1	COURT OF APPEALS	
2	STATE OF NEW YORK	
3		
4	TCR SPORTS BROADCASTING,	
5	Appellant,	
6	-against- NO.	13
7	WN PARTNER,	
	Respondent.	
9		20 Eagle Street lbany, New York March 14, 2023
10	Before:	March 14, 2023
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE ANTHONY CANNAT	'ARO
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARC	IA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSO: ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGA	
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMA	ıΝ
15	Appearances:	
16	CARTER G. PHILLIPS, ESQ.	
17	SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP Attorney for Appellant	
18	1501 K. Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005	
19	DEREK L. SHAFFER, ESQ.	
20	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, Attorney for Respondent	LLP
21	1300 I Street N.W. Suite 900	
22	Washington, DC 20005	
23		
24		Ellen S. Kolmar urt Transcriber
25		



ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So to begin number

13, TCR Sports Broadcasting v. WN Partner.

MR. PHILLIPS: Good afternoon, Your Honors.

Carter Phillips representing the Baltimore Orioles and

MASN. Your Honor, may I reserve three minutes for

2.1

2.2

rebuttal, please?

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: You have three minutes.

MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor.

This case comes to the Court in a particularly unusual posture. There has been a formal and final determination that the first arbitration in this case had to be vacated because of evident partiality demonstrated by the RSDC, by Major League Baseball, and by the commissioner of Major League Baseball.

Under those circumstances, the question then becomes what's the appropriate remedy. Does the court have authority to do something, or is it compelled to send the case back to a forum that's already been determined to be partially evident.

JUDGE SINGAS: Aren't you extending the evident partiality too far? Didn't it all only go to the Proskauer representation?

MR. PHILLIPS: No. They actually - - - the quotation from Justice Andrias' opinion is arising out of

the failure of MLB and the RSDC to correct the evident partiality that was embedded in it. So it's not just the problem of the conflicts of Proskauer. It is the refusal to do anything about it that reflects, for lack of concern for fundamental fairness, which as the U.S. Supreme Court said in Com - - in Commonwealth Coatings that's the fundamental requirement of the Federal Arbitration Act. And so then the question is if you have a fundamental breach of the FAA, what do you do about it?

2.2

Well, Section 10 gives you authority - - - the discretion, to send it somewhere, and most courts candidly, do not - - -you know, no other court that I know of has ever sent a proceeding back to the same forum that's already been declared to be evidently partial.

JUDGE SINGAS: So where would authority come from? FAA 2, 10, or inherent powers? What?

MR. PHILLIPS: All three of those. I think actually Section 5 might even be available. But I mean, Section 2 clearly gives you discretion to send it to the arbitrators. We know that authority says the arbitrators doesn't mean you send it back to the same body. No court has ever done that.

Section 2, obviously, allows you, if the purpose of the contract has been utterly frustrated, which again the notion of fundamental fairness was the essence of this



agreement, and it has been for - - -

2.1

2.2

JUDGE SINGAS: So are you claiming there's evident partiality even after the change of the attorney?

MR. PHILLIPS: Absolutely. At some point, the commissioner of Major League Baseball - - - Major League Baseball reached the conclusion that the Orioles should lose this case. And in the litigation, before - - - in the lower courts, the commissioner of Major League Baseball went on record explicitly rejecting all of the arguments that the Orioles made about how this arbitration agreement should be interpreted. He's made those statements in public, and he's taken that position.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Was that a position adopted by either of the courts below? It seems as if Judge Marks' decision was cabined very tightly to the representation issue, and I thought that carried through at the Appellate Division as well.

MR. PHILLIPS: No, all of those goods. Justice

Marks says that it was the - - - it was the refusal to

provide for any form of fairness, and that was a refusal by

MLB and the commissioner, and the RSDC to engage in any

effort - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: In your view, that's not limited just to the refusal to engage say, in discovery with respect to Proskauer's representation? It

goes beyond that?

2.1

MR. PHILLIPS: Right. It goes to the whole idea of allowing that proceeding to be conducted in a context where it is decidedly partial. And under those circumstances, you know, we don't know when the commissioner reached the conclusion he reached. But we know that by the end of the proceeding — — the first proceeding, which was an evidently partial proceeding, his view was the Orioles should lose, and he has said that over and over and over again. So that partiality continues on to this day, and this Court should not blink at it. It should say look, partiality is.

