1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
3	ANTHONY DEBELISS,	
4		
5	Appellant,	
6	-against- NO. 27	
7	PEOPLE,	
8	Respondent.	
9	20 Eagle St Albany, New March 16,	York
10	Before:	2020
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO	
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA	
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS	
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN	
15	Appearances:	
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23		
24	Colin Richi	land
25	Official Court Transcr	



ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Our next appeal is number 27, People v. Debellis.

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MR. BOVA: Good afternoon. May it please the court. Matthew Bova for Mr. Debellis. I would request two minutes for rebuttal.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: You have two minutes, Mr. Bova.

MR. BOVA: Defense counsel here conceded weapon possession and failed to request the only applicable defense, effectively directing a guilty verdict against his own client. This was not meaningful representation.

Certainly not the meaningful representation that the state constitution mandates.

JUDGE RIVERA: So what in the record supported that defense?

MR. BOVA: So Mr. Debellis' testimony. So at the time that -- so at the time that counsel is analyzing this issue -- we have to really look at the charge conference and see what is before -- what is before defense counsel as far as the record goes and what the law is. Mr. Debellis expressly testifies that he goes to Carmel, removes the firearm from the safe, brings it to the Bronx, and that he is going to turn it in in exchange for cash under the NYPD buyback program. That testimony has to be credited for the purposes of a defense instruction. But defense counsel --

JUDGE GARCIA: There has to be a reasonable view 1 2 of the evidence that supports that testimony, doesn't 3 there? 4 MR. BOVA: No, no, under --5 JUDGE GARCIA: No? 6 MR. BOVA: No because under -- no. Under the law, under Watts and the longstanding rule as far as 7 8 reasonable view goes, you would credit the defense evidence 9 and here it's the defense testimony. And it becomes an 10 issue of credibility for the jury. Now, there's --JUDGE GARCIA: But what if there's conceded 11 12 evidence and there's no reasonable view of that evidence 13 that supports that charge? 14 MR. BOVA: So the question that underlies the 15 charge is whether or not he is, in fact, in the process of 16 voluntarily surrendering a weapon. 17 JUDGE GARCIA: Right, so let's do -- let -- what 18 about a hypothetical where same facts, hypothetical though. 19 On the way down to the Bronx, he stops off and robs 20 somebody, not with a gun but with a knife, and they pull 2.1 him over. And he says I was on my way to the buyback 2.2 program to give this gun back. Does that destroy your

MR. BOVA: I don't think it -- I think that goes to the jury because you still have to credit it.



buyback defense for the gun?

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JUDGE GARCIA: Okay.

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MR. BOVA: Because it's not factually impossible. But that's a pretty -- those facts are completely different because it would be very difficult to persuade -- to persuade a jury on those facts, that you want to participate in this buyback program which is a lawful, sensible thing to do if you want to get rid of a gun and acquire the money before you --

JUDGE WILSON: Is there some point where it could become so unreasonable that you would say no, it doesn't have due credit? For example, he testifies I was driving along the expressway with my sunroof open and it dropped into my car. Still have to get -- give the instruction? And -- and I decided I would take it to the Bronx to turn it in.

MR. BOVA: I mean, you -- I think that sounds completely implausible. But under the law, you get the instruction. I mean, this is not -- this is not some --

JUDGE WILSON: And the jury has to -- and the jury has to decide whether they're going to believe that or not?

MR. BOVA: Yes, but -- but that -- but these scenarios are completely different than what we have here.

The -- this is the scenario that will come into play when someone is surrendering a firearm, it's very similar to



Watson except --

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: And how does -- how is this defense impacted by the existence of an order of protection to the benefit of the wife that he was supposed to have surrendered already weapons?

MR. BOVA: So the -- the fact that there is the order of protection actually confirms counsel's ineffectiveness because from start to finis -- finish of this case, counsel is trying to get this issue in front of the jury. He's trying to get this jury to determine whether Mr. Debeliss is credibly alleging that he is on his way to the buyback program. But instead of --

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So was he trying to invoke sympathy? The judge suggested that he was trying to get nullification because he was putting sympathetic facts. He had a fight with his wife about money because he lost his job.

MR. BOVA: But sympathy is no substitute for a real cognizable defense. Jury nullification, a mercy plea, those are not real defenses.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Does it matter in this instance the defendant appeared sometimes, didn't appear? He had different views of what should be offered. At one point, he wanted to offer evidence that he was sexually assaulted when he was being searched.



MR. BOVA: No, that -- that has no bearing on the question of whether counsel was ineffective for failing to request the instruction because the question is what is the record that counsel is looking at. But I just want to step back, too, in terms of the meaningful representation question. This is not a case involving an absurd fact pattern that counsel believes is a terrible defense. From start to finish in this case, counsel's factual theory from opening through hundreds of pages of colloquy about what the defense strategy is, is that Mr. Debeliss is driving his car with the weapon to surrender it.

