Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant law, defendant's motion which, inter alia, contests the validity of the People's certificate of compliance ("COC") filed on May 27, 2022 pursuant to CPL § 245.50 (4) due to the prosecution's failure to comply with its disclosure obligations under CPL § 245.20 and, seeks to dismiss the misdemeanor complaint for violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial under, inter alia, CPL §§ 30.30 (1)(b) and 30.20 and facial insufficiency is granted in part, and denied in part, as follows: the May 27, 2022 COC is deemed invalid; dismissal under CPL § 30.30 and for facial insufficiency is denied; and hearings are ordered as provided herein. The reasons for the court's decision are explained below.

On February 25, 2022, defendant Darnell Winston was arrested and charged with Penal Law ("PL") § 240.30 (1)(a) (aggravated harassment in the second degree), § 120.14 (1) (menacing in the second degree), § 265.01 (2) (criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree), and § 205.30 (resisting arrest).

On February 26, 2022, he was arraigned and released on his own recognizance. The matter was adjourned to March 10, 2022, for the People to file supporting depositions for the conversion of the complaint to an information, and a certificate of compliance (COC) with their discovery obligations.

At the March 10, 2022 court appearance, the defense requested a hearing pursuant to Matter of Crawford v Ally (197 AD3d 27 [1st Dept 2021]) ("Crawford hearing"), which was granted and scheduled for March 17, 2022.

At the March 17, 2022 court appearance, the assigned defense attorney was unable to be present and the Crawford hearing was adjourned to April 14, 2022.

At the April 14, 2022 court appearance, the defense attorney was again unable to be present and the matter was adjourned to May 3, 2022 for a Crawford hearing (see Memorandum [*2]of Law in Opposition, Exh. 5, at 4).

At the May 3, 2022 court appearance, the Crawford hearing was adjourned to May 5, 2022 because defendant had a pending matter in Family Court, being held at the same time.

At the May 5, 2022 court appearance, defendant's counsel was relieved and new counsel was assigned. The Crawford hearing was adjourned to May 6, 2022.

At the May 6, 2022 court appearance, the Crawford hearing was held after which this court ruled in favor of continuing the complaining witness V.G.'s full order of protection. The matter was adjourned to May 27, 2022 for the filing of a COC.

On May 27, 2022, the People served and filed a COC and statement of readiness. The court directed the parties to confer regarding any discovery disputes and put in writing any remaining discovery objections. The matter was adjourned to June 17, 2022 for a discovery conference.

At the June 17, 2022 court appearance, the defense objected to the discovery on the basis that much of the exchanged Giglio documents were redacted. A motion schedule was set, and the matter was adjourned for decision.^[FN1]

By notice of omnibus motion dated July 15, 2022, defendant sought an order: (1) dismissing the misdemeanor complaint pursuant to CPL § 170.35 (1) for facial insufficiency; (2) invalidating the COC under CPL § 245.50 (4) and directing full compliance under CPL § 245.20; (3) dismissing the complaint for the violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial under CPL §§ 30.30 (1)(b) and 30.20, the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and section 12 of the of the New York Civil Rights Law; (4) precluding all evidence not properly and timely noticed including statements and identification pursuant to CPL §710.30 and People v Boyer (6 NY3d 427 [2006]); (5) for protections under People v Sandoval (34 NY2d 371 [1974]); (6) for the suppression of evidence and noticed statement(s) pursuant to CPL §§ 710.20 (1) and 710.60, including hearings pursuant to People v Huntley (15 NY2d 72 [1965]), and Dunaway v State of New York (442 US 200 [1979]); (7) granting relief pursuant to People v Sanders (31 NY2d 463 [1973]), for at least a twenty (20) day interval from the time of the hearings in order to obtain hearing transcripts and prepare for their use at trial; (8) for discovery of pre-hearing and pre-trial materials pursuant to People v Rosario (9 NY2d 286 [1961]); (9) granting leave to submit memoranda of law; and (10) granting leave to submit subsequent motions.

By affirmation dated August 12, 2022, the People opposed the motion. Reply papers were served and filed by the defense on September 22, 2022.