Ken Feinberg said this is evident partiality,

Justice Acosta is a hundred percent right that this is

evident partiality. And there is a remedy available, which

is under the - - - which is the AAA under Section A - - -

JUDGE WILSON: So I'm puzzled - - - I'm puzzled by something; it may be tangential. But when I read the agreement, it looks really more like an agreement - - - an appraisal agreement rather than an arbitration agreement. That is, if the parties go through med - - - no, they can't resolve it, they go through mediation if they want to or not, and at the end of the day, it then gets referred to by - - - this isn't an arbitral body; it's a value determining body. It really looks like - - - more like an

appraisal agreement than an arbitration agreement.

2.1

I know you've litigated it as an arbitration.

You maybe stuck with that, but it doesn't really read that way. And when I look at Maryland law, which is what the contract chooses, Maryland law seems to suggest this is an appraisal proceed - - contract rather than an arbitration contract.

MR. PHILLIPS: Well, the parties have treated it all along - - - $\,$

JUDGE WILSON: I get that.

MR. PHILLIPS: -- as an arbitration proceeding.

JUDGE WILSON: I'm wondering why.

MR. PHILLIPS: I suppose in part because no one knows exactly what the - - what the nature of or source of judicial review is of an appraisal agreement. The Federal Arbitration Act, obviously ensures that there is judicial review of arbitral awards.

And at the end of the day, this - - - I mean, as written - - - I could imagine why you would - - - you might lead - - - run to the conclusion that it's really just a valuation, an auditing kind of thing. But in context of how it got analyzed by the RSDC both the first time and the second time, it feels candidly much more like the second one. Much more like a true arbitral proceeding.



1	Unfortunately, it's one that's the product of evident		
2	partiality in the Federal Arbitration Act. That tells you		
3	exactly what they're doing.		
4	JUDGE RIVERA: I suppose it's because of the		
5	- I'm sorry.		
6	MR. PHILLIPS: That's all right.		
7	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that because of the choice of		
8	the methodology, the dispute over the choice of		
9	methodology? Is that what you mean?		
10	MR. PHILLIPS: No, I mean, obviously I'm		
11	disappointed by the choice of methodology.		
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah.		
13	MR. PHILLIPS: But the fundamental problem that		
14	courts should be worried about		
15	JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum.		
16	MR. PHILLIPS: is the fundamental fairness		
17	of the process. And if the party in control of		
18	JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. I mean, with respect		
19	to why it's more like an arbitration?		
20	MR. PHILLIPS: Oh, yes. I mean		
21	JUDGE RIVERA: So		
22	MR. PHILLIPS: both what is the		
23	methodology, and then how should the methodology be applie		
24	under the I apologize. I misunderstood your		
25	question. Thank you, Your Honor.		



JUDGE RIVERA: That's okay.

2.2

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, go back to your original statement that this is an unusual posture for this case.

It comes up to us in sort of a strange way.

Let's say we were to agree that the Court would have discretion to send it to a different panel, what are we reviewing? I mean, there's really no decision below on that issue, right. There's a plurality, and then there's a concurring opinion that says something different.

MR. PHILLIPS: Well, you have Justice Marks' decision at the outset of this that said he didn't believe he had authority to do anything other than send it back to the RSDC.

JUDGE GARCIA: Right.

JUDGE GARCIA:

to a third party.

MR. PHILLIPS: So at a minimum, you could say that's wrong.

MR. PHILLIPS: Well, I think the right answer is the court should simply say what the Federal Arbitration Act requires, which is that this be submitted as Justice Acosta said to the - - - via Section 8 under the agreement

Then what do we do with the case?

JUDGE GARCIA: But who would be --- it would be the Supreme Court, in the initial instance here, that would be exercising discretion as to whether to send it to



a different body, right?

2.1

2.2

MR. PHILLIPS: Right.

JUDGE GARCIA: And we would normally - - - that was as the Appellate Division we would review that for an abuse of discretion. So you would be asking us to make that determination?

MR. PHILLIPS: Well, it's not the end of the world if the Court wanted to remand it to Justice Marks to exercise his discretion. Candidly, I think he was pretty put out by the process by which the initial ruling came out, and he said as much. He just said I don't have any authority to do anything about this.

I do think, as a matter of law now, that the answer is clear, no other - - - no other court faced with any situation like this has done anything other than send the matter to a neutral and impartial arbitration panel.

