1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	FARAGE,
4	
5	Appellant,
6	-against-
7	AIM CORP.,
8	Respondent.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York October 16, 2024
10	Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE MADELINE SINGAS ASSOCIATE JUDGE ANTHONY CANNATARO
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE SHIRLEY TROUTMAN ASSOCIATE JUDGE CAITLIN J. HALLIGAN
15 16	Appearances:
17	MATTHEW C. HUG, ESQ. HUG LAW, PLLC
18	Attorney for Appellant 21 Everett Road Extension Albany, NY 12205
19	KEVIN F. BUCKLEY, ESQ.
20	HOWARD S. KRONBERG, ESQ.
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24	Alexander Reaves Official Court Transcriber



CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: First case on the calendar is Farage v. AIM Corporation. Counsel?

MR. HUG: Good afternoon, Your Honors. May I reserve three minutes for rebuttal?

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yes, sir.

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MR. HUG: Your Honors, I think we must be mindful of the procedural posture of this case, a fact that Respondents are keen to overlook. This is a 3211 motion. The entirety of their brief is attempts to resolve issues of fact that haven't even been raised at this stage. The lower courts decided this pursuant to 3211(a)(1), documentary evidence, and you would not find that in any of the - - mention of that in any Respondent's briefs.

The standard here is quite high. It is limited to the four corners of the insurance contract and requires that the document itself establish that my client's claim needs to be dismissed. And that is impossible because there is a condition that must be fulfilled in order for her to have the right to sue under the contract. That condition requires the property to be fully rehabilitated, repaired. This court stated in Executive Plaza - - -

JUDGE TROUTMAN: During the time that passed, what, if anything, did your client do to indicate whether or not there were impediments to the condition preceeding being satisfied?



1	MR. HUG: Sure. Again, with with a mind to
2	that we are at a 3211 stage, she alleged in her complaint
3	that the repairs were complex and that they would have
4	required multiple years of construction under the best of
5	circumstances
6	JUDGE TROUTMAN: How much time had passed at that
7	point?
8	MR. HUG: How much time had passed at what point?
9	JUDGE TROUTMAN: When she asserted that it was
10	going to take multiple of years?
11	MR. HUG: Well
12	JUDGE TROUTMAN: Had she alerted them in the
13	interval of any obstacles or concerns that they weren't
14	holding up to their part?
15	MR. HUG: Yes, it's throughout the complaint.
16	There are several
17	JUDGE TROUTMAN: No, I'm not just saying
18	throughout the complaint. You're saying that these actions
19	were actually taken by her during the interval of time that
20	passed?
21	MR. HUG: Yes. She alleged that she did those
22	things in the complaint, so she alleged that they
23	that the insurance company assigned a succession of claims
24	adjustors, none of whom would take responsibility. They
25	forbade her from commencing commencing in the repairs



until their expert inspected the property. They sent inspectors that had no capacity to understand the engineering challenges posed by the structural damage.

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JUDGE GARCIA: That all goes to me - - - I'm sorry, here. That seems to me to all go to whether it could be completed in a reasonable time, and it doesn't seem to me that that's really the issue, here. Executive Plaza, which I think is a motion to dismiss - - - a certified question here, but it's a motion to dismiss in federal court.

It seems to me the issue is, what did the insured do to alert the insurance company that this was taking longer, right, or and the reasons why it was taking longer, to give them notice in some way that the two-year period wouldn't be complied with, because I think Executive Plaza, as I read it, doesn't say the two-year period's unreasonable.

MR. HUG: Right.

JUDGE GARCIA: It just says, in a particular case, it may be unreasonable to complete the repairs within that time, but this case seems to be a little bit different because it's not - - - I don't think they're arguing couldn't complete their repairs. I think they're arguing, we didn't know what you were doing until six years later.

MR. HUG: Well, they haven't answered the



complaint. I mean, again, we are - - - if you're looking at 3211(a)(1), documentary evidence, they don't have it.

