	determination by family court was that your client had
19	failed to file a petition for custody.
20	MS. KAHN: Right.
21	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And and could she have
22	filed a petition for custody at that point?
23	MS. KAHN: No.
24	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Why not?
25	MS. KAHN: Because this was during the COVID



1	freeze, and there were three administrative orders issued
2	by the chief judge of the family court, and and the
3	two sub-administrative judges holding up all custody
4	petitions until the COVID freeze ended. There was
5	JUDGE HALLIGAN: And is that point clear from the
6	record? I take it you're saying she couldn't have filed -
7	after being told there was no pending custody petition,
8	I take it you're saying COVID freeze precluded her from
9	doing that. Is that point
10	MS. KAHN: And and then about a month later
11	she was able to file. But when she filed her writ
12	petition, the COVID freeze was in effect, and she could not
13	file.
14	JUDGE HALLIGAN: But after she was told that
15	_
16	MS. KAHN: She did file. But the problem
17	oh, and the the idea was, even though this writ was
18	dismissed without prejudice, I'm saying she was prejudiced
19	by the dismissal because in the writ petition she got both
20	personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the father.
21	He appeared, testified
22	JUDGE HALLIGAN: But but just so
23	MS. KAHN: and then and then he just,
24	you know, dropped the phone. But she couldn't get personal
25	jurisdiction over him when she refiled the custody



1	proceeding
2	JUDGE HALLIGAN: I see.
3	MS. KAHN: because he disappeared. So that
4	
5	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel.
6	MS. KAHN: why she was prejudiced by the
7	dismissal of the writ without prejudice. But what I'm
8	saying to is, I don't know that she's going to be benefited
9	if you just grant her if you say it was wrong to
10	dismiss the writ because functionally, the prior visitation
11	proceeding really was her first custody proceeding to the
12	mother. That's not going to do her a whole lot of good to
13	get the kids back from South Carolina if the South Carolina
14	Marshal won't enforce her writ I mean, won't enforce
15	the warrant on the writ without proof of temporary
16	emergency jurisdiction.
17	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Okay. Thank you, Counsel.
18	MS. KAHN: Okay. Thank you.
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Counsel, you may want to
20	stay for
21	MS. KAHN: Sure.
22	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: the balance of the
23	argument.
24	MS. KAHN: I'm sorry.
25	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: That's all right.



MR. KATZ: May it please the court, Philip Katz, the attorney for the children.

2.1

2.2

Your Honor, I think while Counsel's arguments are compelling, I think, as was alluded to by the court, it's a lot simpler than that. This is a case where there was a - - - my clients were living in New York for years. They go on a visitation based on a - - - on a visitation order in 2020, in the summer, that was issued for the grandmother, the paternal grandmother. Grandmother takes the children to South Carolina to visit their father, doesn't return them. That's when Counsel's client files her writ petition.

That writ petition, absolutely, without any regard for whether there was a prior custody order or getting into the semantics of any of that, under DRL 70, instilled within the court, the right - - - the jurisdiction to issue a writ. And in fact, it did issue a writ. But over the course of a year, as you've heard and you've seen in the record - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: But - - -

MR. KATZ: Yes.

JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - the court issued the writ after stating that there was an underlying custody order, apparently, you would think, aware of what the current First Department law is on that issue. And I certainly



The one spouse

don't - - - I mean did - - - did the mother ever argue to 1 2 the family court? It doesn't matter that there is or isn't 3 a custody order? 4 MR. KATZ: So I was there, so I was - - - and I 5 don't recall that, and I don't see that in the record. 6 I don't think that's necessarily relevant to the issuance 7 of a writ. I think - - -8 JUDGE GARCIA: But Counsel, is your argument that 9 the writ issues for the violation of the visitation order? 10 Is that what - - -No, what I'm saying - - -11 MR. KATZ: 12 JUDGE GARCIA: Let's say you have a couple, they 13 have joint custody, one spouse takes the kids to New Jersey 14 for the week and goes to the shore. Can the other spouse 15 go in and get a writ? 16 MR. KATZ: So the - - - the answer is, arguably, 17 yes, the court has the power to consider that. Absolutely, 18 the court has the power to consider that, and the court 19 should consider that. Of course, Your Honors has certain 20 facts that make it obvious that it's not appropriate in 21 that case - - -22 JUDGE GARCIA: But what's the - - - as I 23 understand it - - - and I think section 70's title - - -24 what's the unlawful detention there, right? We have joint 25



custody - - - the couple has joint custody.