Thereafter, the court directed that the People supply for in camera review, the disputed discovery (Giglio documents) that had been previously disclosed to the defense with redactions, together with a privilege log. The unredacted documents and log were supplied to the court on November 14, 2022. The Defense filed its objections to the People's redactions and log on December 7, 2022.

Discussion

Facial Sufficiency

The portion of defendant's motion which seeks to dismiss the misdemeanor complaint [*3]dated "April 29, 2021" (Affirmation in Support of Motion, ¶10), pursuant to CPL §§ 170.35 (1) and 100.40 (1) and (2), and supporting deposition, on the ground that they are facially insufficient to establish violations of the charges against defendant is denied. Significantly, the initial complaint filed in this matter is dated February 25, 2022 (not, April 29, 2021 as alleged), and in any event, was superseded by an information dated March 16, 2022, and supporting depositions of Detective Michael Prilook (dated March 16, 2022), V.G. (dated March 16, 2022) and T.B. (dated March 17, 2022). Defendant was arraigned on the information on April 24, 2022.

Under CPL § 100.50 (1), where, as here, a superseding information replaces an earlier information "charging the defendant with an offense charged in the first instrument, the first such instrument is, with respect to such offense, superseded by the second and, upon the defendant's arraignment of the latter, the count of the first instrument charging such offense must be dismissed." Thus, since the initial complaint was superseded and dismissed by the later instrument, the court finds the defense's facial sufficiency arguments as to the complaint to be moot.

To the extent that the defense argues in its reply that the superseding information has the same defects as the original complaint and is likewise facially insufficient, this court disagrees.

A court reviewing for facial insufficiency must assume that the factual allegations contained in the information are true and must consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the allegations in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 137 [1988]). "So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]). "[T]his prima facie case requirement for facial sufficiency of an information 'is not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial,' nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial" (People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 [2015] [citations omitted]).

Applying this standard here, the court finds that the superseding information sufficiently established the charged crimes of Penal Law § 240.30 (1)(a) (aggravated harassment in the second degree), § 120.14 (1) (menacing in the second degree), § 265.01 (2) (criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree), and § 205.30 (resisting arrest) and therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss on facial sufficiency grounds is denied.^[FN2]

Penal Law § 240.30—Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree

PL § 240.30 provides, in relevant part, that

a person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when: (1) [w]ith intent to harass another person, the actor either: (a) communicates, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, by computer or any other electronic means, or by mail, or by transmitting or delivering any other form of communication, a threat to cause physical harm to, or unlawful harm to the property of, such person, or a member of such person's same family or household and the actor knows or reasonably should know that such communication [*4]will cause such person to reasonably fear harm to such person's physical safety or property, or to the physical safety or property of a member of such person's same family household.

The accusatory instrument here includes the following relevant factual allegations:

Deponents is informed by [T.B.], that at the above time and place [on February 1, 2022], defendant stated to informant, via telephone, in sum and substance: OH YOU WANT TO PLAY WITH MY SHIT. I'LL BURN THE PLACE DOWN. FUCK YOU YOU'RE NOT GOING TO HAVE A PLACE TO LIVE OR WORK. WHO IS GOING TO PAY ME FOR MY PROPERTY. Deponent is further informed by informant that, informant recognized the voice on the phone to be that of defendant's because informant has spoken with defendant on prior occasions both in person and over the phone and recognizes defendant's voice.

Deponent is further informed by informant that, as a re[s]ult of defendant's conduct, informant experienced annoyance, alarm, and fear for her physical safety and the safety of her property.

Defendant argues that these allegations fail to include repetitive or persistent conduct over a period of time and therefore are insufficient. However, one telephone call—as alleged here—has been held to be enough to result in criminal liability for aggravated harassment in the second degree (see People v Shack, 86 NY2d 529, 541 [1995] [by its terms, statute defining aggravated harassment in the second degree imposes criminal liability for making a single telephone call]; People v Thomas, 58 AD3d 445, 445-46 [1st Dept 2009] [accusatory instrument was facially sufficient where allegations of a single telephone call to the victim containing a death threat that placed the victim in reasonable fear for her safety]).

Penal Law § 120.14 (1)—Menacing in the Second Degree

PL § 120.14 provides, in relevant part, that, "[a] person is guilty of menacing in the second degree when: (1) [h]e or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, [or] dangerous instrument..."