The lower courts are obviously incorrect, so then you must proceed to an issue that the lower courts did not decide, which is 3211(a)(7), which is, did she fail to state - - - did her pleadings fail to state a cause of action. We aren't - - -

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JUDGE GARCIA: Well, they've put in a document that is you have a two-year limitation period, here, which would apply. I mean, there's nothing on its face that says that two-year limitation period's unreasonable as I read Executive Plaza, so what have you shown to show, to demonstrate, that that application of the two-year period here in these circumstances would be unreasonable?

They've put in a document showing the limitation. What have you put in to counter that that would be unreasonable to enforce, here?

MR. HUG: Well, they put - - - they put in the contract, which is what we're looking at, right?

JUDGE GARCIA: And that has a two-year limitation?

MR. HUG: It has a two-year limitation, and it requires all repairs to be completed before suit can be commenced. In that regard, the contract almost mirrors the contract in Executive Plaza.



1 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. And what is the 2 circumstances that you have raised to show it's 3 unreasonable to enforce that here? 4 MR. HUG: Okay. So we're talking about a 5 3211(a)(7) issue. 6 JUDGE GARCIA: Right. MR. HUG: Not (a)(1), right? Okay. So then you 7 8 just look at the four corners of the pleading, and she's 9 adequately pleaded it. It's - - - it's throughout the 10 brief, so that was - - -11 JUDGE GARCIA: I quess to Judge Troutman's point, 12 though, where in that complaint specifically does it 13 indicate that she preserved her rights or she notified the 14 company? 15 MR. HUG: Okay. JUDGE GARCIA: Where is that? 16 17 MR. HUG: So in her pleading, she states that 18

MR. HUG: So in her pleading, she states that immediately upon the - - - the incident, she notified the insurance company that she wanted to pursue a replacement value recovery. She alleges that the insurance company immediately responded that according to their estimate, full replacement value would be 1.4 million dollars to - - to complete, evidencing through her pleading that they knew that she wanted a full replacement value. That's what she was going for.

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1	They used their estimate of 1.4 million dollar
2	replacement value from the start to say she's underinsured
3	and that that began the long, steady drip of
4	frustration and unfair business practices, so they were or
5	notice from the beginning. She she alleges
6	throughout her pleadings. We tried to hire people to come
7	in to do the work. There were liens placed on the building
8	because the Tower Insurance company refused to pay the
9	_
10	JUDGE GARCIA: And did they know that? Is there
11	anything in the record that the insurance company knew
12	that?
13	MR. HUG: It doesn't matter at this stage.
14	JUDGE GARCIA: It doesn't?
15	MR. HUG: Because we're looking at the pleading.
16	JUDGE GARCIA: So once you say, I want a
17	replacement value, you could come back ten years later and
18	say, done?
19	MR. HUG: No. I think that the six-year statute
20	of limitations would be applicable, and and no, I'm
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22	JUDGE GARCIA: So any time within six years, you
23	could just come back and say, done?
24	MR. HUG: To avoid 3211 dismissal. If you alleg
25	that the repairs were complex and weren't going to be able



1	to be completed within two years, which she did, and lay
2	out a a series of allegations that their entire
3	arguments have been disputing the veracity of those
4	allegations
5	JUDGE RIVERA: Let me ask it directly. Does she
6	allege somewhere that she notified them, I can't complete
7	these repairs in two years?
8	MR. HUG: In so many words, I can't complete
9	these repairs in two years, no, but if you look at the
10	_
11	JUDGE RIVERA: But could one liberally construe
12	that from the complaint?
13	MR. HUG: Oh, yes, you certainly could.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Where would I'm asking.
15	MR. HUG: Oh, okay. Appendix I'll just
16	give you the citation.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Yes.
18	MR. HUG: 20, 22, 27, and 28.
19	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Would you say those numbers
20	again, please?
21	MR. HUG: 20, 22, 27, and 28.
22	JUDGE SINGAS: So is your argument that there was
23	sufficient notice if you read the pleadings or there
24	shouldn't there's no notice requirement at all?
25	MR. HUG: No, there's clearly notice was given



