This action arises from an apartment-renovation project in which plaintiff, KGD Interiors, Inc., provided design-related and other services for the apartment owner, defendant Kathryn Weill. The renovation took substantially more time—and money—than the parties had originally anticipated. Partway through the renovation, Weill fired KGD.

KGD brought this action, raising claims in contract and unjust enrichment, to recover what it alleges to be (i) unpaid fees required to be paid under the contract and (ii) funds it advanced to contractors on Weill's behalf without reimbursement. KGD has also asserted a claim for tortious interference with contract. (See NYSCEF No. 1 at 2-4.) Weill has counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that KGD had to design several rooms in the apartment in accordance with her requirements and that correcting these alleged defects cost her substantial sums of money. (See NYSCEF No. 20 at 10-11.)

On motion sequence 001, this court granted Weill's motion to dismiss KGD's unjust-enrichment and tortious-interference claims, leaving only the breach-of-contract claim. (See [*2]NYSCEF No. 16.) Weill now moves under CPLR 3212 for partial summary judgment dismissing that claim to the extent it seeks payment for unlicensed home-improvement services. (See NYSCEF No. 52.) The motion is granted.

New York City Administrative Code § 20-387 (a) requires a license to perform home-improvement work pursuant to a contract. Section 20-386 (2) defines "home improvement" as including "construction, repair, replacement, remodeling, alteration, conversion, rehabilitation, renovation, modernization, improvement, or addition" to any part of a building "used or designed to be used as a residence or dwelling place." The statute excludes from this definition "painting or decorating of a building, residence, home or apartment, when not incidental or related to home improvement work." (Id.) A contractor that performs home-improvement work without the requisite license "may neither enforce a home improvement contract against an owner nor seek recovery in quantum meruit." (Blake Elec. Contr. Co. v Paschall, 222 AD2d 264, 266 [1st Dept 1995].)

On this motion, Weill seeks summary judgment dismissing KGD's breach of contract claim in part. Weill contends that "to the extent that KGD seeks fees (here, erroneously denominated by KGD as 'Design Fees') for coordinating and/or monitoring the Apartment's renovation, which was a home improvement project," that fee claim is barred as a matter of law. (NYSCEF No. 53 at 2.) In opposing summary judgment, KGD argues that Weill errs in "implicitly suggest[ing] that any interface between the interior design team and any of the contractors working on her apartment is necessarily consistent with home improvement conduct by the design team" (NYSCEF No. 65 at 7), rather than being "limited to discerning the correctness of the installed designs" that KGD had furnished Weill (id. at 5). This court agrees with Weill.

The parties' initial contract provides that KGD will provide design-consultation services; act as Weill's purchasing agent in obtaining the agreed-upon materials, appliances, and the like envisioned by KGD's designs; and observe on-site installation and quality control. (NYSCEF No. 55 at 1.) To that extent, KGD's work is consistent with its acting only as a designer, rather than as a home-improvement contractor. (See e.g. Raywood Assoc., Ltd. v Seibel, 172 AD2d 154, 154 [1st Dept 1991] ["No license is required for merely decorative additions such as painting, installation of appliances, and the arrangement of furniture and decorative objects."].)

The contract also provides, though, that KGD "will assist, observe and coordinate all trades," that it "will provide counsel and guidance with respect to contractors and subcontractors, and relay observed works to" Weill, and that KGD "will assure to the best of its ability, that work will be done to the Client's satisfaction, provided that contractors and subcontractors [are] approved by KGD." (Id.) Acting as Weill's "agent in coordinating and monitoring the renovations" being carried out by other contractors" constitutes home-improvement work within the meaning of Admin. Code §§ 20-386 and 20-387. (O'Mara Org. v Plehn, 179 AD2d 548, 548 [1st Dept 1992] [affirming grant of summary judgment to defendant]; accord JMT Bros. Realty, LLC v First Realty Builders, Inc., 51 AD3d 453, 454 [1st Dept 2008] [holding that even taking as true that counterclaimant's "role on the project was solely to coordinate, monitor and [*3]supervise the renovation project," it "nevertheless was required to obtain a license" before providing these services].)

Additionally, the contract provided that KGD's "design concept fee" would be calculated based on "an amount equal to 30% of the total cost of all goods and services for The Project." (NYSCEF No. 55 at 2 [emphasis added].) In other words, the parties agreed from the beginning that KGD's compensation would be tied directly to the work (and associated costs) of the various home-improvement contractors retained by Weill on the project. This fee arrangement bolsters the conclusion that even at the outset, the parties intended KGD's work to extend well beyond providing renovation designs, obtaining materials for those designs, and observing their installation.

