1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	TAMES D. NUMBER 6 00
4	JAMES B. NUTTER & CO.,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- NO. 19
7	COUNTY OF SARATOGA,
8	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Stree Albany, New Yor February 8, 202
10	Before:
11	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN
15	Appearances:
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1 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Good afternoon. 2 We will get right down to business with today's first 3 appeal number 19, Nutt - - - James B. Nutter & Co. v. 4 County of Saratoga. 5 Counsel. 6 MR. BLASE: May I reserve two minutes for 7 rebuttal? 8 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: You may. 9 MR. BLASE: Thank you, Your Honor. May it please 10 the Court. Greg Blase for the appellant, JBNC. 11 Your Honors, when read correctly, article 11 of 12 the RPTL gives an aggrieved party a basis to contest the 13 validity of a tax sale based on the lack of notice with 14 competent evidence. The legislature's 2006 amendment to 15 section 1125 did not dispose of that right. 16 JUDGE GARCIA: But what - - - what exactly, 17 counsel, is your argument to us here? Why should you be 18 allowed to do that in this case? 19 MR. BLASE: Because we are the rare party, Your 20 Honor, that brought to the court evidence of lack of 2.1 notice. 2.2 JUDGE GARCIA: And the specific argument you made about that evidence in the trial court was what? 23

rebut the presumption of validity of the notice.

MR. BLASE: That the evidence is sufficient to

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was supported by more than just JBNC's denial. It consisted of the evidence regarded - - - regarding the certified mailing and the fact that the town had not notified us of the county liens, the willingness by JBNC to pay the lien - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: And does that show that they didn't follow the proper procedure, or does that go to show that you didn't get notice?

MR. BLASE: It shows lack of notice, Your Honor.

And that's an important point because - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But what if - - - let's say that's true, but - - - and they followed the entire procedure.

Isn't the obligation on the town to do everything reasonable to get you notice?

MR. BLASE: The town made the mistake and there was a mistake of notice. So I can deal with the town's mistake first, Your Honor.

JUDGE GARCIA: But even assuming it didn't get to you, they had an address that you provided; they used that address. And you're saying at least one of those mailings may not have gotten to you. Even if there's a presumption, how does that rebut it? I mean, they did what they were supposed to do.

MR. BLASE: Well, but the - - - here's the thing,
Your Honor. Both notices failed. But the question is, and

the point is that the county can do everything right, and if the notices don't come back, they're entitled to take that first step and obtain a presumptively valid tax deed.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So just to get perfect clarity on this, are you saying the county did everything right in the sense that they complied with the

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MR. BLASE: I'm not conceding that the notice was sent correctly. What I'm saying is that the county - - -  $\!\!\!$ 

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Did you brief that?

MR. BLASE: We - - - we did, Your Honor. The county prepared an affidavit. They attached copies of documents.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Okay.

statutory requirements?

MR. BLASE: And under 1125, that was the step that the county needed to take to obtain a presumptively valid tax deed. The statute - - -

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Was there anything that you allege or - - - because I didn't see the argument - - - that that was defective in the affidavit?

MR. BLASE: Well, the notice, ultimately, was defective because it wasn't delivered. And I would draw a comparison - - I would draw a comparison, Judge, to the Jones case. Because in the Jones case, what you see there is that the county did nothing wrong. The notices were



1	correctly addressed.
2	JUDGE SINGAS: Yeah, but in
3	JUDGE GARCIA: They noticed that it was it
4	didn't get delivered, which you haven't shown in this case.
5	MR. BLASE: That's the difference between
6	but you have to look at the next step, Your Honor. Because
7	in New York, it's a two-part process. The county sends the
8	notice. And if the notice doesn't come back, they are
9	permitted, for due propit due process purposes and
10	under the statute, to take the presumptively valid deed.
11	But then 1134 and 1137 come into play. And what
12	the legislature was saying is, we're going to deal with
13	that rare case like this one, where there's no notice in
14	the 1137 proceeding after the fact. The pro
15	JUDGE TROUTMAN: So you're arguing both not
16	compliance with the statute and the failure to receive
17	actual notice?
18	MR. BLASE: The noncompliance with the statute is
19	when the court refused to review JBNC's evidence. There
20	was an additional
21	JUDGE TROUTMAN: That is what you're arguing
22	here?
23	MR. BLASE: That is correct, Your Honor. There
24	was an additional obligation by the court to hear the
25	evidence. That's both under 1137



Moved and put in this evidence, which is not where you started, you started, I think, as Justice Garcia was pointing out, arguing "we didn't get notice." We had - - we didn't get actual notice, which under the law, you need not get actual notice; that's not required.