takes the kids to New Jersey for the - - - for the week to 1 2 the shore. And what would be the authority under habeas 3 corpus for child detained by parent to issue a writ? 4 MR. KATZ: So the - - - the facts that Your Honor 5 are describing, I still would argue the court has the right 6 to, at least, consider it, and make sure those are the 7 facts. 8 JUDGE GARCIA: Well, let's say we - - - there's 9 an argument that that's not a good result - - -10 MR. KATZ: Right. JUDGE GARCIA: - - - what would the distinction 11 12 be? 13 MR. KATZ: The distinction here is that the court 14 is aware from the history, at the very least, that these 15 children were living with their mother. Forgetting about 16 whether there's a valid custody order, a visitation order, 17 or whether the visitation order should be called a - - -18 considered a custody order the UCCJEA. I submit to the

JUDGE GARCIA: So is - - - in essence you have to come in and prove you have custody, and in one way or another, and isn't that asking the court to make a custody determination?

court that that's not really what the analysis is.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. KATZ: I don't think you have to prove you have custody, Your Honor. I think the purpose - - - my -



- - my ask of this court is to consider the court's power of issuing a writ under DRL 70, its power to protect these children under the doctrine of parens patriae, is one where the court is obligated to take a look and see if these children are safe. And this court didn't do that. It failed to do that.

2.1

2.2

JUDGE GARCIA: But you have an interstate component here, and I think Counsel alluded to that. And we have some issues with enforcement, which I'm concerned about, and I feel like I don't have a good idea about from - - - from what I've read. What would the effect of New York's enforcement capability, a New York family court judge, issuing a writ like that in South Carolina, right, I mean, without a custody determination?

MR. KATZ: So let me say this to Your Honor first, in sort of answering that question. I - - - I was reading recently a study, and I'm sure this wouldn't be a surprise in terms of these numbers to this court, that was done by Columbia University and an organization called Robin Hood. It's a 2017 study that finds that in the City of New York there are a quarter million single-parent households. And in those households live approximately 580,000 children. So this - - - so they are coming to these family courts every day with these types of situations. There is a mother or a father who's been



1 taking care of a child or children for years. If the other 2 parent wants to come in and just take that child out and 3 walk into another state with those children, as far as I'm 4 asking this court, this court should tell every court 5 beneath it, that it should take a look to make sure that 6 they're not detained. Issue the writ. CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Let me - - - let me ask you 7 8 a question. My understanding, generally, of the writ of 9 habeas corpus is it's a command to bring the body of a 10 person to the court. 11

MR. KATZ: Correct.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: That's what it is.

MR. KATZ: That's all it is.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: It brings the - - - the subject of the writ in front of the court.

MR. KATZ: Correct.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: The court, from that point, needs some other vehicle if it's going to determine custody or whatever, but the purpose of the writ is just to bring the person.

> That is correct. MR. KATZ:

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So as I understand Judge Garcia's hypothetical to you out in the Jersey Shore, say my wife takes the kids there and I don't know about it, I could come to court and say that. The court might well



deny the writ on his facts, right? 1 2 MR. KATZ: Sure. 3 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: If it granted the writ, that 4 doesn't mean that I would get custody. It means it would 5 then have a determination about that problem. 6 MR. KATZ: That's right. 7 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Likewise, if my wife, 8 instead, which she would never do, took the kids to Chile 9 and didn't return for a year and I filed the writ, I would 10 hope I would get a somewhat different result. And as to the interjurisdictional, in that case, you know, Chilean 11 12 problem, you'd have a real problem with service. 13 this case the defendant had appeared, and so you don't have 14 a problem with service. 15 MR. KATZ: That's correct. There's absolutely no 16 problem with service. In fact, the defendant just hung up 17 the phone when he didn't like what he was hearing. And 18 that's exactly what happened. 19 JUDGE GARCIA: Do you think there's any -- what 20 does section 71 - - - it says "detained", but section A 21 says, "where a minor child is residing within the state", 22 right? 23 MR. KATZ: And that's another good question, Your



So - - - and I've provided some case law in my - -

Where a party takes a child outside

24

25

Honor.

