[*1]
Doc Realty Mgt. Inc. v Morales
2024 NY Slip Op 51647(U)
Decided on November 25, 2024
Civil Court Of The City Of New York, Queens County
Sanchez, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.


Decided on November 25, 2024
Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County


Doc Realty Management Inc., Petitioner(s),

against

Jasmin Morales, HENRY GERMAN,
"John" "Doe", "Jane" "Doe", Respondent(s),




Index No. LT-304022-24/QU

Enedina Pilar Sanchez, J.

Recitation, as required by CPLR 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of this motion:

Papers Numbered
Order to show Cause/ Notice of Motion and Affidavits /Affirmations annexed 1
Answering Affidavits/ Affirmations 2

This holdover proceeding was dismissed pursuant to the Decision/Order of September 3, 2024, NYSCEF Doc. No. 14. Petitioner, by notice of motion, now moves for leave to reargue and upon the reargument for an order vacating the dismissal of the petition, or alternatively, leave to amend its pleading, append, or incorporate information in the petition.

Leave to reargue is governed by CPLR Rule 2221(d), it provides: 1) the motion shall be identified specifically as such; 2) shall be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion, but shall not include any matters of fact not offered on the prior motion; and 3) shall be made within thirty days after service of a copy of the order determining the prior motion and written notice of its entry.

The determination of whether to grant leave to reargue lies within the sound discretion of the court. Ahmed v. Pannone, 116 AD3d 802 [2nd Dept. 2014].

Upon granting leave to reargue, Petitioner's request for reargument is denied. Petitioner's argument that the law became effective as to Real Property Action and Proceedings Law on August 18, 2024 is not correct. The effective date of August 18, 2024 goes to the notice provisions, that must be served with a predicate notice, a new lease or a lease renewal issued on or after August 18, 2024. See, 1719 Gates LLC v. Torres, 2024 NY Slip Op 24249 [Civ Ct, Queens Co., September 23, 2024] 1719 Gates LLC v. Torres, 2024 NY Slip Op 242282 [Civ Ct, Queens Co., November 6, 2024]; QN St. Albans Holdings LLC v. Sands, 2024 NY Slip Op 24252 [Civ Ct, Queens Co. 2024] ("While these notice requirements were not phased in until August 18, 2024, one hundred twenty days after the effective date of the statute (L 2024, ch 56, part HH, § 7(a)), the remaining portions of GCEL "take effect immediately and shall apply to actions and proceedings commenced on or after such effective date [April 20, 2024]").

The September 3, 2024 Decision/Order did not apply the Good Cause Eviction Law to the predicate notice. The argument regarding the predicate notice and the retroactive application of the Good Cause Eviction Law is not within the Decision/Order. The predicate notice was not the reason why dismissal of the petition was in order. The petition failed to comply with RPAPL Section 741, although an opportunity to amend the petition was not requested or sought.

The Good Cause Eviction Law (GCEL), Laws 2024, ch56, §7 (Part HH), became effective on April 20, 2024, and the notice provisions were phased in to take effect on August 18, 2024. The proceeding here was commenced upon service of the papers, since that is the point in time when the Respondent learns of the claim and would be required to respond or face a default and eviction. The appropriateness of commencement of a summary proceeding to be upon service was evident during the recent past when we experienced the COVID-19 pandemic, only after a court date was assigned and the papers served was the case commenced.

Commencement upon service was discussed in 92 Bergenbrooklyn, LLC v. Cisarano, 50 Misc 3d 21[App Term, 2d, 11th, and 13th Jud Dist 2015](" it is our view that the question of when a summary proceeding is "commenced" must now be answered differently, in this context and others, depending on the context in which the question arises" at 25) Here the proceeding involves a question of notice arising from the recently enacted the Good Cause Eviction Law and its mandate to take effect immediately. Consistent with the legislative mandate, the court must treat commencement of this proceeding upon service of the petition and notice of petition, and not upon filing. See, 64 Van St. LLC v. Cuevas, 2020 NYLJ LEXIS 705[Civ Ct, Queens Co. 2020].

The court did not overlook or misapprehend the careful analysis and guideline provided by the Appellate Term, Second Department in the seminal case 92 Bergenbrooklyn, LLC v. Cisarano, supra. Commencement here is interwoven with notice that raises potential defenses under the Good Cause Eviction Law, which was to take immediate effect. As such, commencement here was upon the service of the petition and notice of petition which was on May 7, 2024.

Petitioner's second request which is for leave to amend a dismissed petition is not within the scope of Rule 2221(d) as leave to plead does not concern a matter of fact or law that was overlooked or misapprehended by the court. The Court did not overlook or misapprehend the effective date of the Good Cause Eviction Law.

Pursuant to CPLR Rule 3025, leave to amend shall be freely given, however, once a matter has been dismissed, the request to reinstate the proceeding upon leave to amend is not available. The Petitioner may have to pursue other avenues, including a plenary action or commence a new summary proceeding.

Accordingly, it is hereby,

ORDERED, that Petitioner's motion for leave to reargue is granted, and upon reargument, the motion is denied. The Court adheres to the September 3, 2024 Decision/Order.

This Decision/Order will be filed to NYSCEF.

This constitutes the Decision/Order of the court.

Dated: November 25, 2024
Queens, New York
SO ORDERED,
ENEDINA PILAR SANCHEZ
J.H.C.