And the Fourth Circuit in Hooters could not be clearer. They did it even before the arbitration. So for this Court to go on a different direction seems to me would undeniably create a split - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't it - - -

MR. PHILLIPS: - - - between the Fourth Circuit and this Court.

JUDGE RIVERA: But isn't the Court usually to send it to a different arbitrator, not a completely



1 different forum. It strikes me that that's what you're 2 asking for something that would be unusual under the 3 circumstances. 4 MR. PHILLIPS: Only when the - - -5 JUDGE RIVERA: Especially when the parties 6 understood when they entered this agreement, the way the 7 MLB works and what they were specifically asking this 8 entity to do, which it had never done before. 9 MR. PHILLIPS: That's not significantly different 10 than something that happens pretty regularly where a 11 specific arbitrator is identified in the contract, and it 12 turns out that person is not available before it goes to 13 another arbitrator, goes to a completely different process. 14 That happens all the time. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 16 MR. PHILLIPS: What makes it unusual, obviously, 17 is that this is a forum that has become corrupted to the 18 evident partiality process that entered into it. And the 19 question is - - -20 JUDGE RIVERA: But is it corrupted because 2.1 there's no longer a commissioner that's as favorable to 2.2 your - -23 MR. PHILLIPS: Well, there's a commissioner who 24 is evidentially partial against my client's position.



JUDGE RIVERA: Yes, but it seems that the prior

25

commissioner was quite favorable to your side. 1 2 MR. PHILLIPS: Candidly, I'm not sure. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: No one complained about partiality there, right? 4 5 MR. PHILLIPS: I'm not sure whether he was 6 partial or not, and - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: Well, --8 MR. PHILLIPS: - - - you know, if we were - - -9 JUDGE RIVERA: I read your briefs to say it 10 includes statements to the effect that my concern is what happens with the Orioles? 11 12 MR. PHILLIPS: That was in 2005. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: But nevertheless, right? 14 MR. PHILLIPS: Right. 15 JUDGE RIVERA: Nevertheless. 16 MR. PHILLIPS: Again - - - I mean, I don't think 17 that - - - I mean, our perspective on this was we were 18 perfectly comfortable the first - - - when we went to 19 arbitration in the first instance. It is only after we 20 were treated as badly in the first arbitration, and it 21 seems to me at that point we now have evident partiality. 2.2 It's a final determination. The question is, is there a 23 relief to be had there. 24 The Federal Arbitration Act says absolutely there 25 is. I think you should rule as a matter of law that this



case has to go to a neutral decisionmaker at this point, if you felt compelled to send it back - - -

2.2

JUDGE RIVERA: And then how does - - - how does the Court decide what body that would be?

MR. PHILLIPS: Justice Acosta explained that in his dissent. The catchall provision for all disputes resolution in the contract is Section 8. So if you sever out the 2.J provision, the rest is a nonseverability clause in the contract. So the rest of the contract stays in place.

JUDGE RIVERA: That would be the default.

MR. PHILLIPS: So the default is sent through Section 8, so the American Arbitration Association - - - we would get an expert entity, because that's what the - - - that's what the arbitration calls for, for all of - - -

JUDGE WILSON: If we did - - - going back a little bit to something like Judge Garcia's question - - - if we did what you're asking for - - - the first part of what you're asking for, to say they had the power to send this to a different tribunal, are there - - - is it truly then a question of law that we must do that, or are there facts that they require - - - Judge Marks is retired - - - but send it back somewhere to somebody that has fact determining power?

MR. PHILLIPS: Well, I'm not sure - - - I think



the only question would be is there - - - is there a a mechanism under the settlement agreement for where this should go under the circumstances, and I don't think there's any - - - I don't think there's a dispute between the parties on that. Section 8 is the default provision.

JUDGE WILSON: No, I was asking something different. I was asking - - or trying to ask something different. Assuming that that's right, that it's got to go somewhere else if there's sufficient predicate, presumably, that predicate involves some facts at some point. Have those facts all been determined - - -

MR. PHILLIPS: Yes.

JUDGE WILSON: - - - or do we need to send it back somewhere for further factual findings?

MR. PHILLIPS: No, the critical fact in this case has been finally decided is that MLB, the commissioner, and the RSDC, which is just an arm of the MLB, have been found to be evidently partial, and there's no way to unring that bell.