- in my letter brief.

of the jurisdiction, this court has said, in fact I - - - I think I refer - - -

2.2

JUDGE GARCIA: Because just to back it up, what - the problem I have with comparing a writ, habeas writ,
to just bringing someone to court, I mean that's kind of
like a subpoena. And I guess if you're within the state,
no harm no foul, the court has jurisdiction, everyone come
to court. Where you're dealing with another sovereign,
South Carolina, they're going to look at what you've done,
and they may take a very different view of - - - use this
like a subpoena. So don't you think we should consider New
York's enforceability rights, and the way states look at
what we're doing here, when we issue a writ, and whether or
not they're going to honor it, when we make a determination
of what you need to get a writ in the first place?

MR. KATZ: Well, that's a great question, Your Honor, and I think that DRL 70 is a - - a UCCJEA-supported statute. And in fact, if - - if the defendant father had a concern, he could very well have gone to the court in South Carolina and filed something, and then there would have been a UCCJEA conference. It happens all the time. And then it could have been reconciled, but he didn't do that, which should have made this court in New York more worried about what was going on. You have a defendant who hangs up the phone. You have a history of a



case where you have the mother who had the - - - who had these three children in New York for years. Father conceded as much when he - - he consented to the order giving the paternal grandmother access, returning the child to the mother at the end of the access, so this is not the Jersey Shore example.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So what - - - what happens as a practical matter? I take it from your brief, you - - - you are of the view that the children are still in New York State for purposes of DRL 70.

MR. KATZ: That's true.

2.2

response to the Chief Judge indicates, the function of the writ is to secure the children physically, bring them to the state, I - - - I take it that, first of all, you have to figure out how to enforce that vis-a-vis the South Carolina authorities. And secondly, once the child gets here, if the enforcement is viable, does then a custody determination need to be made? I - - - I take it from your answer to the Chief that - - - that the habeas proceeding itself is not dispositive of a custody dispute.

MR. KATZ: Correct. The habeas position, Your Honor, is not the conclusion.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So - - -

MR. KATZ: It's the start.



JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - so can - - - how do we know, and - - - and this goes to Judge Garcia's point, I think, whether South Carolina will, in fact, respect a DRL Section 70 order and assist in the - - - the return of the children to the state, if - - - if the order were so issued?

MR. KATZ: So I believe, and this is, again, just my understanding based upon the facts of this particular

2.1

2.2

my understanding based upon the facts of this particular case, that the problem with getting the order enforced in the first place is that it was a temporary custody order.

And I think that was something that was difficult for Counsel's - - Counsel's client to get enforced because it was a temporary custody order.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But you think a habeas writ would be enforced even though a temporary custody order would not be?

MR. KATZ: So I think a habeas - - - habeas writ will either be enforced, or at the very least, it could be - - it could be domesticated and considered there. I don't think these court - - - the courts of this state should - - should not act because they're concerned about what another state will do. This court should focus on what's best for these children. That's this - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Do you agree with Counsel that that's what stopped the referee in this case, the



- 1	
2	to
3	MR. KATZ: No
4	JUDGE CANNATARO: enforce the order?
5	MR. KATZ: I don't believe that at all.
6	No, I don't believe that at all. I mean I believe I
7	honest I mean there was a combination of things. I
8	think we heard about COVID, we heard about fatigue I
9	think some fatigue with this case. I I think it was
LO	a bad decision, and that's, I think, why we are here, we'r
L1	here
L2	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I may have misunderstood.
L3	thought the point was that they didn't think that the
L4	mother had a custody order, that she's got to go file for
L5	that so they can determine whether or not she should have
L 6	custody
L7	MR. KATZ: So
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: versus the father.
L9	MR. KATZ: it's a fair point
20	JUDGE RIVERA: Legal and physical.
21	MR. KATZ: Your Honor, that that was said,
22	but I'm in those family courts every day
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh.
24	MR. KATZ: and that's not how it works.
25	When you're in those family courts, if if a child is

intimidation by the fact that South Carolina wasn't going



brought in pursuant to a writ, they're able to talk to
their attorney, which these children weren't able to talk
to me at that time. I've spoken with them previous to that
and post that, but at that time, their father kept them
away from me. They talked to their attorney. Then the
court exercises its parens patriae authority and
responsibility to make sure those children are safe. And
that may be directing a party or both parties to file
custody petitions to figure things out.

JUDGE CANNATARO: Counsel, I need to ask before
your time's up.

MR. KATZ: Yes.

2.1

2.2

JUDGE CANNATARO: This is a fascinating discussion about what the jurisdictional predicates for a writ are and whether it would be enforceable or not. Why wasn't any of this passed upon at the Appellate Division? I'm trying desperately to understand why the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal.