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But in any event, once they then moved and you objected and challenged through the UPS tracking of - - - USPS, excuse me, tracking, and also, your respective affidavit saying on our records "we didn't receive anything." And you're saying at that point, the motion should not have been granted to them because you raised a triable issue. Is that where you say these arguments are raised?

MR. BLASE: Yes, Your Honor. And the general rule - - - you're correct, Your Honor. The general rule is that proof of notice is not required for due process.

That's the - - - that's the presumption that the statute implies. So the statute is tracking the due process obligations.

The point here is that notice is not irrelevant in all cases. It's irr - - - it is not necessarily something that the county has to prove. It's not necessarily something that the county has to prove. If someone comes to court with just a mere denial - - -

1	JUDGE RIVERA: But what I understand your
2	argument to be, that you put in question whether or not
3	they actually were in compliance with the statute. I
4	thought that's what you were putting in question.
5	MR. BLASE: What we put in question was the lack
6	of notice, Your Honor. And again, I look to the Jones
7	case. The county can take all of the correct steps, but if
8	the notice is not received and the party doesn't have an
9	opportunity to defend themselves, that is
10	JUDGE GARCIA: But the notice can be received for
11	a lot of different reasons, not received. I mean, you
12	could have moved. You could have done anything. That's
13	not a due process violation that you didn't get it. You
14	didn't leave a forwarding address, right? Not this case,
15	but let's say that's the case. That's not a due process.
16	MR. BLASE: Those are harder cases, Judge. And
17	that's because

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JUDGE GARCIA: That - - -

MR. BLASE: - - - that - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - case would be a due process violation?

MR. BLASE: Well, I'm not sure that it would be at that point, Judge. Because - - - and there are cases that are out there that say, when the interested party does something to stymie the notice, like they move, they change

1	their name, something like that, then the court can look a
2	that issue.
3	Our our issue here is that we had a
4	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But that's not th
5	line that the legislature seems to have drawn here, becaus
6	in 1125, they include the deemed received language in
7	what is it, section (1)(b), and then they have their
8	section (3)(b) language, which says, the failure to
9	actually receive notice is not a fatal defect.
10	MR. BLASE: But in 1137, you can bring a
11	challenge within two years. Who could bring that
12	challenge? Someone who didn't have notice. And of course
13	the words shall be deemed, Your Honor, have been construed
14	by courts and states
15	JUDGE SINGAS: Well, you could have also brought
16	it under 1134, correct?
17	MR. BLASE: Trial counsel was being complete,
18	Your Honor, but it was an action under 1134 and 1137. I
19	think what 1130
20	JUDGE SINGAS: Just as a follow-up, though. Wha
21	evidence do you have that the first-class mail was
22	improper?
23	MR. BLASE: The failure of the certified piece i
24	probative as to the first-class piece. It is
25	JUDGE SINGAS: How?



MR. BLASE: Because they were sent by the same person at the same time, handed to the USPS. And I think what the legislature did when they amended 1125 to require certified is to give respondents, like JBNC, the ability to bring this evidence to court. They also, not for nothing, gave the ability of the county to dispose of one of these cases. If someone comes and says, I didn't get notice, and the county has a tracking receipt that says they did, that would be the end of that suit.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you.

Counsel, can a failure to receive notice by the defendant be evidence of lack of compliance with the statute?

MS. BUETTNER: In a general sense, can a failure to receive notice? It could be because they might not have received it because the county didn't send it, but that's not the case today. As Your Honors have indicated, there is no proof that they didn't get notice except the self-serving affidavits.

JUDGE GARCIA: Is - - - can you start - - -

MS. BUETTNER: Sure.

JUDGE GARCIA: - - - if you would, with the question, is this the same argument that was made in the trial court that we're hearing in this court?