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JUDGE GARCIA: So I'm a bit confused by the colloquy. I've read it, the 1306, whatever. And they seem to talk about a buyback program in there as well. But we don't force counsel to ask for an instruction that they wouldn't be entitled to give which is why I'm asking about the buyback instruction. I've watched the video and listened to the accompanying audio. And the police repeatedly ask him — the police that he's supposedly going to their precinct to turn over a gun, do you have a gun, and he says no on the video. And you can hear it. So how is that possibly compatible, a reasonable view of that video, which there's no question that it's authentic, how is the defense I was going to turn this in compatible with him telling a representative of the police force he's going



to supposedly turn the gun in to I don't have one?

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MR. BOVA: Well, because Mr. Debellis actually directly addresses that in his testimony. He says I didn't think it would do any good. Because a sensible person could not -- could certainly say if I advertise to this police officer that I'm on my way to the buyback program, he might not believe me and instead, he's going to arrest me.

JUDGE GARCIA: It's not even that. You know, it's not even that he says I don't have one, which he does, but it takes him two minutes to pull over when they're behind him. And then at the very end of the video, he goes in and he's doing something in the area where the gun is, and that's how they find it. So all of that evidence, which is, again, on the videotape and on the audio, is completely inconsistent with his defense.

MR. BOVA: This -- this debate that we're having right now I -- I think is exactly the debate that the jury should have had during jury deliberation.

JUDGE GARCIA: No, this is the debate that the judge needs to go through in deciding whether the evidence is -- a reasonable view of the evidence supports the charge.

MR. BOVA: Well, under the reasonable view standard for -- since time in memoriam in this court,



Watts, every case involving reasonable view is you look at 1 2 the evidence that the defense presents and you credit it if 3 it's a question of -- it's -- it's a question of --4 JUDGE SINGAS: You just credit it just like that, 5 just because he said it? 6 MR. BOVA: If it's a question of credibility, 7 yes, Your Honor, it goes to the jury. 8 JUDGE SINGAS: Well, what about objectively? 9 Like, what are the facts that support his statement that he 10 was going to the buyback program? 11 MR. BOVA: Well, he also testifies -- he also 12 testifies that he had a horrible work accident and had his 13 finger -- has his finger sawed off from falling from a ladder. He's fallen on hard times. 14 15 JUDGE SINGAS: About -- about the --16 MR. BOVA: He goes home to get --17 JUDGE SINGAS: About the buyback program. Under 18 265.20, there's a second part of that that says the same 19 shall be surrendered in accordance with such terms 20 established by the superintendent, sheriff et cetera. 2.1 There's no evidence of that in his testimony. So why isn't 2.2 it -- even under Watts, why isn't a judge allowed to say I don't find that that's a reasonable view --23 24 MR. BOVA: So the first thing --



JUDGE SINGAS: -- I'm not submitting it to the

jury?

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MR. BOVA: So the first thing is that Watson, which at the time was decided a year before this trial, simply says that where there's evidence indicating that the defendant is in the process of surrendering the firearm, the issue goes to the jury. That -- that authority was available to defense counsel and defense counsel, the only way he misses that is because he's not doing research into this defense.

JUDGE SINGAS: So that evidence, for you, is a self-serving statement that I was going to return this, despite what the evidence overall at the trial, including the three hours in the video, the fact that they waited an hour before they even found the gun, a judge wasn't allowed to consider that in determining what's reasonable to submit to the jury?

MR. BOVA: No. And -- and this was never even presented to the judge. The reason why the judge rejects the def -- the absurd defense that defense counsel presents -- because I just want to step back a second and focus --

JUDGE GARCIA: But that -- I -- I understand that argument, but this is relevant to whether he was ineffective for not requesting the charge; that's what this is relevant to. I understand your argument that he only argued for the temporary lawful possession on the common



law. But if we're going to assume -- you know, we're going to take up that argument that he was ineffective for not requesting this charge, we have to look at whether the charge would have been given or not, and that's how it's relevant here.

MR. BOVA: So as -- as to whether the charge is given, Watts holds that you credit the defendant's testimony and send the issue to the jury. What ends up happening here is defense counsel is pursuing this factual defense, defense counsel thinks this is -- this is a reasonable enough defense to present to the --

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Well, are there two separate charges or two separate defenses here? There's temporary, lawful possession, and then the statutory I'm going to a buyback program. Are they separate or are they the same?

MR. BOVA: Oh, no, they're very separate. So the voluntary surrenders defense under 265.20 simply requires that a person be voluntarily surrendering the firearm to the NYPD precinct. The temporary unlawful possession defense requires that you only possess the weapon long -- only as long enough as necessary to turn it in. The def --

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So the error is the way he -- he proceeded down the wrong path? Is that your argument?