MS. KAHN: Can you explain?

MR. KATZ: I cannot - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, you can explain too, but I want to hear his answer.

MR. KATZ: I cannot explain why it happened. I mean, it's disappointing that it did happen, but I cannot explain why it happened. I honestly can't.



1 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, it seems, based on your 2 prior answer, that they don't see the practicalities the 3 way you do, right? They're saying you've got to have a 4 custody order before you can go about the business of 5 demanding that these children be brought back to New York. 6 MR. KATZ: And I think - - - I mean, I can - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Maybe that's right, maybe that's 8 wrong, but that seems to be the Appellate Division's - - -9 MR. KATZ: Maybe they were focusing - - -10 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - the law they developed. 11 -- on DRL 76 not on 70. MR. KATZ: 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. 13 MR. KATZ: And quite frankly, if you're looking 14 at DRL 76, I do not think this court should rule in a way, 15 in this case, that sends the message to the lower courts 16 that custody is simply an order. It's not simply an order. 17 There are facts - - -18 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, would all of - - -19 MR. KATZ: - - - that have to be involved. 20 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - this have been avoided if at 2.1 the point in time when she's filing the writ or at some 2.2 point during the various appearances before Judge Arias, at 23 that point, she files a petition for custody. Would it 24 have, perhaps, avoided some of this given the Appellate



25

Division's law?

MR. KATZ: So I do not have a crystal ball, it
may have, it very well may have. But it shouldn't have
been dispositive, is what I'm saying to you.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. BERMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honors. My
name is Geoffrey P. Berman, and I represent the respondent,

Mr. Willie R.

2.1

2.2

Yes, I think it's absolutely accurate that the main issue here is the interpretation of Domestic Relations Law, Section 70. And the question - - - the - - - the - - - on its face, the statute says that either parent can apply for a writ. However, both the First Department and the Second Department have interpreted it to mean that there has to be a prior order of custody in place to give the parent a greater right to the custody of the child. So for example, as Your Honor said, one parent can't go to Jersey - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, where in the law is that required? I understand you're saying that's the way they interpreted it. Where - - - where is that - - - that's not what the section says. What's the hook for that?

MR. BERMAN: Right, so the - - - so the statute is silent on that. And the - - - departments have said that, I think their reasoning, while they're not long decisions, they do say that the one parent has to have a



greater right to custody than the other, which would be set 1 2 forth in an order of custody. 3 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So historically, when the 4 writ of habeas corpus was used in England, and one parent, 5 let's say, was seeking to - - - it was used a bunch of 6 different ways. For example, sometimes a child who had 7 been married to somebody, the parents then claimed that 8 that was - - - the marriage was unlawful, the person had 9 been abducted, and would use the writ to try and - - -10 there's no prior order in those cases, right? 11 MR. BERMAN: Right. 12 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So historically, I don't see 13 any requirement that there be a prior order for invoking 14 the writ where, at least as I understand it, the writ is 15 just to bring the body to the court. It's not a decision; 16 it's just bring the body to me. And you do have to make a 17 showing. 18 MR. BERMAN: Yeah, right. 19 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But I don't think the 20 showing has to be that you have a right by a prior order. 21 Yeah. I mean that could - - -MR. BERMAN: 22 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So if that's the historical 23 practice and then our statute doesn't have that requirement



- - - but you're saying the Appellate Divisions have

grafted it. Why should we follow that?

24

25

1	MR. BERMAN: Yeah, and I I agree to a
2	certain extent. I think the one of the cases cited
3	by Ms. Kahn, the one from, I think, 1976 maybe, the First
4	Ddepartment, they they didn't require a prior custod
5	order and these more recent cases have, and I'm not quite
6	sure why.
7	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So does it seem in a at
8	minimum, that they implicitly determined there was a lack
9	of standing that deprived them of subject matter
10	jurisdiction? The AD?
11	MR. BERMAN: I'm sorry, I I didn't
12	JUDGE TROUTMAN: The AD dismissed
13	MR. BERMAN: Right, yes.
14	JUDGE TROUTMAN: so was there, at least,
15	some implicit finding that there was a lack of standing
16	that deprived them of subject matter jurisdiction to
17	MR. BERMAN: Yeah, I mean
18	JUDGE TROUTMAN: the case?
19	MR. BERMAN: I mean, that's the only reaso
20	why I could
21	JUDGE CANNATARO: Is standing jurisdictional?
22	Does the lack of standing mean there's a lack of subject
23	matter jurisdiction?
24	MR. BERMAN: It sounds like they equate the two.
25	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, more importantly, I