1	because she alleged that immediately after the fire
2	destroyed her building, a series of events took place
3	between her and Tower Insurance Company. That is
4	sufficient to say that they are on notice. They aren't
5	claiming that they weren't on notice. They are claim
6	JUDGE RIVERA: Well, notice of of the
7	damage. The question is whether or not there's notice tha
8	it won't be repaired, if that's what she's looking for,
9	full replacement, within two years.
10	MR. HUG: Right. I mean
11	JUDGE RIVERA: And that's what you're saying. I
12	we look, go to 20, 22, 27, 28
13	MR. HUG: Um-hum. You will see a history
14	JUDGE RIVERA: Liberally construe those
15	paragraphs and that satisfies this requirement?
16	MR. HUG: Now. At this stage, now.
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Yeah, no, no.
18	MR. HUG: Right.
19	JUDGE RIVERA: On the motion to dismiss liberal
20	construction. I agree.
21	MR. HUG: Right. Once we get
22	JUDGE RIVERA: Assuming all facts asserted true.
23	MR. HUG: Yes, which is what you did well,
24	what the federal court did in Executive Plaza was to say,
25	you know, this is a motion to dismiss. Let's send it back



you know, this is a motion to dismiss. Let's send it back

for discovery to take place to - - - to see if the factual allegations that they want this court to resolve are borne out, or my client's are borne out, or there are internal emails or documents, and now we're dealing with an insurance company and we need to consider the public policy of a decision like this.

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Are we going to make it this easy? If only we drag our feet and all we have to do is frustrate the claimant at every turn and that there's a secret menu item of - - that is not in the contract, that you need to bring an essentially frivolous lawsuit before you're entitled to bring it to show us that you really are serious. Otherwise, you can't ultimately sue.

JUDGE SINGAS: But in Executive Plaza, the plaintiff alleged the actions that they took, right, to allow the court to make an assessment if it could, in fact, be completed in two years? I mean, they laid out what they did to restore the property, and we don't have that, here.

MR. HUG: You do have that. She lays out that she spent 1.3 million dollars of her own money. She lays out that she was hiring and being frustrated by hiring vendors that required preapproval. Then they weren't paid, then liens were put against the property, then she can't do anything until their appraisers that they send out there.

JUDGE TROUTMAN: But prior to her complaint,



what, if anything, do you believe she was required to do to 1 2 keep the insurance company, if at all, informed that the 3 condition preceding could not reasonably be completed? 4 MR. HUG: Sure. I think that we need to look at 5 this from a practical standpoint of how people deal with 6 their insurance companies, all right, instead of an 7 esoteric assertion that, you know, there are certain 8 benchmarks that people have to take. 9 She's alleging she's keeping in constant contact 10 with these people. She's being bounced around, likely bounced around in phone trees as we're all used to doing. 11 12 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But where is there a specific -13 - right here. 14 MR. HUG: Oh. 15 Where is there something JUDGE HALLIGAN: 16 specific in the record you can point us to which says that 17 she notified them that it was going to take more than two 18 years? MR. HUG: I think that if you liberally construe 19 20 the complaint and the allegations that she's making as to 2.1 the allegations - - -2.2 But specifically - - - you JUDGE HALLIGAN: 23 definitely - - - I take it you are referring to the 24 allegations that she tried to call them and it was



difficult and there were phone trees, but is there - - -

are there any allegations about the contact of those 1 2 communications which indicate that she was apprising them 3 that it would take more than two years, or is it your 4 position that she doesn't have to do that? 5 MR. HUG: What I'm saying is is that at this 6 stage, not only do you take what is alleged to be true, you 7 draw every favorable inference, so the only inference that 8 can be had from her allegations is that she's in constant 9 contact with these people. 10 JUDGE HALLIGAN: She may be in constant contact, 11

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: She may be in constant contact, but I'm asking whether there's anything - - or there may be allegations to that effect, whether there's anything that specifically goes to the content of those communications and whether it included any reference to how long it would take?