MR. BOVA: Absolutely. Defense counsel pursues one factual theory which is he's in the process of

surrendering it, but he chooses the wrong legal defense. He chooses an absurd temporary unlawful possession defense even though for pages and pages of colloquy the prosecutor and the Court are beating him over the head with the argument that this is not temporary. You're conceding that he -- you -- that your client had this firearm for over a year unlawfully and didn't turn it in. There's nothing temporary.

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: But it's clear the statutory buyback, doesn't matter how long you had it.

MR. BOVA: Yes, there's no temporary requirement. So what counsel does is he hoists an element onto his -- onto his case that he didn't actually have to satisfy which was the temporal requirement. Instead, what he should have done, what any sensible lawyer would have done, was said I have this factual theory, I need to convert it into a defense that will be -- give this jury the opportunity for acquittal. Instead, we get --

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Was he challenged by the fact that there was no standard jury charge, CJI charge for it? For the statutory buyback.

MR. BOVA: No, no. It does -- it doesn't matter that there is no CJI defense because defen -- effective counsel has an obligation to request any defense available, whether or not there be a CJI defense or not.



JUDGE TROUTMAN: Is that because it could still be crafted by the court, the charge?

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MR. BOVA: Well, at that -- at -- at that point, what he should have done was he should have said Your Honor, under 265.20 the jury needs to be instructed that if they determine that Mr. Debellis was, in fact, on his way to surrender the firearm to the NYPD precinct that that is satisfying the terms of the defense; that's -- but that's -- that's the instruction that he never asked for.

So instead of all of the -- instead of this whole argument that we're right -- having right now on appeal, this all should have been hashed out in the jury deliberation room with a properly charged jury. Instead, all Mr. Debellis gets is no defense at all, a con -- and a concession of guilt. And meaningful representation, if it means anything, means that when counsel is trying to present a factual issue to the jury and when there's a legal defense available, he has an obligation to request that legal defense and not simply admit guilt and direct a verdict against his client.

JUDGE SINGAS: Yeah, but sometimes defense attorneys choose defenses that in hindsight would have been the wrong one. So we're to punish him and call him ineffective for choosing a defense that ultimately didn't prevail? I mean, these choices are made.



1	MR. BOVA: No. But he didn't pursue the defense
2	that didn't he didn't pursue any defense that was valid.
3	JUDGE GARCIA: Didn't he pursue that defense and
4	the judge was actually on the fence about giving the charge
5	for a while, and then he makes a determination after he
6	testifies
7	MR. BOVA: What the ju what
8	JUDGE GARCIA: against the advice of counsel?
9	MR. BOVA: So what the judge repeatedly tells
10	counsel is I want to remind you that the CJI requires
11	temporary.
12	JUDGE GARCIA: At one point, say I'm inclined to
13	give it?
14	MR. BOVA: When when they're talking about
15	before when they're talking about the defense, yes, he
16	does indicate that. But he also keeps saying
17	JUDGE GARCIA: How can that be a frivolous
18	defense if at one point the judge is saying I'm inclined to
19	give you the charge?
20	MR. BOVA: Because
21	JUDGE GARCIA: And that's late in the trial. I
22	think it's after the people rest.
23	MR. BOVA: Because at that point, there is no
24	evidence as to how long Mr. Debellis had actually
25	JUDGE GARCIA: And then he testifies.



And then he testi --1 MR. BOVA: 2 JUDGE GARCIA: Against the advice of counsel. 3 MR. BOVA: He -- but then he -- but he testifies. 4 So from the beginning, counsel knows that when Mr. Debellis 5 takes the stand, he is going to admit that he is possessing 6 the firearm and on his way there. 7 JUDGE GARCIA: He's advising him not to do that. 8 MR. BOVA: The whole -- no because on -- at one 9 point, defense counsel does say that. But defense counsel 10 opens on an admission of weapon possession. He opens on 11 the buyback program. In the opening --12 JUDGE GARCIA: But at that point in the trial, 13 which again, I think is after the People rest, the judge 14 indicates I'm leaning towards giving you the charge. 15 MR. BOVA: He does say that, and then --16 JUDGE GARCIA: The client --17 MR. BOVA: -- common sense prevails with the 18 judge and he says as I've been telling you over and over 19 again, temporary is required. 20 JUDGE GARCIA: And he's gotten on the stand at 21 that point and said I had the gun for a year, right? 2.2 MR. BOVA: Yes, and that is why he's so in --23 that is why he's unreasonable because what counsel is doing 24 is once his client testifies, as he knew he was going to 25



testify from the very beginning of this case, once he

testifies that he's had it for a year --

JUDGE GARCIA: But that's a decision he has to make himself, the client. Obviously, it's his right to testify or not. And if you've got this one defense and you're advising your client no, no, no, don't testify, don't testify, and maybe you think at the very end, since we've got this fairly good ruling by the judge, he's not going to get on the stand and I'll get my instruction. And then he decides to testify against that advice. Now you're saying that's no defense ever, never, never, he knew it from the beginning.