1 mean, anyone can file a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 2 anybody else. You don't have the - - - the petitioner of 3 writ doesn't have to have any relation to the subject of 4 the writ. That's historical practice, right? I mean if I 5 thought you were being illegally detained somewhere, I 6 could file a writ on your behalf. 7 MR. BERMAN: Yeah, I mean - - -8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So I'm not sure how standing 9 figures in to the writ of habeas corpus at all. 10 JUDGE CANNATARO: You were the movant for 11 dismissal, correct? 12 MR. BERMAN: No, that was - - - that was actually 13 the - - - there were two respondents on this case. 14 was the - - - there was the respondent grandmother and the 15 respondent father. 16 JUDGE CANNATARO: Oh, it was the grandmother who 17 moved for dismissal? 18 MR. BERMAN: Yeah, she - - - she moved for

MR. BERMAN: Yeah, she - - - she moved for dismissal, and the court granted the dismissal. I was - - I was surprised also, just as everybody else, that the court dismissed the case. I thought they would've decided on the merits. But the - - - you know the reason I imagine they didn't was because of the subject matter jurisdiction issue.

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Because they first started it,



1	there was a there were orders issued or or
2	writs issued, and it just seemed like everybody got tired
3	because he wouldn't participate, he stopped participating,
4	that is the father.
5	MR. BERMAN: Yeah.
6	JUDGE TROUTMAN: And then the case just went
7	away. And then there's a question out there of at least
8	one child that nobody even knows where the child is.
9	MR. BERMAN: Yeah
10	JUDGE RIVERA: It does seem that departmental
11	rule rewards
12	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Uh-huh.
13	JUDGE RIVERA: bad conduct.
14	MR. BERMAN: I mean that's what happened in this
15	case. However, the still the mother could have come
16	in and filed a proper custody petition. I'm surprised for
17	all that time that at any point nobody said, you know,
18	there's
19	JUDGE TROUTMAN: But why couldn't she?
20	JUDGE CANNATARO: What proper custody
21	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, there's a service issue,
22	right?
23	MR. BERMAN: Well, there there became a
24	service issue.
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh



1	MR. BERMAN: But you know, the way she was
2	awarded service of her writ was by email, so there
3	shouldn't be any reason why she couldn't get the same
4	JUDGE TROUTMAN: But why couldn't she?
5	JUDGE CANNATARO: Didn't we just hear there was a
6	moratorium on custody proceedings?
7	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Right.
8	JUDGE CANNATARO: The administrative judge placed
9	a moratorium on filing new custody petitions.
10	MR. BERMAN: I think that was only for about
11	three months. I'm not I'm not sure
12	JUDGE TROUTMAN: But doesn't
13	MR. BERMAN: if it was an
14	JUDGE TROUTMAN: family court
15	MR. BERMAN: extended period of time.
16	JUDGE TROUTMAN: convert different
17	proceedings all the time?
18	MR. BERMAN: So
19	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Even if it was determined by the
20	court below that, well, no, you can't proceed under a hab,
21	family court, they convert proceedings on an hourly basis.
22	MR. BERMAN: Yeah I mean, according to CPLR
23	103(c), the referee probably could have converted it. I
24	think she might have been hesitant to do it because since



there was no order of custody, perhaps she didn't want to

1 say, well, wait a minute, there's no - - - we don't have 2 in-person jurisdiction, and it might be an abuse of 3 discretion if I just confer in person jurisdiction on the 4 court without any - - - you know without having the proper 5 6 JUDGE TROUTMAN: She felt hampered by the 7 Appellate Division rulings that you had to have a prior 8 order of custody and that no one was looking at what had 9 occurred between grandma and the mom as being that 10 appropriate order? 11 MR. BERMAN: I think for sure she looked at it 12 and said, wait a minute, we don't have an order of custody, 13 we don't have a petition for custody, so looking at the 14 First Department rule and their case law and their 15 precedent, I can't grant a writ of habeas corpus without an 16 order of custody. 17 JUDGE TROUTMAN: Was there ever a request for a 18 conversion? 19

MR. BERMAN: I'm not sure. I don't remember seeing it in the record. I didn't appear - - - I didn't appear as the trial attorney below. I'm not sure.

20

21

22

23

24

25

JUDGE RIVERA: And absent such a request there's no sua sponte recognition.