MR. HUG: But Your Honor, again, we need to look at this from the ground level.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: I'm just asking what the record reflects. It may be no.

MR. HUG: Right. So as two years passes, and she's still in communication with these people about why isn't this getting done, it's self-evident that the repairs have taken longer than two years. Otherwise, she wouldn't be constantly keeping in touch with them.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Right, okay. And do you agree



1	that she has to apprise them that it's going to take more
2	than two years, whether she has done that in light of the
3	communications or not, but if she had not been in contact
4	with the insurance company at all, but she could allege
5	that it, in fact, took more than two years, what would your
6	position be then?
7	MR. HUG: Under that hypothetical, I mean, I
8	would need to know what the allegations were. I
9	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, let's assume the
10	allegations are that she is not in contact with the
11	insurer, but she has alleged that, in fact, the repairs or
12	replacement took more than two years.
13	MR. HUG: And they're trying to dismiss strictly
14	on a statute of limitations defense?
15	JUDGE HALLIGAN: Um-hum. Yeah. I'm asking
16	I'm asking whether she has to notify them in any way that
17	she can't do it within two years?
18	MR. HUG: No. I don't think that's not in
19	the contract.
20	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So
21	MR. HUG: Even if it's in the contract, you have
22	to notify us properly.
23	JUDGE HALLIGAN: So the two-year limitation
24	cannot be applied in any case where she can show down the



road that it took more than two years to actually complete

the repairs? Sorry. I see your light's on.

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MR. HUG: Can I complete the - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yeah. Please do.

MR. HUG: Yeah. So if the contract says that you need to notify them within a certain amount of time, I think that would present a different issue. That isn't the issue present before the court. What's present before the court are allegations that it was an immediate notification and a constant battle with these people for over six years. Now, they weren't battling with her because they thought that it was - - the repairs were done. And she sued promptly within the normal statute of limitations shortly after she completed the repairs.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.

MR. BUCKLEY: May it please the Court. Kevin Buckley. Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass on behalf of the insurance company, Respondents. This court has laid out a framework for what an insured should do when coming up against a contractual suit limitation, period, and that begins with your decision in Blitman.

In Blitman, the insured, like here, said it was unreasonable to have to sue the insurance company within the twelve-month period. It was commercially impractical is what the court said, and this court rejected that argument and said, you have to do something as an insured

to protect your rights.

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Well, the difference between this case and Blitman is this case has a provision that precludes suit until a certain event happens, right? That wasn't present in Blitman.

MR. BUCKLEY: Well, in Blitman, you had the two-year suit limitation provision like you do here, and in Blitman, the insurance company did not deny the claim.

They were continuing to investigate, so arguably, you could say there was nothing to sue upon, yet this court said, you have options in Blitman.

And the options were - - - and they're very reasonable, and I'll explain why. The options were, you can approach the insurance company and request an extension on the suit limitation provision. The contractual provision. You're asking the insurance company, can we extend this? Or you can commence suit.

So let's go to the first one. If you approach an insurance company and ask them, can you extend the suit limitation provision because I am diligently working on repairing my property. I've contacted the building department, I've done X, Y, and Z, this is all I've done, but I cannot complete the repairs within two years, would you extend it by six months?

The insurance company would have to be crazy to



say no, because the alternative is you're going to sue them, so they would extend it, and because of that, the insurance company is on notice that you're continuing to assert this right. You're going to go after the whole back and the replacement cost, and if you don't - - - if they do not extend the limitation period for a reasonable period of time, you commence suit.

You request either a breach of contract, declaratory judgment, anticipatory breach, because if you're not going to extend the suit limitation period, basically, what you're saying is, your rights may accrue after the two-year period, but we're not going to pay you.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: So your position is that - - - take it your position then is that notice is not sufficient. In other words, if the insurer declines to extend the two-year period, that you have to bring a suit within the two-year period even if the repairs have not been completed and you've been diligently attempting to do that; is that - - is that the bottom line?