MR. BOVA: Just to correct the record, though, Your Honor, at -- at A-1103 through 06 --

JUDGE GARCIA: Right.

MR. BOVA: -- what happens is there's a discussion of -- there's a discussion of the prof -- the proffer and the judge specifically tells him you cannot get this defense without putting Mr. Debellis on the stand.

That -- and that makes complete sense because there's no evidence until he testifies about the buyback program, about anything that counsel's trying to establish.

JUDGE GARCIA: He makes a colloquy in a way because they're also talking about the buyback program in that colloquy.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.



JUDGE GARCIA: They're not only talking about -you don't need the buyback program to have temporary lawful
possession, right. So I don't understand that discussion
in there.

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MR. BOVA: So it's -- it's hard to understand because it's an -- an incomprehensible defense that counsel is trying to present under the common law defense because what his --

JUDGE GARCIA: But it could be that he says you don't get the buyback defense unless your client gets on the stand, right?

MR. BOVA: Well, and also a temporary unlawful possession defense because we -- there's no idea at that point until he testifies as to the duration. But what counsel is trying to do is he makes -- he takes the position that, well, he has the gun for at least a year and a half in a safe. But after that period elapses, he temporarily decides at that moment to get the gun and bring it to the precinct.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But couldn't it be argued that it was in a safe that he was not in possession of because he wasn't living in the house because of the order of protection?

MR. BOVA: No, for two reasons. The first reason is that Mr. Debellis is in -- so Mr. Debellis in March of



2017, when he's convicted, at that point, he loses the ability to have the firearm under the law, under the penal law. So at that point, he had to surrender it. So it's no — the fact at that point it's in the safe, he has an obligation, as the judge tells defense counsel, to turn it in and surrender; that he can't just leave it there.

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: That is true. So you're saying his constructive possession. So even if it's at the wife's house, in her actual possession, he ca -- it's still his responsibility, he's still possessing?

MR. BOVA: Yes, because he has an obligation to turn it -- to turn the firearm in.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Even though he doesn't have access to it because he has an order of protection that says I can't go to that house?

MR. BOVA: Well, he -- as -- as a factual matter, he does have access to it because mo --

made that argument that Judge Troutman is just making. I mean, the crux of both of these is a voluntary surrender of that weapon. And a defense attorney may have decided, you know what, I'm not going to go with buy -- buyback after he's testified because he can't give any details about this buyback program and he's passed a number of police precincts along the way and didn't stop to give over his

gun, so I'm going to try this; that maybe it was the -- the difference between the actual possession and constructive possession, it's still a voluntary surrender, that's the defense I'm going with. Why isn't that equally reasonable?

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MR. BOVA: No, because on this record what happens is counsel, after Mr. Debellis testifies, uses the buyback theory in service of the temporary in possession defense. And even if any of these other defenses were remotely plausible -- which they're not, but even if they were, once the judge shuts it down and says I'm not charging that, counsel has an obligation to say, well, my whole factual theory here has been buyback. I'm going to request the defense that's tailor made for that so I can actually have an issue for this jury.

JUDGE WILSON: Is there anything ---

MR. BOVA: Instead, he doesn't do that --

JUDGE WILSON: Is there anything we --

MR. BOVA: -- and we have a directed verdict.

JUDGE WILSON: Any reason he couldn't seek both?

Anything incompatible about them?

MR. BOVA: No. No. Not at all. He could have absolutely sought both. But he goes all in on the one that makes no legal sense whatsoever and ignores the one that simply requires the jury to determine the credibility of the precise factual theory that he's been presenting to the



jury.

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JUDGE TROUTMAN: So your argument is that he presented the defense as if the statutory did not exist?

MR. BOVA: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Okay.

MR. BOVA: Yes, he -- he develops the factual predicate for the 265.20 defense, goes all in on the temporary unlawful possession defense which has no basis in law, as the prosecution concedes and has argued throughout these proceedings. Prosecutor tells defense counsel your defense has been demolished by the fact that he possessed it for a long period of time.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Okay

MR. BOVA: At that point, he should have requested the only available defense.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you, Counsel.

MR. BOVA: Thank you.

MS. PHILLIPS: Good afternoon, Your Honors, and may it please the court. Reva Grace Phillips for the Respondent, the Bronx County District Attorney's Office.

Your Honors, defendant asked this court to miss the forest for the -- for the trees. But this case is clearly not just about whether or not defendant was entitled to a specific charge, but whether it was if



counsel was effective. And I think more importantly, as
Your Honors' questions highlighted, whether or not the
court had a sufficient record before it and this court has
a sufficient record before it to make that determination.