MR. BERMAN: She - - - she - -
JUDGE RIVERA: The thing when - - -



1	MR. BERMAN: could have			
2	JUDGE RIVERA: a parent says I want			
3	custody, one would assume the parent has to request it.			
4	MR. BERMAN: Yeah, in terms of custody, yes, yes			
5	Now, in terms of sua sponte, converting it, maybe she could			
6	have done it. I'm I'm not sure. I don't know what			
7	her state of mind was.			
8	JUDGE SINGAS: Did the lower court decisions			
9	actually support your position that explicitly, that you			
10	need a custody order, Kiara and Toussaint? Do you think			
11	they're that explicit?			
12	MR. BERMAN: I think so. I think so. And			
13	because because given the fact that the First			
14	Department ended up dismissing in this instead of hearing			
15	it on the merits, I think they relied on those cases to sag			
16	that, yes, that's that's it. If there's no final			
17	custody order, then there can't be there can't be a			
18	writ.			
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So where are the my			
20	understanding is two of the children are back with the			
21	mother now; is that correct?			
22	MR. BERMAN: As far as I know, Ms. Kahn did			
23	investigate and she			
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And then one is not.			
25	MR. BERMAN: One is not, as far as I know.			



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And we don't know where that child is or - - - so - - - suppose we were to reverse, and I'm not even sure what that means, what practical effect does that have?

MR. BERMAN: I don't know if it has any effect.

I mean my client, I - - - I can't speak for him, I haven't had contact with him. I don't know where the child is.

The child might be with him; the child might not be with him. Unfortunately, none of us know. It's an unfortunate situation for - - - for the child, as well as for, you know - - - for all the children and for the mother. So I don't know what effect it would have.

So in addition, as far as the - - - I know Mr.

Katz mentioned the - - - the parens - - - parens patriae
obligation of the court to the children, and that's - - that's certainly a factor. The court does do things like
convert; they - - - they do have that. They've done that
in the past, and they do it often. But I still think that,
you know, the family court has to respect the precedent of
the Appellate Division, and they can't just sort of do,
well, we have - - - you know, I have a responsibility to
the children so I'm just going to disregard the, you know,
the First Department precedent and just, you know, issue
this - - - issue this writ.

JUDGE CANNATARO: But all of this seems to me



like a justification for converting the habeas petition 1 2 into a custody. That - - - and I'm not at all clear on 3 whether that was even asked for. I know it's an item of 4 relief in the mother's brief here. But I - - - I suspect, 5 based on what I see in the record, that the - - - since 6 Judge Arias had already declared that there was a custody 7 determination, they were doubling down on the theory, we 8 have a custody order. We have a UCCJEA custody order. So 9 - - - but even so, the court could have done it themselves 10 if they disagreed with that. Why wouldn't that happen as 11 opposed to just a straight up dismissal? 12 MR. BERMAN: Yeah, I mean that's - - - that's a 13 good question. I think Judge Arias might have been 14 mistaken. I'm not sure - - - I think she probably - - -15 she - - - she might have thought that was a custody order,

because I don't think she would have referred to it. was - - - it was pretty clearly a visitation order. don't - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: Well, it does say that at the end of the visitation, the children shall be returned to the mother.

> Yeah, right. MR. BERMAN:

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

JUDGE CANNATARO: Strongly suggesting that the mother is the custodial parent.

> Yeah, right. That's true. MR. BERMAN:



-- - but it's not a final order of custody, and there is a 1 2 distinction in the law. You know, there has to be - - - I 3 think what the referee was looking at was the fact that 4 there was nothing that said, final order of custody to the 5 mother, which gives me the basis for issuing a writ. 6 JUDGE CANNATARO: So convert - - - convert the 7 habeas into a custody and then make that determination. 8 MR. BERMAN: And maybe she could have, but I 9 still think that she felt constrained by the First 10 Department precedent that said that she did not have -11 she didn't have subject matter jurisdiction - - -12 JUDGE TROUTMAN: And the reason the habeas wasn't 13 an appropriate vehicle for her is why? 14 MR. BERMAN: Because there was no underlying 15 final order of custody. JUDGE SINGAS: So that would exclude most married 16 17 parents from asking for a habeas, right? 18 MR. BERMAN: Yeah, I mean, it might. They might 19 have to take that first step. I mean, it doesn't make a 20 lot of sense, but they might have to take that first step 2.1 of filing for custody, getting a custody order, and then 2.2 going about it that way because then there would be an 23 illegal detention. 24 JUDGE GARCIA: But I guess what we're struggling



with a little bit here is was that ever requested here?