The accusatory instrument includes the following relevant factual allegations:

Deponent is informed by [V.G.], that at the above time and place [on September 17, 2021], defendant walked towards informant and stated in sum and substance: WHY ARE YOU SPREADING RUMORS ABOUT ME BEING A PEDOPHILE. Deponent is further informed by informant that, defendant then pulled a machete out of the dufflebag [sic] he was carrying, continued to walk towards informant, and stated in sum and substance BITCH I'M GOING TO CUT YOU.

Deponent is further informed by informant that, as a result of defendant's conduct, informant experienced annoyance, alarm and fear for her physical safety.

Defendant argues that the singular act against V.G. did not suffice as menacing under the statute because there was no repetitive conduct over a period of time alleged. However, unlike menacing in the second degree under subsection two (2)—which was not charged against defendant—menacing in the second degree under subsection one does not require a course of conduct, but rather a display of a deadly weapon dangerous instrument, as sufficiently alleged here (see People v Bartko, 96 NY2d 770 [2001] ["menacing [under PL § 120.14 (1)] simply requires an intent to place another person in 'reasonable fear of physical injury' by 'displaying' a weapon or dangerous instrument"]; [People v Britt, 62 Misc 3d 320, 323 [*5][Crim Ct, New York County 2018] [information facially sufficient as to PL § 120.14 (1) charge where allegations included that defendant displayed a dangerous instrument]).^[FN3]

Penal Law § 265.01 (2)—Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the fourth Degree

PL § 265.01 provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when: (2) [h]e or she possesses any dagger, dangerous knife, dirk, machete, razor, stiletto, imitation pistol, undetectable knife or any other danger or deadly instrument or weapon with intent to use the same unlawfully against another."

The accusatory instrument includes the following relevant factual allegations:

Deponent [Det. Brigette Medina] is informed by informant [V.G.] that defendant pulled a machete out of the dufflebag [sic] he was carrying, continued to walk towards informant, and stated in sum and substance, BITCH I'M GOING TO CUT YOU.

Defendant argues there is no is no description of the object that defendant was allegedly holding to classify it as a machete, nor is there an allegation that a machete was recovered by the Police, and a machete is not illegal per se. However, an allegation that defendant possessed one of the enumerated weapons - here a machete - is sufficient to state a charge of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (see People v Nwogu, 22 Misc 3d 201 [Crim Ct, Queens County 2008 2008]). Further, the factual allegation that defendant pulled the machete out of the duffle bag he was carrying and stated "bitch I'm going to cut you," while walking towards the informant, is sufficient to establish the intent element of the statute (see People v Laureno, 163 Misc 2d 873, 875 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1995]).

Penal Law § 205.30—Resisting Arrest

PL § 205.30 provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person is guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer or peace officer from effecting an authorized arrest of himself or another person."

The accusatory instrument includes the following factual allegations:

Deponent is informed by Det. Michael Prilook that at the above time and place, PO Prilook, while dressed in his official police uniform and performing his official police duties attempted to execute an arrest of defendant Deponent is further informed by PO Prilook that, defendant pulled his arms away from detective [P]rilook and shoved them under his body in an attempt to avoid being handcuffed.

Defendant argues that Detective Medina did not allege that Detective Prilook ever announced himself as a police officer or informed defendant of his authority as a police officer and the reason for any arrest of defendant in accordance with CPL § 140.15 (2), and therefore [*6]the allegations of resisting arrest charge were insufficient.^[FN4] "[T]o be facially sufficient . . . [however], an accusatory instrument charging resisting arrest must allege . . . that the arrest was authorized, by setting forth facts establishing that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed an offense in his presence" (People v Canjura, 46 Misc 3d 66 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Judicial Districts 2014]. Since the court found that the accusatory instrument was facially sufficient with respect to the other offenses charged, it follows that the allegations were sufficient to show defendant's arrest was authorized, a key element of the resisting arrest charge (see People v. Jensen, 86 NY2d 248, 253, [1995]). Any failure to comply with the CPL § 140.15 (2), referred to by the defense, does not render the resisting arrest charge facially insufficient as the requirements contained therein are not elements of the offense.