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, Your Honor. That's my position, and that I believe was the position of this court in Blitman, and as the court recognized in Executive Plaza, when it said, this is why this case is different in Executive Plaza, because the insured in Executive Plaza did what we told them in Blitman.



1	JUDGE GARCIA: So
2	MR. BUCKLEY: They protected their rights and
3	they commenced suit
4	JUDGE GARCIA: To the Chief
5	MR. BUCKLEY: and that was thwarted by the
6	insurance company, which was unfair.
7	JUDGE GARCIA: To the Chief Judge's point
8	MR. BUCKLEY: Yes.
9	JUDGE GARCIA: is there anything in this
10	contract specifically that we have in this case that would
11	prevent the insured from doing that?
12	MR. BUCKLEY: Prevent
13	JUDGE GARCIA: Bringing a suit?
14	MR. BUCKLEY: Not that I'm aware of.
15	JUDGE CANNATARO: What do you say to your
16	adversary's argument that at the pleading stage, 3211
17	motion stage, that suit would have been eminently
18	dismissible because the contract also requires completion
19	of the work prior to an action?
20	MR. BUCKLEY: Right. Because if you commence
21	suit before the repairs were completed and you made an
22	allegation that it is impossible to complete the repairs
23	during this period of time, I'm seeking a declaration that
24	this suit limitation provision is not reasonable and fair



1 JUDGE CANNATARO: Oh, it's a different - - - it's 2 a declaratory judgment action? 3 MR. BUCKLEY: Declaratory judgment or 4 anticipatory breach. If the insurance company tells you, 5 we're not going to extend the suit limitation provision. 6 Basically, your rights may accrue later, but we're going to 7 prevent you from suing and acting on it. 8 JUDGE HALLIGAN: But is that what Executive Plaza 9 requires, or does Executive Plaza say that the period isn't 10 reasonable if you can't complete the repairs within that time? 11 MR. BUCKLEY: Well, I think it says both, Your 12 13 I think it's been - - -14 JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, if it says - - - if it 15 says that the period isn't reasonable, if it can't be 16 completed, then I'm not sure why you would need to bring an 17 action along those lines. Doesn't Executive Plaza make 18 that unnecessary? 19 MR. BUCKLEY: I don't think so, and the problem 20 that gets caused by that is what I think was alluded to 2.1 earlier, is that if someone comes six years later and says, 22 well, it took more than two years to complete the repairs, 23 so - - -24 JUDGE TROUTMAN: But what if, during the course



of trying to get the repairs, the property owner sends in

updates? These are the actions that I have taken. I have been unable to get approval or inspections, and I've had some obstacles with your processing department, and names a person. That's not enough, if they're not giving you information establishing that there's an impediment to proceeding in that timely fashion?

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MR. BUCKLEY: Well, I would say, reasonably, that would be enough for the insurance company to say, yes, let's extend the suit limitation provision, and if the insurance company is not reasonable, then commencing suit, and I think the next step after that is when the insurance company thwarts your rights by moving to dismiss the claim as either premature or untimely.

As this court says, it's premature a day before it expires, and it's untimely a day after it expires in Executive Plaza, that's just not fair. That's when we go to - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: I mean, you seem to - -
JUDGE HALLIGAN: I'm having a hard time, though,
seeing how you can square - - but let's assume, as Judge
Troutman suggests, that you are on notice. I realize you
might say here it's not the case.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But you're on notice, clear notice from the insured that the repairs can't be completed



within two years, and that that's a reasonable fact. I'm not sure how needing to go to court prophylactically is - - is something that is right under Executive Plaza. Maybe you can help me understand that?

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, because either getting the extension or going to court, it - - - it shortens the time line. It keeps hold of the repair.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Okay, but getting the extension

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes.

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JUDGE HALLIGAN: - - - I appreciate it, and there may be all kinds of business reasons why that's practical and you're suggesting that's the case, but what I'm asking is, if an extension is denied, how do you square your view that that insured, having provided notice, having requested an extension, reasonably having repairs or replacement that take more than two years still have to bring a suit with Executive Plaza and why that's not unreasonable under Executive Plaza?