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JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, I -- I look at this statute 265.20. And it says a person -- (f) "A person voluntarily surrendering such weapon, instrument, or appliance, provided that" -- et cetera, right. And then you're exempt from the pen -- relevant penal statutes. at its simplest, it seems like an act of production, immunity almost, right. So the obvious case would be I walk into a precinct. They have a gun buyback program. hand the gun to the officer. They can't arrest me and say you were unlawfully in possession of that weapon, under the statute. But it has a logical component to it that says if I stop you outside the precinct on the steps and I'm walking into the precinct and I'm going in to do the buyback program, it's not simply the act of production of me handing it over, I shouldn't be prosecuted if I'm on the precinct steps, right. So how far back do we take that under a reasonable view, you know, of this statute and what breaks the chain?

MS. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, I think that's a very fact specific question here. And to focus on the facts here, this defendant traveled for the -- for over an hour



with this loaded firearm and with a bag of ammunition and a spare magazine that was fully loaded. Counsel relies heavily on the case People v. Watson. The defendant in Watson, the court noted there, the Second Department noted, that the fact that Mr. Watson had a holster, had spare ammunition, and had a loaded magazine clipped into the gun was good evidence that he did not intend to go and surrender it.

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The same is true here. This defendant had a large amount of ammunition on him, including a backup magazine. As Your Honor's questions correctly pointed out, when he was asked by the officer numerous times on video, you know, where is the gun, do you have a gun, hey, I see a holster, where's the gun, defendant says there is no gun.

Defendant goes further than --

JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't Counsel correct that those are all questions that go to his credi -- defendant's credibility and go to the jury? They're the finders of fact --

MS. PHILLIPS: But your --

JUDGE RIVERA: -- and the determiners of the credibility.

MS. PHILLIPS: Well, again, I think Your Honors correctly pointed out that to get to that point, to get that instruction, you first have to have a reasonable view



of the evidence that entitles defendant to that instruction. Here, we don't. Again, the video evidence is uncontradicted.

Defendant's own testimony, you know, is essentially oh well, it wouldn't have done any good.

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JUDGE RIVERA: What's problematic about the video evidence? It -- it -- is it so unreasonable to believe that someone who has a gun, has gone through this issue and with -- with their spouse and is leaving under not the best of circumstances, is desperate -- this is his testimony, we've got to take it for what it is -- desperate for funds, is stopped by the police, is not immediately going to say, yeah, I got a gun right there?

MS. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, I think additional facts --

JUDGE RIVERA: Or say I'm going to the buyback program, who may -- who may be suspect as to whether or not they are going to be allowed to pursue what he claims was his purpose and intent with having the gun in the car to get to the buyback program.

MS. PHILLIPS: So Your Honor, I think defendant's testimony again sort of blows up his own -- his own request here. Defendant testifies that he looks into whether or not there are precincts in his area, that he looks into where there are buyback programs. On cross-examination,



though, he admits that he wasn't aware that there was an upstate buyback program just three days before he was stopped by Ofc. Allen (ph.). He acknowledges that he knows there's all these precincts he's passing. And I think very importantly, he does not testify that the 49th precinct actually has an ongoing buyback program at the time. And as the court says, it does its own research, there is no buyback program at the time.

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And I think it's important to distinguish between a buyback program and the fact that the NYPD will allow you to surrender under 265.20 at any point. Not every precinct at every day is having an actual buyback program where they will give you cash for the gun. That program actually rotates. And I think Your Honors can take --

JUDGE RIVERA: That -- that may be something that he's not fully aware of, but the fact that he had this intent -- the question is his intent. He says this is what I was going to do. The fact that he may not be successful in that moment because the precinct is not the correct one strikes me as not the issue regarding the charge because this is all about whether or not you get the charge, not whether or not the jury should believe him or not believe him.

MS. PHILLIPS: Well, I guess I would respond with two points. So the first being, you know, again, I think



defendant's testimony undercuts the idea that he's going to -- to actually go to a buyback program because, again, he says he did the research. So he's saying in his own testimony, well, I looked into it --

JUDGE WILSON: Well, you know, I --

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MS. PHILLIPS: -- and that's why I thought I was going to get cash.

JUDGE WILSON: I res -- I research all kinds of things and miss something sometimes, right. I mean, again, it seems like it goes to credibility.

MS. PHILLIPS: Again, Your Honor, I think this is all sort of in the totality of defendant's testimony. And the fact that he has these orders of protection against him for over a year and he has this open case and you know, he also loses his permit, it's the totality of defendant's context and his own testimony and the video and everything that piles up to make it so that there is no reasonable --

mean, I think the gun buyback program is aimed at people who may have a gun where they still have an ord -- they have an order of protection or they may have even committed a crime with the gun before, but you want the gun off the street. So there's an incentive. Oh, right, I haven't complied with that order of protection, but now I'm getting the gun off the street. That -- that seems to me kind of