MS. BUETTNER: In general, yes, Your Honor. We



weren't counsel in the trial court. But yes, this is the 1 2 same argument, except we are here to argue that the 3 statute, as is written, shall be deemed received. Actually 4 the Appellate Division does say it is not an irrebuttable 5 presumption. 6 Contrary to what appellant has indicated, there's 7 nowhere in the Appellate Division's decision where it says, 8 this is a irrebuttable presumption. What it says is, we 9 looked at the information. It says that the supreme court, 10 Judge Crowell, looked at the information, looked at the affidavits, and still found that that was not sufficient to 11 12 rebut the presumption. 13 So the certified questions to this court 14 specifically indicate - - -15 JUDGE RIVERA: So what would be sufficient? 16 mean - -17 MS. BUETTNER: I'm sorry. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - if they - - - if they - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: - - - if they - - - if they - - - what would be sufficient? They have - - - you also - - - you cross-moved, as I recall, for summary judgment.

MS. BUETTNER: Correct.

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JUDGE RIVERA: They opposed. And you've got on your motion - - - cross-motion for summary judgment, evidence that you followed, right. You submitted evidence that you felt established, you followed all the procedures,



and you made other arguments. And then they object.

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And they come up with the USPS tracking information that shows that it was - - - the certified mail was delivered to a PO Box, not the address on that certified receipt. What more would they have need - - - and then they've also argued that "we didn't actually receive it", again, going to perhaps you didn't properly mail it.

So what else would they have had to have shown, let me put it that way, to have come up with triable issue of fact?

MS. BUETTNER: That's a very - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: On this question. On this question.

MS. BUETTNER: On this question, yes, Your Honor. That's an unknown because that's not what was before the court. Perhaps they had someone say, we tracked the U.S. Post Office first-class mail. I believe in either their reply affidavit or in their initial papers, they stated, well, first-class mailing can be tracked too. County should have done that. Well, perhaps they could have presented that evidence too.

The point, Your Honor, however, is we don't know what gets to that level. But in this case, it doesn't get there.



JUDGE RIVERA: But why isn't - - - why isn't what 1 2 they presented enough? 3 MS. BUETTNER: It's - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: On a summary judgment motion? 5 MS. BUETTNER: Sure. 6 JUDGE RIVERA: Like, why isn't that - - - or 7 excuse me, in opposition to your summary judgment motion, 8 why isn't that enough? 9 MS. BUETTNER: Sure. In the ca - - the Law v. 10 Benedict case, which they state - - - which they cite, it talks about how, you know, you really should have both 11 12 certified mail and the U.S. In this case, neither came 13 back. 14 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. 15 It was just after the fact - - -MS. BUETTNER: 16 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. 17 MS. BUETTNER: - - - that we - - - the county was 18 told, oh, by the way, certified never came through. First-19 class mailing never came back. And the statute 20 specifically states the forty-five days has to have both 21 certified and U.S. mail come back. The Jones case and the 22 - - - the progeny from Jones, Ju - - - Senator Littles' 23 bill jacket, her memo, everything really was for due 24 process. 25 JUDGE RIVERA: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.



1	MS. BUETTNER: And in this case, we're hearing
2	here, today, that perhaps the county didn't comply with due
3	process. This was the first argument and, Justice, I
4	believe you asked the question
5	JUDGE RIVERA: But I I thought you
6	you well, maybe I misunderstood you.
7	MS. BUETTNER: Sure.
8	JUDGE RIVERA: I thought you agreed that they had
9	put in question whether or not it was properly mailed in
LO	accordance with the statute. Maybe I misunderstood you.
L1	You
L2	MS. BUETTNER: I didn't say that.
L3	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
L4	MS. BUETTNER: No, Your Honor. And I apologize
L5	if that was on my behalf.
L 6	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
L7	MS. BUETTNER: There's no
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, what's the question you
L9	think they put forward
20	MS. BUETTNER: Oh, they put
21	JUDGE RIVERA: their objection to the
22	cross-motion for summary judgment?
23	MS. BUETTNER: They claim that because the
24	certified mail came back
25	.TUDGE RIVERA: Yeah