I - - - I mean, I'm not sure. 1 MR. BERMAN: 2 mean, I'm not sure if the mother had requested that below. 3 JUDGE GARCIA: And do you know if these facts - -4 - if this proceeding had taken place in South Carolina and 5 a writ issues without any custody order and the kids are in 6 New York, would New York honor the writ? 7 I don't know. MR. BERMAN: 8 JUDGE GARCIA: Do you think we would probably 9 want to know that before we allowed this to happen in New 10 York? 11 MR. BERMAN: I - - - I think so. I think - - - I12 think the - - - you know, the State would have a, you know, 13 legitimate curiosity about that. But - - - but still, I 14 mean, I still think they should also honor out of state - -15 - I do think out-of-state jurisdiction should honor the 16 other states' writs. I mean even - - - even if it was - -17 - I don't know how closely they would look at it, but a 18 valid writ from an out of state - - -19 JUDGE GARCIA: I don't either. 20 MR. BERMAN: Yeah, I mean - - but a valid writ, 2.1 if I was South Carolina, I would - - - I would honor it. 2.2 Same with New York as to South Carolina. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: Was - - - was a temporary order of 24 custody in furtherance of getting the children for the 25



court back in New York, then the court could render its

1	decision as to custody?	
2	MR. BERMAN: I think the temporary I don't	
3	know really know what purpose the temporary order	
4	served. I think they were trying to	
5	JUDGE RIVERA: The mother must have	
6	JUDGE TROUTMAN: To prove the mother	
7	JUDGE RIVERA: thought it I'm sorry.	
8	Certainly the mother is thinking, the court	
9	understands these children are living with me and are	
10	coming back to me.	
11	MR. BERMAN: Yeah. I think the I	
12	think the family court was trying to do what it could, but	
13	I still think they're, or at least the referee, had the	
14	impression that a petition had to be filed for a final	
15	order of custody. And the temporary order of custody would	
16	not suffice.	
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Did the father sign that	
18	stipulation related to the mother having physical custody	
19	while the grandmother had visitation?	
20	MR. BERMAN: The father	
21	MS. KAHN: No.	
22	MR. KATZ: No.	
23	MR. BERMAN: I'm not sure he did. I think he did	
24	appear in that matter, but I'm not sure he signed	
25	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.	



1	MR. BERMAN: off on the		
2	JUDGE RIVERA: That's what I thought.		
3	MR. BERMAN: stipulation.		
4	JUDGE RIVERA: Just wanted to confirm.		
5	MR. BERMAN: Yeah. Yeah. But again, I would		
6	argue that that is just a order of visitation to the		
7	grandmother. And it while it does say that, you		
8	know, the child is ultimately returned to the mother, it's		
9	really not a valid order of custody.		
10	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you, Counsel.		
11	MR. BERMAN: All right. Thank you very much,		
12	Your Honors.		
13	MS. KAHN: Your Honor, I know I'm not I'm		
14	out of order to say anything, but in the Second Departmen		
15			
16	MR. BERMAN: I have no I have no objection		
17	Your Honors.		
18	MS. KAHN: if something is said that's		
19	incorrect, you're allowed to correct it.		
20	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So Ms. Kahn		
21	MS. KAHN: As I understand		
22	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Hold on. Just hold on.		
23	MS. KAHN: Yeah.		
24	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Could you come up to the		
25	nodium so you're in front of the microphone please?		



1 MS. KAHN: Oh, I'm sorry. 2 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So you didn't reserve time, 3 but I'll give you a minute. 4 MS. KAHN: Okay. I would just ask that you look 5 at Domestic Relations Law 75-a(3) and (4), which say that a 6 first visitation order is a custody order under the UCCJEA. 7 And a first visitation proceeding is a first custody 8 proceeded. So if there's any question as to whether there 9 was first custody proceeding, the first visitation order to the grandmother, is a first custody order to the mother. 10 It doesn't say that the petitioner in that first proceeding 11 12 has to be the petitioner on the writ. That's all. 13 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Can I ask one - -14 JUDGE CANNATARO: So just to be - - - so just to 15 be clear, Ms. Kahn, you're arguing here, and I think your 16 argument below, is simply that I don't need a conversion to 17 custody because I have a custody order under UCCJEA, under 18 75-a(3). I don't - - - I don't need to argue whether a 19 custody order is required for a habeas writ because I have 20 a custody order now. That was the argument below and here. 2.1 MS. KAHN: Yeah, but part of the problem is South

JUDGE CANNATARO: We have to deal with South Carolina, but - - - but - - -

MS. KAHN: So that's my - - -

Carolina warrant squad doesn't see it that way.

