

**SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK**  
*Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department*

**111.1**

**CA 13-01529**

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, CARNI, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

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SHIKEMA WILLIAMS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATES  
OF FREDERICK VELEZ AND CHRISTINE COX, DECEASED,  
FREDERICK HALL, AND SHAMIA HALL, BY HER MOTHER  
AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, SABRINA HALL,  
CLAIMANTS-APPELLANTS,

V

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

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BENNO & ASSOCIATES P.C., NEW YORK CITY (AMEER BENNO OF COUNSEL), AND  
JEFFREY A. ROTHMAN, FOR CLAIMANTS-APPELLANTS.

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (KATE H. NEPVEU OF  
COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

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Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Glen T. Bruening,  
J.), entered November 7, 2012. The order, inter alia, denied in part  
the motion of claimants for leave to file a late claim.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is  
unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Claimants appeal from an order denying those parts  
of their motion for permission to file a late claim against defendant  
with respect to claims for damages under theories of constitutional  
tort and negligent training, arising from the stabbing death of  
decedent Frederick Velez, an inmate in a correctional facility. We  
affirm. "The Court of Claims has broad discretion in determining  
whether to grant or deny an application for permission to file a late  
. . . claim and its decision will not be disturbed absent a clear  
abuse of that discretion" (*Matter of Martinez v State of New York*, 62  
AD3d 1225, 1226; see *Collins v State of New York*, 69 AD3d 46, 48).  
Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying that part of  
the motion with respect to the proposed constitutional tort theory  
(see generally *Martinez v City of Schenectady*, 97 NY2d 78, 83). To  
the contrary, "recognition of the claimant[s'] State constitutional  
claims was neither necessary nor appropriate to ensure the full  
realization of [their] rights, because the alleged wrongs could have  
been redressed by . . . timely interposed common-law tort claims"  
(*Lyles v State of New York*, 2 AD3d 694, 695, *affd* 3 NY3d 396; see  
*Peterec v State of New York*, 124 AD3d 858, 859; *Shelton v New York  
State Liq. Auth.*, 61 AD3d 1145, 1150).

We also reject claimants' contention that the court abused its discretion in denying that part of the motion with respect to the proposed negligent training theory. A claim that defendant, as an employer, was "negligent in failing 'to properly interview, hire, train, supervise, and monitor' its employees . . . 'does not lie where, as here, the employee is acting within the scope of his or her employment, thereby rendering the employer liable for damages caused by the employee's negligence under the [alternative] theory of respondeat superior' " (*Drisdom v Niagara Falls Mem. Med. Ctr.*, 53 AD3d 1142, 1143; see *Brown v State of New York*, 45 AD3d 15, 26-27, lv denied 9 NY3d 815; see generally *Leftenant v City of New York*, 70 AD3d 596, 597).

Entered: March 18, 2016

Frances E. Cafarell  
Clerk of the Court