So you have an en - - - an evidently partial entity. And so then the question - - - so they're not available. So then the question is where do you send it, and Section 8 tells you where you send it. It should go to the AAA. And obviously, if you send it to the AAA, candidly, this dispute will be over a lot sooner than if

you don't send it to AAA and we will continue to go through this process, seemingly in perpetuity.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you, counsel.

2.2

MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. SHAFFER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Judge, and may it please the Court, Derek Shaffer here on behalf of the Nationals.

Your Honors, first time around, Justice Marks found evident partiality in one discrete respect. You can find it in the record at 3839 rejected all other arguments by my friends to the other side as to why there was evident partiality or any other basis for vacature indicated just how easily, how readily that evident partiality could be cured. So let's look at what's happening the six years since.

You had a newly constituted RSDC, the same one that decides all such disputes about fair market value and about television rights across Major League Baseball, decided this dispute. You had a change of counsel, not only by the Nationals, but by the RSDC. That happened twice, because the Orioles didn't like the first chosen counsel, so they went to a second counsel at that point.

Seven expert reports were submitted. A two-day hearing was held before the RSDC. And then the RSDC's

1 forty-seven-page decision issued that Justice Cohen aptly 2 characterized as extraordinarily detailed and thorough. 3 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So in this instance, they 4 originally contracted for a place for disputes to take 5 place, correct? 6 MR. SHAFFER: Correct. 7 JUDGE TROUTMAN: So your argument, one person 8 being disqualified could not, in fact, or ever or could 9 make it such that we should disregard an agreement that the parties reached in the original settlement? 10 11 MR. SHAFFER: That's exactly right. And to put a 12 sharp point on that, they reached that agreement in Section 13 2.J.3 of their agreement. It was core to the agreement. 14 It was right up-front. This is the only way that all 15 important disputes over rights fees could be decided was by 16 the RSDC. And that was exactly what the RSDC did in this 17 agreement. You can find that in 203 of the record. 18 that forum was uniquely competent to decide, as is often 19 true for in - - - for industry insider arbitration to 20 decide - - -2.1 JUDGE WILSON: So what - - -2.2 - - - what is established MR. SHAFFER: 23 methodology. 24 JUDGE WILSON: What about the - - - what about 25 the repeated statements by the commissioner in between the



first and second arbitration that suggests this is a foregone conclusion? It's going to come out exactly the same way, and so on. I mean, you wouldn't be too happy if Chief Judge Cannataro would have been saying how this case was going to come out unfavorably to you for the last month or two, I assume.

2.1

2.2

MR. SHAFFER: That's true, but I think what the commissioner was saying there was that the integrity of the process would need to be respected, that the RSDC's decision would be final as the parties had agreed - - - had agreed they would be. Not that there was a specified outcome, and here's what the numbers should be. Just that the outcome would be entitled to judicial enforcement.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, would you - - - suppose he'd said the latter that you say he didn't say that. It's the outcome that's going to be exactly the same. Would you then say we should send it to a different forum?

MR. SHAFFER: I think you can look to what the RSDC itself said in explaining why it was not recusal - - recusing it. You can find it at 4450-51 of the appendix that they have just as much integrity, just as much reliability as a judge who looks at these questions, says you do not have - - - there's not basis for recusal. And in fact, they are independent. They are their own body that decides disputes across Major League Baseball.

In most of the RSDC's cases, they're deciding have individual clubs essentially shortchanged Major League Baseball by not having fair market value transactions, so it looks like they have less money than they actually have to contribute to Major League Baseball.

2.1

2.2

JUDGE WILSON: That sounds like an appraisal proceeding to me.

MR. SHAFFER: Perhaps, Your Honor, and I credit
Your Honor's point. I do think that this is an arbitration
agreement under the FAA. I think the parties have agreed
to that. But the point is the appraisal is - - - as
between individual clubs and Major League Baseball.

So you always have, when the RSDC is deciding these disputes, you have the interest of Major League Baseball against the individual clubs, yet you have owners who are part of this whole framework. Their clubs will be subjected to the same established methodology, the same sort of determinations. That's exactly what Baltimore signed up for when they did this agreement, extremely sophisticated parties, very familiar with this league. Their owner, sitting on the executive committee of Major League Baseball, goes to Congress, praises the RSDC for the work it does in these cases and all across Major League Baseball. And if you subscribe to what my friends from the other side are arguing, you would basically be invalidating



everything that the RSDC does, because they always have the commissioner in baseball and Major League Baseball who can be somewhere in the ether of their cases. Yet, these are arbitrators who do their jobs reliably, with integrity, no less than other arbitrators, and Justice Marks found all that.