MR. BUCKLEY: Because I believe Executive Plaza pulls in and says, Blitman supports the position here because they did in Executive Plaza what Blitman said. They commenced suit, and it was only when they were presented with the catch-22 of the suit being dismissed and then being found untimely later, that you need the



exception that Executive Plaza provided. It was - - -

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JUDGE CANNATARO: So it is an exception in Executive Plaza? To the last question, it would be an exception that excuses the claimant from having to go through the rigamarole of filing a suit, getting it dismissed as being untimely or premature, and says, if you could provide a notice - - if you can show notice to the carrier that completion within the limitations period is unreasonable, we'll let you go on that. We'll let it slide under those circumstances?

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE CANNATARO: So I think what we keep going back to about this requirement of a suit, under Executive Plaza, it's not really an absolute requirement of notice, rejection, suit. It can be notice, rejection, and then you know, you told them, you can sue later. Isn't that what Executive Plaza says?

MR. BUCKLEY: I believe so, if I follow you, Your Honor, but it - - -

JUDGE CANNATARO: I'll just say it one more time, and then we don't have to belabor this, but you seem to be implying that you can give notice to the carrier that it cannot reasonably completed - - - the work cannot be completed within the limitations period.

They say no, and you seem to be implying that



there is then a subsequent requirement that you also commence an action, and my reading of Executive Plaza and I think some of the questions you've been hearing say, no, that second component, the commencement of a subsequent action is not necessary if you can later show that it wasn't reasonable to expect work to be done within two years?

MR. BUCKLEY: I do believe the action commencing

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MR. BUCKLEY: I do believe the action commencing the action or getting an extension is a necessary and reasonable requirement under Blitman.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So suppose the two-year limit in the contract had been a two-day limit?

MR. BUCKLEY: Yeah.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Would you still need to go to the insurer and ask for an extension?

MR. BUCKLEY: If that's what's written in the contract - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Yep.

MR. BUCKLEY: - - - and you're trying to modify the contract, I would say following Blitman, yes, you should ask for an extension and explain, this is unreasonable, and the insurance company would say, either, yes, we agree because you can't repair, or no, and then it's time to go to the court and say, court declaratory judgment or anticipatory breach of contract. We cannot



complete these repairs - - -

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CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: So there's no way you could make the unreasonableness argument on the face of a contract? You always are going to have to either get an extension and then have to go to court because they say no, or you're going to have to get an extension and they say yes?

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, Your Honor. As the first step in a multi-step process, and then the next step in executive - - -

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And that's not - - - we don't find that in the contract? You're drawing that from Blitman and Executive Plaza?

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, Your Honor, and then I would like to just touch upon the exception, which seems to be what my adversary was focusing on here, is the exception is that we couldn't complete the repairs within the two-year period, and therefore, you cannot enforce that provision.

The allegations within the complaint do not identify anything that would alert the insurance company that within two years, the repairs could not be made, unlike in Executive Plaza, where there were pages and pages of paragraphs 14 to 23 in the Executive Plaza complaint set forth dates - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Can I ask you? What if the nature



1 of the actual damage and the nature of the necessary 2 repairs would, on their face, make clear that no one could 3 complete it in two years. Would that matter? 4 MR. BUCKLEY: I believe the same requirements 5 would apply, Your Honor, because without some guide rails 6 for the parties to follow, this could be a lawsuit that 7 commences six years or ten years after the loss because it 8 just takes more time. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: Let's say the damage is to a 10 building that's fifty floors. 11 MR. BUCKLEY: Yep. 12 JUDGE RIVERA: Very large space, right, square 13 footage on each floor. It's hollowed out. It's obvious, 14 on its face, that this cannot be done in two years, even 15 working around the clock. 16 MR. BUCKLEY: Right. JUDGE RIVERA: You still say that they cannot 17

JUDGE RIVERA: You still say that they cannot proceed, just making that kind of an argument. They just asserted that in their complaint; given the nature of these damages, it's unreasonable to expect that this would be repaired within two years.