The deposition testimony of Kevin Gray, KGD's principal, reflects that KGD assumed this broader role during its work on the project itself. Gray testified that the reason KGD billed Weill as a percentage of the costs of other contractors' work was that KGD had been "asked by the client to work with every trade that she has on the job and report back to her." (NYSCEF No. 62 at Tr. 202 [deposition transcript].) Weill asked KGD to "review the scope of work" of her architect "and pay his bills and meet him and discuss every aspect of the job that was going on." (Id. at Tr. 216.) KGD was acting, in short, as Weill's "eyes and ears on the job," holding "meetings at the apartment as needed with the appropriate parties and [Weill] present." (Id. at Tr. 217.) KGD's responsibilities at times extended to hiring contractors for Weill, such as an asbestos testing/remediation company—and paying the company "on her behalf"—when the company's work was "something that neither the architect, the [general] contractor and certainly not [Weill] wanted to be involved in." (Id. at Tr. 215.) And in some instances, KGD served as a payment conduit between Weill and contractors on the project, advancing them payments on Weill's behalf and being reimbursed later.^[FN1] (See id. at Tr. 141-142, 147, 150-151, 251.)

Weill has thus established prima facie that KGD's work was not limited to design or decoration services, but encompassed the kind of monitoring, coordination, and management tasks that the Appellate Division has held constitutes "home-improvement work" within the meaning of Admin Code § 20-386. In opposition, KGD does not raise a material dispute of fact on this point. KGD does not, for example, provide evidence (testimonial or documentary) that might conflict with Gray's deposition testimony described above.^[FN2] At most, KGD identifies facts indicating that some of its work for Weill was design-related, rather than being broader "home improvement" tasks. (See NYSCEF No. 65 at 5-6.) That showing is insufficient to create a jury question on whether other services that KGD performed for Weill encompassed home-improvement work.

KGD urges this court to reject what it characterizes as Weill's "suggest[ion] that any interface between the interior design team and any of the contractors working on [the] apartment is necessarily consistent with home improvement conduct by the design team." (Id. at 7.) And it emphasizes an equitable point: That before terminating the parties' agreement, Weill "obtained the benefit of KGD's expertise and the multiple facets of [the] design prepared by KGD," as well as the "substantial economic benefit of designer net pricing and other discounts" through using KGD as an "intermediary for recommended vendors."^[FN3] (Id. at 2-3; see also NYSCEF No. 69 at ¶¶ 8-9.)

As set forth above, however, the court's conclusion that KGD performed home-improvement work for Weill does not rest on equating "any interface between the interior design team" and other contractors with "home improvement conduct," as KGD would have it. Additionally, because Admin Code § 20-387 is intended "to safeguard and protect consumers against fraudulent practices and inferior work by home contractors" (B & F Bldg. Corp. v Liebig, 76 NY2d 689, 692 [1990]), "'strict compliance with [this] licensing statute . . . is required.'" (KSP Constr., LLC v LV Prop. Two, LLC, 224 AD3d 58, 63 [1st Dept 2024], quoting Chosen Constr. Corp. v Syz, 138 AD2d 284, 286 [1st Dept 1988].) Indeed, recovery for satisfactory home-improvement work is barred if that work was unlicensed—even when "'the homeowner knew of the lack of a license and planned to take advantage of its absence.'" (Id.) KGD's arguments in opposition to summary judgment are thus unavailing.

That this court agrees with Weill that KGD may not recover fees for the unlicensed home-improvement work it performed does not end the court's inquiry. This is so for two reasons. First, Weill herself acknowledges that some of the fees KGD seeks were incurred "for decorative design services." (NYSCEF No. 74 at 1.) Weill thus seeks dismissal of KGD's remaining claim in breach of contract only "to the extent it seeks to recover fees for home improvement services such as construction management services." (Id. at 2.) Second, the record suggests that some of the amount sought by KGD in breach of contract also comprise the sum of alleged unreimbursed advance payments that it made to contractors on Weill's behalf. Admin Code § 20-387 would not bar KGD from recovering those amounts, either.

In other words, even accepting Weill's arguments on this motion, some part of KGD's contract claim against her remains. It is unclear to the court, however, how much of that claim is left. Nor are the parties' papers on the motion sufficient to resolve that question here. In these circumstances, further input from the parties is needed to enable this court to determine (i) whether the parties disagree about how much of the total amount claimed by KGD is statutorily barred (and how much is left) under this decision; and (ii) the appropriate resolution of any disagreement.

The parties are directed, therefore, to meet and confer about what increment of KGD's [*4]claimed fees is outside the statutory bar—whether as charges for alleged decorative design services or as alleged unreimbursed contractor payments. The parties shall, on or before December 20, 2024, inform this court by letter (efiled on NYSCEF and emailed to SFC-Part7-Clerk@nycourts.gov) whether they have been able to reach agreement on this issue. If so, the letter shall identify the amount on KGD's contract claim that remains under this decision. If the parties are not able to agree, the parties shall provide the court (by the same means) with further briefing on that issue on or before January 17, 2025.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Weill's motion for partial summary judgment dismissing part of KGD's breach-of-contract claim is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer and provide the court with further letter submissions about the increment of KGD's breach-of-contract claim that remains following this decision, as set forth above.