2.2

23

24



2 MS. KAHN: - - - problem. 3 JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - make sure I understand 4 what your legal approach was, both here and below. 5 MS. KAHN: Yeah. 6 JUDGE CANNATARO: It is, essentially, that you 7 have a custody order. 8 MS. KAHN: Yes. 9 JUDGE SINGAS: If I may, Chief? 10 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes, of course. 11 JUDGE SINGAS: I think you had an answer for us, 12 a purported answer for why the AD dismissed. I'd like you 13 to share that. 14 MS. KAHN: Well, because - - - oh, the reason the 15 AD dismissed was I filed my appellant's brief, and then I -16 - - and then they - - - the other side didn't file any 17 briefs. I also filed a motion to ask in the Appellant 18 Division to judicially notice the prior visitation 19 proceeding because that wasn't a formal part of the 20 mother's writ proceeding. And I felt it was critical that 21 the Appellate Division understand the foundation on which 2.2 we were requesting the enforcement writ. 23 Instead of the respondents filing answering 24 briefs, the father's - - - I think it was the father's 25 counsel, Mr. Calderone (ph.), filed a motion - - - a cross

JUDGE CANNATARO: - - - I just want to - - -



```
motion, to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter
1
2
        jurisdiction. And I filed a reply, but mainly I - - - I
 3
        was - - - you know, I felt that - - - that my - - - since
 4
        it was all one ball of wax, and I had made all my
5
        jurisdictional arguments on the motion to - - - for
 6
        judicial notice, I - - - I - - -
 7
                  JUDGE TROUTMAN: So in the very - - -
                  MS. KAHN: - - - I was a little sloppy in my
 8
 9
        reply.
                  JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - in the very least - - -
10
11
                  MS. KAHN: Huh?
12
                  JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - in the very least, are
13
        your arguing that they improperly dismissed it without full
14
        briefing?
15
                  MS. KAHN: I never did. But - - -
16
                  JUDGE TROUTMAN: No, no, what I'm - - - saying -
17
18
                  MS. KAHN: Yeah.
19
                  JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - they dismissed it.
20
                  MS. KAHN: They dismissed it.
21
                  JUDGE TROUTMAN: Now that you're in front of us -
22
23
                  MS. KAHN: Yeah.
24
                  JUDGE TROUTMAN: - - - are you arguing that it
25
        was error for the Appellate Division to dismiss without
```



full briefing?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. KAHN: Yes. And one other thing you should know, the children - - - the children's counsel never submitted a brief to the Appellate Division because he - -- somehow he wasn't expected to. It was true he couldn't communicate with his clients, but he's told me repeatedly, and the record reflects that procedurally, he agreed with me that the first - - - the first visitation order was a physical custody order to the mother. And the father had a duty to come back to New York if he wanted to file a modification petition. And he also said in - - - in the trial transcript, he said that the father - - - father appeared at the allocution and knew perfectly well in the visitation proceeding that the mother had physical custody and - - - and the paternal grandmother only got her hour of visitation from the physical custody of the mother. Because you don't get - - - you don't get visitation from thin air. You've got to get it from physical somebody. And if you look at the grandmother's petition, which is part of the record because it was part of the judicial notice motion, you'll see she specifically says, I, the paternal grandmother, live in New York. The mother and the children have lived in New York at 140th Street for nine years - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Counsel - - -



1	MS. KAHN: and the father lives in
2	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: we have your point.
3	MS. KAHN: South Carolina.
4	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.
5	(Court is adjourned)
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	



1	CERTIFICATION			
2				
3	I, Ashley Bennett, certify that the foregoing			
4	transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of			
5	Celinette H.H. v. Michelle R., No. APL-2021-56 was prepared			
6	using the required transcription equipment and is a true			
7	and accurate record of the proceedings.			
8				
9	appley Bennett			
10	Signature:			
11				
12				
13	Agency Name:	eScribers		
14				
15	Address of Agency:	7227 North 16th Street		
16		Suite 207		
17		Phoenix, AZ 85020		
18				
19	Date:	September 22, 2023		
20				
21				
22				
23				