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MR. BUCKLEY: I don't believe so, Your Honor. I believe there needs to be more factual allegations as to why it could not be repaired within the two years.

JUDGE RIVERA: So if it's included in the



1 complaint, I went to two different construction companies. 2 I went to an engineer. They all confirmed this would not 3 be completed within two years; what if she just said that 4 in the complaint? 5 MR. BUCKLEY: I believe that would be closer to 6 the standard. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 8 CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: But in that circumstance, 9 would she still have to put you on notice as you review and 10 ask for an extension?

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MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, Your Honor. I believe so.

CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: And what if it's your own, let's say, adjuster who's gone there and sends a report back to you and says, this is going to at least take five years minimum; does she still have to come and ask for an extension?

MR. BUCKLEY: I believe so, Your Honor, and because - - - and this is the reason why. The claims are adjusted and paid on an actual cash value basis. That means you're paid for the damage to your property, less depreciation. That's what gets paid up front. Most of the time, insureds make the claim, get the actual cash value payment, and you never see them again.

Either the actual cash value payment was enough for them to make the repairs, or they decide not to make



the repairs and use the money for something else, so you
don't know until a claim is made for a replacement cost
coverage and what someone says, we're making the claim for
replacement cost coverage, or we're commencing suit to get
the replacement cost hold back.

And that's an important right for - -
CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: She did notify you, right?
The complaint alleges she notified you that she's seeking
replacement cost?

MR. BUCKLEY: She did not make a request within

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MR. BUCKLEY: She did not make a request within the 180 date period for the replacement cost, and then she didn't do anything within the first two years to alert us to the fact that she was making the repairs and that she was going to seek the replacement cost hold back. There's nothing specific in the allegations in this complaint, and she did not put in an affidavit - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, she's alleging, I regularly, if not daily, was in contact with the insurance company to try to move this forward, and I was obstructed ninety-nine percent of the time.

MR. BUCKLEY: Yes.

JUDGE RIVERA: What about that kind of an allegation?

MR. BUCKLEY: I don't believe that would do it,
Judge Rivera.



1	JUDGE RIVERA: Why not?
2	MR. BUCKLEY: Because that's a conclusory
3	allegation that pretty much any plaintiff attorney could
4	copy and paste and thwart the provision in the policy.
5	JUDGE RIVERA: If she details every attempt?
6	MR. BUCKLEY: If she detailed the attempts and
7	the attempts
8	JUDGE RIVERA: Are factual assertions?
9	MR. BUCKLEY: Factual assertions and they
10	reasonably link to causing a delay, that's different.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: A different story? Okay.
12	MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
13	MR. KRONBERG: May it please the court. Howard
14	Kronberg for the Respondent, brokers. Your Honor, I'm
15	happy to say that I'm kind of a bystander on this. It's
16	been ably argued by both sides. I've submitted kind of a
17	me too brief, so if the court has no questions for me, I
18	will yield my time, and I thank you.
19	CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you.
20	MR. KRONBERG: Thank you, Your Honors.
21	MR. HUG: I guess I'm baffled by the necessity of
22	providing a notice on top of working with your insurance
23	company, because this notice claim that is so important



doesn't find its way into the insurance contract with a

layperson, who most people, when they're dealing with their

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1 insurance company when they're getting their building 2 repaired after a four-alarm fire that completely destroyed 3 it, structurally, through fire and water damage - - -4 JUDGE RIVERA: So in your view under the 5 contract, what, if anything, did she have to do? 6 MR. HUG: She just had to pursue the repairs of 7 the building within a reasonable period of time. 8 JUDGE RIVERA: Um-hum. 9 That is it. The insurance company knew MR. HUG: 10 full well, as per the allegations, because they were 11 working with her throughout. Nickel and dime her - - -12 JUDGE SINGAS: You said within a reasonable 13 period of time. There's no time allegations about when 14 this happened, right? We don't know - - -15 MR. HUG: She says immediately. 16 JUDGE SINGAS: Everything immediately? 17 just blanket that? 18 MR. HUG: Well, yes. I mean, you immediately - -19 - she immediately began the process of repairing the 20 building. The first step was setting it boarded up, and 2.1 what did the insurance company do? They sent vendors to 2.2 board the building up, and they didn't pay them, so there 23 were liens put on the building. Then she couldn't - - -24 then that frustrated her ability to get financing. She was