the whole purpose of the gun buyback program. 1 2 I would absolutely agree with Your MS. PHILLIPS: 3 Honor that the point of the buyback program and the point 4 of 265.20 is to encourage folks to give their guns up. 5 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. 6 MS. PHILLIPS: But it's to encourage them to do 7 that locally and to do that without traveling and causing 8 this sort of reckless situation which the court actually 9 talks about in one of these colloquies, where it talks 10 about, you know, am I going to give this charge or not. 11 And he says, you know, and I'm also considering the fact 12 that he sort of recklessly takes a loaded firearm on public 13 transit and then he's in an unregistered vehicle when --14 JUDGE RIVERA: But what -- what does that have to 15 do with the fact of his intent? What does that have to do 16 with that? Maybe they won't accept the gun when he gets 17 there, but what does that have to do with the charge? 18 MS. PHILLIPS: Well, Your Honor, I think it -- it 19 goes to whether or not, again, there's a reasonable view of 20 the evidence here. And I think the court expressly says, 21 you know, I'm considering the public policy ramifications. 22 The point here is to encourage --

MS. PHILLIPS: What I think the court is talking

JUDGE RIVERA: Oh, because he's reckless in

pursuing the buyback program?

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about is the point of -- the public policy interest here.

And I'm trying to give effect to that is, is to encourage surrender. And it's --

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JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, no questions asked, right?
No questions asked, right?

MS. PHILLIPS: No questions asked. However, Your Honor, I would note, you know, I think defendant cites to a Wayback Machine, like I think this goes to another point I would have which is this really should be raised by way of a 440 motion; that's the criminally recognized way of having, you know, a Wayback Machine. But I think in terms of this question of, you know, was he actually on his way to the 49th for any kind of, you know, buyback program, it's an open question. And if Your Honors actually look at the --

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Are there two different charges that could have been pursued here?

MS. PHILLIPS: I do believe that defense counsel could have requested two defenses. However, the fact that defense counsel didn't request both defenses doesn't render him ineffective. Defense counsel may reasonably and strategically decide to pursue one defense without the other for any number of reasons.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, but are they -- but they're not incompatible, so what would be the reason not to ask



for the charge that better fits his testimony and better fits the opening?

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MS. PHILLIPS: Your Honor, he could have felt, for instance, that if he presented both to the jury that this would muddle the jury's, you know, interpretation of the issues. He could have felt that the trial court would select which one it felt was better and he wanted to pick the one that he thought was going to be more convincing.

JUDGE RIVERA: But it's pretty much -- I mean, maybe you see the record differently, but counsel's argument, he's pretty much argued it. He's just not requesting the charge. He's pretty much done what I think you fear which is presenting scenarios that would confuse the jury or direct them in one -- to come out instead of at acquittal with -- with a -- the guilty verdict. It seems these are the things that he's done, he's just not gone the last step that Counsel argues is logical and what any defense lawyer in his shoes would have done which is then say, well, give me the charge. We've laid the groundwork. Give me the charge.

MS. PHILLIPS: Right, Your Honor. And -- and so I think that, again, this should be raised by way of a 440 motion because we simply don't know why defense counsel selected one of the strategies over the other.

As I was about to say, the NYC city official



website gun buyback program directly instructs if you intend to surrender, call the police precinct first to let them know, so that they can tell you what the proper policies and procedures are; that's the website today.

This 440 hearing would allow defendant to explore

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what did that look like at that time. And I think it's reasonable to believe that this defense counsel could easily have read the McKinney's instructions we cite in our brief, could easily have asked his defendant, hey, you know, did you look into this? Did you actually call the precinct? Because it says online you should. We don't even know actually where defendant's address is at the time. From this record, we don't know where his mother's house is, where he's living. We don't know if defendant considers his mother -- mother's house his residence.

Under 265.20 and under People v. Ditore, there has to be strict compliance with policies and procedures at the local precinct. We don't actually know if defendant did any of that groundwork.

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm not -- I'm still having difficulty. So the jury doesn't go for it. Okay.

MS. PHILLIPS: And Your Honor, I think --

JUDGE RIVERA: But why not ask for it once you've laid the groundwork for it?

MS. PHILLIPS: Well, again, I think that, you



1 know, defense counsel chose which of the defenses he 2 thought he was more likely to get, based on the judge's 3 ruling. Judge Troutman went into the constructive 4 possession part. JUDGE WILSON: Well, even if you -- even if you 5 6 thought that, once the court says okay, you're not getting 7 your first choice, why don't you then say okay, I've got 8 plan B here? 9 MS. PHILLIPS: Again, you know, I think that for the same reasons the court is denying the -- the common law 10 11 instruction, the court is signaling it would deny the 12 statutory instruction. And just as Your Honors asked 13 Counsel --14 JUDGE WILSON: Really? 15 MS. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, the 16 court is engaging in an in-depth colloquy talking about the 17 buyback program. And he's saying I find it really hard to 18 believe he was actually on his way. 19 JUDGE WILSON: Did anyone point the statute out 20 to the court? No, right? 2.1 MS. PHILLIPS: Pardon me? 22 JUDGE WILSON: Nobody's pointed the statute out



we don't know what was said at all of the bench

MS. PHILLIPS: Not that we're aware of. Again,

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to the court at all.

conferences. We don't know what defense counsel and defendant talked about.