He rejected every argument that was made for why the RSDC's output was supposedly invalid, and he found one discrete basis for evident partiality that was completely and undisputably fixed. Again, not just by the same RSDC upon return, but a newly constituted RSDC.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Do you agree with that holding that the first proceeding was infected by some structural inequity?

MR. SHAFFER: To be honest, Your Honor, we thought - - we disagreed with it, but we took our lumps and we wanted to get this matter resolved. And although my friend says that it was destined that Baltimore was going to lose, in fact, they mostly won.

The second time around, they did even better in terms of the ultimate valuation. We are not huge fans of that, except we need to have a binding reliable resolution by the RSDC, which also is going to decide these issues for other points in time. I mean, we - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But only because



Justice Acosta predicted that the outcome at the second proceeding had to be nearly the same as the one in the first. And - - - and his prediction became true, and it sort of suggests to me that maybe the unfairness goes beyond just the one that was identified by Justice Marks.

2.1

2.2

MR. SHAFFER: Well, Mr. Chief Judge, I think that that's an unfair critique by my friends to the other side, because of course if it had been a much worse outcome for Baltimore, I don't think they would have been holding that up as a virtue of the second arbitration. It's the - - - it's the same established methodology that's being applied. The same basic inputs of what are comparable teams making off of their television rights. And you have basically the same numbers. The difference is you had projected numbers for the first arbitration; the second RSDC was looking at the actuals. But look at their work.

I would encourage Your Honors to read, as Justice Cohen did, the fifty-page decision by them, 5662-5711.

They go through every argument made by Baltimore, credit most of them, do their own independent work, and it's not a surprise that the basic number is somewhere in the same ballpark as the first, because again, it's the same established methodology. You're looking at the same market comps. And you're basically working through the parties' competing positions which have - - - which have not



changed.

2.1

2.2

JUDGE SINGAS: Can we talk about that judgment for a minute? Do you think it accounts for all setoffs and profit sharing, like - - -

MR. SHAFFER: It accounts for the number that shall be paid in the language at Section 2.G of the agreement. That's all the RSDC decides, and it gave the courts everything needed to decide what is the amount that shall be paid off the television rights. It says what were the - - what the numbers should have been versus what the numbers were. It says three times what its deciding as to the numbers.

And so - - -

JUDGE SINGAS: So what are you asking us to do regarding a judgment?

MR. SHAFFER: Simply affirm. I think this Court should affirm. And I'd note that all justices - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So the RSDC had the right to enter judgment?

MR. SHAFFER: It did. I think this was everything that the RSDC could have done.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: So it's not just valuation?

MR. SHAFFER: It's not just valuation as to these rights. It's the - - - it's the amounts that shall be paid versus what actually was paid, and it is complete unto



3 Cohen so found, and he was unanimously affirmed. And so we would submit to Your Honors - - -4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: But what about the offsets? 6 MR. SHAFFER: The offsets could be left to a 7 separate proceeding. I'm sure my adversaries are going to 8 argue everything that they can - - -9 JUDGE WILSON: Why should - - -10 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Why shouldn't there be? Yeah. 11 12 JUDGE WILSON: Why - - -13 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Why should there 14 be a money judgment now if we still have to do the offsets? 15 I'm sorry, Judge. 16 MR. SHAFFER: Because I think that the RSDC did 17 its work, and that it is complete work as to the value of 18 the television rights and what those contracts should have 19 been, and you can simply do subtraction to get to the 20 correct number. 2.1 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But in its decision it says the 2.2 authority runs no further than determining the fair market 23 value of the rights at issue. Does not speak to 24 adjustment. 25 MR. SHAFFER: Well, but my respectful submission

itself. All justices who've reviewed the second

arbitration award have unanimously agreed on this.

1

2



to the Court is that it is deciding what is the amount that should be paid pursuant to those rights, and you can, as you often have in a separate litigation between parties.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But is also an argument that they understood their limitation.

MR. SHAFFER: Well, I think that they said three times in their opinion: at the beginning, at the end of their analysis, and then in the conclusion what exactly the amounts were that, again, under the operative provision shall be paid. I think they were indicating that they thought their work was done, and I think that translates to a money judgment.