Defendant challenged the validity of the People's May 27, 2022 COC based upon redactions made to the exchanged disciplinary records of the police officers involved in defendant's arrest, that are expected to testify at defendant's trial.^[FN5]

Under the "initial discovery" provision of CPL § 245.20 (1), soon after the commencement of an action, "[t]he prosecution shall disclose to the defendant and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test, all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control, including but not limited to" a non-exhaustive list of materials. The prosecution is to make a diligent and good faith effort to ascertain the existence of the discovery materials and make them available to the defense, even if the information is not in the prosecution's physical possession, except for lost or destroyed material, and materials subject to a protective order (see CPL §§ 245.20 [2]; 245.70 [1]; 245.80 [1][b]). For CPL §245.20 (1) purposes, "all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed in the possession of the prosecution" (CPL § 245.20 [2]). "CPL 245.55 mandates a 'flow of information' between the prosecution and law enforcement 'sufficient to place within [the prosecution's] possession or control all material and information pertinent to the defendant and the offense or offenses charged '" (People v Audino, 75 Misc 3d 969, 975 (Crim Ct, New York County 2022).

Unless the court has made "an individualized finding of special circumstances . . . the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of section 30.30 until it has [fulfilled its discovery obligations under CPL §§ 245.20 (1) and] filed a proper certificate [of [*7]compliance]" (CPL § 245.50 [3]; see also People v Aquino, 72 Misc 3d 518, 520 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2021]). Further, under CPL § 245.20 (7), "[t]here shall be a presumption in favor of disclosure" and "openness" when interpreting the disclosure provisions (see also People v Randolph, 69 Misc 3d 770, 772 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2020]).

CPL § 245.50 (1) sets for the requirements for a COC as follows:

[t]he certificate of compliance shall state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery. It shall also identify the items provided (emphasis supplied).

The statute further states that where "additional discovery is subsequently provided prior to trial pursuant to section 245.60 [under the prosecution's continuing duty to disclose material discovered after the initial discovery has been exchanged and a COC filed], a supplemental certificate shall be served . . . identifying the additional material and information provided" (CPL § 245.50 [1]). The last sentence of CPL § 245.50 (1) states: "No adverse consequence to the prosecution or the prosecutor shall result from the filing of a certificate of compliance in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances; but the court may grant a remedy or sanction for a discovery violation as provided in section 245.80 of this article."

To interpret CPL §§ 245.50(1) and 30.30 together, in the context of a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the Court first examines the People's "actual readiness" (CPL § 30.30 [5]); that is, whether the prosecution has "done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried," including filing a valid COC (People v England, 84 NY2d at 4). In order to find the COC to be valid, the Court must be satisfied that it was filed in "good faith and reasonable under the circumstances" (CPL§ 245.50 [1]). If any known discoverable materials were not exchanged prior to the filing of the COC, the prosecution must demonstrate how due diligence was exercised with regard to those items not exchanged (see People v Pierna, 74 Misc 3d 1072, 1088 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2021]). They must detail the reasonable inquiries made to obtain these discoverable materials (see id.; CPL§ 245.50 [1]). If after review of the details provided by the prosecution, the court is satisfied that the COC was filed in good faith despite the discovery that was not exchanged, it may consider appropriate sanctions pursuant to CPL § 245.80, the severity of which may depend on the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the discovery that was not exchanged prior to the filing of the COC (see CPL § 245.50 [1]).

However, if the court finds that the COC was not filed in good faith or was not reasonable under the circumstances, the COC shall be deemed invalid and there is no need to consider the sanctions under CPL § 245.80, or to consider if the defendant was prejudiced (People v. Perez, 75 Misc 3d 1205 [A], *3 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]; see also People v Georgiopoulos, 71 Misc 3d 1215 [A], *3 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2021]; People v Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574).

Thus, "discovery compliance is a question of diligence and reasonableness given the particular facts of the case: neither a claim of good faith nor an absence of bad faith, standing alone, can exempt the People from these requirements" (People v Aquino, 72 Misc 3d at 5; People v Georgiopoulos, 71 Misc 3d 1215[A], *3 ["good faith and due diligence are the touchstones by which a certificate of compliance must be evaluated"]). Rather, "[w]hen the People submit documentation to the court certifying their compliance with their statutory obligation, they must do more than merely mouth the words" (People v Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at [*8]574-75).