JUDGE SINGAS: I mean, what she characterizes as 1 2 immediate might not be what somebody else characterizes as 3 immediate. It might not even have been within the two 4 years. 5 MR. HUG: That's what discovery is for, Judge. 6 JUDGE SINGAS: Is it? 7 MR. HUG: Yes. 8 JUDGE SINGAS: I mean, we're supposed to just 9 adopt that it could have been within two years? It could have been within five years? It could have been within 10 twenty-four hours? 11 12 MR. HUG: That's right. 13 JUDGE SINGAS: We're supposed to guess? 14 MR. HUG: No, you're not guessing. Immediately 15 means immediately, and she - - - she obviously had 16 immediate - - - her allegations are that they boarded it 17 up. I mean, when are you boarding up a fire - - - a burnt 18 out fire building? You're boarding up the windows 19 immediately. She - - - the appraisers are there. 20 inspectors are there. It's immediately. You must construe 21 this pleading liberally and grant her every possible 2.2 inference. I would note also that this court decided 23 24 Executive Plaza before all this happened, so if you - - -



JUDGE RIVERA: So if I can just clarify?

position here is that the reason - - - if I'm understanding you correctly. One, doing liberal constructions of that complaint, doing all the inferences that one could in favor of the nonmovant. Accepting all the facts as asserted as true, someone would read this complaint to say that whether or not she could have done it within two years, put that apart for one moment.

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They obstructed her ability to even attempt to do so; am I understanding - - -

MR. HUG: That's the gravamen of the complaint.

JUDGE RIVERA: So your position is not that she - without that obstruction, that she couldn't do it
within two years. You're not taking that position?

MR. HUG: Well, she does allege that. In the complaint, it says, even under the best of circumstances, this was a multiyear construction project.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.

MR. HUG: So yes, she covers it both ways, and I would note that Executive Plaza isn't an exception to anything. We know what the holding is because the court clearly stated, we hold that such a contractual limitation period applied to a case in which the property cannot reasonably be replaced in two years is unreasonable and unenforceable.

That means you look at it in the rear view. Was



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JUDGE HALLIGAN: Well, we also know though - - I'm over here.

MR. HUG: I keep getting - - -

JUDGE HALLIGAN: No worries. I - - - yeah.

MR. HUG: It's my fault, the speaker.

JUDGE HALLIGAN: But we also know that there was a suit brought there, right?

MR. HUG: In Executive Plaza?

JUDGE HALLIGAN: Yeah.

MR. HUG: Yes, and in dicta, at the end, I think what the court was simply saying was, this decision can stand beside the other without inconsistency because we know what the holding is. The holding doesn't say in Executive Plaza that we hold that a contractual limitation period can be deemed unenforceable if you bring a frivolous lawsuit before - - before it can be actually brought under the terms of the contract.

It simply says, in this case, as an example of how absurd the result ordinarily would be, the - - - it's basically the insurance company spoke out of both sides of their mouth. It's too early to sue, it's too late. It was simply an example that was given as one of many examples, I would imagine, that would be raised in order to demonstrate to this court that the repairs could not be reasonably



completed within a time. She has alleged that in her complaint. I think that's sufficient. That's the end of the story. doesn't mean that she wins. We have discovery, and they could make a summary judgment motion, but all of this I think is premature. CHIEF JUDGE WILSON: Thank you. MR. HUG: Thank you. (Court is adjourned)



CERTIFICATION I, Alexander Reaves, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the Court of Appeals of Farage v. AIM Corp., No. 95 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Signature: Auxal Per Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 7227 North 16th Street Suite 207 Phoenix, AZ 85020 Date: October 19, 2024