JUDGE SINGAS: Wouldn't the defense attorney have just said you know what, I'm not going to go with either of these. I'm going to go with this is sort of a pathetic person who's down on his luck who's, you know, leaving.

His wife asked him to move out. I'm going to go for sympathy and pity for the jury. I know if I ask for these charges that technically once they hear the charge, I may not meet those requirements, and then that will water down my sympathy defense. I mean, why isn't that a legitimate defense that an attorney could pursue?

MS. PHILLIPS: I think that's absolutely a legitimate defense. And I think that from the record being --

JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't it sympathetic that he's trying to get money from the buyback program because he's financially desperate?

MS. PHILLIPS: Well, Your Honor, in the court's colloquy with defense counsel where he's talking about what -- what he needs to get over his problems with issuing this charge, he talks to counsel. And he says explicitly, I don't want to blindside you, basically. If he testifies --

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

MS. PHILLIPS: -- that this is temporary and



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honest possession, it's going to open the door to these orders of protection.

JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.

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MS. PHILLIPS: And defendant's decision to testify against counsel's advice opened him up to -- to a devastating cross-examination where he has to admit he has orders of protection that ban him from seeing his children and wife, so it directly cuts against his sympathetic defense where he is saying, you know, I was a great father, I care for my autistic son, all of these things. And -- and then to have him on cross say oh, well, but there are two orders of protection actually banning me. And defendant even tries to be cute and say oh, well actually that order, no. That's a temporary order. And --

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, to that point.

MS. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE GARCIA: And I see your time is up, but the way this works, if he raises the defense and the judge says okay, you've raised it, do the people get an opportunity to rebut?

MS. PHILLIPS: Yes, Your Honor. I believe if the court was going to issue the instruction, it would give the people an opportunity to rebut that.

JUDGE GARCIA: And we don't know on this record what that rebuttal would have looked like because he never



raised the defense, right?

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MS. PHILLIPS: I think that we can have some sense of what the rebuttal would have looked like because the people had already put in a substantial --

JUDGE GARCIA: It would have more of a sense if you had a 440, right?

MS. PHILLIPS: That's absolutely right, Your Honor. And for those reasons, this court should affirm the Division's decision and find that this should have been raised by way of CPL 440. Thank you, Your Honors.

MR. BOVA: So the ineffective assistance analysis focuses on the relevant period at the record which is the charge conference. Counsel has an obligation to request the charges based on the evidence. So once Mr. Debellis testifies, he has to request defenses based on that.

Client says I don't have a gun, is he unlawfully in possession of it from that point, going forward? I mean, even if he was really going to bring this to a buyback program and a police officer pulls you over and he says to you do you have a gun and you say no, how is that compatible with them taking the gun back, even if you were before that? Isn't it from -- because what I'm struggling with is this chain, how far back can it go, and do you always have to just give this evidence. Again, if the gun

	rails say the gun left from the sky. So at that point,
2	where the officer of the precinct that you're supposedly
3	turning it in to says do you have a gun and you say no,
4	aren't you from that point forward unlawfully possessing
5	it?
6	MR. BOVA: No, because the statute says that
7	someone who is voluntarily surrendering the firearm
8	JUDGE GARCIA: But you're not anymore. You're
9	saying I don't have one.
10	MR. BOVA: But the statute grants immunity for
11	those that are doing it. So this off and on immunity
12	JUDGE GARCIA: You're doing that. Not forever.
13	MR. BOVA: But you have done it, you are in the
14	process of doing it.
15	JUDGE GARCIA: But I rob a bank with it, but I
16	was in the process of doing it. I still have immunity from
17	the possession count?
18	MR. BOVA: No, because on those facts, if you're
19	robbing a bank, it's impossible to believe that you're
20	surrendering the firearm, but
21	JUDGE GARCIA: If you're lying to a police
22	officer from the precinct that you're supposed to turn it
23	in to.
24	MR. BOVA: No. Besides the besides that being
25	inconsistent with the text of the statute which



acknowledges that there is an immunity for the voluntary surrender, that would create a gotcha game, where --

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JUDGE GARCIA: I think if -- you could argue that if he had said yes. And here I was, turning it in, then I think you could have a pretty good argument under this statute. I don't know if it would win, but you would probably get the charge, but --

MR. BOVA: If the legislature had intended for immunity to hinge on one's ability to have that communication with the officer, they would have just written that into the statute.

JUDGE GARCIA: I just think that's a facts and circumstances case, right. So you look at the -- what's in the record here to see if what you are arguing for is any reasonable view of that evidence. And there's no dispute as to what happened because there is a video and audio of it here.