Here the court finds that the People failed to meet their discovery obligations when the May 27, 2022 COC was filed and therefore, it is deemed invalid (see People v Rodriguez, — Misc 3d —, 2022 NY Slip Op 22393 [App Term 1st Dept, December 29, 2022] [COC invalid where people failed to provide discovery to the defense and did not establish they exercised due diligence]; People v. Perez, 75 Misc 3d at 1205 [A], *4 [COC invalidated where People failed to provide known discovery and no showing of diligence]; People v Aquino, 72 Misc 3d at 523-24 [same]; People v Georgiopoulos, 71 Misc 3d 1215[A], *6 [CPL § 245.50 [1] [given the deficiencies in both the COC and People's explanation, the court found no showing of due diligence and certificate deemed invalid]).^[FN6]

CPL § 245.20 (1)(k) requires that the People disclose, as relevant here, "[a]ll evidence and information, including that which is known to police or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to . . . (iv) impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness."

The People have a duty to disclose "whether or not such information is recorded in tangible form and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits this information" (CPL § 245.20 [1][k]; see also William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, CPL§ 245.10 [items enumerated in CPL § 245.20 (1)(k)(iv) must be disclosed regardless of whether they are considered "material" or "credible"]).

Moreover, "all evidence and information that tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness . . . whether or not in tangible form" includes allegations, as well as records and other underlying materials, as to complaints against police officers that have been determined by the IAB to be substantiated and/or unsubstantiated and are therefore required to be disclosed before a valid COC can be filed (see Matter of Jayson, 200 AD3d 447, [2d Dept 2021] [CPL § 245.10 (1)(k)(iv), broadly requires disclosure of all impeachment evidence and a mere summary of allegations is insufficient]; People v Randolph, 69 Misc 3d 770, 773 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2020][the People are required to disclose IAB records and materials of substantiated and unsubstantiated allegations for compliance with discovery obligations]; [People v Porter, 71 Misc 3d 187, 190 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2020] [disciplinary records of substantiated allegations must be disclosed]). In People v Rodriguez (— Misc 3d —, 2022 NY Slip Op 22393 [App Term, 1st Dept, December 29, 2022]), the Appellate Term, First Department specifically held that underlying impeachment materials are required to be disclosed pursuant to CPL § 245.10 (1)(k) and affirmed the invalidation of the People's COC for their failure to disclose those documents prior to filing of the COC.

Additionally, as of June 12, 2020, Civil Rights Law § 50-a (the law that shielded law enforcement from disclosing underlying disciplinary documents) was repealed, and the legislative intent was to make law enforcement disciplinary records available (see People v Randolph, 69 Misc 3d at 772; People v Porter, 71 Misc 3d at 190). "Permitting the prosecutor to be the arbiter of essential information is antithetical to that principle" (People v Barralaga, 73 Misc 3d 510, 519 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021] [quotations omitted]). "[I]t is not for the People to [*9]determine whether a particular item might be admissible or might serve as impeachment material" (People v Soto, 72 Misc 3d 1153, 1160 [Crim Ct, NY County 2021]).^[FN7]

Here, it is undisputed that prior to filing their COC, the People disclosed to the defense disciplinary records of the four (4) police officers involved in defendant's arrest and expected to testify at trial ( Detectives Medina, Trozzi, and Prilook and Police Officer Chin), which contained multiple redactions pertaining to, inter alia, the names of potential witnesses (both civilian and police) to the testifying police officers' alleged prior misconduct, as well as portions of allegations and other investigatory material.^[FN8]

After in camera review of the redacted documents, the court finds that the defense was entitled to much of the redacted information which the People failed to disclose. For example given that the charges against defendant include resisting arrest, the People should have disclosed allegations against Detective Trozzi as to his excessive force during prior arrests, including the names of eye witnesses and other police officers that may have observed Detective Trozzi's alleged conduct. Such information would tend to impeach the credibility of the testifying police witness and deprived the defense of potential trial witnesses who may have first-hand knowledge of the officers' alleged prior bad conduct.