MS. BUETTNER: - - - that is sufficient to create 1 2 a question of fact. 3 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Certified mail back? 4 5 MS. BUETTNER: Or the - - - I'm sorry. 6 certified mail did not come back. But they proved that, 7 oh, look, we have something from the U.S. Post Office 8 saying it was sent to a PO Box. The county never knew 9 that. 10 JUDGE WILSON: I understand that there's an 11 absence of a postmark also, right, on the certified mail 12 receipt? 13 MS. BUETTNER: There is. 14 JUDGE WILSON: And that they're also asserting 15 that as evidence, that perhaps the mailing wasn't done 16 properly. 17 MS. BUETTNER: That the certified mailing wasn't 18 don't properly. 19 JUDGE WILSON: Okay. 20 MS. BUETTNER: There's no evidence that the - - -21 JUDGE WILSON: Well, that's - - - depends on the --- I mean, his argument is the evidence that the regular 22 23 mailing was also - - - regular was not proper, was it, was 24 deposited along with 600 plus other pieces of mail, and the 25 fact that the one that was certified that is supposed to be



tracked, and so on, doesn't have a postmark and never came 1 2 back is evidence that something was wrong with the other 3 one too. Now, I don't know if I agree with that, but 4 that's his argument. 5 MS. BUETTNER: Yes, that is their argument. 6 JUDGE WILSON: So there's some evidence it's just 7 a question of what weight that has. 8 MS. BUETTNER: Sure. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: And I may add, although it would 10 not on its own be enough for simply to assert "we didn't 11 receive it." They also claim that their records had no 12 indication of receiving it. 13 MS. BUETTNER: Which is - - - we would argue 14 which is similar to them saying, we didn't receive it. 15 Whether they say, we didn't receive it, or they look at 16 documents and say - - -17 JUDGE RIVERA: No, I agree with you. On its own, 18 it's not good enough, but the question is whether or not 19 all of this together might be enough to raise that triable issue. 20 21 MS. BUETTNER: And with all - - -22 JUDGE RIVERA: Even if it's not good enough to 23 get them summary judgment motion. 24 MS. BUETTNER: Correct.



JUDGE RIVERA:

But it's your motion.

1 MS. BUETTNER: Correct. And with respect, we 2 believe the supreme court and then the Appellate Division 3 did get this correctly. 4 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: What was the 5 argument below regarding that postmark issue? Is it - - -6 was it argued that the postmark isn't necessary for a valid 7 certified mailing, or that, you know, that is some proof that it wasn't certified mail? 8 9 MS. BUETTNER: It actually wasn't discussed by the county below. I believe at that point, it was - - -10 11 there was a postmark missing. However, that is not proof 12 in and of itself that it didn't go, that it wasn't mailed. 13 JUDGE GARCIA: There's proof that it actually 14 went, right? I mean, isn't there a receipt that it was 15 delivered to some other PO Box somewhere? 16 MS. BUETTNER: Correct. 17 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: So -18 JUDGE GARCIA: So it went. 19 MS. BUETTNER: Correct. 20 JUDGE GARCIA: It's not a question of it never 2.1 got mailed, so the lack of a postmark doesn't go to whether 2.2 it was mailed or not, whatever it may go to. But and the address on the certified letter was the address that was on 23 file? 24



Correct. And Your Honor, that is

MS. BUETTNER:

where the county is standing before you saying, we did everything that we were required under the amended statute. Everything to the letter.

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In Rem tax foreclosures are very strict. And those of you that may have been involved in them before, you have to - - - as an attorney, you sit there and you go over and over and over all of the issues because you want to make sure you don't get tripped up. And in this case, the appellate is saying, although - - - I believe he was saying, although I heard something different today, that the county did what the statute said. We just didn't get notice of it.

I'd like to, if possible, go - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: Does notice require actual notice?

MS. BUETTNER: Absolutely not, Your Honor.

Actual notice is not required.

ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: What about checking to see if the delivery was completed, the way they did?