MR. BOVA: No. There is a dispute that counsel is trying to present to the jury throughout this entire case. And the dispute is whether Mr. Debellis is telling the truth when he says he's on his way to the precinct; that's the dispute.

JUDGE GARCIA: But even if he was, even if he was, may -- accept that for a second in the hypothetical and the cop pulls him over and he says I don't have a gun.



	why doesn't that no more you're taking this in, you're
2	lying about having a gun now and you're unlawfully in
3	possession of it?
4	MR. BOVA: Because his immunity has already
5	his immunity has already attached at that point.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: But then why not when he robs the
7	bank?
8	MR. BOVA: Well, there's two
9	JUDGE GARCIA: Because it's already attached.
10	MR. BOVA: There's two
11	JUDGE GARCIA: Because I was on my way. I
12	stopped off. I robbed the bank. But I had immunity
13	because I was going to turn my gun in.
14	MR. BOVA: If if someone if someone is, in
15	fact, in the process of voluntarily surrendering the
16	weapon, that is when the immunity attaches.
17	JUDGE GARCIA: So then I robbed a bank.
18	MR. BOVA: The
19	JUDGE GARCIA: I'm I'm doing it. I'm really
20	going. And I see a bank and I'm, like, oh, well, I'm going
21	to go in and I'll rob it, but then I'm going to go to the
22	precinct.
23	MR. BOVA: Now I think I understand the
24	hypothetical better now. No, then you get prosecuted for
25	robbery, but you have immunity for the weapon



JUDGE GARCIA: So you wouldn't get prosecuted for 1 2 unlawfully having a weapon in that case? 3 MR. BOVA: No because that's what that -- the 4 statute gives you immunity. You would be prosecuted for 5 armed robbery, though, and you would get a lot of time for 6 that. But I mean, it's not -- it's -- it's -- the 7 legislature did not require an announcement, so. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: You're pretty unlikely to persuade 9 the jury. 10 MR. BOVA: Yes, and that's why that factual 11 scenario is so much different than this because this is 12 just a man who is down on his luck, who is in financial 13 trouble, who tells -14 JUDGE GARCIA: But you would get the charge in 15 that case, if you robbed a bank, because in your view, you 16 would have immunity for the weapon? 17 MR. BOVA: If -- yeah, I mean, if the person 18 testifies to that fact, you would get the charge. But 19 there are -- I just want to, like, just as -- I just want 20 to reiterate, though. There are a lot of, like, very 21 ridiculous things that someone could testify to and jurors 2.2 decide whether it's ridiculous or not. But the fact that -23



JUDGE GARCIA: But the judge has to make a

gateway determination which is I think where we have a bit

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of a disconnect here. The judge has to make a

determination whether that charge goes to the jury, whether

there's a reasonable view of the evidence to give that

charge.

MR. BOVA: Yes, and the reasonable view analysis

is based on what the ev -- whether there's some evidence

supporting the defense. And this is not a re -
JUDGE SINGAS: And then according to you, the

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JUDGE SINGAS: And then according to you, the some evidence is just him saying so. So on any gun possession case moving forward, a defendant takes the stand and says I was going to a gun buyback, regardless of what the other evidence shows, they're entitled to that charge?

MR. BOVA: And then it goes to the jury like jurors assess credibility all the time. And that was the law under Watson at the time this case was tried.

JUDGE SINGAS: On every gun possession charge, regardless of what the evidence is?

MR. BOVA: Just like in every homicide case, a defendant could in theory take the stand and say I thought I saw a knife first, and then there is a charge on justification. This is how the jury system works. But those are --

JUDGE SINGAS: No. That's not how the juries -the judges make a determination, especially in the
justification charge, looking at the reasonableness and how



the evidence was proffered.

MR. BOVA: The judges look at --

JUDGE SINGAS: So you're saying in this situation, the judge doesn't have that obligation?

MR. BOVA: The judges don't look at credibility at the charge --

JUDGE SINGAS: I'm not saying credibility.

JUDGE GARCIA: What if there was a video in that case with the guy just has his hands up the entire time and the defendant shoots him and he says, oh, I thought he had a knife. But you can see his hands and his fingers are spread and there's no knife. Get a charge?

MR. BOVA: No, because you have video evidence conclusively proving that that makes no sense. Here, we just have a theory based on consciousness of guilt because he was not sophisticated in announcing his legal defenses at the time of his arrest; that is the kind of issue that goes to the jury. The scenarios that we discuss, they are — they are ridiculous. I still think they would go to the jury. But this is not that. This is a sensible defense based on the facts and it is the defense that counsel is trying to get before the jury, he just botches the analysis and we get a directed verdict.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you.

MR. BOVA: Thank you.



1	MS.	PH]	ILLI	IPS:	Thank	you,	Your	Honors.
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## CERTIFICATION I, Colin Richilano, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of People v. Anthony Debellis, No. 27 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Coin Michily Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: March 27, 2023