The People's argument to support many of the redactions—that the redactions were made for, inter alia, "confidentiality and safety of witness(es), attorney and non-subject officer(s)" (People's Redaction Log)—is not supported by the law. Additionally, the People's redactions go beyond those under NY Public Officers Law § 89 2-b (requiring redactions to law enforcement disciplinary records prior to disclosure as to items involving the officer's medical history, home address, personal telephone and cell phone numbers, and personal email address) and section 2-c (permitting redactions to law enforcement disciplinary records for technical infractions).

Moreover, the People failed describe any diligent or good faith efforts to supply the documents in an unredacted form. Notably, as explained above, under CPL § 245.20 (7), there is a presumption in favor of disclosure and openness.

The People also did not request a protective order, additional time to comply with their discovery obligations upon a showing of good cause pursuant to CPL § 245.70 (1) and (2), nor seek "an individualized finding of special circumstances" from the court, as permitted by CPL § 245.50 [3]).

Further, the People's "obligation to provide discovery, and to certify compliance with that obligation, is not relieved by an absence of prejudice to the defendant" (People v Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d at 574; see also People v Diaz, 75 Misc 3d 314, 320 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022] [prejudice analysis not to be considered when assessing validity of a certificate of discovery compliance]).^[FN9]

As such, the court orders that, within 7 days of the date of this order, the People disclose to the defense the following previously supplied Giglio documents, unredacted except as to redactions permitted under CPL § 245.20 (6), NY Pub Off Law § 89 2-b and 2-c: (1) as to Detective Trozzi; (2) Detective Prilook; and (3) Police Officer Chin.^[FN10]

Since the COC has been deemed invalid, the People's statement of readiness filed on May 27, 2022 failed to stop the speedy trial clock under CPL § 30.30 (see CPL § 245.50 [3]; People v England, 84 NY2d at 4 ["A statement of readiness at a time when the People are not actually ready is illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock"]; People v Rodrgiuez, 2022 NY Slip Op 22393, *1 - 2 [the invalid COC did not stop the speedy trial clock]). The court finds a total of 40 days are chargeable to the prosecution for the time period from arraignment (February 26, 2022), through May 27, 2022 (the date the court directed the parties to confer about the discovery issues).^[FN11] Since the 90-day period for the prosecution to be [*10]ready for trial has not lapsed, dismissal based on CPL § 30.30 grounds is denied.

Defendant's request to determine the admissibility of his prior criminal history and bad acts (Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia) is referred to the trial court.

That portion of defendant's motion which seeks to preclude evidence not properly and timely noticed, including statements and identification pursuant to CPL § 710.30 is denied at this time. Determination to preclude any unnoticed CPL § 710.30 evidence is referred to the trial court.

To the extent that defendant seeks suppression of evidence and noticed statements or identifications, hearings are ordered to be conducted prior to trial in accordance with People v Huntley (15 NY2d 72 [1965]), People v Rodriguez, 79 NY2d 445 [1992]/US v Wade (388 US 218 [1967]), and Dunaway v State of New York (442 US 200 [1979]). The court notes that the People argued that the complainants may identify defendant during trial based on their knowledge of each other and notice would therefore not have been required (see People v Rodriguez, 79 NY2d 445, 450 [1992]).

Defendant's request pursuant to Sanders for at least a twenty (20) day interval from the time of hearings to obtain the hearing transcripts and prepare for their use at trial is hereby referred to the trial court.

The People are reminded to provide all Rosario, Brady, and/or Giglio materials.

Defendant's request to submit a memorandum of law is referred to the trial court with respect to any hearings and/or trial.

Defendant's application for leave to file additional motions is denied at this time, subject to rights under CPL §255.20(3), to move for further leave, upon good cause shown.

The defense's motion to deem the COC invalid is granted; dismissal on facial sufficiency and speedy trial grounds is denied; pre-trial hearings are ordered as follows: Huntley/Rodriguez/Wade/Dunaway; the portions of the motion seeking relief pursuant to Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia and to submit a memorandum of law are referred to the trial court; and, within 7 days of the date of this order, the People shall disclose to the defense the unredacted Giglio documents as to Detective Trozzi; (2) Detective Prilook; and (3) Police Officer Chin.