MS. BUETTNER: And that is not required under the statute either. Such a - - - there has to be - - - as the Jones' case said, there has to be a balance between the state's interest and the property interest and the prior pro - - - and - - -



1	JUDGE RIVERA: But you're saying today that
2	first of all, just to be clear, that it's your reading of
3	the Appellate Division decision different from theirs, tha
4	is to say your reading is not that it excludes the
5	majority doesn't exclude the possibility of putting forwar
6	enough information, just it's not here to rebut this
7	presumption.
8	So your position, just to be clear
9	MS. BUETTNER: Uh-huh.
10	JUDGE RIVERA: today is, that the
11	presumption is rebuttable?
12	MS. BUETTNER: Yes. And that's what the
13	Appellate Division did say. In fact, the Appellate
14	Division, if you go through it, it specifically states
15	_
16	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Just what
17	I'm sorry.
18	MS. BUETTNER: Yes.
19	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: I know you're
20	looking through that.
21	MS. BUETTNER: That's okay.
22	ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: But can I just as
23	you, what is the presumption that is rebuttable? Is it th
24	presumption that the notice was received, or is it the
25	presumption that all necessary requirements in this



in 1125 have been complied with? 1 2 MS. BUETTNER: The latter. The county's taken 3 the position that it's the latter. To go back - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: Why isn't it the presumption that 5 it's been received? Isn't that the whole point of the 6 certified mail and expanding post-Jones, the requirements 7 on the municipality, different ways to provide notice? MS. BUETTNER: And the municipality does - - -8 9 JUDGE RIVERA: And if these things came back, 10 you'd have to do something else? 11 MS. BUETTNER: If they came back, That is true. 12 we'd have to do something else. They didn't come back. 13 JUDGE RIVERA: But why isn't that - - - that the 14 presumption is to the receipt, not that you've mailed it? 15 MS. BUETTNER: Because to put a presumption on 16 the actual notice would take away from the 1125, I believe, 17 it's (3)(b), where you'd say you don't need actual notice. 18 JUDGE RIVERA: Then why does it say, shall be 19 deemed received, as opposed to shall be deemed mailed 20 properly? 2.1 MS. BUETTNER: In the event - - -2.2 JUDGE RIVERA: It would seem it has to mean that 23 it got to the entity or the individual that it was being 24 mailed to for the purpose of notice in accordance with the



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statute.

1 MS. BUETTNER: And that goes to the due process -2 3 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Okay. Go ahead. 4 And you can - - -5 MS. BUETTNER: It goes to the due process 6 argument. And in this case, due process was followed by 7 the county. Thank you. 8 ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO: Thank you. 9 MR. I: Your Honors, I must take issue with how 10 counsel has characterized the supreme court decision. On 11 page 6, the supreme court says, it's so troubling that the 12 notices weren't - - - that the mail went to the wrong 13 address, but I'm bound by that fact that they weren't 14 returned. 15 And on page 3 of the Appellant Division decision, 16 they said almost the exact same thing. They said, the 17 proof established that they didn't get notice, but because 18 they weren't returned by the post office, it's too bad. 19 And one can only - - - you can only imagine, in 20 the next case, you'll have any number of scenarios, where, 21 you know, through a series of mistakes, an innocent 22 homeowner doesn't get notice, doesn't know they need to pay 23 the tax, and becau - - - but they were delivered somewhere



JUDGE GARCIA: But wouldn't your rule be, then,

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else. So that - - -

1 that the town really has an obligation to do what you did? 2 To go to the post office, to pull the tracking records to 3 the certified mail, and see if it got there, because 4 otherwise, and you know, we may be talking about a town 5 with relatively fewer - - - maybe we're talking about New 6 York City. They have to look at every single one of these 7 8 and pull the record because they don't know when they 9 foreclose. Two years later, somebody could come in and 10 say, you know, what - - - we went and got the certified 11 mail record and it did -- it got delivered to a different 12 post office box and now I get, you know, relief. 13 MR. BLASE: Judge, this was the standard in the 14 third department for thirty years and it didn't impinge tax 15 sales - -16 JUDGE GARCIA: If they had to go look at the 17 certified mail record? 18 MR. BLASE: No, that you had a rebuttal 19 presumption as to notice. And it didn't slow down tax 20

sales. It didn't slow down - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: What was the rule when they had that?

MR. BLASE: It was that - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: A regular mailING.