If you were to disagree with that, Your Honor, all you would do is simply - - - you would affirm in all other respects, and indicate that it is not yet a judgment that could be monetized and collected on.

But if I may be just a couple quick points under the federal - - - $\!\!\!\!$

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Before you do, my last question on that is, doesn't the agreement provide a separate procedure for disputes over payments of the -- you know, the correct number of payments for the rights?

MR. SHAFFER: Mr. Chief Judge, in all other respects, Section 8 provides for arbitration of all the other disputes separate from Section 2, but that is my



point, that the RSDC under Section 2 did everything the RSDC could do to say an amount certain what was the value of the television rights that should have been paid, that shall be paid to the Nationals versus what was paid, and I think that they're entitled to have their judgment enforced no different than in other arbitrations.

2.1

2.2

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But to the extent that it's declaring the value of the rights, but it didn't do the math with respect to what had been paid and what the offsets are, and there was that - - - that loan that was made that - - -

MR. SHAFFER: That's been repaid. That - - - that loan has been repaid. Justice Cohen so found and explained that. So that - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But I'm not saying it factors in, but it might. I'm just saying there are a lot of other things that go into deciding what the final money judgment should be in this case besides what's the value of the rights, which is, Judge Troutman said, that was their charge for this arbitration. Just determine the value of the rights.

MR. SHAFFER: I think those other disputes - - - potential disputes that Your Honor is alluding to are ones that will be litigated, as this case has been litigated until kingdom come by my friends at the other side. So I



think that is a recipe for just having this litigation continue and continue in never-ending fashion as opposed to having one chapter of this at long last more than a decade later conclude, and then if there are going to be separate litigations about other aspects of the dealings between these teams, other points in time, that can be litigated as cases are often litigated in parallel. That's my respectful submission.

2.1

2.2

But as to the Federal Arbitration Act, which this case is being decided under, Section 2 provides only for reformation of a contract, a recission of a contract on such grounds as exist in law or equity, no one in this case - - no one in this has offered a coherent clear analysis of what the basis is for reforming or rescinding the contract as - - as negotiated between sophisticated parties who understood what the RSDC was and how it operated within Major League Baseball, and did that with - - with precision and with clarity.

So I don't think that there is a basis under Section 2, and I don't think anyone has - - - has credibly suggested otherwise.

Under Section 10, you have after-the-fact vacature. That's what happened the first time around including to Justice Marks, and could readily be fixed.

There's no basis to send it to a different



arbitral tribunal under that. And Section 5, not only is inoperative, because you don't have a mechanical lapse, you have an RSDC that does exist. It is performing its responsibilities. It's there to arbitrate this case, and it was reconstituted in time to do that, just as it's decided all disputes throughout Major League Baseball.

2.1

2.2

Last, the Second Circuit has specifically held in the Solomon case, which we cite in response to the amicus briefs that if you have a designation of an arbitral forum that is central to the parties' agreement as it so clearly was here and set forth in Section 2J, you cannot - - - you cannot then have a remand to a different arbitral forum.

And I think that that rule makes sense. It tracks what the Supreme Court has held about the enforcement of private arbitration agreements, and no court, with all due respect to Mr. Phillips, no court has held otherwise under the Federal Arbitration Act.

JUDGE RIVERA: But doesn't that make sense so long as the parties identify the arbitral forum as not corrupted? I mean, that's their point. It's just - - - it's corrupted, and that's not what they bargained for. They didn't bargain for a corrupt arbitral forum.

MR. SHAFFER: I think that is a grotesque caricature of what this tribunal was and what it did, and you have that from Justice Marks, you have that from a



majority of the Appellate Division, you have that from Justice Cohen. The reality of the fact that you had an RSDC that did its work just as a fair arbitral tribunal would. You have the unanimous affirmance of that. You could leave for another case what do we do if there's a fundamental act of fairness. My respectful submission in terms of the set of law on this, and the clear text in the Federal Arbitration Act, is you would vacate the award of such a tribunal and say that that's going to be the law of the case, and there's no prospect of valid judgment ultimately issuing.

2.1

2.2

And then if that keeps happening and keeps happening, perhaps extraordinary relief in that case might be warranted. This case is not even close to that in terms of where it falls on the spectrum.