It was a regular mail, but it was



1	that well, I think home owners were entitled to
2	certified, even in that earlier amendment. But the point
3	is, is that these cases don't come up often, but when they
4	do
5	JUDGE GARCIA: If it's a regular mailing and you
6	don't get it back
7	MR. BLASE: they involve an innocent home
8	owner who's lost their home.
9	JUDGE GARCIA: then you don't have an
10	obligation to track down the certified mailing record. Bu
11	now that they've put in the certified mailing record, unde
12	your rule requirement under your rule, the town, the
13	municipality would have to check that record. Otherwise -
14	
15	MR. BLASE: Yes.
16	JUDGE GARCIA: there's no repose in any
17	foreclosure for two years
18	MR. BLASE: There's no repo
19	JUDGE GARCIA: when the statute runs.
20	MR. BLASE: There's no repose at all because of
21	section 1137. We said, in our reply, that we're not
22	imposing that burden on the county. But the 1137 states,
23	on its face, it's not in contention here. That the deed
24	shall not be conclusive for two years.



So for thirty years, the county operated under a

rebuttal presumption. And for thirty years, they lived under a regime, and they still do today, where whatever deed they take is not conclusive for two years.

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JUDGE GARCIA: So what if the rebuttable presumption is the same burden that you had when it was just a regular mailing?

MR. BLASE: Those cases - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: They send the mailing out and nothing comes back, which is what happened in this case, as far as we know. So why have you met any burden that you have to rebut?

MR. BLASE: Those cases were harder to prove.

And I think the fact that the legislature added the certified requirement for everythin -- everyone, it's telling you it's a rebuttable presumption, that the respondent come in within two years with that evidence.

Otherwise, if it only turns on the post office - - and I don't believe that the legislature intended to
give the post office the last word here, but if it only
turns on the post office returning the notices, then you
really don't need the certified mailing. Because if
someone has proof that they didn't get it, too bad; they
would still lose their house. And that - - - that - - that is - - - that cannot be what the legislature did when
they amended 1125.



JUDGE RIVERA: So let me ask you this. Based on what you submitted in opposition to their cross-motion for summary judgment, I assume your position is that, then, they should have, of course, denied them summary judgment. But then should you have requested more discovery? I mean, what should have happened, given the nature of what you submitted with your objections to their cross-motion?

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MR. BLASE: The - - - what should have happened is the court should have said, I've reviewed the evidence, I've weighed it, here's my view of the evidence.

What the supreme court said was "I'm so troubled by the fact that you have proven to me that you didn't get notice, but unless those notices are returned by the post office, I can't do anything for you." That was the error, because the court owed some additional process at that point, which was to look at the evidence. I'm not sure if additional discovery is needed or not.

JUDGE RIVERA: But what would have - - - but is the conclusion that the court would have had to have reached that persuaded - - - given what is before them on the cross-motion and your opposition, that they didn't follow the statute; is that what the court is trying to figure out?

MR. BLASE: No, because - - and this is in the Jones case. Jones states that general rule, that it - -



1 there's - - - there's no - - - that actual notice is not a 2 requirement. 3 JUDGE RIVERA: Correct. MR. BLASE: But then Jo - - - but Mr. Jones got 4 5 his house back because at that crucial moment, the county 6 owed him more process. Our argument is that at that 7 moment, when we brought that - - - and this is how the 8 statute is set up. At that moment, when we brought that 9 evidence to the supreme court, it was error for the supreme court to say, I can't hear this evidence because you can't 10 show me that the notices were returned. 11 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Is it then that you're saying, at 13 that point, if the court reaches that conclusion, it should 14 have been determined whether or not equitable relief is 15 appropriate? 16 MR. BLASE: I think the court, on remand - - - if 17 that happens --18 JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah. 19 MR. BLASE: - - - the court can review the 20 evidence and determine "should I grant summary judgment 21 based on the evidence, not based on my assumption that I -22 - - that only the notices being returned can overturn a 23 sale and can also - - - if they don't find a basis in the



ACTING CHIEF JUDGE CANNATARO:

Thank you,

statute, can consider equitable relief."

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1	counsel
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2 MR. BLASE: Thank you.

(Court is adjourned)



## CERTIFICATION I, Cynthia R. Piett, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of James B. Nutter & Co. v. County of Saratoga, No. 19 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature: Lynthia R. Piett Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: February 13, 2023