So I think this is an easy case for Your Honors to affirm consistent with the set of laws of the Federal Arbitration Act. And otherwise - - - otherwise, New York would be holding in special disfavor industry insider arbitrations, which are commonplace. They're commonplace within sports leagues as we have here. They're commonplace within industries. They are very valuable for the Second Circuit as specifically acknowledged in the Lucent case that there's value in having industry expertise.

Who better than the RSDC to say what is its



established methodology for valuing television rights among Major League Baseball clubs, and what are - - - what's fair value to arms-length transactions? They know that better than anyone. But when you have industry insiders, you will also have ties that throw across an industry. It is likelier that they're going to have dealings with one party or another, as is true certainly with the Orioles here. And to say that you can then indict the tribunal that's been chosen based on evident partiality not only to get one vacature, but then to disqualify the entire arbitral tribunal would make New York inhospitable to venerable well accepting arbitration agreements and arbitration mechanisms like we have here. That's going to be the rule of law here.

2.1

2.2

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you.

MR. SHAFFER: Thank you, Your Honors.

MR. PHILLIPS: Thank you, Your Honor.

My friend starts with Justice Marks' findings.

His - - his statement was, "This complete inaction by MLB and the commissioner objectively demonstrates an utter lack of concern for fairness of the proceeding, and is so inconsistent with basic principles of justice that the award must be vacated". This is not a problem of a single arbitrator. This is a problem of MLB and of the entire institution, first.



Second of all, there was no question what the second arbitration award was going to look like. It's within .02 percent of the first award. You can reverse engineer from a number - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel - - -

2.1

2.2

MR. SHAFFER: - - - and go back to where we are JUDGE GARCIA: - - - that's really assuming that the conflict originally had effect on the award. It's kind of setup in a way, right. So if the award is indifferent the second time, then you're kind of reaffirming, well, the conflict must have affected the dollar figure the first time. But they were only - - - what they were only saying there was the appearance of - - - and I understand that's what they say in the decision - - - but it was the appearance of Proskauer representing these different entities that created the problem that eventually overturned that first arbitration award.

So to say, well, you didn't get a different number the second time, I don't see the connection there, because they weren't saying in that decision that that conflict affected the number the tribunal gave you. They were just saying it couldn't stand because of that - - - what happened there.

MR. PHILLIPS: But what it - - what it did say was the product of that process was poisoned.



Right. And that's - - -1 JUDGE GARCIA: 2 MR. PHILLIPS: That poison - - -3 4 5 6 7 8 my point, I can't follow that. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

2.2

23

24

25

JUDGE GARCIA: It's not saying the number is - -

MR. PHILLIPS: No. Fair enough.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - to use your phrase, poison. So to say oh, because the numbers stayed the same it proves

MR. PHILLIPS: Fair enough, but I don't need that, because what I'm - - - the problem of the poison is the commissioner and MLB, and they are the ones who made a final determination that the Orioles should lose at all costs, and that's exactly what happened. But the focus shouldn't be on the second arbitration. The question is Justice Marks looked at the first arbitration, said it had to be set back, and then concluded he had no authority to do anything in that situation. But we know that frustration of purpose, my friend says what's the legal basis? Frustration of purpose.

Justice Acosta said it. The court in Erving and Aviall have both recognized that that's an appropriate basis for sending a case to another tribunal. Even the Solomon case he cites himself, the court decided the question. It didn't send it back to the same forum in which that case had arisen.



on the final money judgment, because I don't think you should ever get to it, but clearly if you did, that is so far beyond what the Federal Arbitration Act provides.

That's not what the parties agreed to, to allow somebody to just enter a judgment under these circumstances. And his concern about it is, is this litigation going to go on forever? Well, it's not going to end with - - - even if this Court does affirm, we got a whole new proceeding that has to go on regardless of that.

And as I said at the outset - - - at the end of my last remarks, the only way to get this to full closure, send it to a neutral forum, let that forum decide it, and then regardless of what gets decided, it will no longer be a basis for challenging anything in court, because that will be a fair and impartial ruling in the case. That's what we bargained for. Fair and impartial. Once it became impartial, that's frustration of purpose. I ask the Court to reverse. Thank you.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)

2.1



CERTIFICATION I, Ellen S. Kolman, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of TCR Sports Broadcasting v. WN Partner Group, No. APL-2020-175 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature: Ellen S. Kolman Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: March 20, 2023

